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Chapter One 
 Introduction 
 
1. Background to the study  
Ethnic heterogeneity rather than homogeneity characterise the populace of 
many countries around the world. More than 90% of the current 180 or so 
states in the world are ethnically plural in character; these states are home to 
almost 95% of the world’s population.1 The heterogeneity ranges from 
having just two different ethnic or linguistic groups to an accommodation of 
a sizable number of ethnic groups.  
 
The multi-ethnic character of states is attributable to many different factors. 
In the majority of cases, it has been the result of conquest and annexation. 
Different ethnic groups are involuntarily incorporated into a larger state. 
The case of Ethiopia illustrates this fact. As the discussion in chapter six 
indicates, the present day Ethiopia is mainly the result of Emperor 
Menelik’s expansion into the south and west and the forceful incorporation 
of these regions into the Ethiopian Empire. Colonialism has also brought the 
same effect. This is especially true in Africa where almost none of the 
existing states on the continent are the result of consensual state formation 
but a haphazard and arbitrary union of different cultural communities by the 
colonial masters. The colonial boundary that African states inherited and 
maintained (i.e. as the result of their compliance with the Organisation of 
African Unity’s (OAU) principle of upholding colonial borders) has resulted 
in multi-ethnic states.2  
 
                                                 
1  See Gurr 1993. 
2  OAU Document AHG/Res. 16 (I). 
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In few other instances, multi-ethnic states have been a result of agreements 
entered into freely in which case different cultural groups decide to live 
under the umbrella of a larger state. This could be attributed to reasons of   
economic and political expediency or to some other historical and political 
factors that contributed for the formation of a strong bond that was followed 
by a decision to live together. In the 19th century, for example, linguistic and 
religious groups joined voluntarily to form the Switzerland confederation.3 
 
More often than not, the constitutional approach and the political practice 
followed by most of these multi-ethnic states do not accommodate their 
ethnic diversity. The institutional principles of these states have ignored or 
suppressed the cultural differences which are the major aspects of their 
social realities. Many states have turned their back on the vast cultural 
diversity which characterizes many of their societies. At the forefront of the 
constitutional and political agenda of most of these countries has been the 
pursuit of political unity and territorial integrity. The overriding aim of 
these countries has been to create and maintain national unity often at the 
expense of ethnic diversity. The reassertion of ethnic identity and political 
rights along those lines has been considered an enterprise that compromises 
political unity and territorial integration. Such hegemonic states have paid 
dearly in a bloody civil war that took thousands of lives.  
 
The political conflicts that engulfed many countries around the world are 
often explained in terms of states’ failure to manage the increasing 
assertiveness of ethnic politics. The genocide perpetrated in Rwanda that 
claimed the lives of one million people and the civil war in south Sudan, 
which had been on going for over thirty years, are two stark examples of 
                                                 
3  Fleiner 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 3  
“identity–driven” conflicts in Africa.4 The ethnic conflicts in the Balkan5 
and Sri Lanka,6 in which many lives have been lost, are but few of the costs 
that states sustained as they pursue their practice of political unity and fail to 
adopt a truly inclusive constitutional approach that recognises ethnic 
plurality. 
 
There is, however, an emerging trend of accepting the principle that ethnic 
diversity of a society must be recognised and provided practical expression, 
typically through some form of institutional principles. In some cases, this 
shift towards the recognition of ethnic diversity and providing practical 
expression thereto has been achieved by adopting a federal system. In the 
African continent, Nigeria, a country of more than 250 ethnic groups, has, 
for example, adopted a federal form of government.7 In Asia, the relatively 
successful federal arrangement of the state of India is another notable 
response to the problem ethnic diversity poses in a country of “18 national 
languages and some 2, 000 dialects and a dozen ethnic communities and 
seven religious groups”.8 The Swiss federalism, which is referred by some 
as “a love of complexity”,9 also manifests that the country has opted to deal 
with its ethnic diversity through federal arrangements. 
 
2. Statement of problem 
The move towards the politics of accommodation begs the question of the 
relevance of institutional design in a multi-ethnic society where ethnic 
groups are geographically concentrated. This is the question that this study 
                                                 
4  Deng and Gifford 1995.  
5  Gurr 1993. 
6  Rajagopalan 2000: 205-208. 
7  Dent 1995. 
8  Majeed 2005: 181. 
9  As quoted in Schmitt 2005: 348. 
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seeks to address. It examines how a state can use its institutional designs to 
accommodate ethnic diversity without posing a threat to the political and 
territorial integrity of the state. In particular, it examines the relevance of 
the federal design to the political crisis and continuous tension that 
dominate multi-ethnic states around the world. It investigates whether 
adopting institutional principles in a federal form helps us to adequately 
respond to ethnic claims and build a state that belongs to all who live in it.  
 
With the view to achieve the above mentioned objective, the study seeks to 
answer the following questions: 
 
? Should a multi-ethnic state recognise its multi-ethnic character?  
? Is ethnic recognition categorical?  
? Can federalism serve as an effective instrument to accommodate 
ethnic claims while at the same time building national unity and 
maintaining political integration in a multi-ethnic society? 
? How should a multi-ethnic state design its institutions, within the 
context of federalism, to respond to the challenges of ethnic 
diversity?   
? Does federalism provide multi-ethnic states with institutional 
principles that are a panacea to the challenges of ethnic diversity? 
 
3. Scope of the study 
This study uses the federal experiences of two countries as case studies: 
Ethiopia and South Africa. Both multi-ethnic states have recently emerged 
from a history of ethnic and racial conflicts that have divided their 
respective societies for decades. In an attempt to move away from the past 
and build a state that belongs to all who live in it, the constitution makers of 
both countries opted to use federalism as a vehicle. Although both countries 
have adopted federalism, the model of federalism each adopted in a 
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response to the ethnic heterogeneity that prevails in each country and the 
challenges it entails are poles apart. This is also where the interest to use the 
two countries as case studies stems from. 
 
The major point of difference between the two systems lies in the 
significance they attach to ethnicity. In the case of Ethiopia, ethnicity 
constitutes one of the major features of the constitution. Nine regional self 
governments delimited, by and large, on the basis of ethnic identity make up 
the Ethiopian federation.10 All sovereignty, according to the Constitution, 
resides with these ethnic groups, which the Constitution refers to them as 
“Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”.11 That is why the 
Ethiopian federalism is often referred to as ethnic federalism. South Africa 
has, on the other hand, adopted, to say the least, an unassuming approach to 
the issue of ethnicity. The Constitution recognises, albeit implicitly, the 
political relevance of ethnic identities. Unlike the Ethiopian federal 
arrangement, however, the South African approach eschews the 
constitutional categorisation of ethnic identities. The two constitutions, thus, 
differ in the significance they attach to ethnicity as a basis for the 
organisation of their respective societies they seek to regulate. 
 
In the case of Ethiopia, the fact that the point of departure of the self-
government as expressed in the federal arrangement is not geography but 
ethnicity has given rise to controversies. The Ethiopian constitutional 
approach to claims of ethnic identity, it is argued, intensifies ethnic loyalty 
and hatred among ethnic groups rather than healing the wounds sustained as 
a result of historical injustices and fostering political unity. Some, as a 
                                                 
10  Article 47 the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  
(Ethiopian Constitution).  
11  Preamble Ethiopian Constitution. See also article 9 Ethiopian Constitution. 
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result, fear that the risk for political disintegration and violence is too great. 
The fear is intensified by the fact that the Constitution recognises the right 
to self-determination along with a clause of secession.12  Others refer to the 
recent Ethiopian political history and argue that any constitution that aims to 
learn and at the same time move away from the wrongs of the past, should 
not fail to provide recognition to ethnicity.  
 
The modest approach to ethnicity followed by South Africa has also 
similarly given rise to contrasting remarks. Critics have stated that the South 
African approach to ethnic heterogeneity represents the usual trend in 
Africa where there is no disposition to cultivate or even acknowledge 
diversity. Accordingly, it reinforces the common practice of African states 
where political unity is pursued at the expense of cultural plurality. For 
others, it represents “a modest but well considered approach to claims of 
ethnic identity”.13  
 
It is the contrast between the institutional principles that underlie the 
responses of the two countries to the challenges of ethnic diversity which 
makes them the best candidates for case studies.  Using the two case studies, 
the thesis seeks to respond to the research questions outlined above.  
 
4. Significance of the study 
This thesis focuses on federalism and ethnic diversity. Using two case 
studies, South Africa and Ethiopia, it sets to examine whether institutional 
designs in a form of federalism can serve as an effective instrument to 
respond to ethnic claims while at the same time maintaining national unity 
in the context of multi-ethnic societies. The issues this study investigates are 
                                                 
12  Article 39 Ethiopian Constitution. 
13  Alemante 2003: 54. 
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not only topical to multi-ethnic states around the world but constitute the 
core problems to which communities, ranging from the troubled Sudan to 
Nigeria and from the Western Sahara to the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), are struggling to find solutions. In this regard, the thesis may assist 
those multi-ethnic states that are struggling to find institutional solution to 
the ethnic conflicts that characterise their society.  
 
5. Methodology 
The research takes the form of a study of all relevant literature, including 
law journal articles, books, case law and other relevant materials. The 
Ethiopian system is examined by reviewing the Constitution, relevant 
legislation, literature, minutes of the Ethiopian Constitutional Assembly, 
government reports and other relevant documents. The South African 
experiment is examined by using similar sources of information as well as 
jurisprudence of the South African courts.  
 
6. Limitations of the study 
Few caveats are in order. First, as the title of this thesis suggests, the focus 
is on ethnic diversity. Other types of diversity are not discussed in this 
thesis. The methodological approach adopted by this thesis, which involves 
using two case studies to arrive at a certain conclusion, requires that we deal 
with the same subject matter. Thus, although race is an important part of 
identity politics in South Africa, this thesis has decided to focus on ethnicity 
making the selection of the two countries for case studies a plausible option. 
The thesis makes reference to other politically relevant cleavages, including 
race and regionalism, only when it is necessary to make a point to the main 
focus of this thesis. 
 
Second, the track record of federalism suggests that federalism, if it is to 
work best, needs to be complemented by certain other processes and 
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structures: the rule of law, democracy and the culture of human rights in 
particular. Unpacking these processes and structures is not the objective of 
this thesis. The focus is on how the institutional design of states can be used 
to regulate the challenges of ethnic diversity. In particular, it zooms in the 
institutional principles that federalism specifically makes available for the 
purpose of accommodating ethnic diversity.  
 
At this juncture, it is important to note that institution and institutional 
principles as understood in this thesis refers to established rules and 
practices that constitute a state’s response to the challenges of ethnic 
diversity. Primarily this includes the constitution, legislation and other 
established practices that regulate the management of ethnic diversity. 
 
Third, in so far as the processes and institutions that are discussed in this 
thesis are concerned, the aim is to examine how they can be used as a 
device to accommodate ethnic diversity. The point of reference to these 
institutions and arrangements is their role in the accommodation of ethnic 
diversity. Thus a discussion on educational curriculum, for example, would 
not delve into the details of education policy and examine the quality of the 
education policy. The concern is rather to examine how decisions on 
education curriculum can reflect on a state’s policy of accommodation.  One 
should thus not be wary of the ‘isolated approach’ that this thesis has 
adopted and the specific angle from which this thesis discusses matters like 
language policy, education and the like.  
 
7. Structure 
The argument and comparative review are presented as follows: Chapter 
Two discusses the challenges of multi-ethnic states. It commences the 
discussion by addressing terminological and conceptual problems around 
ethnic identity, ethnicity, nation and state. It then discusses the common 
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tendency to transform an ethnically diverse state into a nation-state. It 
shows that the legitimacy and political integrity of most of these multi-
ethnic states has been challenged by the rise of ethnic nationalism and the 
formation of ethnic-based political movements. It attributes this endemic 
problem to the organisation of the state in these societies and especially to 
the illusion of nation-state building in multi-ethnic societies. It then explores 
the politics of recognition which stresses the need to move towards the 
recognition of ethnic diversity. It explores the argument that says the state 
needs to move away from the nation-state paradigm towards the recognition 
of ethnic diversity.  
 
Chapter Three seeks to locate institutional principles that supplement the act 
of recognition. It does this within the context of a federal arrangement. In 
this regard, it first determines the meaning of federalism and federation. It 
then examines the capacity of federalism to provide practical expression to 
the act of recognition by accommodating ethnic diversity while at the same 
time maintaining national unity and political integrity. It examines whether 
the institutional principles that underlie federalism (i.e. self rule and shared 
rule) can go a long way towards accommodating the multi-ethnic character 
of a society. Furthermore, it seeks to identify the major issues that multi-
ethnic states have to deal with in their effort to translate the institutional 
principles of recognition, self rule and shared rule into institutional reality. 
It identifies key institutional issues against which the institutional response 
of both Ethiopia and South Africa can be examined. In general terms, it sets 
the template for analysing the cases of both South Africa and Ethiopia.  
 
Chapter Four and Five deal with the South African case study. Chapter Four 
discusses the political role of ethnicity in South Africa’s constitutional and 
political development. With the view to setting the background for a 
discussion of the institutional arrangement in South Africa, it traces the role 
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and place of ethnicity in South Africa’s constitutional and political 
discourse. This is followed by Chapter Five which focuses on the present 
institutional response of South Africa to the challenges of ethnic diversity. 
Using the template developed in Chapter Three, it evaluates the South 
African system with a view to determining whether it responds to the 
particular ethnic-diversity related exigencies of the society it seeks to 
regulate.  
 
Chapter Six and Seven follows a similar pattern with a reference to 
Ethiopia. Chapter Six examines the role and place of ethnicity in Ethiopia. 
By discussing the political history of Ethiopia, it determines the political 
relevance of ethnic identity. Using the template developed in Chapter Three 
and against the background portrayed in Chapter Six, Chapter Seven 
proceeds to examine how the institutional principles of recognition and 
federalism, as adopted in the Ethiopian context, has been able to 
accommodate ethnic diversity while at the same time maintaining national 
unity. 
  
Chapter Eight concludes the journey of this thesis by doing two major 
things. First, it summarises the major findings of this study. Second, it 
identifies key institutional lessons that may assist multi-ethnic states in 
recognising and providing practical expression to the ethnic plurality that 
characterises their society and build an all-inclusive state.   
 
8. Argument 
The argument that is put forward in this thesis is the following:  
 
8.1 Recognition as institutional principle  
The thesis contends that a multi-ethnic state must somehow recognise the 
ethnic plurality that characterises its society. It presents recognition of 
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ethnic diversity as an important institutional principle of a state that seeks to 
respond to the challenges of ethnic diversity. It advances this argument 
based on two points. First, an empirical examination of the experiences of 
multi-ethnic states suggest that states that are predicated on suppressing 
ethnic diversity has not succeeded in achieving their goal of creating a 
common national identity. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that most 
of these countries are plagued by ethnic-based conflicts. Second, a state 
cannot remain neutral in so far as ethnic relationships are concerned, 
although this, admittedly, is the best strategy to build a state that does not 
create a hierarchical relationship among the different ethnic groups. The 
upshot of this argument is that the state has no choice but to recognise its 
multi-ethnic character. 
 
Recognising ethnic diversity is not, however, categorical. The extent to 
which a state should recognise ethnic diversity is contingent on the political 
relevance of ethnicity in the state under consideration. At the centre of this 
argument is the position that views politicised ethnicity as a contingent 
process. The likelihood of ethnic differences to translate into political divide 
that warrant recognition in the public sphere is dependent on historical and 
political circumstances that attend the state formation process or the so-
called “nation-state building” project.  
 
Yet care must be made not to confuse the ‘non-categorical’ view of 
ethnicity with the ‘categorical-denial’ of ethnicity which suggests that a 
state should turn a blind eye to ethnic diversity or, in the extreme case, 
suppress ethnic diversity. The non-categorical view of ethnicity does not 
detract from the position that recognition of ethnic diversity is an imperative 
institutional principle of a multi-ethnic state that seeks to build a state that 
belongs to all who live in it. The implication is rather that the political 
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relevance of ethnic identity should come into the equation when the state 
determines the extent to which it should provide recognition to ethnicity. 
 
The institutional principle of recognition can be given practical effect 
through the constitution, other important documents and state symbols. 
  
8.2 The institutional principles of self rule and shared rule 
The thesis further argues that recognising ethnic diversity does not suffice. 
The state’s decision to recognise ethnic diversity must be supplemented by 
institutional principles that go beyond symbolic concessions, which the 
institutional principle of recognition seems to largely represent. Although 
the thesis does not reject the relevance of universal individual rights in a 
multi-ethnic society, it cast doubt on the capacity of the individualistic 
approach to effectively respond to the challenges of ethnic diversity. It 
contends that universal individual rights must be supplemented by 
institutional principles that give practical effect to the act of recognition.  
 
The thesis locates these institutional principles within the federal design. In 
multi-ethnic states where the different ethnic groups are generally 
territorially concentrated, federalism, it is submitted, has the capacity to 
accommodate ethnic diversity while at the same time maintaining national 
unity. It argues that the institutional principles of federalism can be used as 
a device to supplement the act of recognising ethnic diversity with practical 
institutional arrangements.   The institutional principles are embodied in the 
self rule and shared rule component of the federal arrangement.   
 
8.2.1 Self rule 
The institutional principle of self rule is derived from the basic feature of 
the federal idea that there is a constitutionally guaranteed division of 
political power between the federal and state governments. In a federal 
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arrangement, the federal units are autonomous in respect of powers vested 
in them. Federalism can be said to have truly recognised ethnic diversity 
only when it provides real and sufficient autonomy to the federated entities. 
The institutional principle of self rule can be provided practical effect 
through territorial autonomy, legislative autonomy and financial autonomy. 
 
8.2.2 Shared rule 
The institutional principle of shared rule is derived, on the other hand, from 
the fact that federalism promotes joint rule for some purposes. If the 
territorial force that pulls toward national unity and the other towards 
diversity are to be contained within their legitimate limits and thus ensure 
the maintenance of the federation, the system must be accompanied by the 
institutional encouragement of common institutions that provide the bond to 
hold the federation together. It is for this reason that growing attention is 
being paid to appendage the notion of federalism as “autonomy” with the 
notion of federalism as the co-management of society at large. This 
institutional principle finds practical expression through the legislative 
bodies of the federation, the executive and other important national 
decision-making bodies. 
 
8.3. The federal response in a form of a ‘purpose continuum’ 
Even if one agrees that the federal design is quite relevant in building an all 
inclusive state in multi-ethnic societies, it is the particular nature of the 
federal design that ultimately determines the extent to which it can 
successfully build a multi-ethnic state that successfully embraces unity and 
diversity. Consistent with the view that denies a singularity position to 
ethnicity, the thesis argues that a federation that is designed to 
accommodate ethnic diversity must be underlined by a greater degree of 
plasticity in its recognition of ethnic diversity and must, to the extent 
possible, mirror the political saliency of ethnicity in the state under 
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consideration. In other words, there is no singular model that can be 
prescribed to multi-ethnic states that are dealing with the challenges of 
ethnic diversity. The institutional design of a federal state must vary 
depending on the nature of ethnic relationships that is prevalent in the 
country. 
 
With this view in mind, the thesis introduces what it calls the ‘purpose 
continuum’. On this purpose continuum are located institutional designs 
whose purpose ranges from prevention to remediation. At the prevention 
end of the continuum are institutional arrangements that are designed to 
prevent the elevation of ethnic identities to political identities. The 
quintessence of a preventive institutional design is that it responds to ethnic 
concerns without precipitating conditions in which ethnicity becomes a 
single rallying point of political mobilisation. This form of institutional 
response is appropriate in contexts where the political mobilisation of 
ethnicity is not significant and inter-ethnic solidarity is not at stake.  
 
At the other end of the continuum are federal designs that are remedial in 
nature and whose purpose is to serve as a corrective measure to the already 
heavily deteriorating ethnic relationships. These federal designs are marked 
by their rigorous use of ethnicity as a basis to organise their state and 
society. This particular type of institutional response is sensible in a multi-
ethnic society that is heavily characterised by inter-ethnic rivalry and a 
political space that is dominated by the political mobilisation of ethnicity. 
The precise position of a state’s institutional response on the purpose 
continuum should thus be based on a correct analysis of the political 
saliency of ethnicity in that country.  
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8.4. The limits of federalism 
Federalism is not a panacea for all challenges of ethnic diversity. It is 
submitted that federalism, as institutional device, is not enough to respond 
to the challenges of ethnic diversity. A federal design that is constructed to 
accommodate ethnic diversity must go beyond the traditional institutional 
features of a federation. It must include non-traditional institutional features 
of a federation and other non-federal features in order to give full effect to 
the institutional principles that respond to the challenges of ethnic plurality. 
This includes, first, institutional features that reflect the multi-ethnic 
character of the state and thus give practical effect to the institutional 
principle of recognition. Second, it must incorporate institutional designs 
that promote the institutional principle of shared rule in the most contested 
political space of the executive and the lower house of the national 
parliament. Third, it must include, in addition to judicially enforceable bill 
of right,  institutional features that extend the institutional principles of self 
rule and shared rule to respond to the concerns of intra-substate minorities.
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Chapter Two 
Towards the recognition of ethnic diversity 
 
1. Introduction 
As it is indicated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, ethnic plurality is 
the defining feature of almost all countries in the world. Ethnically plural 
states constitute the overwhelming majority of states recognised by the 
United Nations. The boundaries of most modern states do not coincide with 
ethnic divisions. What is also common is that most of these ethnically 
diverse states are seldom free of ethnic tensions. This chapter focuses on the 
challenges of multi-ethnic states and examines whether the design and 
orientation of the state towards ethnic diversity contributes to the ethnic 
turmoil that exists in many of these ethnically plural states.  
 
Two main arguments are put forward in this chapter. First, it is argued that 
the rise of ethnic nationalism and the formation of ethno-nationalist 
movements in many parts of the globe are often attributed to the 
organisation of the state which often reflects the tendency to transform an 
ethnically plural state into a nation- state. This refers to a process in which 
states engage in the construction of a state that is characterised by cultural 
and social homogeneity. Some attempted to do this by fostering overarching 
identities in order to surpass internal differences over national identity. 
Others focused on creating national identity by diffusing the language and 
culture of the dominant group throughout the country. States generally 
focused exclusively on the maintenance of national unity and political 
integration. This provoked a forceful nationalist response from marginalised 
ethnic groups much less to blend different communities into a nation-state. 
Second, a multi-ethnic state that claims a policy of neutrality when it comes 
to ethnic relationships cannot avoid identifying itself with a particular ethnic 
group. State neutrality on ethnic relationship mostly turns out to be a myth. 
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Based on these and other considerations, including the limitations of 
universal individual right to respond to the demands that ethnic diversity 
poses to ethnically plural states, the chapter contends that institutional 
recognition of ethnic diversity is often the only way forward. As an 
alternative that provides a system through which a state can acknowledge its 
ethnic diversity and maintain national unity without the need to transform 
itself into a nation–state, institutional recognition of ethnic diversity is the 
healthier response to the exigencies of ethnic diversity.  
 
 Before we discuss the common tendency to transform an ethnically plural 
state into a nation–state and the ethnic strife that it caused, it is useful to 
address the terminological problems. The chapter, therefore, commences by 
exploring the terms ethnic group, ethnicity, nation, nation-state and the like. 
It then proceeds to discuss the so-called nation–state building process that 
preoccupied many ethnically diverse states and shows how it mostly gave 
rise to conflict-ridden societies. This is followed by sections that 
consecutively examine the relevance of universal individual rights and the 
option of political divorce to the multi-ethnic challenge. Finally, the chapter 
introduces the principle of recognition and examines how a state that 
organises its society based on the principle of recognition can accommodate 
ethnic diversity and ensure national unity. 
 
2. Ethnic group and ethnicity 
As indicated earlier, many multi-ethnic states are characterised by political 
disputes that are often ethnic in origin. Ethnic identity has become a 
common mobilising force so much so that “ethno-nationalism” has become 
a standard vocabulary in the discourse of nation and nationalism. It is this 
cultural marker that nationalists have often used to mobilise groups or more 
specifically subordinate minorities in order to become politically assertive. 
In fact, ethnic movements have often posed a serious threat to the territorial 
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integrity and legitimacy of the state. One cannot help but wonder what 
accounts for the intensity and scope of these ethnically motivated 
movements that pose an endemic challenge to many ethnically plural states. 
The reason might become clear as we proceed with our discussion but first 
comes the need to clear the confusion on what constitutes an ethnic group. 
 
2.1 Ethnic group defined 
The word ‘ethnic’ originated from the ancient Greek word ethnos, meaning 
a nation in the latter’s immaculate sense of a group characterised by a 
common descent.1  Academics, however, considerably vary in their opinion 
regarding the modern usage of the terms ethnic group and ethnicity. In fact, 
the term ethnicity made it into the social sciences only very recently. It 
appeared as a social scientific concept in the mid-twentieth century while it 
made it into the Oxford English Dictionary for the first time only in 1970s.2  
 
The American literature on the subject of ethnic groups indicates that 
American sociologists used the term ethnic group to refer to “a group with a 
common cultural tradition and a sense of identity which exists as a subgroup 
of a larger society”.3 The term has been applied to refer to any discernible 
minority, be it religious, linguistic, or otherwise.4 For American 
sociologists, the term ethnic group and minority group are thus 
synonymous. As observed by many, this American conception of ethnic 
group has a racist tone.5 It has its roots in the way the White Anglo–Saxon 
Protestants (WASPs) perceive themselves. WASPs do not perceive 
themselves as ethnic group. They consider themselves as those that set the 
                                                 
1  Connor 1994: 43. 
2  McCrone 1998: 24. 
3            Connor 1994:43. 
4   Connor 1994: 43. 
5  McCrone 1998: 24. 
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standard by which others are to be judged. It is the ‘others’ that are defined 
as ethnic. This includes Blacks, Hispanics, Jewish, Polish, Irish and so on.  
 
The American understanding of ethnic group is problematic for at least two 
important reasons. First, there is nothing in the original understanding of the 
term which suggests that an ethnic group should be a minority. An ethnic 
group, in its original meaning, refers to a basic human category. The term 
applies both to the dominant group and to those that are usually referred as 
minority groups. Yoruba of Nigeria, Hutu of Rwanda, Baganda of Uganda, 
though numerically dominant, are still referred as an ethnic group as are the 
other numerically small cultural groups. An ethnic group need not be a 
subordinate part within a state. In fact, ethnic groups do not necessarily 
confine within a state. They may extend across several states, as do the 
Arabs. Secondly, the utilisation of the term ethnic group to any ‘discernible 
minority’ makes the distinction between various forms of identity at best 
ambiguous.6 This, however, does not mean that the term ethnic group has 
been given a precise definition. 
 
A look at few definitions would reveal that the term ethnic group is 
definitionally chameleonic. In some cases, the term is used to refer to a 
small community with archaic characteristics. For others, myths of common 
ancestry are the defining feature of an ethnic group. Collectivities that share 
a myth of origin are also commonly referred as ethnic groups. The sharing 
of culture, and especially language, is also common to many definitions. 
Others emphasise the importance of historical memories. 
 
Phandis and Ganquly, in their book, Ethnicity and Nation building in South 
East Asia, define an ethnic group as 
                                                 
6  Connor 1994: 43. 
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either a large or small group of people, in either backward or 
advanced societies, who are united by a common inherited 
culture (including language, music, food, dress, and customs 
and practices), racial similarity, common religion, and belief in 
common history and ancestry who exhibit a strong 
psychological sentiment of belonging to the group.7 
 
By explicitly stating that the term ethnic group includes both small and 
large group of people, the authors are rejecting the American conception of 
ethnic group. They reject the view that the term ethnic group can be used to 
refer to minority groups only and not to the group that is dominant within 
the larger state.  They have as well declined to accept the usual tendency of 
associating ethnic groups with backward societies. Ethnic group accordingly 
is not a phenomenon of backward societies but also industrialised societies. 
Difficult to accept is the fact that their definition suggests common religion 
as one of the defining features of an ethnic group. It is not clear if religion is 
essentially ethnic. It is submitted that with the advent of universalist world 
religions (i.e. Christianity and Islam) the latter has ceased to be ethnic 
specific. This has, for example, been the case in Africa. Once Africa has 
become home for diverse religions, many members of an ethnic group have 
abandoned their traditional beliefs and adopted either of these universalist 
world religions. There as a result developed in modern Africa a diversity of 
religion adherence with individuals, who otherwise belong to the same 
ethnic group, following different religions. This has taken away religion 
from the area of ethnic specificity. As Hasting notes, “Baganda Catholics 
might struggle bitterly with Baganda Protestants, but both were Baganda; 
even Baganda Muslims were Baganda”.8  
                                                 
7  Phandis and Ganquly 2001: 19. 
8  Hasting 1997: 176. 
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Adrian Hasting provides a very detailed and descriptive definition of an 
ethnic group. For him, an ethnic group is defined by 
 
…the common culture whereby a group of people share the 
basics of life – their cloth and clothes, the style of houses, the 
way they relate to domestic animals and to agricultural land, 
the essential work which shapes the functioning of a society 
and how roles are divided between men and women, the way 
hunting is organized, how murder and robbery are handled, the 
way defence is organised against threatening intruders, the way 
property and authority are handed on, the rituals of birth, 
marriage and death, the customs of courtship, the proverbs, 
songs, lullabies, shared history and myths, the belief in what 
follows death and in God, gods or other sprits. All of this as 
shared through a spoken language. 9  
 
For Hasting, it seems, common culture, shared history and myth and 
common language are the core features of an ethnic group. He later adds 
genetic unity as one of the essential elements of an ethnic group. The 
genetic unity, according to him, could be partly real, partly mythical. He 
attributes the survival of an ethnic group without territorial base, which is 
the case with the Jews and the Gypsies, to their “closest adherence to an 
original charter providing a distinct genetic unity”.10 This suggests that 
association with a specific territory is not, according to Hasting, one of 
ethnic attributes.  
 
Smith, in his book, National Identity, defines an ethnic group as “named 
human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, 
                                                 
9  Hasting 1997: 167. 
10  Hasting 1997: 169. 
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having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity”.11 
Smith, unlike Hasting, obviously makes reference to ‘an association with a 
specific territory’. As he makes it clear later when he discusses each 
attribute of an ethnic group, his reference to a specific homeland should not, 
however, be taken to mean that a community should actually reside in or be 
in possession of a certain territory to be regarded as an ethnic group. What 
matters for ethnic identification is not the actual possession but the 
attachment. Association to a certain land has thus a ‘mythical and subjective 
quality’. Smith makes mention of a collective proper name as one of ethnic 
attributes. 
  
 As the foregoing discussion on the definition of an ethnic group suggests, 
there is a wide divergence among academics regarding the precise definition 
of the term. Yet, one can also identify elements that are common to many 
definitions of an ethnic group. Among these are: culture shared by members 
of an ethnic group, common ancestry, common language, shared historical 
memories and association with a specific territory. Based on this, this thesis 
adopts a working definition which regards an ethnic group as a group of 
people who adhere to common origin, which may be real or myth, share one 
or more culture including language, belief in common history and consider 
a specific territory as their own  homeland.  
 
2.2 The nature of ethnicity 
There is a general disagreement regarding the formation of ethnic identity 
and why it persists. Much ink is wasted by scholars trying to explain the 
phenomenon of ethnicity, the sense of belonging to an ethnic group. There 
are, generally speaking, two schools of thought on this subject: the 
primordialist school and the instrumentalist school.  
                                                 
11  Smith 1991: 21.  
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2.2.1. The primordialist school 
For a primordialist, ethnic identity is a biologically ‘given’ or ‘natural 
phenomenon’.12 It is natural in a sense that it is “derived from a cultural 
interpretation of genealogical and non–genealogical descent among a 
certain group of people”.13 It is treated as given in human relations.14 It 
constitutes the relationship network which human individuals become a 
member by birth and thus through time acquire objective cultural attributes 
of the group, which often includes language, religion, customs and tradition, 
food, dress and music.15 Accordingly, the shared mutable and immutable 
qualities given at birth such as national origin, ancestry, mother language, 
shared history, traditions, values and symbols determine the sense of 
distinctiveness both for members of the group and for outsiders.16  
 
According to the primordialist view of ethnicity, the emotive power of 
ethnic distinctions inevitably leads to political demand and conflicts.17 This 
view attributes conflicts to primordial ethnic passions. For a primordialist, 
“[p]eople are naturally emotionally attached to the ethnic group to which 
they belong and…this attachment necessarily implies feeling of antagonism 
towards other groups that sooner or later express themselves through 
violence and/or, in [multi-ethnic states], in movement towards 
                                                 
12  Phandis and Garguly 2001: 23. 
13  Cruz 1998: 168. 
14  Esman 1994:10   
15  Phandis and Garguly 2001: 23. The position that ethnicity is one of the ‘givens’  
of human existence has received a new impetus from socio-biology which regards 
ethnicity as an extension of processes of genetic selection and inclusive fitness. 
See Smith 1991: 20. 
16          Cruz 1998: 3.  
17          Ghai 2001: 5.   
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independence”.18 Irrespective of state policy, this school argues, there is 
innate propensity among different ethnic groups to engage in conflicts. 
Human nature is thus behind the formation of ethnic identity. The 
inescapable conclusion is that conflicts are unavoidable in multi-ethnic 
states. 
 
2.2.2. The instrumentalist school 
The instrumentalist school of thought provides quite a different view of 
ethnicity. For this school of thought, ethnicity is far from being a natural 
phenomenon. It does not denote a fixed unchangeable characteristic. It is 
not a historical given at all. For proponents of this school, a human hand is 
behind the formation and maintenance of an ethnic identity. “[Ethnicity is] 
the product of processes which are embedded in human actions and 
choices…rather than biologically given ideas whose meaning is dictated by 
nature”.19 It especially emphasises the role of elites in the formation of 
ethnic identity. It, in fact, views ethnicity as the social and political creation 
of elites. With the primary objective of protecting and promoting political 
and economic advantage for their groups as well as themselves, elites, 
according to this view, select, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials 
from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent.20  
                                                 
18  Diez-Medrando 2007: 22. 
19  Phandis and Ganquly 201: 24. Some anthropologists go to the extent of   
suggesting that ethnicity can even be created and recreated at will. Some even 
attribute the creation of ethnicity to the work of anthropologists. “[E]thnicity is 
created by the analyst when he or she goes out into the world and poses questions 
about ethnicity” Eriksen 1993: 17.  See also Banks 1997: 21.  
20   Phandis and Ganguly 2001: 26. History provides us with numerous cases  
where elites manipulate ethnicity to promote open and hidden political, economic 
and ideological interests. Fascinating accounts of manipulation by intellectuals 
and grammarians who invoke distorted versions of history or phonetics to advance 
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The malleability of ethnic identity constitutes the main argument of this 
position. It stresses that belonging to an ethnic group is not a natural 
phenomena but a matter of attitudes, perceptions and sentiments that are 
necessarily ephemeral and variable, changing with the particular situation of 
the subject.21  Ethnic boundaries shift over time. This is mainly attributed to 
the fact that ethnicity is considered as the function of actions and choices 
initiated or stimulated by external pressures.22 Roosens remarks that 
 
[e]thnic self–affirmation or the ignoring or minimization of 
ethnic identity is always related in one way or another way to 
the defence of social or economic interests. Many people 
change their ethnic identity only if they can profit by doing 
so.23  
 
2.2.3. The synthesis 
As it is clear from the foregoing discussion, the primordialist versus 
instrumentalist debate represents two extreme approaches to ethnicity. A 
primordialist considers ethnicity as an inborn feature of human identity.  An 
instrumentalist, on the other hand, regards ethnicity as the work of 
individuals or groups who desire to achieve a certain goal and want to 
mobilise a group for that particular purpose. Both views of ethnicity are not 
without problems.  
 
Let us start with the primordial concept of ethnicity. Being a view that 
considers ethnicity as combination of objective traits, a primordialist view 
of ethnicity would have to show that all members of a group share a 
                                                                                                                            
the political and economic interest of themselves or that of the group they claim to 
represent are plenteous.  
21   Smith 1991: 20. 
22   Roosens 1989: 13. 
23  Roosens 1989: 13.  
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distinctive trait. That is not, however, always possible. It is not uncommon 
to find out that there is no distinctive trait common to all the group 
members. Euskara is, for instance, considered as the language of the 
Basques. But not all Basques of Spain and France really speak Euskara; nor 
do all Catholics of Northern Ireland believe in Transubstantiation, the 
Assumption, and the infallibility of the Pope.24 Of course, anthropologists 
would get around such difficulties by indicating that inter–ethnic marriages 
and other external influences result in individual members losing ‘their 
genuine identity’. By doing so, they would, however, only be describing the 
“presumed characteristics of the unadulterated [ethnic] type” 25 rather than 
the actual characteristics of all group members.  
 
There is, on the other hand, considerable truth to the view that ethnic 
identity is malleable. Ethnic identity is not a fixed unchangeable 
characteristic. This has mainly to do with the fact that those elements that 
define an ethnic group have strong subjective components thus making it 
possible to change the contents of one’s ethnic identity. One such important 
attribute of an ethnic group, as indicated earlier, is common origin. This 
particular attribute renders an ethnic group more like one titanic family tied 
by a common ancestry. However, as it is always quickly pointed out, it is 
not always clear if there is really a common ancestor from which all 
members of the ethnic group descend to. More often than not this claim for 
a common ancestry turns out to be a myth rather than any fact of ancestry. 
Fictive descent and putative ancestry give most ethnic groups the impetus to 
continue living together as one huge family.26 Identity is thus often 
                                                 
24  Lagerspetz 2004: 1311. 
25   Lagerspetz 2004: 1311.  
 26  This is not, however, a problem. It is myths of common ancestry, not any fact of  
ancestry (which is usually difficult to ascertain) that matters for the sense of ethnic 
identification. Fictive descent and putative ancestry have proven to be crucial.  
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presumed than objectively established. Hence, the strong subjective nature 
of this specific attribute of ethnicity. A subjective component is also very 
much alive in the ethnic attribute that associates members of an ethnic 
group with a specific stretches of territory. As it is the case with common 
ancestry, an attachment to a specific homeland could have a mythical and 
subjective component.27 As indicated earlier, it is also agreed by many that 
it is this attachment and associations rather than residence in or possession 
of the land that matters for ethnic identification.28 This, as indicated earlier, 
is especially true for ethnic diaspora communities29 like the Jews and 
Armenians.  
 
Subjective view or attitude, due to its very nature, is liable to change. The 
fact that subjectivity characterises most attributes of ethnicity suggests “the 
                                                 
27  Smith 1991: 23. 
28  Smith 1991: 23. 
29   Ethnic groups can be of two distinct types: homelands societies and diaspora  
communities. Those ethnic groups that are the long-time occupants of a particular 
territory and thereby claim an exclusive as well as a moral right to rule it are 
considered as homeland societies. On the other hand, those ethnic communities, 
who as a result of population migration caused mainly by oppression in their home 
state and/or by the attraction of better economic prospects and opportunities, are 
found in foreign countries, are considered as ethnic diaspora communities. The 
political objective of these two groups is also very different. While ethnic 
homeland societies can claim territorial autonomy, ethnic diaspora communities 
cannot claim territorial control in foreign state. Rather they can only normally 
demand “non-discriminatory participation as individuals in public affairs, voting, 
office holding, access to justice –plus non-discriminatory access to education, 
employment, housing, business opportunities and public services; and official 
recognition of their right to maintain institutions that perpetuate elements of their 
inherited culture” (Phandis and Ganquly 2001: 5). In this study, unless otherwise 
explicitly stated, the usage of the term ethnic group is restricted to homeland 
societies.  
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shifting nature of ethnic boundaries and the malleability, within certain 
limits, of their members’ cultural identity”.30 The holder of a subjective 
view may either change the hierarchy it gives to the different cultural 
markers or may choose to pick and assert as identity distinction a certain 
identity in a situation where multiple identities co-exist adjacently. Take, for 
example, the case of Bangladesh. The majority of the populations in the 
former East Pakistan were Muslims as well as Bengalis. When British India 
was partitioned in 1947, the people of the present day Bangladesh opted to 
join Pakistan thus asserting their Muslim identity over their Bengali 
identity. However, as their discontent within Pakistan grew and led to the 
formation of a liberation movement, they stressed their Bengali identity to 
justify their political secession from the rest of Pakistan.31  What this says is 
that the significance that members of an ethnic group attach to each attribute 
changes from time to time for various reasons. To the extent that this 
happens, one will also be able to witness a change in the cohesion and self 
awareness of the community as well as the content of an ethnic group. In 
exceptional cases this may even entail a shift in the boundary of an ethnic 
group. Smith has the following to say in this regard: 
 
As the subjective significance of each of these attributes waxes 
and wanes for the members of a community, so does the 
cohesion and self-awareness of that community’s membership. 
As these several attributes come together and become more 
intense and salient, so does the sense of ethnic identity and, 
with it, of ethnic community. Conversely each of these 
attributes is attenuated and declines, so does the overall sense 
of ethnicity, and hence the ethnie itself would dissolve or be 
absorbed. 32 
                                                 
30   Smith 1991: 24. 
31   Phandis and Ganquly 2001: 26. 
32  Smith 1991: 23. 
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One should, however, be cautious of overstating the changeability of ethnic 
boundaries or the fluidity of their cultural contents. There are limits to the 
process of constructing ethnic identities. As Norval notes, identities are not 
fungible in the sense that they can be “picked and chosen as if from a 
supermarket shelf”.33 It must also be noted that ethnicity does not come out 
of thin air just to assert or protect political or economic interest. More often 
than not there is some pre-existing form of cultural identity upon which 
ethnicity is built and, when the conditions are ripe, it is based on this pre-
existing form of cultural identity that it establishes itself. It is only when we 
understand ethnicity as such that we can account for the continued existence 
of ethnic bonds in particular instances. Overstating the instrumentality of 
ethnicity also renders it difficult to account for the original crystallisation of 
ethnic identity.34  
 
The view that is adopted here thus lies somewhere between these two 
extreme theories of ethnicity. It is submitted that bonds derived from myths 
of descent provide the bedrock for the initial formation of ethnic identity. 
This, however, does not mean that the contents of ethnic identity cannot be 
changed or modified.35 As anthropologist Hull observes:  
 
Cultural identities come from somewhere, have stories. But 
like everything, which is historical, they undergo constant 
transformation. Far from being externally fixed in some 
essentialised past they are subject to continuous play of 
history, culture and power. Far from being grounded in a 
sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we 
                                                 
33  Norval 1999: 81–100. 
34  Banks 1997: 34. See also Smith 1991: 23 – 25. 
35  Cruz 1998: 169 – 170.  
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give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position 
ourselves within, the narratives of the past.36 
 
The view that is adopted here, therefore, rejects a simplistic 
instrumentalism. It refuses to accept that elites and political agents can 
simply manipulate identities in any way it pleases them. It, however, 
concedes that ethnic identities can be shaped by social, economic and 
political processes. That especially happens in the context of state policies 
and state action, inter-group rivalry and state resource competition. Studies 
in Africa and South East Asia have often demonstrated that ethnic 
consciousness is a frequent result of oppression by the state or the majority 
community. The contingencies of historical, social and political processes 
through which the images for identification are sustained, contested and 
negotiated need therefore be emphasised. 
 
Ethnic identity is mobilised by political agents to demand greater 
concessions and share in power and authority. This is often manifested in 
the form of ethnic movements. The focus and aspiration of such movements 
may include a basic demand for the recognition of the identity of the group 
they claim to represent or autonomy within some form of a counter-
                                                 
36  This is also where Smith’s understanding of ethnicity becomes relevant. Smith  
adopts the approach that stresses the historical and symbolic-cultural attributes of 
ethnic identity. Smith’s (1991:20) conception of ethnicity considers such 
collectivities as “doubly ‘historical’ in the sense that not only are historical 
memories essential to their continuance but each such ethnic group is the product 
of specific historical forces and is therefore subject to historical change and 
dissolution”. A similar explanation is suggested by Kellas (1991: 8) who regard 
the human nature as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of 
ethnicity. According to him, “sufficient conditions” relating to ethnicity go beyond 
“human nature”. He locates the explanations for the development of ethnicity in 
any particular case in the contingencies of history. 
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majoritarian settlement including a demand for ethnic territorial autonomy 
within a federal frame. An ethnic movement, however, poses a serious 
challenge to the state when it demands the creation of a state of its own. 
This brings the question when and how an ethnic group turns into a nation 
and ethnicity gives rise to a nationalist movement. It is this issue that the 
next section addresses. This, however, requires a need to clarify the 
confusion surrounding the terms nation and state. We thus start the 
following section by defining the term nation. 
 
3. Nation 
The term nation, an anthropological concept, comes from the Latin word 
nasci, which can roughly be translated to mean to be born.37 It generally 
connotes a community of people with “a consciousness of belonging 
together”.38 The word has, however, come to mean different things through 
time. Back in the medieval times, a university student’s nationem refers to 
the specific part of the country from which the student came. Even in the 
early 17th century,39 it was still being used to describe the inhabitants of a 
country notwithstanding the diversity of the population’s ethnic 
composition. That in a way made ‘nation’ synonymous with the people or 
the citizenry. This misuse of the term nation as referring to the people or 
citizenry still continues to the present day.40 
  
A number of scholars have attempted to define the term nation. There 
simply is no agreement on how we are to define a nation or even how one 
should go about identifying one. Ernest Renan, in his famous lecture, 
                                                 
37  Jenkin 1997. See also Rudolph 1971: 2. 
38  Rudolph 1971: 2. 
39  Even in the early 17th century, no strong relation was made between a nation that  
one belongs to and one’s ethnic group. See Connor 1999: 38. 
40   Connor 1999: 38. 
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“Qu’est – ce qu’une nation?” provides us with a spiritual view of a nation. 
He states that a nation is in essence a ‘soul’, a spiritual principle, a kind of 
moral conscience. He considers a nation to be “a large scale solidarity, 
constituted by the feeling of sacrifices that one has made in the past and of 
those one is prepared to make in the future.”41 Written in the wake of the 
Franco–Prussian War of 1870–1871, his writing is often considered as a 
political statement.  Being a French liberal nationalist, Renan was dismayed 
over the loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany on the ground that the territory 
was objectively part of the Reich. Renan argued that what is important is the 
people’s day to day commitment to the territory in which they were 
governed. This is what he referred as the “daily plebiscite” of the nation’s 
existence: “a great aggregation of man [sic] with a healthy spirit and 
warmth of heart creates a moral conscience which is called a nation”.42 
 
This conceptualisation of the nation as a ‘moral conscience’ has some 
semblance with Benedict Anderson’s famous definition of the nation as “an 
imagined political community”.43 Anderson’s definition of the nation as “an 
imagined political community”, which has come to be the dominant 
definition by the 1990s, adopts, like Renan, a spiritual view of a nation. He 
considers a nation to be an imagined community because members of even 
the smallest nation do not and will never know their fellow members “yet in 
the minds of each member lives the image of their communion”.44  
 
Anderson’s criticism of Ernest Gellner’s claim that nationalism “invents 
nations where they do not exist” sheds more light on his definition of the 
                                                 
41   McCrone 1998: 5. 
42  McCrone 1998: 5. 
43  Anderson 1991: 6. 
44  Anderson 1991: 6. 
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nation as an “imagined community”.45 Gellner, argues Anderson, 
incorrectly equates ‘invention’ with ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’ rather than 
with ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’. This is a very important distinction. By 
clearly differentiating his position from that of Gellner, Anderson is making 
the point that the nation is ‘imagined’ and not ‘imaginary’. The latter 
implies a community that may not exist in fact, a community built on 
‘falsity and fabrication’. It represents a community whose claims 
concerning its existence depend on a fallacious description of feeling and 
perceptions shared by members. The existence of imagined community is, 
on the other hand, a social fact.  
 
Tamir criticises Anderson’s definition of the nation as “trivial” and 
“uninformative”.46 Her main criticism centers on the fact that Anderson 
conditions the existence of an imagined community on the likelihood of 
face– to–face encounter among its members. If what makes a community an 
imagined community is the likelihood of face–to–face contact among its 
members, Tamir argues, all human associations could be considered as 
imagined communities. She attempts to illustrate this problem by making 
reference to a family. One obviously cannot meet all present members of his 
or her family. Even if that is possible, one cannot still be considered to have 
met the whole family as the image of one’s family is created not only 
through face–to–face contact with its present members but also through the 
awareness of the existence of former generations. Based on Anderson’s 
concept of an imagined community, she argues, there is no reason why we 
should not consider a family as an imagined community. We should thus 
note, following Anderson’s definition, that there is likelihood that even the 
smallest social groups can be considered as imagined communities. That 
                                                 
45  Anderson 1991: 6. 
46  Tamir 2004: 345. 
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makes Anderson’s definition, she concludes, unhelpful as it would not assist 
us in distinguishing a nation from other kinds of social groups. 
 
 It is not, however, clear when Anderson refers to the likelihood of face-to- 
face-contact as a condition to an imagined community that he was merely 
referring just to that physical impossibility or unfeasibility of face–to-face-
encounters. A careful examination of Anderson’s definition would reveal 
that this is nothing but a simplification of his definition of the nation. Of 
course, the size of a community shouldn’t matter if a community is to be 
considered as an imagined community and thus a nation. By pointing out 
the absence of face–to- face encounter among members and yet indicating 
the presence of an image of the communion in each of its members, 
Anderson was only emphasising the psychological bond that sustains a 
nation. He was stressing the feeling of communion that exists among its 
members. The absence of face-to-face- encounter is mentioned only to 
highlight how strong the feeling of belongingness is among the members of 
a nation. As Anderson himself points it out, a nation is imagined because it 
is conceived “as a deep, horizontal comradeship”.47 
  
A look at other definitions of a nation would, in fact, show that a strong 
psychological bond that joins all members is the most defining feature of a 
nation. Tamir, for instance, talks about a “national consciousness fostering 
feelings of belongingness and national fraternity as the paramount common 
denominator of all nations”.48 Rudolph claims that nations are identifiable 
primarily by psychological or attitudinal criteria.49 Hasting similarly puts 
                                                 
47  Anderson 1991: 7. 
48   As quoted in Connor 1999: 37. 
49  Rudolph 1971:2. 
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horizontal comradeship at the center of what constitutes a nation.50 For 
Connor, “the essence of a nation is a psychological bond that joins a people 
and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all 
other people in a most vital way”.51  
 
The emphasis on the presence of a psychological bond begs the question of 
the relevance of objective factors in sustaining a sense of national identity. 
It brings forth the question whether nations have objective bases at all. 
Some of the definitions provided by prominent scholars on the subject seem 
to suggest a positive response. In National Identity, Smith argues that a 
nation is a “named human population sharing an historic territory, common 
myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy 
and common legal rights and duties for all members”.52 From this 
definition, one can point out a number of objective factors that Smith 
considers necessary to sustain a sense of national identity. He, for example, 
deems it necessary for individuals to share historic territory, a common 
economy and common legal rights and duties. Adrian Hasting as well 
stresses a territorial and cultural element in his definition of a nation when 
he refers to “a historico–cultural community with a territory it regards as its 
own and over which it claims some sort of sovereignty”.53 Others put 
emphasis on common language and territory as sufficient basis to maintain 
a sense of common national identity.  
 
On the other hand, scholars like Renan and Anderson discounted the 
“objective” bases of a nation. For them, nations are not the determinate 
products of given sociological conditions such as language or race. Renan 
                                                 
50  Hasting 1997. 
51  Hasting 1997: 36. 
52  Smith 1991: 14. 
53  Hasting 1997: 25. 
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had even ridiculed the blood definition: “One does not have the right to go 
through the world fingering people’s skulls and taking them by the throat 
saying: ‘you are of our blood; you belong to us!’”.54 For Max Weber, 
neither can the fact that people speak the same language make them 
members of the same nation. Tamir, when criticising Smith’s definition of a 
nation, argues that conditions like the sharing of a common territory and 
even historical memories do not necessarily guarantee the development of a 
national identity.55 For most of these scholars, there is more to nationalism 
than the mere presence of objective traits shared by all members of a 
community.  
 
It is true that the mere presence of objective factors like language, religion, 
culture or historical experiences do not necessarily imply the existence of 
nationhood. Common language is often insufficient to sustain a sense of 
national identity.56  Renan was also correct in suggesting that shared blood 
is not a sufficient factor for the establishment of a nation. There is enough 
evidence to suggest that most groups claiming nationhood do in fact 
incorporate several genetic strains.57 Neither can religion supply a sufficient 
basis for nationalism despite its ideological power.58 A good example in this 
regard is the case of Bangladesh and Pakistan. The fact that both share the 
same religion was not obviously good enough to establish a strong 
psychological bond and thus remain belonging to the same nation. A shared 
                                                 
54  McCrone 1998: 4. 
55  Yael 2004. 
56   Weber 1978: 395. 
57  Of course, one may argue that the fact that the groups claiming nationhood have  
genetic strains doesn’t really matter as long as they believe they descend from a 
common ancestor. In analyzing socio-political situations, what ultimately matters 
is not what is but what people believe is (Connor 1999: 37). 
58   Rudolph 1971: 3. 
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territory under a common government sharing economic and legal systems 
does not also necessarily result in the development of a common national 
identity as attested by the political reality in Canada, Belgium, the former 
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. 
 
We should not, however, be dismissive of the relevance of these objective 
factors to the development of a common national identity. Their 
contribution cannot be denied.  What one rather needs to be cautioned 
against is from exaggerating the isolated effects of these objective factors. It 
is the combination of several kinds of objective relationships that contribute 
to “the development of the psychological phenomenon we speak of as 
unifying sense of nationhood among people”.59 Rudolph has captured the 
contribution of objective factors scrupulously when he stated that the 
subjective facet (i.e. the psychological bond that glues individuals together 
in the spirit of belonging to one nation) is largely a function of objective 
factors.60 After all, how can one distinguish a nation from other social 
groups like women, homosexuals and the like who as well share a strong 
psychological bond if it is not for the objective factors. 
 
Objective factors that play an important role in making a nation in a 
particular case may not have that same effect in other scenarios, may not 
even exist at all or may play a divisive role. “Many of these [objective 
factors] could be mutually substitutable – some playing a particularly 
important role in one nation–building process, and no more than a 
subsidiary part in others”.61 Living together in the same territory, as 
                                                 
59  Rudolph 1971: 3. 
60  The more of these attributes a given population possesses or shares, the more  
likely that the phenomenal psychological bond that we have been referring to shall 
emerge. 
61   Hroch 1996: 61. 
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mentioned earlier, did not result in the development of common national 
identity in Canada and Belgium. On the contrary, the Scottish nationalism is 
based on living in a common territory despite “clear and abiding social, 
religious and geographical differences”.62  
 
What then is a nation? It is hardly possible to provide a hard and fast 
definition of a nation.63 For the purpose of this thesis, however, a nation, 
broadly speaking, is primarily defined by the strong psychological bond that 
exists among members of a community. Members of a nation share a 
feeling of unity and substantial distinctiveness. Members are united in a 
sense that individuals see themselves affiliated with and committed to other 
members. Their sense of unity is also manifested in the fact that they see 
themselves as sharing a common destiny. Their sense of distinctiveness can 
be attributed to a combined effect of objective traits which may include a 
belief in separate origin/evolution, historical memories and/or linguistic and 
cultural ties. There also exists among members of a nation a shared feeling 
of exclusivity. National identity is therefore, a combination of both strong 
psychological bond that exists among members of a community and 
objective attributes.   
 
3.1 Distinguishing a nation from an ethnic group 
What then distinguishes a nation from an ethnic group? The basic, and for 
our purpose, the most important distinction between an ethnic group and a 
nation lies in the fact that the latter harbours ‘political and statist ideas’. The 
development of political and statist ideas within an ethnic group transforms 
                                                 
62  Smout 1994. See also Hroch 1996: 61. 
63  Tamir (1993:68) aptly states that “there is no satisfactory answer to this question,  
nor can we draw more rigorous boundaries. Greater precision, if at all possible, 
would force us to overlook the immense variety of social phenomena laying claim 
to the title “nation” ”. 
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the latter into a nation. Establishing an independent statehood is not, for 
example, the ambition of an ethnic group. The moment an ethnic group 
starts to project an ambition to establish an independent statehood, it ceases 
to be considered as an ethnic group.  
 
The distinction mark of [a nation] by definition is its 
relationship to the state. A nationalist holds that political 
boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries, 
whereas many ethnic groups do not demand command over the 
state. When the political leader of an ethnic movement makes 
demands to that effect, the ethnic movement therefore by 
definition becomes a nationalist movement.64 
 
The desire to establish an independent statehood is thus the most important 
distinguishing feature of a nation. It is, however, important to note that it is 
not necessary for an ethnic group to claim a state of its own in order to 
achieve the status of nationhood. If an ethnic group seeks some form of 
autonomy or self-government, then it has transformed into a nation.65  
 
As the title suggests, this thesis has opted to use the term ‘ethnic diversity’. 
This stems from the objective of this study, namely how ethnically diverse 
states like Ethiopia and South Africa deal with their ethnic diversity 
irrespective of the fact that the ethnic communities that inhabit the country 
have developed a political agenda or not. The focus of this study is not 
confined to a state’s reaction to an ethnic claim but also how a state can 
ensure or maintain that ethnic differences do not translate into political 
divide. Thus, ethnic diversity is used in this thesis broadly to refer to ethnic 
                                                 
64   Eriksen 1993:30. See also Ghai 2001: 5. 
65  Brass 1991. 
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communities that have not developed political agenda as well as those that 
are politically mobilised and can thus be regarded as nations. 
 
3.2 Nation and state distinguished 
The term nation is also often confused with the term state. The two terms 
are used interchangeably. The one is considered as synonym for the other. It 
is not clear how this inter-utilisation of the terms nation and state has 
developed. Some scholars trace it back to the developments that unfolded in 
the late seventieth century. They specifically relate it to the spread of the 
doctrine of popular sovereignty owing to the writings of John Locke. At the 
heart of this doctrine is the belief that all power emanates from the people. It 
identifies the people as the source of all political power. This revolutionary 
doctrine made the people and the state almost synonymous.  “L’etat c’est 
moi become l’ etat c’est le people”.66 And owing to the misunderstanding of 
a nation as the people or the citizenry, the terms nation and state has 
consequently come to mean the same thing. Hence why the French 
Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen proclaimed that “the source of all 
sovereignty resides essentially in the nation; no group, no individual may 
exercise authority not emanating expressly therefrom”. 67  
 
There is, however, a difference between the two terms. The state represents 
the major political subdivision of the globe.68 It is the territorial juridical 
unit, a legal concept “describing social group that occupies a defined 
territory and is organized under common political institutions and an 
effective government”.69 It can thus be easily conceptualised in quantitative 
terms. Unlike the state, the intangible nature of a nation makes the latter 
                                                 
66  Connor 2001: 38. 
67  Connor 2001: 39. 
68   Connor 1999: 36. 
69   Phandis and Ganquly 2001: 20. 
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difficult to define and conceptualise. A nation, as indicated earlier, is a self–
conscious community characterised by a strong psychological bond that 
joins its members.  
 
What is intriguing is that the habit of inter-utilising nation and state 
developed despite the fact that there is a frequent usage of the term nation-
state. It is intriguing because the very fact of using the term nation-state 
illustrates an appreciation of the vital difference between the two terms. The 
term nation –state is designed to describe a territorial–political unit (a state) 
whose borders coincided or nearly coincided with the territorial distribution 
of a national group.70 In a nation–state, the cultural (nation) and the political 
(state) are in alignment. The ‘people’ who are governed by the institutions 
of the state are by and large culturally homogeneous in having a strong and 
common linguistic, religious and symbolic identity.71 It is, in short, a term 
which is developed to express a state of affairs in which a nation has its own 
state.72 
                                                 
70   Phandis and Ganquly 2001: 39. 
71   McCrone 1998: 7. 
72  In a case where nation and state coincide, the state is perceived as the political  
extension of the nation. In such situation, appeal to one trigger the identical, 
positive psychological response as appeals to the other. “To ask a Japanese 
Kamikaze pilot or a banzai–charge participant whether he was about to die for 
Nippon or for the Nipponese people would be an incomprehensible query since 
the two blurred into an inseparable world. Hitler could variously make his appeals 
to the German people in the name of state (Deutsches Reich), nation 
(Volksdeutsch) or homeland (Deutschland), because all triggered the same 
emotional associations” (Connor 1999: 40). Similar responses can be elicited from 
members of a nation that is clearly predominant within a state. But the invoking of 
such symbols has quite a different impact upon other ethnic groups in the 
particular state. Thus, “‘mother Russia’ evokes one type of response from a 
Russian and something quite different from a Ukrainian” (Connor 1999: 40). 
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The nation–state that combines one state with one nation is often regarded 
as optimal and ideal.73 A survey of all the countries around the world would, 
however, reveal that only very few of them qualify as nation–states. Connor 
points out that only less than 10 per cent of the states around the globe can 
be considered as nation–states.74 Another scholar, Charles Tilly, states the 
same thing about countries in Europe. He claims that very few European 
states qualify as nation–states. Even in those states, which have a nation or 
potential nation accounting for more than 90% of the state’s total 
population, there is often an important minority. In many others, the largest 
ethnic element accounts for 50% to 74% of the population or for less than 
half of the population. This says the ‘state’ rarely coincides with the 
‘nation’. That is why the existence of a nation–state is often considered a 
dream as much as a reality.75 
 
Had the world been composed of nation-states, there would have been no 
problem in the inter-utilisation of the term nation and state.76 That 
unfortunately has not been the case though the world is often described as 
one of nation-states. As the section that follows shortly reveals, neither has 
the inherent tendency of most ethnically plural states to transform into a 
nation–state has become a reality. In fact, the root problem of conflict-riven 
multi-ethnic states often lies, as the following section argues, in this 
propensity to transform an ethically diverse state into a homogenised entity, 
a nation-state. 
 
 
 
                                                 
73   Neuberger 1994: 233- 234. 
74  Connor 1999. 
75   Hasting 1997: 3. 
76   Connor 1999: 40. 
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4. The illusion of nation-state building 
If a state is ethnically plural, there are, broadly speaking, two options that it 
might wish to follow. One approach is to disregard the ethnic mosaic 
feature of the state and attempt to develop a single national identity along a 
single culture or ideology that transcends ethnic differences. This would be 
a decision to create a single national identity, a mono-cultural society. The 
other option is to embrace the ethnic diversity of the state. The state in this 
case can choose to promote a harmonious coexistence of separate ethnic 
groups. Until very recently, states, in all parts of the globe, have adhered to 
the first option and sought to establish nation–states.  
 
The dominant streams of European thought considered the unitary, 
unfragmented nation as the ideal, the optimal state form. Diverse 
nationhood was considered as almost invariably negative due to its 
allegedly disruptive and centrifugal nature.77 The states sought to promote 
cultural universalism within their boundaries as means of extending their 
legitimacy. The western European core regions attempted to impose a single 
language, religion, and - in the broadest possible sense – culture upon all of 
their subjects.78 This is despite the fact that many of these European 
countries contain diverse ethnic groups like the Catalans and Basques in 
Spain, the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, the Scots and Welsh in 
Britain, the Corsicans and Bretons in France, 
 
The situation is more or less the same in Africa, if not worse. Confronted 
with the complex problems of maintaining the territorial integrity of the 
newly independent but deeply divided states they inherited from the 
departing colonial powers, African leaders sought to establish nation-
                                                 
77   Okafor 2000: 523. 
78  Hechter and Levi 1993:186. 
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states.79 They thought recognising and cultivating the ethnic diversity that 
defines the basic feature of their society would give rise to divisive politics, 
instability and disintegration. The homogenisation of intra–state ethnic 
differences was thus their main preoccupation. “Kill the tribe to build the 
nation”80 was their motto. As Neuberger has put it, this was the major 
preoccupation of the leaders of post-colonial Africa:  
 
Zambia’s President Kaunda said that ‘our aim has been to 
create genuine nations from the sprawling artifacts the 
colonialists carved out’. Cameroon’s president Ahidjo sees the 
institution of the state as a means to achieve nationhood. For 
him, ‘ L’integration nationale c’est l’adaptation des cityones 
aux differentes structures d’Etat’. The same is true of Senghor 
who writes, ‘The state is …primarily a means to achieve the 
nation’81 
 
At the center of the nation-building process of many of these states, be it in 
Europe, Africa or Asia, has been a policy that promotes unity at the expense 
of ethnic diversity. This has taken many forms. In some cases, it has taken 
the form of what is often referred to as the ‘ostrich response’.82 Here the 
state attempts to eliminate differences by presenting itself as a mono–
cultural state. This involves a denial on the part of the state that there are, 
for instance, linguistic minorities in its territory. That, in fact, is the policy 
France adopted in relation to its linguistic minorities. Despite the fact that 
there are a number of regional languages within its borders, France, when 
                                                 
79  Okafor 2000: 512. 
80  This is the famous slogan of FRELIMO, a national liberation movement in  
Mozambique. 
81  Neuberger 1994: 235.  
82   Addis 2001: 736. 
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signing the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages, 
declared that it has no linguistic minorities within its jurisdiction.83  
 
In other instances, repression has taken the form of building national 
identity based on a putative majority ethnic identity. Such practices include 
attempts to suppress the voices of a distinct ethnic group or to suppress 
ethnic groups economically, politically, culturally, and/or linguistically. The 
French state has historically erected numerous legal and administrative 
barriers to the maintenance of the Breton language and culture. French is the 
only official language for teaching and governmental business.84 Numerous 
state institutions such as universal conscription were also designed to create 
a common French identity and to be robustly assimilative.85 In many other 
western democracies, an attempt were also made to erode the sense of 
distinctiveness claimed by ethnic groups by “abolishing traditional forms of 
local or regional self–government, and encouraging members of the 
dominant group to settle in the minority group’s traditional territory so that 
the minority becomes outnumbered even in its traditional territory”.86 The 
situation is the same in most multi-ethnic states both in Africa and Asia. 
 
The coerced nation building project has seldom succeeded. The attempts to 
build a common national identity through large centralised states have not 
                                                 
83   Addis 2001: 730. 
84   Hechter and Levi 1993: 189. In addition to facilitating communication across  
communities, a single national language is often regarded as an instrument to 
promote unity. Some, on the other hand, decline the demands of an ethnic group 
for an official recognition of minority languages on the ground that multilingual 
states should work towards monolingualism as it facilitates economic growth by 
ensuring efficiency (Lowrey 1992: 726). 
85  Linz, Stephan and Yadav 2004: 1. 
86    Kymlicka 2005: 2. 
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been able to produce the desired result. Neither has it brought political 
stability and economic development to most of these ethnically plural states. 
States that have attempted to impose the language and culture of the 
majority group have often engendered a violent reaction. Many have seen 
the proliferation of ethnic nationalist movements. In some cases, this has 
taken the form of armed uprisings. The political mobilisation of ethnic 
communities giving rise to conflicts organised and waged along ethnic lines 
have become a widespread phenomena. Countries, in which ethnic groups 
are waging collective action against the state seeking either ‘equity’ or a 
state of their own 
 
are to be found in Africa (for example, Ethiopia) Asia (Sri 
Lanka), Eastern Europe (Romania), Western Europe (France), 
North America (Guatemala), South America (Guyana), and 
Oceania( New Zealand). The list include countries that are old 
(United Kingdom) as well as new (Bangladesh), large 
(Indonesia) as well as small (Fiji), rich (Canada) as well as poor 
(Pakistan), authoritarian (Sudan) as well as democratic 
(Belgium), Marxist–Leninist (China) as well as militantly anti – 
Marxist (Turkey). The list also includes countries which are 
Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu 
(India) and Judaic (Israel)87  
 
We have specially witnessed an increasing number of ethnic conflicts in the 
closing decades of the 20th century. By the 1990s ‘ethnic’ conflicts had 
broken out in many countries around the world. The collapse of 
communism in the former Soviet Union was followed by pockets of ethnic 
conflict in Eastern Europe. In some cases, the conflicts have resulted in the 
partition of larger states with new smaller states joining the United Nations. 
It was during this same period of time that humanity witnessed the 
                                                 
87   Connor 1999: 163-164. See also Kymlicka 2004:1.  
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Rwandan genocide that took the lives of close to one million people in only 
one hundred days. It was also then that a new word, ‘ethnic cleansing’, 
made it into the English vocabulary.88  “[Ethnic] nationalism”, it is said, 
“had joined the ranks of the Undead.”89 
 
To sum up, a policy that pursues national unity at the expense of ethnic 
diversity has seldom succeeded. Leaders of these states, under the guise of 
national unity and development, developed an ethnocratic state, a state 
which is controlled by one or some ethnic groups and predicated on the 
subjugation of others. Far from attaining its desired objective of creating an 
ethnically monochrome state, it has been the reason for the proliferation of 
ethnic–based movements. The experience of multi-ethnic states generally 
suggests that states should move away from this artificial nation–state 
building project. There is, however, little agreement on the path that these 
states must take in order to tackle the challenges of ethnic diversity. Some 
suggests political divorce or secession as the answer to the ethnic turmoil 
that characterises many of these states. Others advise these states to rely on 
universal individual rights. The succeeding sections examine the 
effectualness of these two alternatives.  
 
5. Political divorce as a response to the challenges of ethnic 
diversity 
Some point out to the ethnic tensions and conflicts that have permeated 
multi-ethnic states for decades and suggest political divorce as the ultimate 
solution. For these groups of scholars and politicians, the difference is 
unmanageable. They thus recommend separation. Despite the fact that this 
                                                 
88  McCrone 1998: 2. 
89  McCrone 1998: 2. 
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option seems to represent ‘a simpler and tidier solution’, there is no 
guarantee that it addresses the problem of ethnic diversity effectively. 
 
First, secession seems to be a presumptuous response as it assumes that all 
ethnic groups within a state want to go their own way. It presumes that 
establishing an independent statehood is the ambition of all ethnic 
movements that represent or claim to represent the interests of marginalised 
ethnic groups.  Yet it is not at all clear if political divorce is the first priority 
of all communities as some might forgo secession in favor of securing a 
substantial measure of self government within a larger and stronger 
accommodative state or some form of recognition of their identity within a 
larger political partnership.90 Moreover, separation may only be an 
appropriate response after examining other options and only if it appears 
that “there is no possibility of the various [ethnic] groups getting along and 
a group may have good reasons to believe that the statehood is its only 
security”.91 Otherwise, it would just simply be a knee-jerk response. This 
suggests that political divorce should be considered only as a last resort.  
 
One should also note the border crisis that may ensue if one simply accepts 
political divorce as a solution to the challenges that ethnic diversity poses to 
ethnically plural states. This would, for example, be the case in Africa 
where countries are the result of a haphazard and arbitrary boundary making 
that was engineered by the colonisers. As a result, many of these countries 
                                                 
90  The recent development in Sudan can be instructive in this regard. The Southern  
Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) has renewed its commitment to fight for ‘a 
united country on a new basis’ rather than independence for the south. The matter, 
however, is yet to be settled by a referendum. See a report by BBC ‘Kirr wants to 
keep Sudan united’ available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4144142.stm, 
accessed on 12 December 2005. 
91   Lowrey 1992: 733. 
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have incorporated a significant number of ethnic groups. Thus, if political 
divorce is the recommended prescription for ethnic diversity, the map of the 
continent would have to be significantly redrawn. It would not be difficult 
to imagine how this could easily give rise to protracted border crisis in 
countries like Nigeria that alone contains more than two hundred distinct 
ethnic groups. Added to this is also the non-viability of small ethnic states 
that may emerge as a result of the redrawing of the map of the continent. 
 
There are, of course, scholars like Okechukwu Oko92 who strongly believe 
that this is the only way out if Africa is to experience peace and stability. 
The problem with this view is that there is even no guarantee that peace and 
stability will necessarily follow any ambitious project that attempts to 
redesign the map of the continent. The redrawing may make most groups a 
majority in their own houses thus allowing them to exercise their rights to 
self government. It is, however, more likely that the redrawing may still 
leave a small pocket of ethnic groups within the newly established states as 
it does not necessarily give ethnic groups an ethnically macrocosm state 
unless followed by ethnic cleansing. This means political divorce would 
only transfer the locus of ethnic conflicts. The impossibility of having 
neatly divided ethnic groups even after a complete redrawing of the map of 
the continent (unless through ethnic cleansing) therefore works against the 
viability of the secession option.  
 
The international community is as well very reluctant to countenance 
secession as the solution for ethnically fractured states. Motivated by the 
need for maintaining the stability of world order, the international 
community clearly favours counter majoritarian political settlements over 
political divorces as a political prescription for ethnic conflicts as the latter 
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results in shifts in international boundaries. The United Nations and The 
European Union, for example, insisted on the territorial integrity of Bosnia. 
One major product of the Dayton–Paris Accords was the establishment of a 
constitutional framework that offers substantial territorial and political 
autonomy to members of the three largest ethnic groups.93 Similarly, in 
Georgia, U.N. mediators have proposed that the civil war launched by 
Abkhazian separatists be settled by drafting a new constitution that would 
offer the Abkhazians substantial local autonomy and a veto over central 
government actions that directly affect Abkhazian interests.94  
 
6. The individual rights approach 
The problem with the secession option redirects one to look for responses to 
the challenges of ethnic diversity within the internal framework of the state. 
As indicated above, one such alternative that states have adopted to deal 
with the challenges of ethnic diversity is to constitutionally guarantee 
universal individual rights irrespective of ethnic, gender, race and other 
group memberships. This individualistic approach, some argue, goes a long 
way to in terms of responding to the challenges of ethnic diversity. This 
section turns on this particular approach and discusses the basic premises of 
the individualist liberal position with regard to the challenges of ethnic 
diversity.  
 
6.1. The individual rights approach and the multi-ethnic challenge 
A traditional liberal democracy treats citizens as individuals. It ascribes 
certain fundamental freedoms to each individual. The group to which the 
individual belongs to is irrelevant. Groups are merely a “collection of 
                                                 
93  Kelly 2002: 252.  
94  See generally Chirikba 1998.  
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individual agents, an aggregation of the constituent parts”.95 In fact, the 
classical liberalism considers the individual as the ultimate agent of action. 
It accordingly attaches a moral right only to that agent. According to this 
strand of liberalism, rights should only be seen in individual terms.96 The 
individual, for example, has the right to use the language of his or her own 
choice. This he or she can do alone or in association with others. 
 
 Furthermore, a liberal democracy imposes on the state a negative duty. The 
government, according to this liberal position, has only the duty to respect 
and protect the rights of the individual. This means the state should only 
refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the 
right. With respect to rights related to ethnic relationships, this imposes on 
the state the duty to respect, among other things, the rights of the individual 
to use his language or exercise his culture alone or in any form of 
association with others. The state should not also discriminate against 
anyone based on language, religion or the way of life that one follows as a 
result of his or her association with a certain ethnic or national group.97 No 
positive obligation is, however, imposed on the state. The state, for 
example, is not obliged to officially recognise, affirm or materially support 
any culture or language.98 As aptly noted by Addis, 
                                                 
95   Addis 2001: 736. 
96   Addis 2001: 736. 
97   This non – discrimination principle applies when the state distributes benefits and  
resources, or when it  performs its traditional function of protecting citizens. 
98  There is an emerging trend in human rights, which tend to move away from  
the traditional conception of rights as ‘shields’ to one that conceptualizes rights as 
‘swords’, too. The idea being that the state, rather than simply protecting members 
of society from the heavy hand of state power, must also be obliged to engage 
positively in matters related to the bill of rights. Hence, for example, the inclusion 
of socio economic rights as justiciable rights in the South African Constitution and 
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[t]he state’s moral obligation is to respect these privately made 
choices in the same way that is required to honor other choices 
made by individuals as to who they will associate with, and on 
what terms and conditions that association will take place. The 
negative duty of the state to refrain from curtailing the right of 
individuals to speak (and cultivate) their language with other 
members of the linguistic group does not imply a positive duty 
on the state to officially affirm, recognise, or support, any of 
those minority languages.99 
 
It is this individualist liberal position that, in fact, provides the theoretical 
foundation for most international human rights instruments.100 This has, for 
example, been the case with the first two international instruments that are 
adopted by the United Nations: The United Nations Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The Charter has nothing 
to say about group-specific rights. It simply recognises individual rights. 
This individualist outlook is, in fact, made clear in the opening article, 
Article 1(3), which outlines the purpose of the United Nations. According to 
this Article, the purpose of the United Nations is to encourage “respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion”. The reference to “fundamental freedoms 
for all” is interpreted as to mean fundamental freedom for all individuals 
and not groups.101 The same holds for the UDHR. The document declares 
that “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
                                                                                                                            
the obligation of the state to provide access to socio-economic resources and 
services. This argument is hardly extended to apply to the rights of ethnic groups. 
99   Addis 2001: 739. 
100  For more see Addis 2001: 739. 
101          Addis 2001: 739. 
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language, religion, political or other opinion”. The documents, other than 
providing for a right against discrimination, do not mention group–specific 
rights. 
 
It is important to note that even those instruments that attempt to address 
ethnic related claims are informed by this same individualist philosophy. 
These instruments do not promulgate the rights of ethnic groups but the 
rights of “persons belonging to a minority”.102 The first reference to group 
rights, and specifically minority rights, is made in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which, in article 27, states: 
 
In those states in which ethnic or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with other members  of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language. 
 
One should, however, note that the Article makes reference only to persons 
belonging to ‘such minorities’ and not to the groups themselves. That means 
the right is an individual right that can be exercised by persons belonging to 
such minorities and not to be invoked by a group as such.103 As noted by 
Addis, persons belonging to such minorities enjoy an associational right, 
which is the right to choose with whom to associate and under what 
conditions to do so.104   
 
This preoccupation of international human rights instruments with 
individual rights is a post World War II development. Most of the bi-lateral 
                                                 
102  Bowring 1999: 6- 9. 
103   Bowring 1999: 4. See also Higgins 1994: 127. 
104   Addis 2001: 741. 
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and multi-lateral treaties as well as declarations established after the First 
World War were concerned with protecting individuals as members of 
particular ethnic group and especially minorities.105 Such protection was, 
however, extended to a minority only in cases where there is a ‘kin state’ 
nearby which shows the desire to protect its ethnically affiliated group 
living just across the border. This often took a form of mutual undertakings. 
Germany, for example, agreed to provide certain rights and privileges to 
ethnic Poles residing within its borders on a condition that Poland treat 
ethnic Germans in Poland in the same manner. But these accords did not 
last long. Nazi Germany used these treaty provisions as a ground for 
invading Poland and Czechoslovakia. They justified their invasions on the 
ground that these countries “were violating the treaty rights of ethnic 
Germans on their soil”.106 The exploitation by the Nazis of these minority 
rights brought the whole system into disrepute.107  
 
It was the abuse by the Nazis of these minority rights and the Holocaust that 
followed which, according to many writers, explains the shift from group– 
specific rights to universal human rights and thus the adoption of 
international instruments with a strong individualist orientation. The 
Holocaust was seen partly as the consequence of group–thinking, which 
viewed people “as members of this or that group, rather than as 
individuals”.108 After World War II, the approach taken to protect ethnic 
groups has taken an indirect form of protection. It was no longer considered 
advisable to provide for special rights to members of a particular ethnic 
group. As Bowring puts it in the following quotation, the approach was 
                                                 
105    Bowring 1999: 3. 
106   Kymlicka 2005: 2. 
107   Bowring 1999: 4. 
108   Addis 2001: 746. 
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rather to protect ethnic groups indirectly by providing basic human rights to 
all individuals: 
 
The general tendency of post-war movements for the promotion 
of human rights has been to subsume the problem of national 
minorities under the broader problem of ensuring basic 
individual rights to all human beings, without reference to 
membership in ethnic groups. The leading assumption has been 
that members of national minorities do not need, are not 
entitled to, or cannot be granted rights of a special character. 
The doctrine of human rights has been put forward as a 
substitute for the concept of minority rights, with the strong 
implications that minorities whose members enjoy individual 
equality of treatment cannot legitimately demand facilities for 
the maintenance of their ethnic pluralism.109 
  
It is thus no wonder that the individualist liberal position is often defended 
on the ground that it is only when politics is conducted at the level of 
individuals that one can guarantee peace and stability in multi-ethnic 
societies. Politics, when conducted in terms of group rights, heightens the 
loyalty of group membership and thus “making politics a battle among 
permanently warring factions”.110 According to this position, prejudice, 
intolerance and stereotypes will reign when politics is conducted at the level 
of group rights. Proponents of this position thus recommend the 
individualist liberal position if politics is gong to be conducted in a manner 
that ensures peace and stability. For them, group-specific rights are “anti – 
human”.111   
                                                 
109       Claude, 1955. See also Kymlicka, 2005: 3. 
110       Bowring 1999: 2. 
111       Bowring 1999: 2. 
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The individualist liberal position believes that anxieties of persons 
belonging to ethnic groups can be effectively addressed by universal 
individual rights. According to this position, a system that recognises and 
provides for universal individual rights goes a long way to respond to the 
challenges of ethnic diversity. The expression of cultural identity should be 
left to the private sphere and the state should thus remain neutral on matters 
of ethno–cultural differences. Proponents of this position often mention 
freedom of association to show how recognition of universal individual 
rights can go a long way to accommodate ethnic differences. Kymlicka 
summarises this position as follows: 
 
Freedom of association enables people from different 
backgrounds to pursue their distinctive ways of life without 
interference. Every individual is free to create or join various 
associations, and to seek new adherents for them, in the 
‘cultural market place’. Every way of life is free to attract 
adherents, and if some ways of life are unable to maintain or 
gain the voluntary adherence of people that may be 
unfortunate, but it is not unfair. On this view, giving political 
recognition or support to particular cultural practices or 
associations is unnecessary and unfair. It is unnecessary, 
because a valuable way of life will have no difficulty attracting 
adherents. And it is unfair, because it subsidizes some people’s 
choice at the expense of others. 112 
 
6.2. The limits of the individual rights approach 
The individual rights approach of liberal democracies to the challenges of 
ethnic diversity would not have been problematic in a nation-state where the 
cultural group coincides with the boundaries of the state. In such states, as 
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noted by Basta, universal equal treatment suffices.113 The question is 
whether a liberal state, as it exists now, with its predominantly individualist 
orientation, will be able address the demands of ethnic groups in a multi-
ethnic society or does it need to be supplemented by other institutional 
measures that respond to the needs and demands of multi-ethnic states.   
 
To begin with, the individualist liberal position can be criticised for lack of 
consistency in its application of the individualist principle.114 As indicated 
earlier, the individualist liberal position relies on the principle that treats 
people as individuals. For this position, rights cannot be asserted or 
articulated in terms of groups. It does not see groups separately from the 
individuals who compose them. Proponents of this same position do not, 
however, hesitate to establish territorial borders and treat some individuals 
differently from others on the ground that the former do not belong to the 
state. The problem with this position, a position that allows one to exclude 
others based on the criterion of citizenship, is that it relies on the same 
classifications that it intends to avoid. It relies on the same vocabulary that 
proponent of group rights use to defend and promote the culture and 
language of ethnic groups: Group–specific rights. 
 
Another problem and, for the purpose of this thesis, the major criticism is 
that in multi-ethnic states, the traditional civil and political rights that 
merely consider individuals as equal citizens, regardless of their particular 
identities, cannot adequately address questions that arise in relation to ethnic 
and national groups: 
 
                                                 
113       Basta 2000. 
114        Addis 2001: 747.  
 
 
 
 
 58  
Which language should be recognised in the parliament? 
Courts? Should each ethnic or national group have publicly 
funded education in its mother tongue? Should internal 
boundaries be drawn so that cultural minorities form a majority 
within a local region? Should political offices be distributed in 
accordance with a principle of national or ethnic 
proportionality?115 
 
If the state is going to effectively address these questions and thus 
accommodate cultural diversity, it needs to supplement individual rights 
with institutional measures that represent an acknowledgment of its multi-
ethnic reality. 
 
Furthermore, the claim made by liberals that the state has to remain neutral 
in relation to ethnic relationships, that it has to leave the matter to the so 
called ‘cultural market place’, is in effect a call for the separation of state 
and ethnicity. According to the liberals, the ‘cultural market place’ should 
rather decide if a certain culture is going to survive or decay. The state 
should not interfere with the operation of this market place. The argument 
for separation of state and ethnicity is often reinforced by making reference 
to the principle of separation of church and state, which requires the state to 
remain neutral on religious matters. The separation of state and religion 
requires the state not to officially recognise or assist any particular religious 
group. By the same token, the state should not endorse or support the 
culture and language of any particular cultural group. In short, there should 
be a “benign neglect” of ethnic and national differences. 
 
The difficulty with accepting the above stated position is that there is no 
way that the state can avoid recognising and promoting the identities of a 
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particular ethnic group.116 Simply put, the state cannot remain neutral with 
respect to ethnic groups.  This can be illustrated by making reference to the 
use of language. The use of a certain language by important public 
institutions like public schools, courts, parliament and other similar 
institutions provides a favourable environment for the development of the 
culture of the particular group whose language these institutions are using. 
The use of language as the language of government is, in fact, very 
important for the survival and development of culture. It is this potent force 
of language that may explain why it has been a fundamental cause of 
political conflict and violence throughout the world. Thus, when a 
government opts to use a certain language as official language, “it is 
providing what is probably the most important form of support needed by [a 
particular cultural group], since it guarantees the passing on of the language 
and its associated traditions and conventions to the next generation”.117 Of 
course, states may adopt a culturally neutral language as it the case with 
most decolonised states in Africa but this is not an option that is always 
available.  
 
Decisions regarding boundaries in multi-ethnic states may also have the 
same effect of promoting a particular cultural group. A state may decide to 
draw boundaries in a manner that particular ethnic groups will never 
become a majority. It, in other words, may decide to draw boundaries in a 
manner that ensures that the dominant group always outnumbers other 
ethnic groups. For instance, the American government has historically made 
decisions about state borders with the aim of ensuring that there is a WASP 
majority in each state.118  On the other hand, the state can draw boundaries 
                                                 
116  Patten 2001. 
117   Kymlicka 1995: 111. 
118   Glazer 1983. See also O’Leary 2004. 
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to make ethnic groups majorities in their own house and thus enabling them 
to exercise control on decisions that affect the survival of their language and 
culture.119 Either way, the decision of the state has important effect in terms 
of recognising or suppressing, as the case may be, the language and culture 
of a particular ethnic group. The same can be said with regard to the 
distribution of functions and responsibilities. 
 
What the above two examples suggest is that the analogy does not work. 120  
It may be possible for the state not to have an established church. However, 
it is seldom possible for the state to remain neutral to cultural differences. 
When the state decides to adopt an official language, when it decides to 
draw the boundaries in a certain manner or when it officially considers 
certain days of a year as a public holiday, it tend to promote the culture of a 
particular ethnic group.  
 
Despite what proponents of liberalism insist it is not also evidently clear 
that political peace and harmony will be guaranteed only if people are 
treated as individuals rather than as members of a group. In fact, there is 
overwhelming evidence that indicates the contrary. The failure to recognise 
an ethnic group or deny the rights of a group has often resulted in ethnic 
strife. This can best be exemplified by the civil strife that often follows 
when certain groups are denied the use of their language. This happened, for 
instance, in Sri Lanka.121 The civil war in Sri Lanka between the Tamil 
minority and the Sinhalese majority is attributed to the language policy of 
the government. In 1956 the Sinhalese majority government enacted the 
Official Language Act, according to which Sinhala become the official 
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120  Kymlicka 1995: 112. 
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language of Sri Lanka. This was seen by the Tamil minority as a threat 
against their distinctive identity. This has eventually led to the civil war that 
continues to plague the residents of the island. This suggests that citizens in 
a multi-ethnic state will keep their allegiance to the larger state when they 
see their identity being endorsed by the state. 
 
6.3. Concluding remarks 
As the foregoing discussions suggests, universal individual rights approach 
is an important part of the state’s response to the multi-ethnic challenge. As 
the discussion in the following chapters shall show, it is especially 
important in terms of responding to the claims of ethnic groups that are not 
territorially dispersed. It is, however, submitted that individual rights 
approach is a necessary but not sufficient approach to deal with the 
challenges of ethnic diversity. A state’s list of fundamental civil and 
political rights needs to be supplemented by other measures that reflect the 
recognition of ethnic diversity. It is here that what this study calls the 
principle of recognition becomes relevant. The discussion in the following 
section turns on what the principle of recognition is all about and its 
relevance to the multi-ethnic challenge. 
 
7. The principle of recognition 
The principle of recognition becomes pertinent in a situation where a state 
incorporates two or more than two territorially concentrated ethnic groups. 
Recognition, as adopted in this thesis, is an institutional principle that 
mandates the state to acknowledge the ethnic plurality that characterises the 
society it seeks to govern. It requires the state to recognise the right of 
ethnic groups to preserve their linguistic and cultural distinctions as well as 
manage their own affairs. This stands in sharp contrast with the policy of 
assimilation that many countries have adopted.  
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According to the policy of assimilation, ethnic groups are expected to 
abandon their distinctive culture and assimilate entirely to the dominant 
cultural norms. They are invited to adjust themselves through assimilation 
into the dominant culture. The analogy of the melting–pot is often used to 
explain the nature of this policy. Originally coined by Israel Zangwill, the 
Anglo-Jewish writer, the term was initially used to refer to the manner in 
which immigrants who came to the United States at the end of the 
nineteenth century were encouraged to think of themselves as Americans. 
The analogy was used to show how the immigrants gradually “abandon 
their cultures of origin until, as in the action of the melting–pot, they 
eventually became fully part of the bright new alloy”.122 A policy of 
assimilation does not thus recognise diversity. Rather it promotes the 
development of a common culture often by ‘eliminating’ the other.  
 
What a state policy based on the principle of recognition aspires to achieve 
is quite the opposite. A principle of recognition doesn’t require ethnic 
groups to assimilate into the identity of the dominant group. It doesn’t 
expect them to abandon their original characteristics. On the contrary, it 
appreciates ethnic diversity. It aims to recognise rather than suppress 
diversity. Its basic claim is that more allowance should be made for 
diversity and difference. It, in fact, refers to diversity as a ‘demographic 
fact’ that needs to be acknowledged. That is why the analogy of the salad–
bowl and not that of the melting–pot is often used to describe a state policy 
that is underpinned by the principle of recognition. As succinctly put by 
Watson, “[i]n the bowl different constituents retain their distinctive flavours 
                                                 
122  The term was originally coined by the Anglo Jewish writer Israel Zangwill in his  
play, the melting – pot, produced in New York in 1908. Watson 2000: 4. 
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and forms but the dish as a whole is recognizably sui generis, having its 
own distinctive character as a result of its unique blending.”123 
 
The principle of recognition is based on the assumption that the remedy to 
the exigencies of ethnic diversity that many states face lies in reversing this 
trend of suppressing and denying ethnic diversity and embracing institutions 
and policies that accommodate ethnic diversities while at the same time not 
losing sight of the need to maintain inter–ethnic solidarity. They have to 
devise appropriate institutional framework that guarantees equality and 
political space for ethnic communities while facilitating the achievement of 
cooperation and compromise among themselves. They should resort to 
government institutions that provide ethnic communities with the 
opportunity to participate and advance their interests in the political 
decision making process. 
 
This, in fact, seems to be the emerging trend in the West. There has been a 
change in the manner most western countries deal with the multi-ethnic 
challenge. Today, a number of these states have come to realise that they 
cannot suppress or eliminate the socio-cultural differences that their 
countries exhibit as a result of ethnic diversity. That a nation building 
project that aims to suppress ethnic plurality cannot succeed. They have as a 
result abandoned the goal of eliminating ethnic diversities.  They have come 
to accept that “their [ethnic] groups will endure into the indefinite future 
and that their sense of nationhood and nationalist aspiration must be 
accommodated in some way or other”.124 As a result, most of western 
democracies no more consider themselves as nation–states. They rather 
                                                 
123   Watson 2000:4. 
124  Kymlicka 2005: 2. They have as well come to accept that “these groups will  
continue to see themselves as separate and self–governing nations within the 
larger state into the indefinite future”. Kymlicka 2005: 3 
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have come to accept their multi-ethnic character. This includes an 
acknowledgment on the part of the state that ethnic groups have a valid 
claim to the language rights and self- government powers that are relevant 
to manage their own affairs.  
 
The question, however, remains, whether this shift suggests that 
recognition is a fundamental human interest that has to be realised in 
every society.  There have been, of course, serious attempts to posit 
recognition as a political ideology of universal reach. Many have tried to 
find a theoretical foundation for recognition in a freestanding value or 
ideal of constitutional democracy.125 Taylor is one of the constitutional 
theorists who insist on providing a theoretical foundation to recognition. 
In his influential essay, The politics of recognition,126 Taylor 
distinguishes between a politics of universalism and a politics of 
difference.  These constitute the two forms of recognition which, 
according to Taylor, are important to contemporary politics. The first, 
politics of universalism, emphasises “the equal dignity of all citizens and 
the content of this politics has been the equalization of rights and 
entitlements”.127 This politics of universalism rejects the existence of 
first-class and second-class citizens. The politics of difference, the 
second form of political recognition that arise as a result of the 
development of the modern notions of identity, emphasis, on the other 
hand, the recognition of “what is peculiar to each” individual or group. 
Briefly, “[with the politics of universalism], what is established is meant 
to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; 
with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the 
                                                 
125  Andreas 2003: 5. 
126  Taylor 1992: 37 – 38.  
127  Taylor 1992: 37. 
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unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctiveness from 
everyone else”.128 Taylor’s chief concern is with the second form of 
recognition. He argues that recognition of distinctness is a vital human 
need. His thesis is then that to be recognised in one’s cultural 
distinctness is a universal human interest. What this thesis calls the 
principle of recognition thus becomes a reasonable realisation of a 
human interest for recognition of cultural distinctness. In this context, 
recognition is considered as an integral part of an ideal conception of 
constitutional democracy. 
 
Unlike Taylor’s contention, it is not clear that the claim for the 
recognition of cultural distinctiveness is a ‘categorical demand’. As 
noted by Andreas, the claim to cultural distinctiveness does not stand as 
a matter of fundamental human interest.129  It is not like the interest to be 
treated with equal concern and respect, which is a universal human 
interest. The importance of securing recognition for one’s cultural 
identity rather depends on historical circumstances. As Andreas notes, 
 
[e]ven if cultural identity happens to be important to a person 
or a group and so anchors a claim to recognition of it by 
others, it is not obvious that recognition by any others is what 
is desired or desirable. Do French Quebeckers seek 
recognition of their distinct society by Zulus or Texans? 
Would Zulus or Texans have standing to extend or withdraw 
recognition from French Quebeckers? Indeed if we accept 
Taylor’s idea of the value of cultural difference and its 
recognition, it is puzzling why the demand for recognition is 
not put forward across as often as it is within societies. It is 
more plausible to think that recognition of distinctness or 
                                                 
128   Taylor 1992: 38. 
129  Andreas 2003: 5. 
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difference by others matters only when the others are those 
with whom there are reasons to feel closely identified. 
Recognition becomes salient with differences among those 
who, for any number of reasons, otherwise feel a sense of 
mutual identification. Whether or not there are such reasons 
has less to do with fundamental human needs or interest than 
with the contingencies of history. 130 
 
Cultural distinctiveness does not always suggest that a multi-ethnic state 
should organise itself along ethnic lines. The politics of pluralism comes 
to the fore only when historical, economic and social circumstances 
deem cultural distinctiveness a politically relevant divide. The service of 
the principle of recognition is necessitated not based on the 
acknowledgment that cultural distinctness is a universal human interest 
that needs recognition in the public sphere, but on historical and other 
contingencies that warrant the adoption of ‘a politics of difference’. This 
says the principle of recognition is not a necessary part of an ideal 
conception or theory of democratic society; it need not be realised in 
every polity.131  
 
This also means that there are societies in which the mere application of 
the ideal conceptions of constitutional democracy cannot help to achieve 
a well ordered regime due to historical, economic and social 
circumstances. Haysom was referring to these circumstances when he 
discussed the relevance of the classical liberal model to deal with ethnic 
plurality, and especially identity–based conflict in multi-ethnic societies. 
He identified four conditions in the absence of which a standard liberal 
democratic approach cannot do an effective job in managing ethnic 
                                                 
130  Andreas 2003: 5-6. Emphasis added 
131  Andreas 2003: 5-6. 
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diversity: “Conditions of economic opportunity that allow individual 
upward mobility regardless of group identity; absence of discrimination 
or at least a level of cultural and religious tolerance; a national identity 
that allows entry to members of culturally diverse groups; the practice of 
interest–based politics”.132 His thesis is then that a standard liberal 
democratic approach will fail to fulfill its promise of managing ethnic 
diversities within an accommodating state, not because of its intrinsic 
flaws, but because the conditions in many deeply divided societies 
prevent its actualisation, prevent the integration of diverse identities 
within a cohesive polity.133 It is in such societies that state arrangement 
that is based on the principle of recognition becomes essential. Does 
this, however, mean multi-ethnic states, in which mobilisation around 
ethnic identity is in-existent, does not have to worry about recognising 
the ethnic diversity that characterises their society? 
 
Relying on the arguments advanced above, some may contend that 
universal individual rights suffice in a multi-ethnic context where the 
state formation process has not produced hierarchy among the different 
ethnic groups and inter-ethnic relationship, as a result, is not at stake. 
The problem with this argument is that it overlooks the point that a 
multi-ethnic state in which inter-ethnic relationship is not at stake must 
have gone through a policy, albeit implicitly, that acknowledges its 
ethnic diversity. This assertion is intrinsically linked to the fact that there 
are always issues that a multi-ethnic state cannot resolve without 
considering its implication on ethnic relationship. As argued in the 
previous section, language policy is one such good example. Unless the 
state adopts a culturally neutral language, as it is the case with most 
                                                 
132  Haysom, 2003: 223. 
133  Haysom, 2003: 224. 
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decolonised states, or, an ‘equitable official language policy’, it cannot 
circumvent the politics of language and its ramifications on ethnic 
relationships. This says that ethnic identity will become a non-issue in 
the arena of political mobilisation only when the state formation process 
was driven by elements of recognition that facilitate the establishment of 
an all-inclusive state. In other words, ethnicity appears as an identity that 
is not politically relevant when the multi-ethnic society in question has 
not experienced ethnic stratification in the political, social or economic 
arena.  
 
The ‘categorical view of recognition’ should not thus be stretched to 
imply that multi-ethnic states, whose political space has not yet been 
characterised by political mobilisation of ethnicity, should not worry 
about recognising ethnic diversity. The categorical view is rather to 
suggest that recognition is not a fundamental human interest that a 
society has to strictly organise itself along ethnic lines to the exclusion 
of all other identities and interests. In fact, the experience of multi-ethnic 
federations suggest that multi-ethnic states that have not yet experienced 
ethnic politics have to continuously guard themselves from the illusion 
that the management of ethnic diversity is not a relevant challenge. 
 
Finally, the espousal of the principle of recognition and the emphasis on 
the recognition of the distinctive identity of ethnic groups should not 
imply that allegiance to the larger state does not exist or is not desirable. 
Persons belonging to different ethnic groups, despite their identification 
with politically mobilised ethnic group, can have allegiance to the larger 
political community and share the sense of what Linz et al refer to as the 
“we feeling”.134 Some refer to this as ‘patriotism’135 while others 
                                                 
134  Linz, Stephan and Yadav 2004. 
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commonly call it ‘civic nationalism’ and the states where such feeling 
exist a ‘state-nation’136 (as opposed to a nation-state) or a ‘nation of 
nations’.137 The important point is that such sense of solidarity can exist 
in multi-ethnic state only when the definition of the state reflects an 
acknowledgment of the ethnic diversity that characterises the society it 
seeks to regulate.138  
 
8. Conclusion 
A multi-ethnic state is confronted with the complex problem of managing 
ethnic diversity. As the foregoing discussion indicates, the state cannot 
overcome this challenge by suppressing ethnic groups. That can only lead to 
further ethnic strife. It can neither be done by attempting to establish an 
ethnically neutral state, or put differently, by separating state and ethnicity. 
A multi-ethnic state has to rather focus on other ways through which it can 
respond to the challenges of ethnic diversity without trying to transform 
itself into a nation–state.  
 
The principle of recognition, as argued in this chapter, provides one such 
alternative.  According to this principle, it is not enough to protect only 
universal individual rights. The common rights of citizenship are not 
adequate enough to provide protection to ethnic claims. If the needs and 
demands of ethnic groups are to be accommodated, the state needs to 
recognise its multi-ethnic character. It must supplement universal individual 
                                                                                                                            
135  See Kymlicka 1995:13. 
136  Linz, Stephan and Yadav 2004. 
137  See Liobera 1997: 46-50. 
138  Kymlicka (1995: 13) illustrates this by making reference to Switzerland where the  
different linguistic communities “feel allegiance to the larger state only because 
the larger state recognises and respects their distinct national existence”. 
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rights with institutional measures that reflect the recognition of ethnic 
diversity.   
 
Recognition is not, however, sufficient. Adopting the principle of 
recognition entails the need to adopt institutional designs that reflects its 
commitment to ethnic diversity. The state should design institutional 
structures that help it to translate its recognition of ethnic diversity into 
tangible institutional reality and establish an all-inclusive state. One form of 
institutional response that this study is going to focus on involves the 
adoption of some sort of federal arrangement as the basis for the 
organisation of multi-ethnic states. Broadly speaking, this includes the right 
to manage own affairs, according to which a group is allowed to exercise 
some form of political and/or territorial autonomy, and the co-management 
of the multi-ethnic society, which among other things, could require the 
representation of the different ethnic group in important national 
institutions.   
 
In the following chapter, the discussion examines whether federalism, as an 
institutional design, has the capacity to accommodate ethnic diversity and 
thereby supplements the act of recognition. The discussion commences by 
introducing the meaning and nature of federalism. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Federalism as institutional design to recognise and accommodate ethnic 
diversity 
 
1. Introduction 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the attempt to build a nation-state in 
the context of a multi-ethnic society has seldom succeeded. Violent reaction 
has been the common response to this form of nation–building. It has, in 
some cases, resulted in the proliferation of ethnic movements. In extreme 
cases, it has engendered separatist movements. As a result, the principle of 
recognition, an institutional response that suggests a state to move away 
from the nation-state paradigm towards a politics of recognition and 
accommodation, is presented as a promising alternative. A corollary of the 
decision to adopt the principle of recognition is the espousal of institutional 
measures that supplement the act of recognition and provide practical effect 
thereto. Policy makers and academics recommend various institutional 
measures that would allow multi-ethnic states to accommodate ethnic 
demands without endangering their political integrity. As it has become 
clear by now, one such institutional device that this thesis focuses on is 
federalism.   
 
Federalism has not always been used as a device to manage ethnic diversity. 
Neither is its present use usually confined to serving as a response to 
problems engendered by ethnic diversity. There are other functions that 
federalism can serve. Notwithstanding that, the main argument in this 
chapter points out that federation, as institutional state design, has the 
capacity to accommodate ethnic diversity and maintain the political and 
territorial integrity of the state. The thrust of the argument lies in the 
projection of federalism, not as concept of rigid institutional principles 
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requiring uniform application, but as institutional principles that embodies 
core values, which can respond to the exigencies of an ethnically plural state 
through a carefully orchestrated pragmatic application.  
 
We shall begin the discussion in this chapter first by exploring the meaning 
of federalism and federation. We then proceed to examine its similarities 
and differences from other forms of institutional organisation. This is 
followed by a section that discusses the relevance of the federal solution to 
the multi-ethnic challenge. Finally, the chapter concludes by identifying the 
institutional options and problems of managing ethnic diversity within the 
federal frame and, in the process, develops an analytical framework against 
which this thesis, in succeeding chapters, will examine the institutional 
framework of South Africa and Ethiopia. 
 
2. Federalism and federation 
The term federalism has usually been used interchangeably with the term 
federation. There is, however, an important distinction between the two 
terms. This distinction was explicitly stated first in King’s seminal study, 
Federalism and Federation.1  This was later taken up by Burgess in his 
edited book, Federalism and Federation in Western Europe, which 
appeared in 1986.2 The distinction was further elaborated when Elazar 
discussed the variety of federal arrangements.3 Elazar considered federalism 
as a broad generic term encompassing a variety of forms of which 
federation was but one specific form. This distinction is widely accepted by 
other writers on federalism. However, the problem with Elazar’s use of the 
two terms is that though he was well aware of the distinction between 
                                                 
1  King 1982: 91. 
2  Burgess 1993, 4. 
3  Elazar 1987: 12. 
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normative and descriptive discourse, he tended to use the term ‘federalism” 
as both a normative and descriptive term.4 Watts, on the other hand, advises 
students of federalism to keep three terms distinct: federalism, federal 
political systems and federation.5 This thesis, following Watts, distinguishes 
between federalism, on the one hand, and federal political systems and 
federation, on the other, as normative and descriptive terms respectively.  
 
Federalism,6 as a normative concept, has two essential aspects: 
autonomy and union.7 Simply put, the autonomy aspect is a reference to 
self–government and about making self–rule possible for the constituent 
units. The union aspect is, on the other hand, a reference to the co-
management of the whole society and about the desire of people and 
polities to come or stay together8 for common purposes. With the notion 
                                                 
4  Watts 2000:162. 
5   Watts 1994: 8. 
6  Clear–cut definitions of federalism do not come by easily. Rufu Davis, in his book  
on the federal principle, endeavored to find a common definition of federalism but 
only to abandon his quest as “one that interferes with the pragmatic understanding 
of political systems organized on a federal principle” (as quoted in Elazar 1987: 
28).  
7  These two elements of federalism are evident in many definitions of federalism  
(See Wheare 1963: 10; Kriek 1992: 36; Livingstone 1968: 22; Friedrich 1964: 
121; Duchacek 1970: 194). 
8  Two processes of federalism may be identified. In its classic conventional fashion,  
federalism involves the coming together of separate communities to create a new 
entity, which is the case with the USA, Switzerland and Australia. On the other 
hand, what we have been witnessing in the twentieth century has been the 
federalization of what has been a unitary government. Examples of these so-called 
holding together federations include India, Belgium, Canada and Spain. Kincaid 
(2002: 10) maintains that, whichever pattern the federalization process takes, the 
end requirement is the same. For him, holding together federalism is “a process of 
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of multi-level government that it embodies, federalism therefore seeks to 
accommodate “the existence at one and the same time of powerful 
motives to be united for certain purposes and of deep–rooted motives for 
autonomous regional governments for other purpose”.9 As famously put 
by Elazar, federalism is “self rule plus shared rule”.10 For the purpose of 
this study, federalism refers to the combination of elements of ‘self rule’ 
for some purposes and ‘shared rule’ for others with the aim of 
accommodating and promoting distinct identities within a larger political 
union in some constitutionally entrenched basis.   
 
As a normative concept, federalism represents an organising principle that 
prescribes the adoption of institutional arrangements that we generically 
refer to as federal political systems, a descriptive term that encompasses a 
range of possible political organisations that reflect the principles of 
federalism: federations, certain kinds of unions, federacies, associated 
                                                                                                                            
coming apart and then voluntarily coming back together again” (Kincaid 2002: 
10). 
9  Watts1999: 31. 
10  Elazar 1987: 4-5. The fact that the federal idea entails autonomy and partnership  
is also implied in the derivation of the word “federal” which has its origin in the 
Latin word foedus meaning covenant (Elazar and Kincaid 2000). A covenant 
represents a compact between equals to act jointly on specific issues of general 
policy while each keeping their autonomy to act independently in matters related 
to the expression of regional identity (Friedrich 1968; Kincaid 2002). Federalism 
therefore creates a general but limited government. It is general because it enjoys 
nation-wide responsibilities and authoritative capacity to carry out those 
responsibilities. It is limited because it is allows the general government to 
exercise its powers only in constitutionally designated range of areas, leaving the 
constituent units to enjoy the power to exercise authority within their respective 
communities. In short, federalism creates a “limited but encompassing polity” 
(Elazar 1987:67; See also Kincaid’s (2002:7) reference to federalism as a 
“compound republic”). 
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states, leagues and cross–border functional authorities.11 Federalism can 
manifest in different kinds of organisational forms in so far as the 
organisation in question reflects the combination of self rule and shared 
rule.12 In fact, the term federal political systems may come to represent 
other types of political formations that we have not yet come across. This 
thesis focuses on federation.    
 
The term federation refers to “a specific species within the genus of federal 
political systems”,13 which was first invented by the founding fathers of the 
United States of America at the city of Philadelphia in 1787. As a tangible 
institutional reality of the federal principle, federation includes structures, 
institutions and techniques, which serve to translate the federal idea into an 
institutional reality. The problem is, however, that federations themselves 
vary extensively.14 The fact that certain states consider themselves as 
federation does not help much in this regard. Closer scrutiny reveals that it 
is difficult to distinguish polities that claim to be federations from unitary 
state structures.15 Neither has the reluctance of states to consider themselves 
federal prohibited the literature from referring them as federations. A good 
example is India. 
 
Federations vary enormously in three ways.16 They vary, first, in their 
federative institutions and the extent to which they are majoritarian in their 
                                                 
11  Watts 1994: 8. See also O’ Leary 2003: 3. 
12  See also Watts 2000: 164 
13  Watts 1998:  121. 
14  The difficulty of distinguishing federation from other political formations has led  
one eminent federal theorist  to go so far as to conclude that federation in political 
practice is a myth. See generally Riker 1975 
15   Elazar 1987: 12. 
16  O’Leary 2003: 3- 5. See also Kincaid 2005: 409 – 448.  
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character and processes. Some level of limitation, albeit in different degrees, 
is imposed on the powers of ‘federation–wide majorities’ in all 
federations.17 Secondly, they vary in the distribution of power within the 
federal governments. Some federations have very powerful second 
chambers while others create very weak second chambers. Some have 
separately elected executives; some have executives chosen by the federal 
first chamber. Thirdly, the manner competencies are distributed between 
federal and regional governments distinguishes one federation from another. 
In some case, the powers of the federal government are specifically 
enumerated by the constitution while in other federations it is the powers of 
the regional governments that are constitutionally circumscribed and 
limited. Some governments have adequate executive or administrative 
powers to give effect to their own legislative powers while others have 
entrenched a constitutional separation between the national government’s 
legislative powers and the authority to implement national legislation. 
 
The foregoing discussion confirms that the work of translating the federal 
idea into an ‘institutional reality’ can and has taken many forms. 
Federations thus vary in the extent to which component units are 
represented within the national institutions of the government institutions, in 
the powers they distribute to the different levels of government and in the 
                                                 
17  A federation is not majoritarian to the extent that it “has mechanisms, such as the  
separation of powers, bill of rights, monetary institutions and courts that are 
insulated from the immediate power of a federal governing majority” (O’Leary 
2003: 3- 5. See also Kincaid 2005: 409 – 448). On the other hand, a majoritarian 
federation is characterised by a concentration of political power at the federal 
level; the system “facilitates executive and legislative dominance either by a 
popularly endorsed executive president or by a single party prime minister and 
cabinet” (O’ Leary 2003: 4). 
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manner that these competencies are distributed.18 As aptly identified by 
Watts19 and O’Leary20, however, there are a minimum set of elements that 
characterise any genuine federation. In a true federation, there are at least 
two governmental units (the federal and regional) each acting directly on 
their citizens, thus allowing self rule for the constituent units.  Both the 
federal and regional governmental units enjoy separate powers or 
competencies allocated to each level via a written constitution – although 
they may have concurrent or shared powers. Furthermore, in true 
federations, the constitutional division of power between levels of 
government can not be amended unilaterally by either level of government. 
It requires the consent of all or a majority of the constituent units. 
Federations also provide for shared rule in the form of a provision for the 
representation of regional views within the federal policy–making 
institutions. This is usually addressed in the form of a bicameral legislature 
with the second chamber usually representing the constituent units. They 
also require an umpire (which usually are courts and referendum), entrusted 
with the duty of upholding the constitution and ruling on disputes between 
the governmental tiers 
 
To sum up, the appropriate working definition for this thesis regards 
federation as an institutional arrangement that involves at least two orders of 
government with self rule and shared rule incorporated into the system on 
some constitutionally entrenched basis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
18   See also Chen 2002: 299. 
19  See Watts 1994: 8-9. 
20  See O’Leary 2003: 3. 
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3. Federation as a territorial arrangement 
Federal states can have territorial base or non–territorial base.21 In the 
former, it is territorial areas that serve as units of a federation. On the other 
hand, although academics like Livingston find it very difficult to consider a 
society without territoriality as federal,22 there are cases where the federal 
units are not territorially bound. Federalism, as a non–territorial project, is 
often associated with dispersed ethnic communities. In this type of 
federalism, various communities are locked in the same region and attend to 
their own local interests in accordance with the subsidiarity principle while 
at the same time cooperating with each other on matters of common 
concern.23 The various communities, which are also sometimes referred to 
as corporate units,24 represent the constituent parts or corporations of the 
central legislative body. This form of federation provide for non–territorial 
based institutional support in combination with a non–territorial form of 
political representation.25 This form of federalism was first developed as a 
response to the challenges posed in democratising the multi–ethnic Austro–
Hungarian Empire where a solution had to be found to secure the cultural 
rights of geographically scattered ethnic groups.26 In countries like Belgium, 
however, both territorial and non–territorial conceptions of federalism are 
attained. 27  
                                                 
21  Kriek 1992: 19. 
22  Livingstone 1956: 2  
23  Kriek 1992: 22. 
24  Kriek 1992: 22. 
25  Smith 1995: 6. 
26  Smith 1995: 6. See also Kriek 1992: 22. 
27  Federalism in Belgium is characterised by the existence of two different types of  
constituent units: Regions that are territorial units and Communities that are linked 
to individuals and languages and not territory. The three regions are Flemish, 
Walloon and Brussels while Flemish, French and German are the three 
communities. The regions have authority over socio-economic matters such as 
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This study focuses on multi-ethnic states where ethnic groups are 
geographically concentrated. Both in Ethiopia and South Africa, the two 
case studies, ethnic groups are more or less geographically concentrated. 
Seven of the nine provinces in South Africa are, for example, dominated by 
one language group. In Ethiopia, as well, each ethnic group is, by and large, 
concentrated in a specific part of the country. Hence, the option of the 
federal solution is examined as an option to address the challenges of ethnic 
diversity in the context of ethnic groups that are geographically 
concentrated. This does not mean, however, that the thesis does not at all 
discuss issues related to ethnic groups that are not geographically 
concentrated. The impracticality of creating neatly ethnically defined 
constituent units in any federation means that a federal arrangement, if it is 
to be successful in managing ethnic diversity, must address the concern of 
these ethnic groups as well. The point is rather that the major focus of this 
study is the management of ethnic diversity in countries where ethnic 
groups are, by and large, geographically concentrated.  
 
The territorial focus of the study suggests the need to qualify the definition 
of federation that is already adopted by this thesis. For the purpose of this 
thesis, federations are taken to involve territorial division of authority. The 
adopted working definition of federation would thus read: Federation is an 
institutional arrangement that involves at least two territorially based orders 
of government with self rule and shared rule incorporated into the system on 
some constitutionally entrenched basis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
urban planning, housing, environment, economic development, employment and 
energy while the communities exercise power over cultural matters, education, use 
of languages and other matters that are of relevance to the communities. Lecours 
2002: 58 – 73. 
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4. Federalism: An ideology or a pragmatic tool? 
Some view federalism as a political ideology of universal reach.28 Such 
view of federalism considers the latter as a necessary part of an ideal 
conception or theory of democratic society. It regards federalism as 
something that must be realised in every polity. These efforts to posit 
federalism as a freestanding ideology are, however, problematic. 
 
Most constitutional theorists are usually hesitant to consider federalism 
as a free-standing ideology comparable to or separate from liberalism or 
socialism. They argue that a purely self–referential theory of federalism, 
unlike that of liberalism or socialism, cannot answer crucial questions 
about the human condition: about desire, happiness, justice, value, etc.29 
Even when some constitutional theorists reluctantly consider federalism 
as an ideology, they consider it as a ‘weak ideology’. Burgess, for 
example, considers federalism as a “political ideology in the precise 
sense that it reflects values and beliefs which recommend specific forms 
of federation”.30 Similarly, Smith is very reluctant to consider federalism 
beyond a ‘very general conception’; he, in fact, labels it as 
“programmatic orientations”.31 Federalism is not thus defended as 
political ideology in the manner of a doctrine which trumpets universal, 
a priori truths. It rather represents a response to specific problems.32 
                                                 
28  Andreas 2003: 5. 
29  Smith 1995: 1-29. Commitment to federalism does not represent a general  
ideological desire to achieve some abstract notion of democracy or freedom. See 
Burgess 1993: 110. 
30  Burgess 1993: 112. 
31  Smith 1995: 4. 
32  A similar remark is also made by Riker when he stated that one should not decide  
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This ‘particularistic approach’ to the application of the federal principle 
accentuates the need to abandon the classical, essentially very static, 
conceptions of the application of the federal idea and move towards a more 
pragmatic approach. For long, both academics and politicians have been 
obsessed with a “geographical conceptions of federalism with its emphasis 
on a rigid, a priori division of governmental competences among a number 
of postulated equal political entities”.33 Students of federalism no longer 
apply such rigid conception of federalism when determining the 
organisation of a federal state.  A pragmatic approach to the federal idea has 
become the common trend. The focus is now ‘on functionalism’. The 
endeavor is to adopt this old idea of federalism to the challenges of the 
contemporary world. Carl Friedrich has adequately captured this fact when 
he presented “the notion of federalism as process – as a constantly evolving 
series of community decisions in concrete problem – situations, in sharp 
contrast to classical federalism’s insistence that it was a fixed and static 
system of dividing and allocating law-making competences between equally 
fixed and static sets of geographically based communities”.34 Indeed, every 
application of the federal principle may well be federal in its very own way. 
This also implies that insofar as there is a functional need, “there is no 
shortage of alternative constitutional paradigms or models available to be 
shaped to contemporary problem-solving” .35  
 
This pragmatic understanding of federalism implies a methodological 
perspective that a federal solution should adopt in a multi-ethnic state. It 
                                                                                                                            
“on the merits of federalism by an examination of federalism in the abstract, but 
rather on its actual meaning for particular societies”. Quoted in Burgess 1993: 
104. 
33  McWhinney 1992: 7 
34   Fredrick: 1986: 10. 
35   McWhinney 1962: 6. 
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emphasises the particularistic approach that a federal solution should take 
when dealing with the exigencies of an ethnically plural state. This 
approach first informs the identification/selection of conditions that call for 
the application of federal principles. Second, it requires us to apply the 
institutional principles that underlie the federal design in a manner that it 
can address the particular conditions of the society in question.36    
 
5. Accommodating ethnic diversity through federalism 
States adopt federal arrangement for different reasons. For some, federalism 
is used as a basis for providing overarching regional security architecture 
based on mutual self–protection.37 For others, federalism is regarded as 
safeguard from the tyranny of the majority that is induced by the 
concentration of power in a single governmental actor.38 In some other 
                                                 
36   Watts (10  ) similarly underlined the pragmatic nature of the federal solution when  
he remarked that the extent to which federalism can successfully responds to the 
particular exigencies of a society depends on “whether the particular from or 
variant of federal system that is adopted or evolved gives adequate expression to 
the demands and requirements of the particular society in question”. See also 
Andreas 2003: 8. 
37  Traditionally, federalism was considered, as in the case of U.S.A, as an instrument  
to prevent dangers from foreign forces and influence as well as from domestic 
faction and insurrection. In fact, the Confederate American states moved to a 
federation largely because of these reasons (See Hamilton et al 2005). In the early 
days, the European federalists’ advocacy for a federal Europe was similarly 
motivated by the desire to avoid aggressive and preemptive wars among states 
themselves (Smith 1995: 6).  
38   The concern about the concentration of power is regarded as an important reason  
for the adoption of a federal arrangement in the United States. In promoting a 
federal republic, Madison wanted to reduce the risk of majoritarian tyranny by 
dividing the majority “into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens that the 
rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested 
combinations of the majority” (Selassie 2003: 81); See also Smith 1993:6.  
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cases, economic motives are the driving forces behind the process of 
federalisation. Traditionally, this has to do with the desire to benefit from a 
large single market. This belief is reinforced today by many Europeans who 
champion the establishment of an enlarged regional trading bloc in order to 
secure a substantive control of shares in a competitive world economy.39 
More recently, federalism and especially the concomitant devolution of 
power to lower levels of government is regarded as a good strategy to 
deliver development.40  
 
This study recognises the instrumentality of federalism in achieving the 
above mentioned goals but the concern here is with the relevance of the 
federal idea to accommodate ethnic diversity. The objective is to look into 
how federalism and its institutional form, federation, can be used as a 
device to manage ethnic diversity without posing threat to political and 
territorial integrity. We are not thus to probe in detail and critically examine 
the economic and security related benefits of federalism. We may, however, 
discuss some of these political uses of federalism but only when it is 
relevant to make a point to the main thesis of this study.  
 
Federalism is increasingly being presented as a countermajoritarian political 
settlement that can be used to manage ethnic diversity.  Others, however, 
contend that federalism intensifies ethnic conflict that it is meant to prevent 
and thus advice against the adoption of federalism to the multi-ethnic 
                                                 
39   Smith 1995: 6; see also generally Keohane, Robert and Joseph 2001. 
40  The assumption is that the central government can never possess enough  
information to tailor policies to specific circumstances. Being closer to the people, 
lower level of governments, it is assumed, have the advantage to achieve 
allocative efficiency and match local developments with local needs (See Elazar 
1987:252; Parikh and Weingast 1997: 1593 – 1594; Yonatan and Kirkby 2008).  
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challenge. As the following discussion shows, there is little consensus on 
the utility of federalism in managing ethnic diversity. 
 
5.1 Federalism as a promising alternative to manage ethnic diversity 
For most ethnic groups and territorially structured communities, federalism 
offers the most realistic way to maintain state unity in the face of important 
centers of power and ethnic divides. In a study carried out for the Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Watts argued: 
 
As in Canada, so in India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria…and 
Switzerland, linguistic, racial and religious minorities that feared 
discrimination at the hands of numerical majorities but were 
unable alone to support effectively a genuine separate 
independence, have sought provincial autonomy within a federal 
political system as a way of preserving their own distinct identity 
and way of life. In each of these countries the multilingual and 
multicultural character of the society has frequently been cited by 
politicians as the crucial characteristic making a federal political 
system necessary.41 
 
Being a compromise, the federal option lies mid–way between the options 
of a state that promotes complete assimilation or the submergence of 
differences and that of the dissolution of the state or the separation of some 
portion of that state.42 
 
It is generally argued that federalism serves as a device for accommodating 
the interests of two or more distinct ethnic communities locked within the 
boundaries of a single state thus providing a “sound strategy for promoting 
                                                 
41  As quoted in Gagnon 1993: 25.  
42   Alemante 2003: 83. 
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national unity and political legitimacy”.43 It has the advantage of being a 
provider of accommodation with the potential to respond adequately to 
problems occurring in multi-ethnic contexts.44 Watts argued that “[i]n many 
societies where the political demands for integration and for separatism 
have been at odds with each other, the adoption of a federal system has 
seemed a solution to the problem of reconciling these conflicting 
pressures”.45 
 
Fleiner et al argue that the appeal of federalism in handling ethnic 
diversity lies in the fact that it offers a constitutional mechanism that not 
only tolerates but also promotes diversity.46 Federalism does not see 
diversity as a problem that requires a careful diagnosis. It rather 
embraces diversity as a virtue and an advantage that deserves state 
protection and promotion. A state organised based on such principle, 
they argue, uses the “value of cultural diversity to enable the whole 
society to participate in the endeavour of the state to seek justice, 
promote peace and protect liberty”. 47  
 
                                                 
43   Alemante 2003: 83. According to the view that adopts federalism as effective  
device for accommodating ethnic diversity, “harmony will be increased in a 
system in which territorially concentrated minorities are able to exercise autonomy 
or self–determination on matters crucial to their identity and continued existence, 
without the fear of being overridden or vetoed by the majority group” (Alemante 
2003: 83). 
44  Gagnon 1993: 20. Diamond and Plattner (1994) argue that “ethnic conflicts –  
particularly ethno-political threats to the central state–can often be mediated 
through a judicious implementation of federalism and constitutional guarantees for 
the protection of individual collective (minority) rights”. 
45  As quoted in Gagnon 1993: 25. 
46  Fleiner, Klain, Linder and Saunders 2003: 206. 
47  Fleiner, Klain, Linder and Saunders 2003: 206. 
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Some, like the Tremblay Commission, established by the Quebec 
Legislative Assembly in 1953 to investigate constitutional problems in 
relation to Quebec, have even gone to the extreme and asserted that 
federalism is the only political system that allows “two cultures to live 
and develop side by side within a single state”.48 For them, it is only 
under such arrangement that the different conflictual groups can buy into 
the system as a whole.   
  
5.2 Federalism as a poor device to manage ethnic diversity 
Many academics and politicians have reservations about the effectiveness of 
federalism in managing ethnic diversity and preventing conflict. Some even 
consider it as a poor constitutional approach to forge unity among the 
medley of ethnic communities that characterise the majority of states in the 
world. They consider this form of government inherently at odds with the 
purposes that it is meant to achieve. Smiley’s, for example, notes a paradox 
in the relation between federalism and nationalism: 
  
[There is] a paradox here in the sense that the cohesion and 
desire for autonomy of particular groups in federal states 
which made federalism necessary at the outset makes such 
regimes somewhat unstable. Because of the continuing 
strength of such spatially demarcated diversities, there is an 
ever–present impulse for those who wish to preserve the 
                                                 
48  Gagnon 1993: 27. Friedrich (1968: 32) writes: “Federalism provides the  
opportunity to give maximum scope to such linguistic self–expression. 
Bilingual (or even multilingual) communication may be a substantial burden in 
official and unofficial communication, but it is the necessary price which must 
be paid where otherwise only an imposed single language is likely to disrupt 
the community and tear apart those bonds which might otherwise suffice for 
effective political life. And federalism makes that possible”.   
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existing federation to counter such divisive forces by 
resorting to nationalistic appeals.49  
 
Federalism, according to this view, results in the erosion of national unity 
and the promotion of ethnic hostility or inter–group rivalry. Apart from 
escalating ethnic tensions, it erodes the limited national identity or sense of 
common political destiny.50 Federalism, they argue, has the propensity to 
promote ‘ethnic fundamentalism’. In a state that promotes politics of 
difference, “those who seek popular support must strive to be the most 
authentic and ‘ethnic’ of the candidates or parties, and the most resolute in 
asserting the ethnic interest as against the ‘others’ ”.51  
 
Proponents of this view refer to the historical records of federalism and 
argue that federalism does not have an encouraging record as a stable form 
of government. For Carven, this must be admitted as a simple matter of 
statistics.52 The picture for an ardent supporter of federalism is not an 
encouraging one. This is especially true in the twentieth century during 
which federations in multi-ethnic states have broken down. This is true both 
in the communist and post–communist world of Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, the USSR and in the post colonial world of sub-Saharan 
Africa, South Asia and the Caribbean. Based on this, many conclude that 
federal option is not a successful model to imitate especially in a multi-
ethnic context. Elazar, a prominent scholar of federalism, was very reluctant 
to endorse the federal option in a multi-ethnic context. He argued that 
federations in a multi-ethnic context are difficult to sustain.53 He, in fact, 
                                                 
49  Smiley 1987: 14. 
50  Haysom 2003: 224. 
51  Haysom 2003: 225. 
52  Carven 1991: 243.  
53  Watts 2000: 165. 
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commented that confederations rather than federations of ethnic states 
would have a better chance of success. Every federal state is doomed to face 
a concerted bid for secession by one or more of its component regions.   
 
5.3 Assessment  
It must first be admitted that federalism does not prevent conflict. Neither 
does it eliminate political conflicts. Conflicts are an inherent component 
of all federal societies.54 Conflict is considered as “an intrinsic and 
inevitable aspect of social change and an expression of the heterogeneity 
of interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by 
social change come up against inherited constraints”.55 In fact, the 
literature on conflict and conflict resolution maintains that conflicts 
cannot be prevented but managed.56 In this context, what federalism does 
is rather provide an institutional framework within which diversity can 
be fully managed and solutions acceptable to all can be found.57 As 
Gangon aptly reminds us, “the success of federal systems is not to be 
measured in terms of the elimination of social conflicts but instead in 
their capacity to regulate and manage such conflicts”.58 What federalism 
does is thus manage conflicts by making ethno–regional coexistence a 
possible reality.  
 
Furthermore, care must be made not to suggest that federalism 
necessarily ensures the harmonious co-existence of all ethnic groups. 
                                                 
54  Gagnon 1993. See also Watts 1994: 15. 
55  See generally Oliver, Woodhouse and Miall 1999. 
56   Student of conflicts are advised to avoid using the term conflict prevention.  
Instead they are encouraged to employ terms like conflict settlement, conflict 
management and conflict resolution.  
57  Gagnon 1993: 24 
58  Gagnon 1993: 24. 
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Due to the dynamic forces that are competing for political resources, it is 
difficult to guarantee the success of federalism in managing ethnic 
diversity. What must be emphasised is the capacity of a system based on 
the principles of federalism to strike a deal that has the potential to 
satisfy ethnic communities sharing a common territory for the long 
haul.59 After all, state building is a risky endeavour, especially in a multi-
ethnic state where longstanding cleavages are often involved.  
 
One cannot also simply rely on failed federations and argue that 
federalism is a poor device to manage ethnic diversity. As much as there 
have been examples of failed federations, one must also be careful not to 
overlook federations that have relatively been effective in managing 
ethnic diversity. The federations of Switzerland and Canada have 
survived and progressed for well over a century. India has survived for a 
half century. These federations, of course, are not without problems. 
Some level of strain characterises these and other federations in multi-
ethnic states. In fact, certain federations are characterised by a perpetual 
state of crisis. Be that as it may, it is these federations that have managed 
the challenges of ethnic diversity better than other systems of 
government. It is these forms of governance that  have provided an 
effective means of regulating deep divisions within society and 
preventing their spill over into inter–communal violence. One must not 
also lose sight of the reason for the establishment of some form of federal 
political systems in multi-ethnic polities is the very fact that the latter are 
“difficult to govern”. 60 
Considered in such context of relativity, federalism emerges as a promising 
alternative. Rather than undermining a state’s stability, federalism can 
                                                 
59  Burgess 1993: 24. 
60  Watts 2000: 166.  
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actually lead to a strengthening of the state as it allows it to avoid the threat 
of a devastating civil war provoked by decades of a policy of repression 
followed against ethnic groups or distinct territories. When issues like 
devolution of power, self-government, shared responsibility, internal self-
determination are adequately addressed in a properly designed federal 
system, they present a promising perspective for many countries that have, 
for decades, been engaged in a massive civil war and/or characterised by 
long histories of inter–communal tensions. Such solutions can, arguably, 
serve not as a destabilizing, but, on the contrary, as a stabilizing factor for 
the state in question as they allow it to achieve a vitally important internal 
coherence between its ethnically heterogeneous components.  
There are, of course, academics who maintain that all the objectives that 
federalism is alleged to satisfy in terms of managing ethnic diversity can as 
well be satisfied by adopting decentralisation.61 Andreas argues that 
                                                 
61  Like federalism, decentralisation involves devolution of power. The difference lies,  
however, in the status that the two systems attach to regional autonomy. In a 
decentralised system, the central government decides the functions and 
responsibilities that need to be devolved to the component units and those that it 
retains. The devolution of power to the component units thus depends on the 
wishes of the central government, which means that the central government wields 
the authority to ‘recentralise’ powers and functions that it has already 
‘decentralised’. In the case of federalism, however, powers are not only devolved to 
the sub national units but are constitutionally guaranteed, which means division of 
power cannot be altered by a unilateral act of any of the constituent units or the 
national government as it is the case with decentralised systems. Thus, the division 
of powers between the different levels of authority in a federation springs from a 
constitutional agreement to share power and not to centralise it; such a system is 
therefore a ‘non–centralised’ system and not decentralised (Elazar 1987: 166). In 
addition, effective separate representation of the sub units for the purpose of 
participating in policy formation and legislation, and, more especially, effective 
separate representation in the amending of the constitution itself provides a 
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decentralisation, like federalism, “serves experimentation, diversity and 
residential self–selection”.62 He thus argues that it is not at all clear that the 
aspirations that federalism is meant to fulfil could not as well be satisfied by 
adopting decentralisation. 
It is true that decentralisation provides communities limited autonomy and 
thus self–government. But as pointed out earlier, decentralisation takes the 
centre as primary source of power. Whatever powers delegated to the 
regions are undertaken at the pleasure of the central government. The 
prominence of the centre means, among other things, that “central power 
continues to be exercised in accordance with the majority principle and the 
decisions as to what minority should have how much governmental power 
continues to depend on the majority”.63 Furthermore, if ethnic groups are to 
fully exercise their autonomy, it is not enough that they are given autonomy 
and self-government. They must also be able to ensure that decisions taken 
at the central level do no affect their autonomy unduly. They can only do so 
when they are able to take part in the central legislative and policy 
formations. Decentralisation does not allow that. In the strictest sense of the 
terms, it is federalism that provides for effective separate representation of 
the component units in decision making at the national level of government.  
5.4. Concluding remarks 
In this thesis, federalism, underpinned by the institutional principles of 
self rule and shared rule, is presented as institutional design that 
                                                                                                                            
reasonably precise criterion for a federal as contrasted with a merely decentralised 
order of government (Kincaid 2002).The foregoing discussion should not, however, 
suggest the existence of a watertight division between a decentralised and a federal 
system. There are political systems that feature elements of both federalism and 
decentralisation.  
62  Andreas 2003: 22. 
63  Fleiner, Klain, Linder and Saunders 2003: 206. 
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supplements the principle of recognition by providing practical effect to 
the act of recognition. It is argued that the capacity of federalism to 
respond to simultaneous pressures for the expression of distinctiveness 
and maintaining the territorial integrity of a state makes it a promising 
alternative for those that either wants to build or hold together an 
ethnically plural state. The institutional and territorial matrix of 
federalism, which is conducive to acknowledge and reflect diversity, 
makes it appealing to constitution makers in a multi-ethnic society. It is 
submitted that a properly designed federalism has the capacity to 
effectively accommodate ethnic diversity. 
However, it is important to note that this thesis has not presented the mere 
adoption of federalism as a solution to deal with ethnic diversity. It has 
rather emphasised the capacity of federalism to respond to the challenges of 
ethnic diversity. That means even if one agrees that the federal design is 
relevant in building an all-inclusive state in multi-ethnic societies, it is the 
particular configuration of the federal design that determines the extent to 
which it can build a multi-ethnic state that successfully embraces unity and 
diversity. The realisation of the capacity inherent in federalism to respond to 
the multi-ethnic challenge thus depends on how the underlying institutional 
principles of self rule and shared rule are translated into institutional reality.  
The following section, by focusing on how the principles of recognition, 
self rule and shared rule can be translated into institutional reality, looks 
into how a federation can strike a balance between unity and diversity in 
order to effectively respond to the challenges of ethnic diversity. By making 
references, whenever relevant, to the experiences of multi-ethnic states that 
have adopted federalism to deal with ethnic claims, it identifies key 
institutional issues that constitution makers have to consider in using 
federalism as institutional design to accommodate ethnic diversity. It 
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introduces the institutional options and problems of managing ethnic 
diversity within the federal frame. By doing so, it also sets the template for 
analysing the case studies that follow in succeeding chapters.  
6. Institutional arrangements for recognising and accommodating 
ethnic diversity 
The aim of the remaining parts of this chapter is to discuss, in a comparative 
manner, how the institutional principles of recognition, self rule and shared 
rule can and have been translated into practical and institutional 
arrangements that help to realise the capacity of federalism to respond to the 
challenges of ethnic diversity. The discussion commences by examining 
how a state’s decision to recognise its multi-ethnic character can be 
translated into institutional reality. Drawing on the experience of multi-
ethnic federations, it analyses the ways in which a state can go about 
recognising its multi-ethnic reality. The chapter proceeds to examine how 
states, once they recognise the multi-ethnic fact, can supplement this act of 
recognition using the institutional principles embodied in a federal frame. In 
this regard, the discussion first focuses on the institutional principle of self 
rule and sheds light on state practices and sub-national autonomy. The 
sections that follow discuss, in a similar fashion, the institutional principle 
of shared rule and how this principle can and has been given effect through 
practical and institutional expressions within the federal frame. The plight 
of intra-substate minorities in multi-ethnic federations is also discussed in 
this section.  
 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, the focus of this thesis is primarily 
on institutional arrangements that impact on the accommodation of ethnic 
diversity. A complete institutional response to the challenges of ethnic 
diversity cannot, however, only focus on these diversity-specific 
 
 
 
 
 94  
institutional arrangements but must also include other institutional 
arrangements that are common to all federations including federations that 
are constructed to accommodate ethnic diversity. A good example in this 
regard is a fiscal arrangement. Fiscal arrangements are not specific to 
federations that are designed to respond to the challenges of ethnic 
diversity. They, however, indirectly impact on diversity-specific 
institutional arrangements as the latter will be meaningless if they are not 
accompanied with the necessary financial resources. It is thus important to 
note that this thesis focuses on both diversity-specific arrangements and 
other supportive institutional arrangements that are common to all 
federations, yet have importance to multi-ethnic federations.  
 
6.1. Recognition 
The institutional principle of recognition basically relates to the state’s self–
definition - how the state views itself. It concerns itself with the type of 
nationalism that the state promotes; whether the state considers itself as a 
nation-state (or aspiring nation-state) or as a state with multi-ethnic 
character.  
 
Many doubt the value of recognising the multi-ethnic character of a state. 
Pointing to the symbolic nature of the act of recognition, they prefer to 
concentrate on practical and tangible matters. There is, however, an 
emerging consensus that the symbolic concession that recognition 
represents is important in dealing with the multi-ethnic challenge.64 The act 
of recognition, according to this view, at least suggests that the state is 
moving away from the nation-state paradigm towards a politics of 
accommodation. As Tierney notes, it indicates a preparedness to 
accommodate ethnic diversity: 
                                                 
64    Keating 2001: 107.   
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…such preparedness to face the state’s [multi-ethnic] reality is 
in fact a sign of the state’s strength and an indication that it 
has the self – confidence to flourish through embracing 
positively the deep diversity upon which it was 
constituted.65 
 
The symbolic nature of the act of recognition should not blind one from 
recognising the important way that such recognition affects policy making 
and public discourse. The way that the state defines itself informs to a large 
extent the policy that it follows when dealing with ethnic claims. A state 
that strongly views itself as a nation-state is likely to deny or repress claims 
made by ethnic groups. On the other hand, a state that projects itself as a 
multi-ethnic state is less likely to ignore the demands of ethnic groups. A 
state’s self definition thus sets “a normative framework for the constitution 
which can then inform constitutional process in a broader way”.66 This says 
that the identity of a state as defined by the state itself embodies not only 
symbolical value, which the act of recognition seems to largely represent, 
but also has practical significance as it informs the institutional choices a 
state has to make.67 
 
The most significant issue in Canada’s constitutional debate has been over 
the visions of the nature of the Canadian state. There are two competing 
visions. The federal government, through legislation and policies, has been 
promoting pan–Canadianism, regarding Canada as one nation that happens 
                                                 
65  Tierney 2004: 240. 
66  Tierney 2004: 235. 
67   It is also possible that this principle provides guidance to courts when  
adjudicating disputes that relate to the constitutional structure of the federation 
(Tierney 2004: 235). 
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to be composed of two linguistic groups.68 This vision of the state, which is 
often identified with Pierre Trudeau, one of Canada’s most influential Prime 
Ministers,69 reflects the position that “any state recognition of cultural 
diversity must be granted on a uniform individual and pan-state basis; it 
must be personalised and deterritoralised”.70 It represents Canada as one 
multicultural state united through citizenship to a vision of a state which, 
but for its institutional design, is unitary in its political ethos.71 This monist 
vision of the state is rejected by Quebec nationalists who regard Canada as a 
multi-national society that contains two multicultural societies: Canada (The 
Rest of Canada-ROC) and Quebec.72  
                                                 
68  The British North America Act of 1867 officially recognised the bilingual  
character of Canada and thus guaranteed the use of French and English in the 
Quebec legislature, in the federal parliament and in Canadian courts (Balmer 
1992: 445). 
69  Trudeau was the most prominent promoter of the ‘image’ of Canadian  
nationalism.  He said: “One way of offsetting the appeal of separatism is by 
investing tremendous amounts of time, energy, and money in nationalism, at the 
federal level. A national image must be created that will have such an appeal as to 
make any image of a separatist group unattractive” (Trudeau 2005: 222). A plan 
was adopted by the federal Cabinet to promote the image of the federal 
government in Quebec in 1996. Although the program officially started only in 
1997, it was later revealed that the program has, in fact, started a few years back 
through the Prime Minister’s secret “Unity Fund”. Through this secret fund, over 
300 million dollars were spent between 1997 and 2002 through various Quebec ad 
agencies and federal crown corporation to promote the image of Canadian 
nationalism (see Gagnon and Herivault 2005: 10). 
70  Karmis and Gagnon 2001: 172. 
71  Tierney 2004: 238. 
72  Quebec has continuously been demanding to be recognised as a ‘distinct society’  
in Canada. This was the main agenda in the two rounds of constitutional 
negotiations. In the 1987 Meech Lake Accord, Quebec demanded to be recognised 
as a ‘distinct society’. Such recognition would have affirmed Quebec’s dualist 
vision of the state, though set out only in the unenforceable paragraphs of a 
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Many analysts agree that this reluctance on the part of Canada to perform a 
symbolic act of recognition to Quebec’s national character has contributed 
to identity fragmentation. Watts remarks that “[e]fforts to deny or suppress 
the multiple identities within its diverse society have, in Canadian 
experience, almost invariably led to contention, stress and strain”.73 Rocher 
et al similarly comment that the failure of Canadian political actors to 
respond to Quebec claim for recognition has kept the Canadian political 
system highly unstable.74 The decision of Quebec nationalist to hold a 
referendum on Quebec’s sovereignty in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Charlottetown Accord, which is accompanied by the increase in political 
and social fragmentation, is also often attributed to the failure of the state to 
concede symbolic recognition to Quebec.75 
 
The reluctance to extend symbolic recognition often rests on the fear that it 
implies the right to establish a separate state. The mere fact of extending an 
act of recognition does not, however, necessarily imply the right to self 
                                                                                                                            
constitutional preamble. The Accord was initially approved. It failed to come into 
effect after two provinces refused to assent to the deal. The Charlottetown Accord, 
which began in 1990, dealt with the same issue but in a more comprehensive 
manner. The proposal of this Accord was defeated in referendum. 54% of the 
population voted against it and majorities in six out of ten provinces, including 
Quebec, voted against the deal. Tierney 2004: 238. See also Tully 1995: 175 
73   Watts 2000: 49. 
74  Rocher, Rouillard and Lecours 2001: 195. 
75  Gagnon and Herivault (2005: 1), commenting on what the “recognition of  
Quebec” would entail in a concrete manner for Canada’s institutions, argue that 
the outcome of the Meech Lake debate has made the “distinct society” 
compromise obsolete and no longer good enough to a majority of Quebecoise. For 
them, the only acceptable form of recognition today would be the inclusion of a 
clause recognising the “Quebec nation” in the preamble of the Canadian 
Constitution. 
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determination which can only be realised by establishing an independent 
statehood. As argued in the preceding chapter, many nationalist movements 
are often satisfied by a protected measure of autonomy. Extending such 
symbolic recognition, however, can go a long way in contributing to the 
stability and lasting union of the state. As the Canadian experience 
illustrates, the failure to concede a symbolic recognition to political 
communities increases discontent among the constituent units and facilitates 
identity fragmentation. 
 
The act of recognition can find expression in different forms.  In some 
cases, it can be explicitly articulated in the preamble to constitutions. In 
other cases, it can be embedded in the constitution’s design, especially in 
language related section(s) of the constitution. It can also find expression in 
the various state symbols including the use of flags, anthems, public 
holidays and even the name of the state itself.76  
 
6.1.1 Preamble 
The preamble to a constitution often reflects the orientation of a state. It 
gives an indication as to whether the state aims at a nation-state construction 
or readily recognises its multi-ethnic character. The preamble to the Swiss 
Constitution, for example, expresses the determinations of the cantons “to 
                                                 
76   Rousseau (1972, 281), when discussing the formation of Polish ‘nationality’,  
advised the use of these and other similar symbolic codes. He stated that the state 
“should encourage the ‘creation of games, festivities and ceremonials of a Polish 
character… Public officials should wear distinctively Polish clothing and… an 
education system, staffed by Polish rather than foreign teachers should be used to 
‘shape the souls of the citizen in a national pattern’…” Similarly, Trudeau (2005, 
222), in a bid to promote the ‘image’ of Canadian nationalism, argued that 
“[r]esources must be diverted into such things as national flags, anthems, 
education, art councils, broadcasting corporations, film boards…”. 
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live together with our diversities, with respect for one another and in 
equity”.77 As noted by Fleiner, this indicates that the cantons and the Swiss 
federation did not adopt the homogenisation solution of “We the people of 
the …” (cf., the United States Constitution).78 On the contrary, they decided 
to remain “the peoples of the cantons”.79  
 
A slightly different formulation is adopted in the Spanish Constitution. The 
preamble affirms the will of the “Spanish nation to protect all Spaniards and 
all the peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, their cultures and 
traditions, languages and institutions”. Article 2 further states that “[t]he 
Constitution is founded upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, 
the common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards, and recognises and 
guarantees the right to self government of the nationalities and regions of 
which it is composed and the solidarity among them all”. Tierney argues 
that the Constitution has fallen short of fully recognising the national 
diversity of the Spanish state.80 He argues that different visions of the state 
are entrenched in the constitution which must qualify any claim that it (the 
Constitution) represents a complete acknowledgment of internal diversity. 
The recognition of ‘nationalities’ is qualified by the first phrase in Article 2 
which emphasises “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the 
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”.  
                                                 
77  Schmitt 2005:348.  
78  Fleiner 2002: 4. 
79  A recently amended version of the preamble to the Swiss Constitution reads: “we  
the Swiss people and cantons”. This suggests the emergence of ‘the Swiss people’ 
out of a process that recognised the diversity of “the people of the cantons”. This 
could be interpreted as an indication where the recognition of ethnic diversity can 
eventually give rise to ‘civic nationalism’ or what some authors refer as 
‘patriotism’.  
80  Tierney 2004: 242. 
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A different interpretation of the constitution is provided by others who 
argue that the Spanish approach represents a balanced approach to the issue 
of ethnic diversity. The Constitution, by emphasising the indissoluble unity 
of Spain while at the same time recognising Spain as ‘an ensemble of 
diverse peoples, historic nationalities and regions’, is seeking to reconcile 
unity with diversity.81 It embodies a balance, albeit difficult, between two 
historical elements of Spanish history: the federalist and the centralist.82  
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the formulation of the preamble to a 
constitution is an important element of recognition. It indicates whether a 
state recognises its ethnic diversity or presents itself as a homogenised state. 
Furthermore, although it represents the unenforceable part of constitutions, 
it guides public discourse and, more importantly, courts that adjudicate 
disputes between the different levels of government. It informs, to a great 
extent, the institutional choices that a state has to make in the body of the 
constitution. 
 
6.1.2 Symbolic codes 
The image of a state is reflected in the various types of symbolism that the 
state adopts. Symbolic codes of a state include the name of the state itself, 
the public holidays it celebrates, the flag(s) used in public buildings, official 
emblems and the like. The argument has been that symbolic codes of a 
multi-ethnic state should reflect the multi-ethnic character of the state.  
 
 
 
                                                 
81  Guibernau 2004.  
82  Conversi 2001. 
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6.1.2.1 Names and terminologies 
The use of terminologies and names has important symbolic values. One 
such important and often contested symbolic value relates to the name of 
the state. Some multi-ethnic states are reluctant to refer to themselves as 
federal despite the fact they reflect many of the characteristics of a federal 
state. Federalism is regarded as the ‘F word’. They believe that describing 
the state as a federal encourages centrifugal tendencies. The Indian 
Constitution, for example, does not describe the state as federal despite the 
federal features that characterise the state. In fact, amendments to describe 
India as a federation were rejected in the Constituent Assembly and official 
documents rarely use the term ‘federal’.83 
 
In other circumstances, the description of the state as federal is taken as an 
important measure that marks the move towards institutional recognition 
and accommodation of ethnic diversity. The 1994 Constitution of Belgium, 
which was based on the 1993 reform, describes Belgium, in the first article, 
as a “federal state, composed of communities and Regions” thus sanctioning 
its move toward a greater degree of accommodation with symbolic value .84 
Several institutions were renamed: central institutions would henceforth be 
called ‘federal’, while regional and community executive bodies would be 
referred to as ‘governments’.  
 
In short, the formal description of the state may reflect the level of the 
commitment of the state to the recognition of ethnic diversity. 
 
 
                                                 
83  Majeed (2005: 183) relates the decision of the Assembly not to describe India  
as a federal to the fact that “they were not thinking of federalism in the usual sense 
at all.” 
84  Karmis and Gagnon 2001: 164. 
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6.1.2.2 Flag 
The use of flags also reflects on the image that a state aims to promote. 
Article 4 of the Spanish Constitution describes ‘the flag of Spain’. It, 
however, also recognises flags and ensigns of the subnational units or 
autonomous communities, as they are referred to in Spain. It stresses that 
these flags may be used together with the flag of Spain on public buildings 
and in the official ceremonies of autonomous communities.85 This 
represents an acknowledgment of the diverse identity that characterises the 
Spanish society. In the United Kingdom, the Union flag is “no more than 
the superimposition of the flags of the component [units]” thus reflecting 
the diverse composition of the Kingdom.86    
 
6.1.2.3 The practicality of adopting an all-inclusive state symbols 
Other symbolic codes that reflect on how the state defines itself include coat 
of arms, the designation by the state of certain dates as public holidays and 
even the naming of places and towns. Historically, in most countries the 
choices of these codes reflects the identity and practice of the historically 
dominant group.87 It has often been argued that a state that promotes itself 
as an accommodating state has to take into account the practices and values 
of the different ethnic groups in the designation of these symbolic codes as 
well. Not all public holidays are, for example, equally important to all 
ethnic groups. Based on their culture and history, some ethnic groups might 
prefer other particular holidays. Multi-ethnic federations like Canada and 
Belgium have tried to be more accommodating by allowing the adoption of 
                                                 
85  Tierney 2004:  243. 
86  Keating, 2001: 104. 
87  Patten 2001:  285 
 
 
 
 
 103  
holidays at the level of the constituent units in addition to state-wide public 
holidays.88  
 
Yet some question the practicality of recognition through symbolical codes. 
They wonder how, as a practical matter, one can include the images, stories, 
languages and festivals of all or even most ethnic groups in the official 
document and codes of states. “How many images can reasonably appear on 
a flag? How many languages can be squeezed into a letterhead? How many 
cultural groups’ festivals can be recognised as public holidays?”89 This, 
admittedly, is one of the challenges of building inclusive state symbols in a 
multi-ethnic state. Yet multi-level governance, in a federal or other form, 
surely can go a long way in responding to these challenges as its different 
levels of government and the corresponding territorial organisation can be 
used to cater for different identities. A good example in this regard is found 
in Scotland where there are even public holidays that are only celebrated at 
the municipal council level.90  
 
6.1.3 Language policy 
As language is often one of the key expressions of ethnic identity, language 
rights in a federal state are “invested with a symbolism of its own”.91 It 
represents the recognition (or the lack thereof) of the linguistic identities of 
the state’s constituent units.92 As a result, language policy often correlates 
with visions of uniformity or visions of diversity.  
                                                 
88  Keating 2001: 105. 
89  Levey 2001: 4. 
90  Keating 2001: 105. 
91  Coulombe 2001: 242. 
92  Language polices go beyond the symbolic realm of recognition. Language  
policies, for example, play an important role in securing access to power and 
influence. They affect access to public services or employment in public services. 
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Multi-ethnic states have adopted different language policies. Some adopted 
a policy modeled on the individualistic approach to the whole issue of 
language rights while others opted for the territorial model of language 
planning.  
 
6.1.3.1 The individualistic model 
Under the personality approach, individuals are entitled to use their mother 
tongue in every part of the country with few territorial restrictions. The 
language policy adopted by Canada during the government of Pierre 
Trudeau, which was later entrenched in the 1982 Constitution, represents 
this approach. Under the Official Languages Act, passed in 1969, both 
French and English were granted official status.93 Canadian citizens were 
thus entitled to federal government services in either official language. 
Minorities, where their numbers justify, were allowed to have their children 
educated in their mother tongue. This policy entailed a symmetrical 
application from coast to coast, whereby French-speaking minorities outside 
Quebec and the English-speaking minority inside Quebec receive equal 
constitutional protection.94  
 
                                                                                                                            
A language policy that restricts the use of languages other than the historically 
dominant language in public notices or in the extension of public services will 
impair access to these services by members of other language groups. It can also 
have the capacity to affect the enjoyment of other rights. A language policy that 
only promotes a single language group can have the effect of discrimination as it 
can create barriers to the exercise of voting, education and other rights. See 
generally Coulombe 2001. 
93  Balmer 1992:445. 
94  Coulombe 2001: 248-249. 
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The individualistic model adopted by Canada aimed to separate linguistic 
differences from the collectivities, territories and institutions which 
constitute them. It emphasises an individualistic orientation of the right. In 
such a vision, linguistic differences are individual attributes, protected from 
coast to coast by a central state. The major criticism leveled against this 
model of language policy is that it, with its integral coast-to-coast 
bilingualism, presents a monist vision of the state in the symbolic realm.95 It 
regards the state as one bilingual nation. It refuses to recognise the 
Francophone community as a territorialised linguistic community.  
 
Another criticism directed against this approach is that it has the tendency to 
perpetuate the dominant position that a historically privileged language 
group enjoys in the state; it is likely to have the effect of strengthening the 
pressures for assimilation to the dominant group.96 This is illustrated by the 
situation in Quebec. In Quebec, before the passing of language laws, the 
cultural division was such that ‘capital spoke English and labor spoke 
French’ thus resulting in English occupying a disproportionate place in 
Quebec in relation to French; that in a way encouraged people from the 
other group to assimilate to that language group thus resulting in providing 
a disproportionate place to the historically dominant group.97 That is why 
Quebec embarked upon what is called ‘the language normalisation 
                                                 
95  Karmis and Gagnon 2001: 152. 
96  Karmis and Gagnon 2001: 155. 
97  The Commissioner of official languages, in his 1995 Report, noted this fact.  
The Report concluded that French still has a disproportionate place in relation to 
English even in the federal administration where the progress in the use and status 
of French is more visible. The Commissioner concluded that French did not 
achieve ‘a fair status as a language of services and work’. The 1996 Census also 
revealed that “the historical pattern of assimilation among francophone minorities 
has not yet been overcome” (Karmis and Gagnon 2001: 155).  
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process’.98 This process, which came as a reaction to the disadvantaged 
position in which the linguistic minorities found themselves, aims at 
restoring the majority status that local languages should assume in their 
localities.  
 
6.1.3.2 The territorial model 
Other states have responded to the language problem by adopting the 
territorial model of language planning. Under such systems, the official 
language would be that of the majority of the locality. This model of 
language policy has the effect of promoting unilingualism. A good example 
in this regard is Belgium where both French-speaking Flanders and Dutch-
speaking Walloon endorse unilingualism with Brussels being the only 
region that has adopted official bilingualism. Individuals moving into the 
either parts of Belgium must assimilate. French–speaking Belgians moving 
to a Flanders territory will have to send their children to Flanders schools 
and vice versa. There is thus a strict policy of both territorial and individual 
monolingualism implying that “[t]here are no all Belgian language rights”.99 
Similarly, in Switzerland, language guarantees are provided on the bases of 
the principle of territoriality. German–speaking Swiss moving to a French-
speaking canton has to leave behind any prior claim to language 
protection.100 In India, as well, the states are allowed to adopt their own 
regional languages. The Constitution specifically provides that the states are 
entitled to adopt one or more of the languages in use in the states including 
Hindi for official purposes of the state. Currently, 22 languages are 
recognised by the Constitution.101  
 
                                                 
98  Tully 1995: 175. 
99  Keating 2001: 128 
100  Fleiner 2000.  
101  Dhavan and Saxena 2006 
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This territorial model of language policy represents recognition of the 
linguistic identities of the constituent units. It also provides ample room for 
a community to develop its language and culture. The only concern might 
be that it risks developing isolated communities and scores low in the 
promotion of inter-group solidarity.  
 
A variant of the territorial model of language policy is adopted in Spain. 
The Castilian language has been the dominant language in Spain for 
centuries while other national languages were suppressed.102 The 1978 
Constitution made Castilian the official language of the central government, 
statewide, while making languages of the autonomous communities co-
officials in their respective communities. It further imposes a duty on all 
citizens of Spain to learn Castilian and the right to use it. This limits the use 
of local languages to the activities of the autonomous communities thus, 
unlike the Canadian Constitution, denying any official status in relation to 
central institutions such as the Government, Congress, the administration 
and the Courts. Although the sanction of the Castilian language as co-
officials of the autonomous communities have played an important role in 
promoting national unity, it has also the adverse effect of further 
entrenching the disproportionate status the local language holds in its own 
                                                 
102  Spain, after almost four decades of Franco’s highly centralised and homogenising  
regime, adopted a new constitution in 1978. During the Second Spanish Republic 
(1931-1938), which was considered by many as a progressive government, 
Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia were allowed to enjoy some level of 
autonomy. This was, however, short lived. The Franco regime, which came to 
power in 193, emphasised unity and condemned all forms of cultural diversity. 
The regime suppressed all regional political institutions and laws. It also 
prohibited the use of Catalans and Basques (Euskera) languages and all sorts of 
symbolic elements (flags, anthems) of the Catalan and Basque identities. See 
Guibernau 2003: 122. 
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localities. As noted by Agranoff, “the language issue has created the single 
most protracted policy conflict” in Spain.103 
 
6.1.3.3 Concluding remarks 
As the Canadian experience shows, the individualistic approach to language 
planning follows a non-exclusive approach and allows individuals to use the 
language of their preference across the country. This may be feasible in a 
country like Canada where there are few linguistic communities. The 
capacity of this approach to give practical effect to the act of recognition in 
a multi-ethnic context is, however, questionable. The tendency of this 
particular language policy to perpetuate the dominant position of a 
historically dominant language is also something that must be looked into. 
Without a deliberate intervention from the state or the constituent 
government, it is likely that the historically dominant language group will 
continue to remain as the majority status language with the languages of 
other groups relegated to a secondary level.  
 
Of course, the territorial model of language planning is not without 
problems either. As indicated above, this particular model scores low in 
terms of promoting inter-ethnic solidarity. It must, however, be noted that 
under certain circumstances such language policy might be the only way to 
hold the state together. In the case of Belgium, for example, it is argued that 
Belgium would not have existed as one state today had such an arrangement 
not been made.104 In Switzerland, too, the territoriality principle to language 
is considered to be instrumental in guaranteeing peace among the different 
language groups.105  
                                                 
103  Agranoff 1994: 73. 
104  Balmer 1992: 443 
105  Fleiner 2000. 
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It is true that the success of a federal arrangement in accommodating ethnic 
diversity cannot be measured solely on the basis of its language rights 
regime. It is, however, generally agreed that a well designed language 
policy goes a long way in contributing either to the effective reconciliation 
of unity and diversity or to the eventual polarisation of the cultural 
communities and further disintegration of the state.106  
 
6.2. Self rule 
As indicated earlier, it is not sufficient that a state recognises its ethnic 
diversity. The acknowledgment of ethnic diversity must be supplemented 
by institutional principles that give practical effect to this act of recognition. 
One such institutional principle that federalism provides is the principle of 
self rule, also known as ‘autonomy’ or ‘self government’.107   
 
There seems to be a general agreement with regard to the locus and meaning 
of the concept of autonomy. Sohn aptly indicates that the concept of 
autonomy lies in a continuum between the concept of non self governing 
territory and an independent state.108 Harhoff also made a similar remark 
when he stated that autonomy lies “between full-fledged state like 
sovereignty and full subordination under national authority”.109 The concept 
of autonomy falls short of granting full fledged independence but enables 
the inhabitants of a territory to control their economic, social and cultural 
                                                 
106   Balmer 1992: 447 – 448. 
107  Although the synonymous nature of the terms self rule, autonomy and self   
government are contested by some authors (see, for example, Welehengama 2000 
and Lapidoth 1997), this thesis uses the terms interchangeably. 
 
108  Sohn 1980: 90. 
109  Harhoff 1986: 30 
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affairs. In this study, autonomy therefore refers to the constitutionally 
entrenched powers of constituent governments to exercise control over 
some or all of their own economic, political, social and cultural affairs. 
 
Self rule finds practical expression through the different territorial and 
institutional structures of a federation. It finds practical expression in the 
geographical configuration a federation. Self rule can also receive 
institutional expression through the division of powers – which powers are 
allocated to which level of government. The other important aspect of self 
rule is financial autonomy. We now turn our attention to these important 
aspects of self rule, starting with territorial autonomy.  
 
6.2.1. Territorial autonomy 
The level of autonomy that an ethnic group enjoys is largely affected by the 
territorial structure of the state. There are two basic approaches in so far as 
the geographical configuration of multi-ethnic federations is concerned.  
 
6.2.1.1 Territorial or administrative federalism 
The first approach, which is often described as territorial or administrative 
federalism, advocates the drawing of boundary lines according to 
geographical or administrative convenience. The territorial units are fixed 
with ‘ruler and compass’. The state declines to reflect its ethnic diversity in 
the territorial division of the federation. The state functions on the premise 
that the various communities form a common society.110  
 
In some cases, the state seeks to ensure that each constituent unit is 
composed of a fairly equal number of diverse ethnic groups in a manner that 
“each constituent unit becomes…a demographic microcosm of the state as a 
                                                 
110  Kriek 1992: 20. 
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whole”.111 This, it is assumed, forces the different communities to cooperate 
with each other in the pursuance of power at the constituent unit level. In 
other cases, this approach may be underlined by the ‘divide and conquer 
policy’ that seeks to avoid territorially based ethnic claims. A classical 
example of this approach is the internal unit demarcation in the United 
States of America. As the USA expanded south westwards from its original 
largely homogenous citizenry of the 13 founding colonies, the territorial 
structuring was done in such a manner that the different ethnic groups will 
never become a majority. The government did this by drawing boundaries 
in manner that WASPs always outnumber the other ethnic groups. State 
boundaries were gerrymandered to ensure that there will be a WASP 
majority in each state.112 The government also used different techniques to 
ensure that immigrants do not concentrate in a particular part of the 
country.113 There is, as a result, “little coincidence between ethnic groups 
and state boundaries”.114 Another example of such territorial structuring is 
Pakistan.115  
 
The major criticism held against this type of internal unit demarcation is 
that it denies territorial autonomy to ethnic groups. By failing to provide 
geographically concentrated ethnic groups a homeland, it denies them 
territorial space which is essential to promote their identity. It also makes 
                                                 
111   Anderson and Stansfield, 2005: 365. 
112   Kymlicka 2005: 112. 
113  “Grants of public land were denied to ethnic groups per se to promote their  
dispersal: William Penn persuaded Welsh immigrants from setting up their own 
self-governing barony in Pennsylvania..” O’ Leary 2004: 80. 
114  Milton Gordon quoted in O’Leary 2004: 80. O’Leary (2004, 80)  states that “the  
sole coincidence is between white majorities and state boundaries, and that is no 
coincidence”. 
115  Rajalopalan 2000. 
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cultural groups continuously vulnerable to the dominant position of the 
majority group or, as the case may be, to the historically dominant group. 
More often than not such territorial structures of federations are underlined 
by strong integrationist and assimilationist dispositions of the state. Hence 
the reason why these federations are often referred to as mono-national 
federations. 
 
6.2.1.2. Ethnic model of federalism 
The other major approach takes ethnicity as the basis for the organisation of 
the state and draws the internal boundary of a state along ethnic lines. This 
approach is famously referred to as the “ethnic” model of federalism. In this 
form of territorial division, “ethno–regional communities are considered as 
most appropriately represented through their spatial compartmentalization 
(states, cantons, provinces, communes), predicated on the belief that ethno – 
regional or national communities should receive due territorial 
recognition”.116 Each territorial area accommodates a separate ethnic or 
linguistic group. Boundaries drawn to coincide with ethnic divisions are the 
basic feature of this approach. This is what commentators meant when they 
talk of a federal society, a situation where the boundaries of the territorial 
units of a federation are coterminous with the boundaries of its ethnic, 
religious or linguistic communities. 117 
 
This type of territorial structure, it is argued, provides extensive self rule for 
an ethnic group by allowing the latter to form a majority in one of the 
constituent units, thereby, “guaranteeing its ability to make decisions in 
certain areas without being outvoted by the larger society”.118 A good 
                                                 
116  Smith 1995: 6. 
117  Smith 1995: 6. 
118  Kymlicka 1995: 27-28.  
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example of such geographical configuration is India, where the federal 
system has been designed in a manner that reflects the linguistic 
collectivities.119 A territorial structure based on linguistic provinces is, in 
fact, an important characteristic of the Indian federation. The process of 
provincial re-demarcation that took place in India has resulted in the 
reorganisation of all non-Hindi-speaking multi-lingual provinces of the 
country “into states in which a single regional language was dominant and 
was generally adopted also as the sole official language of each state”.120 
The process of state reorganisation along ethnic lines, which started in 1956 
with 15 states, has resulted in a federation that currently has 28, by and 
large, linguistically defined states.121    
 
Some suggest that this approach is appropriate “in contexts where the 
divisions among communities are especially deep and intractable, where 
secessionist sentiments is intense, or where divide and conquer approaches 
are either logistically unfeasible, or rejected by one or more 
communities”.122 In such a scenario, it is argued, drawing boundary lines to 
force communal co-existence may simply exacerbate tension, leading to 
further violence. According to this view, it is in situations where relation 
between the different groups has broken down irreparably and ‘ethnic 
claves’ are the only solution, that this model of federalism becomes 
relevant. Currently, this approach is being discussed in a number of divided 
societies including Cyprus, Afghanistan, and Somalia.  
 
It must, however, be noted that ethnic federalism may also be adopted under 
less extreme circumstances. A particular ethnic group may have been 
                                                 
119   Friedrich 1975: 232. See also Rajagopalan 2000. 
120  Brass 1991: 315. 
121  Dhavan and Saxena 2006. 
122   Anderson and Stansfield 2005: 366. 
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dominated culturally, linguistically, economically and politically by a 
historically privileged ethnic group. Under such circumstances, the former, 
in order to avoid the continued dominance of the dominant group, may 
prefer a territorial structure that endows it with a ‘mother state’. It may opt 
for ethnic federalism that structures the geographical configuration of the 
federation along ethnic lines making each ethnic group a majority in its own 
house.123 Such an arrangement, it is argued, empowers geographically 
concentrated ethnic groups with the tools to protect and promote their 
distinctiveness, without fear of the dominant group imposing their values or 
vetoing their aspirations.124 
 
6.2.1.3. The dangers of providing mother state to each large 
ethnic group 
Many may agree with the decision to provide territorial autonomy to 
geographically–concentrated ethnic groups. They may not, however, be 
comfortable with large communities having their own constituent units. 
There is a fear that large ethnic groups carved under a single constituent unit 
pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the state.125 “When the territories 
in question are spatial surrogates of large-scale, potentially self-conscious 
cultural communities, most territorial conflicts become community conflicts 
as well”.126 This is often illustrated by the Belgian experience.  
 
It is argued that the territorial structure of Belgium, which is mainly 
structured along three linguistic lines, has facilitated identity fragmentation 
along ethno-regional lines.  As noted by Murphy, it has done so in at least 
                                                 
123  This also helped to avoid inter-ethnic tension that exists as result of the actual or  
perceived domination of one ethnic group by the other. 
124  Simeon 1998: 47. 
125  Hale 2002: 4 
126  Murphy 1995: 93. 
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two ways. 127 First, it has led to a restructuring of key social and economic 
arrangements to reflect the underlying ethno-regional divisions. It entailed 
the division of a host of social and economic institutions along language 
lines. This has manifested, first, in the division of the Belgian broadcasting 
services into Flemish - and French-language wings, which eventually were 
completely separated. As a result, they are run by distinct entities that had 
“no explicit mandate…to promote integrative values, or even mutual 
understanding across linguistic lines”.128 The other manifestation of 
institutional division and which is more significant is the division of major 
state-wide political parties along linguistic lines. This has, with the 
emergence of regionalist parties that, in the first place, induced the split of 
the traditional state-wide parties, reinforced regional structures and 
identities. It has done so by reducing opportunities for inter-community 
interaction and communication and by waning cross-cutting cleavages. 
Second, issues that are hardly related to language and culture have taken an 
ethnic dimension. This is evidently so in matters that have economic and 
financial implications. Murphy remarks: 
 
[I]ssues that would not necessarily pit north against south were 
interpreted in that way because of the particular configuration of 
Belgian federalism. Under other circumstances one could imagine 
debates over fiscal policy focused on competition between the 
industrial heartland of central Belgium and the agricultural 
periphery of the northeast and the far south. One could imagine 
controversies over school funding between richer cities and poorer 
towns. One could imagine high-profile competitions between 
communes or districts within Flanders and Wallonia for 
telecommunication contracts. Or one could imagine disputes over 
arms sales between pacifist university communities and industrial 
                                                 
127  Murphy 1995: 89. 
128  Murphy 1995: 89. 
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centers where jobs were dependent on continued arms production. 
But the structure of federalism imposed a different geographical 
logic on these matters – a logic in which linguistic identity, 
institutional politics, and social interest are largely spatially 
coincident and mutually reinforcing. 129 
 
Nigeria, the oldest federation in Africa, faced with a similar situation, has 
continuously adjusted its internal boundaries. Initially, Nigeria was 
established as a three-unit federal structure that granted autonomy and 
hegemony to the country’s three major ethnic groups, namely, the Muslim 
Hausa-Fulani of the Northern Region, the Christian Igbo in the South East 
(eastern Region) and the religiously bi-communal Yoruba in the southwest 
(Western Region). This was considered by many as one of the basic 
structural flaws of the Nigerian federation. It is argued that the erection of 
the federation’s boundaries around the country’s major tripartite ethnic 
fault-lines had led to hegemonic ethnocentrism and secessionism on the part 
of the “big three”. As a result, the original geographical configuration of the 
federation was abandoned and replaced with twelve state structures in 1967. 
Since then the number of states has increased continuously. Currently, the 
number of states in Nigeria stands at 36.130   
 
In sum, the experience of multi-ethnic federations suggests that ethnic 
groups have territorial autonomy, implying a delineated part of a territory 
wherein an ethnic group will have the authority to manage its own affairs. 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, however, little consensus is available 
                                                 
129  Murphy 1995: 93. 
130   Watts (1999:63) mentions other states where asymmetry in population, size and  
wealth of the constituent units has contributed to instability including East 
Pakistan prior to its secession, Russia prior to the break up of the USSR in 1991 
and the Czech Republic within Czechoslovakia prior to its split in 1992  
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on the particular territorial structure that multi-ethnic federations should 
adopt in order to provide ethnic groups with territorial autonomy.  
 
6.2.2. Division of powers and competencies 
Division of powers between the federal government and the constituent 
units is one important area where the state can provide practical expressions 
to self rule. An important issue in relation to the distribution of powers and 
competencies in multi-ethnic federations relate to the area of competencies 
reserved to the constituent units. Which competencies are relevant to 
subnational units in a federation that is constructed to respond to the 
challenges of ethnic diversity? Often discussed in a multi-ethnic federation 
is also the issue of whether the system should provide equal powers to all 
subnational units or allow those with ethnic claims to enjoy more powers 
than others. Should the federalism be symmetrical or asymmetrical? These 
are some of the issues that this chapter addresses in the sections that follow.  
 
6.2.2.1. Competencies allocated 
As in many other types of federations, the debate about ‘who does what’ is 
pertinent in federations that are constructed to accommodate ethnic 
diversity. An important question is, however, whether the specific purpose 
of multi-ethnic federations informs the distribution of power and 
responsibilities between the federal state and the constituent units. The 
experience of a few multi-ethnic federations might shed light on the matter. 
 
In Belgium’s ‘double federation’, the legislative body of each linguistically 
defined cultural community is empowered with competences over cultural 
and educational affairs. Thus, the Flemish community has competence over 
matters like education (including post–secondary education), culture 
(language, radio and television, public libraries, cultural agencies) and the 
so-called ‘personalised’ matters in which the use of language is important 
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(i.e. health care, family policy, social welfare, the integration of 
immigrants).131 Furthermore, the Belgian federation provides its constituent 
units the power to negotiate international treaties in areas of their own 
competence.  
 
In Canada, the Constitution Act of 1982 allows provinces to guard their 
autonomy in areas that are of particular significance to them. This is in 
terms of the ‘opt out procedure’, according to which, provinces can avoid 
the effect of constitutional amendment proposed by the central government 
on matters relating to education or other cultural matters.132 This has 
allowed Quebec and other provinces to develop some measure of autonomy 
in cultural maters.133  
 
The effect of the particular purpose of multi-ethnic federation is clearly 
pronounced in the distribution of powers adopted by the Swiss Constitution. 
An important principle underlying the distribution of powers in Switzerland 
is that the cantons (i.e. the constituent units) must have the power to make 
and execute decisions “that are relevant to their cultural development based 
on their cultural heritage”.134 Areas like language, culture and education fall 
under the jurisdictions of cantonal governments. 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that identity-related matters are often left 
to the jurisdiction of the constituent units, allowing the latter to exercise 
                                                 
131   Rocher et al 2001: 18. See also Karmis and Gagnon 2001: 163 
132  Tierney 2004: 194. 
133  Recently, an agreement has been reached between the central government of  
Canada and Quebec to grant the latter a ‘semi- formal presence’ at the UNESCO, 
a UN agency that deals with matters of culture and education (‘PM makes 
UNESCO deal with Quebec’ May 04-2006).  
134  Fleiner 2006: 274 
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control over matters that are of relevance to them. This seems to be 
consistent with the purpose of multi-ethnic federations. However, the 
increasing interrelation of economic and cultural policy suggests that the 
demands of ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic federation cannot be met by 
simply providing them with the power to exercise control over culturally-
related matters. As Watts notes, 
 
[t]he original simple Canadian solution of 1867, which consisted of 
centralizing control of economic policy but assigning responsibility 
for cultural distinctiveness and related social programs to the 
provinces, has been complicated by two developments. One is the 
greatly increased cost of social policies requiring federal financial 
assistance and the other is the realization by regionally concentrated 
ethnic groups that their distinctiveness depends not just upon cultural 
policy but also upon being able to shape economic policies regarding 
their own welfare135   
 
This suggests that the distribution of power and responsibilities should not 
only focus on providing the constituent units control over identity-related 
matters. It suggests the extension of the jurisdiction of subnational units to 
other areas that affect their welfare. 
 
Finally, it is also important to note that the legislative autonomy of 
subnational units is affected by the extent to which their legislative powers 
are full and exclusive. As the experience of multi-ethnic federations shows, 
interferences with the legislative powers of constituent units come in 
different forms.136 In some cases, the federal government is empowered by 
the constitution with specific override or emergency powers to invade or 
                                                 
135  Watts 2006: 331 
136  Examples of such quasi-unitary powers are found in the constitutions of India (see  
Majeed 2005) and Spain (see Conversi 2001).  
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curtail the otherwise jurisdiction of constituent units. In other cases, 
provision is made in some constitutions for the centre to issue directives to 
constituent governments in specified areas. This sometimes goes to the 
extent of allowing the central government to suspend constituent 
governments for prescribed reasons. Although providing the constituent 
governments final decision making powers over matters that are relevant to 
them reinforces their autonomy, few constitutions thus provide full and 
mutually exclusive power to each level of government. The concern in this 
case is the extent and the conditions under which central governments can 
circumscribe constituent units in areas that normally come under the 
jurisdiction of the latter.  
 
6.2.2.2. Symmetry and asymmetry  
In any multi-ethnic state, not all constituent units demand some level of self 
government. In most cases, a state would be composed of units that, due to 
historical reasons, demand a certain level of autonomy and others that 
merely represent regional divisions and do not have any aspiration for self 
government.137 Countries like Canada and Spain illustrate this very well. In 
the case of Canada, Quebec represents the Francophone community, which 
considers itself as a national community entitled to a certain measure of self 
government while the other nine provinces do not harbour nationalist 
aspirations and are simply dubbed as the ‘Anglophone Canada’ or rather 
famously, the ‘Rest of Canada’, merely representing regional divisions. The 
same is true in Spain. In that country, Catalonia, the Basque country and 
Navarre are national communities while the other 14 provinces reflect 
regional divisions of a single nation, Spanish.  
                                                 
137  Kymlicka 2005: 277.  
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As noted by Kymlicka, ethnic-based units usually demand more powers 
than regional-based units.138 They aspire for more self government. The 
extent to which nationality-based units jealously guard their powers in the 
face of attempts of greater centralisation by federal governments is a major 
indication of this fact. Centralisation of powers by the Spanish national 
government would invoke little or no anger from the 14 autonomous 
communities as it would among the Catalonians, the Basque country or 
Galicia and, most importantly, not for the same reason. If any of the 14 
Spanish communities object to the centralisation policy proposed by the 
central government, it would most probably be on the grounds of efficiency 
or democracy. Ethnic-based units would, however, resist such centralisation 
policy based on the ground that these policies pose a threat to the very 
survival of their respective communities. They might, of course, also 
disapprove of such policies based on the same reason that regional based 
units do. The converse, however, is not usually true.  
 
One of the issues that is often raised within the context of such states is 
whether the state should adopt symmetrical or asymmetrical federalism. In 
asymmetrical federalism, all regions are treated equally. No special power, 
be it based on historical claim or the peculiar culture and needs of a 
particular community, is provided to a constituent unit within the federation. 
In asymmetrical federalism, by contrast, one or more of the constituent units 
are vested with special or greater self governing powers than others.139 An 
                                                 
138  Kymlicka 2005: 277. 
139  The notion of asymmetry in the federal context is regards to have been introduced  
by Charles Tarlton (Tierney 2004: 188). Two types of asymmetrical federalism are 
identified: “one dictated by the different size and demography of the units, the 
other determined by the different privileges and rights enjoyed by each unit – 
whether they are territorially or ethnically based” (Conversi 2001: 133). In this 
section, we are concerned with the latter type of asymmetrical federalism. It must, 
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example of asymmetrical federalism, albeit in a limited manner, is the 
Indian federalism, which provides special provision for Kashmir, Nagaland 
and Meghalaya.140 
 
Proponents of asymmetrical federalism argue that this model of federalism 
is important to “take account of the fact that within a state there are 
significant cultural or societal differences among the constituent units”.141 It 
enables the constitutional system to accommodate the distinctive political 
agenda which may well adhere within these constituent units. According to 
this view, providing equal autonomy to all constituent units would belie the 
political reality of the constitute units that compose the federation.  Many 
thus advise the adoption of asymmetrical federalism to respond to the 
specific demands and particularities of the constituent units. 
                                                                                                                            
however, be noted that even this type of asymmetry arises in various ways. 
Asymmetrical mode of arrangement seems to be inherent in any system whose 
constitution provides for shared and concurrent powers. For example, in the case 
of Spain, the autonomy enjoyed by each autonomous community and the powers 
they exercise varies from autonomous community to autonomous community 
despite the fact that the devolution system moved from the asymmetrical mode of 
sub-state national societies to one of symmetry. This variation is mainly attributed 
to the complex matrix of ‘exclusive’, ‘shared’ and ‘concurrent’ powers outlined by 
the constitution that leaves “scope for considerable variation from one statute of 
autonomy to another in terms of the actual powers which are devolved” (Tierney 
2004: 202). Regions may make use of different concurrent powers. National laws 
may apply differently for other reasons, the outstanding example being the 
’notwithstanding’ clause in Canada which enables a province to opt out of most 
provisions of the Charter under prescribed conditions (Ghai 2001:12). This shows 
that asymmetry does not necessarily develop as a result of a deliberate 
constitutional measure that aims to accommodate particular community groups but 
could as well be a necessary consequence of the system. 
140  Majeed 2005. 
141   Tierney 2004: 188. 
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This asymmetrical system of federalism does not, however, lie easy with 
politicians, scholars and especially among members of other ethnic groups 
that do not demand or enjoy such differential treatment. The differential 
treatment offered to Kashmir is, for example, resented in India.142 The same 
is true about how the rest of Canada feels towards Quebec.143 Generally, the 
idea of asymmetrical federalism is strongly resisted by most members of the 
dominant group.144  
 
Many states thus prefer to extend the same level of autonomy to all the 
constituent units without engaging in any kind of differential treatment. 
Rather than responding to a particular nationalist group and limiting the 
extension of a measure of autonomy to that same group, many states have, 
in ‘a coffee to all’ fashion, opted to extend the same treatment to all 
constituent units of the state. In Spain, for example, the system of 
autonomous communities was originally created in order to accommodate 
the nationalist demands of the historic territories, namely the Basque 
country, Catalans and the Galicia. Spain now has 17 autonomous 
communities and treats its constituent units more or less symmetrically. 
Similar developments took place in Sri Lanka which decided to give 
roughly the same option to all the other constituent units despite the fact that 
                                                 
142   See Kashyap 1990. 
143  See Kymlicka 1998. 
144  Kymlicka (2005: 279) founds the resistance to asymmetrical federalism in the  
context of Canada puzzling: “If English Canadians want a strong federal 
government, and the Quebecois want a strong provincial government, asymmetry 
would seem to give both groups what they want. It seems perverse to insist that all 
subunits have the same powers, if it means that English Canadians have to accept 
a more decentralised federation than they want, while French Canadians have to 
accept a more centralised federation than they want”. For Taylor, this represents 
“confused moral thinking” (Kymlicka 2005: 279).  
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the reason for the adoption of the system was only to accommodate the 
Tamils.145  
 
6.2.2.3. Concluding remarks 
The centrality of distribution of powers in managing ethnic diversity is 
patently unquestionable As noted by Watts, however, “where particular 
distribution of powers has failed to reflect accurately the aspirations for 
unity and regional autonomy in a given society, there have been pressures 
for a shift in the balance of powers, or, in more extreme cases, even for 
abandoning the federal system”.146 Notwithstanding this, there is no clear 
agreement on the type of matters as well as the scope of the powers and 
functions that must be entrusted to the federation and the constituent units.  
 
The symmetrical vs. asymmetrical debate is also often central to multi-
ethnic federations. Taking into account the ethnic discord that asymmetrical 
federalism often entails, some may argue that a state would generally be 
better off by extending the same treatment to all constituent units. This is 
especially the case in a situation where there are more than two ethnic 
groups within the state under consideration. In a bi-ethnic state, with the one 
representing the majority of the population, adopting an asymmetrical 
arrangement, whereby the numerically small group would be able to enjoy 
greater level of autonomy, might work fairly well. The political 
entanglement of adopting asymmetrical federalism in a multi-ethnic state, 
however, points towards the adoption of symmetrical federalism. Adopting 
such a system might reduce the tension and resentment that ensues as a 
result of the differential treatment that asymmetrical federalism entails. 
 
                                                 
145  Tiruchelvam 2001: 197-218. 
146  Watts 1996: 103. 
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Furthermore, as noted by Ghai, the adoption of a symmetrical system of 
government or the “conversion of asymmetry into symmetry would not 
necessarily be against the interests of the original claimants of 
autonomy”.147 The only objection of original claimants of autonomy to such 
true devolution of power to all the constituent units could only be based on 
the issue of status. For these groups of constituent units, extending special 
autonomy to them is a matter of acknowledging their distinctiveness. As the 
experience of multi-ethnic federations shows, they regard the decision of the 
national governments to extend the same treatment to all the other 
constituent units of the states as a deliberate attempt to dilute their 
nationalist agenda.148 The issue is thus whether a state should adopt 
asymmetrical federalism with the view to assert the special status of a 
particular group or accord the same power to all constituent units and avoid 
intra-federal tensions. Whichever option a state follows, however, it is 
inevitable that it faces resistance from each community depending on the 
choice it chooses to make. 
 
6.2.3. Fiscal autonomy  
Fiscal autonomy refers to the financial capacity of the constituent units to 
discharge their expenditure responsibilities. A disparity between the 
responsibilities of constituent governments and their revenue-raising 
authority, it is argued, limits the powers of constituent governments. One 
such type of disparity that this section focuses on is vertical imbalance. 
Vertical imbalances occur when constitutionally assigned financial authority 
of the federal and the constituent governments do not correspond with their 
constitutionally assigned expenditure responsibilities.149 These imbalances 
                                                 
147  Ghai 2001: 13. 
148  Agranoff 1994: 61-89. 
149  Watts 2002: 458. Vertical imbalance occurs for two reasons. First, these  
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closely relate to the power of the constituent governments’ taxing powers 
and financial transfers from the central government to the constituent units.  
 
The common feature of financial arrangements in many federations is the 
dominance of the central government.150 The central government takes the 
lion share of revenue collected while most constituent governments have 
limited revenue generating responsibilities. Even when constituent 
governments are entrusted with taxing powers, they do not have powers 
over most of the taxes that generate high revenue. Those revenue sources 
are left to the central government. The constituent units, as a result, rely on 
intergovernmental transfers.  
 
                                                                                                                            
imbalances occur as a result of the disparity that ensues as a result of major taxes 
being allocated to the central government while responsibilities that require 
extensive expenditure are assigned to the constituent units on the ground that these 
responsibilities are best administered at that level. A second reason for the 
imbalance relates to the fact that the significance of different taxes as well as the 
cost of expenditures vary from time to time making any attempt to match revenue 
resources with expenditure responsibilities difficult, if not impossible.     
150  In Spain, for example, the primary power to raise taxes is vested exclusively in the  
central government. With the exception of the Basque and Navarre, “the 
autonomous revenue of communities still make up only a small percentage of their 
total revenues” (Rocher et al 2001: 89. See also Rocher, Rouillard and Lecours 
2001:189). The financial dominance of the federal government is also visible in 
Canada where the financial capacity of provinces regularly fails to fiancé their 
constitutional responsibilities and the federal government takes in more tax 
revenues than it spends its own area of jurisdiction (Knopfff and Sayers 2005).The 
same is true in Nigeria (See Dent 1995; Saberu 2004). In Switzerland, on the other 
hand, the financial autonomy of the constituent governments is far more 
consolidated where fiscal authority is divided between each order of government 
with each of them having direct access to several sources of revenue (Schmitt 
2005). 
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The dominance of the central government in financial matters has a 
crippling effect on the autonomy of constituent governments. In Canada, the 
federal government, which, as indicated above, takes in more revenue than 
it spends in its own areas of jurisdiction, is criticised for using its financial 
muscle to interfere with areas of provincial jurisdiction. The federal 
spending power is regarded by government of Quebec as an “invasion of 
provincial autonomy and, as such, poses a threat to the cultural 
distinctiveness of the Quebec nation”.151 Finally, it is important to note that 
the degree of ‘constituent autonomy’ is affected not only by the extent to 
which the constituent units rely on transfers but also by the level of 
expenditure autonomy they enjoy which is determined by whether the 
transfers are conditional or unconditional in character.  
 
6.3. Shared rule  
Entrusting ethnic groups with self rule goes a long way in terms of 
responding to the challenges of ethnic diversity. That, however, addresses 
only part of the enigma. Representation of the constituent units in the 
institutions of national government is equally important. In the absence of 
such representation, “central power continues to be exercised in accordance 
with the majority principle, and the decisions as to what minority should 
have how much governmental power continues to depend on the 
majority”.152 If ethnic groups are to fully manage their own affairs and 
ensure that decisions taken at the central level do not unduly interfere with 
their autonomy, they must be able to participate in and influence central 
legislative and policy formations. In a nutshell, the constitution must 
                                                 
151  Telford 2003: 23. Gagnon and Herivault (2005: 15) similarly remark that “the  
federal spending power is used and abused by Ottawa to encroach upon all 
provincial jurisdictions”. Similar comments are made by Knopff and Sayers 
(2005: 125). 
152  Fleiner, Klain, Linder and Saunders 2003: 206.  
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provide for institutional arrangements that translate the principle of shared 
rule into institutional reality. However, safeguarding the autonomy of the 
constituent units is not the only, and not even the main, reason why federal 
constitutions should provide for institutions of shared rule. In addition to 
serving as a vehicle for dealing with shared objectives and functions, such 
institutions provide the glue to hold the federation together. Power sharing 
arrangements at the central level generally has the effect of promoting the 
“we feeling”.153 
 
Shared rule thus has the dual aspect of providing ethnic groups with the 
political means to ensure its autonomy while bringing it within the political 
processes of the state. Experience has shown that excessive concentration 
on self rule and the absence of adequate representation and influence in the 
federal institutions for particular ethnic groups may lead to disintegration.154 
The success of shared rule processes and institutions is thus determined not 
only by their effectiveness in guaranteeing the autonomy of constituent 
units but more importantly in the role they play in promoting national unity 
and providing joint spaces through which the various communities can 
communicate.155 
 
Shared rule can be concretised in different institutions of federal 
government. This often includes the federal legislature, the executive as 
well as the judiciary. But shared rule as a device that promotes the co-
management of society goes beyond these state institutions and includes 
intergovernmental relations and resource redistributive schemes. It also 
includes other role players like political parties. In the following pages, we 
                                                 
153  Linz, Stephan and Yadav 2004: 9. 
154  Watts 1996: 103. See also Watts 2001b. 
155  Rocher et al 2001:196. 
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shall discuss, in a comparative context, how this principle of shared rule has 
been given institutional and practical expression in the institutions of 
national government. The next section focuses on lower house.  
 
6.3.1. Lower house and the electoral system 
Traditionally, representation of the constituent units in a federation is 
discussed in relation to second chambers. There is, however, an emerging 
consensus that the representative character of the central government can be 
enhanced by ensuring representation in the lower house, too. The argument 
has been that by establishing a lower house that is generally seen as 
representative of the entire population and not simply the majority, a state 
can do a better job of accommodating ethnic diversity. The 
representativeness of the lower house depends on the electoral system.  
 
The main choice of electoral system is between plurality–majority systems 
and proportional representation systems. In the former, which is also usually 
referred to as the first-past-the-post system, the winner is the candidate with 
the most votes in a constituency. The proportional representation system, on 
the other hand, allocates seats to all candidates based on the votes they 
received. Accordingly, a party that wins 40 per cent of the votes gets 
approximately 40 per cent of the seats. A small party that fails to secure a 
significant vote would not go empty handed. Unlike the majority system 
that exaggerates the share of seats for the leading party, proportional 
representation equates a party’s share of the national votes with its share of 
the parliamentary seats.156  
 
A general point made by many is that proportional electoral systems are 
most likely to facilitate accommodation between diverse ethnic groups. 
                                                 
156  Reynolds 1999: 90. 
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One, in fact, has gone so far as to suggest that “the surest way to kill the 
idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American 
system of first–past-the-post”.157 Multi-ethnic societies which are often 
threatened by centrifugal politics need institutions like proportional 
representation electoral system that paves the way for moderation and 
compromise.158 It can also serve as a confidence building mechanism as it 
enables numerically weak ethnic groups to gain parliamentary 
representation. The PR system, it is argued, facilitates a more representative 
legislature. 
 
The practice in multi-ethnic federations seems to endorse the views of the 
proponents of the proportional representation system. In Canada, which has 
adopted the majority electoral system, there is an inherent 
overrepresentation of pluralities with minority parties tending to be 
underrepresented. Switzerland, on the other hand, employs a proportional 
representation system, which has accurately reflected the distribution of 
votes and hence the views of the constituent units. Belgium has also 
complemented federalism with a proportional representation voting system. 
Proportional representation in both federations “has tended to encourage 
multi-party systems, making party coalitions more common in their federal 
government”.159 
 
It is further argued that in proportional electoral system both large and small 
parties, with the view to maximise their overall national votes, create 
regionally and ethnically diverse lists.160 The presence of political parties 
with state-wide objectives in a multi-ethnic state is important as it creates 
                                                 
157  Lewis 1965: 71 
158  Reynolds 1999: 93 
159  Watts 2005: 18. See also Hale 2005: 5 
160  Reynolds 1999:  97 
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the opportunities for a dialogue between communities and increases the 
level of mutual understanding.161 It assists in the promotion of one of the 
main objectives of shared rule, namely inter-ethnic solidarity.  
 
A corollary effect of adopting the proportional representation system is that 
the focus on enhancing the representative character of the lower house 
through this particular electoral system enables political actors to develop a 
‘federation-wide consensus.’ By providing parties the opportunity to 
communicate and cooperate with each other, it promotes mutual 
understanding and the co-management of society. It also encourages the 
settlement of autonomy related questions through negotiation and 
compromise which are the hallmarks of federalism. This is very important 
in the context of multi-ethnic states. As noted by Watts, “in the process of 
shared rule, it is not just the institutional structures but the ways in which 
political parties operate and the interrelationships between federal and state 
(or provincial) branches of political parties that affect the extent to which a 
federation-wide consensus may be developed”.162  
 
Another associated consequence of the proportional electoral system is that 
it allows smaller nationalist parties the opportunity to hold the balance of 
power.163 This is in a situation where a state–wide party falls short of an 
overall majority seats.  In such scenarios, regional parties can enter into a 
bargain with the state-wide party whereby they can lend their support and in 
return gain increased autonomy and more concessions from the state. This is 
illustrated by the Spanish experience where regionally-based nationalist 
parties advance their claim for enhanced autonomy and recognition using 
                                                 
161  Rocher et al 2001: 180. See also Covell 1987: 57-82. 
162  Watts 2001b: 45. 
163  Rocher et al 2001: 187. 
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the national political process.164 This is important for multi-ethnic 
federations for the same reasons mentioned above. The involvement of 
nationalist parties in the national political terrain, though likely to create 
pressure on the system, could also be a blessing in disguise as it allows the 
nationalist parties to communicate and cooperate with the state-wide parties 
and with nationalist parties of other regions. This interaction between the 
party systems contributes a lot to effectively manage the tensions between 
the recognition and autonomy of communities, on the one hand, and the 
integrity of the state, on the other.  
 
However, the above stated benefits of the proportional electoral system 
should be seen against the criticism that it exacerbates the ethnic tension 
that characterises many of these multi-ethnic states. For Lardeyert, this 
system is the least suitable electoral system for ethnically divided societies 
as it “‘tends to reproduce ethnic cleavages in the legislature”.165 This is 
illustrated by the Bosnian experience. In Bosnia, where the PR electoral 
system is adopted, ethnic groups are represented in parliament in proportion 
to their numbers. Parties, established along ethnic lines, rely exclusively on 
the support of the community they seek to represent in order to secure seats 
in parliament. This has reinforced the ethnic divide that characterise the 
country. Reilly and Reynolds thus argue that “Bosnia’s 1996 elections were 
effectively an ethnic census, with electors voting along ethnic lines and each 
of the major nationalist parties gaining support almost exclusively from 
their own ethnic groups”.166  Based on this fear, some advise the adoption of 
a system that avoids division along ethnic lines and recommends to “oblige 
                                                 
164  Rocher et al 2001: 187. 
165  Lardeyert 1991: 35. 
166  Reilly and Reynolds 1999: 30. 
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members of each group to run against one another on (transethnic) political 
and ideological grounds in a single member district”.167 
 
To sum up, in considering an electoral system for multi-ethnic societies, 
emphasis is often given to inclusivity and electoral system that facilitates 
representative legislature. Notwithstanding the centrality of the design of 
the electoral system, it is important to note that there are a variety of factors 
that affect the impact of an electoral system on the accommodation of ethnic 
diversity.168 The nature of the conflict and the society in question, especially 
the settlement pattern of ethnic groups, are important variables that 
determine the impact of an electoral system as an institution that responds to 
the challenges of ethnic diversity.  Multi-ethnic states should thus take all 
these factors into account when determining their choice of an electoral 
system  
 
6.3.2. Second chamber 
The principle of shared rule gets institutional expression through second 
chambers,169 usually associated with regional representations.170 In multi-
ethnic federations, the primary role of second chambers is representing 
                                                 
167  Lardeyert 1991: 35. The argument forwarded by Lardeyert is criticised on the  
ground that it represents the usual tendency of concealing ethnic diversity; the 
usual inclination to ignore ethnic identity and promote overarching identity. This, 
as indicated throughout this thesis, engenders tension and violent response. 
168  Reilly and Reynolds 1999. 
169   An association has often been noted between federalism and bicameralism. For  
Duchacek, bicameralism is one of the ten yardsticks of federalism. Wheare did not 
see logical requirement for the national government of a federation to contain an 
upper house based on equal regional representation. He, however, considers it 
essential if federal government is to work well (Sharman 1987: 82 – 99). 
170  As a matter of convenience , this section and the section hereafter use the phrase  
‘regional representation” to refer to the representation of constituent units. 
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regional interests.171 They are regarded as a forum for introducing the 
interests of the constituent units into the national political process. 
 
6.3.2.1. Composition of second chamber 
The capacity of second chambers to effectively represent regional interests 
is closely related to the appointment system and particularly to the manner 
in which members are appointed or elected to the senate. In some cases, 
second chambers are composed of the delegates of the executives of the 
state government who vote as a bloc on the instruction of each state cabinet. 
A good example in this regard is the Bundesrat of Germany whose members 
are delegates of the Land governments that are instructed by the latter. In 
other cases, India being a good example, they are composed of 
representatives chosen by state legislatures or by special procedures 
established by them. There are also systems where members of second 
chambers or at least half of them are directly elected.172 In Switzerland, 
members of the second chamber are directly elected. Such representation 
systems generally provide an opportunity for voicing regional preferences 
and protecting regional interests. There is, of course, no guarantee that 
members of such senates will usually vote along constituent government 
lines.173 The fact that the power to appoint representatives to second 
                                                 
171  Regional representation is not the only purpose of second chambers. In some  
jurisdictions, the constitutional role of second chambers is to check the power of 
other elements in the governmental process to achieve a system of limited 
government. This mainly has been the argument advanced in the Federalist 
Papers. See Sharman 1987: 85. 
172  Sharman 1987: 84 
173    The appointment process by itself, of course, does not guarantee effective  
representation of regional interests in the second chambers. It is a common 
practice in some federations that members of the senate more often vote along 
political-party and interest-group lines than along constituent government lines. 
See Kincaid and Tarr 2005: 430. 
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chambers resides with the constituent units themselves does, nevertheless, 
put members in a better position to defend and advance regional interests.  
 
The effect of the appointment system to second chambers becomes more 
apparent when one looks at federations that do not provide for any of the 
representation systems mentioned above. Canada is a good example. In 
Canada, the Senate was originally intended to represent the interests of the 
provinces. As a result of the process by which members are appointed, 
however, the senate has conspicuously failed to achieve this role.174 
Members of the Senate are nominated by the federal Prime Minister, 
providing the federal government exclusive power over the appointment of 
senators. The regional composition of the senate is thus nominal. With 
senators that, once appointed, are entitled to hold offices until the age of 75, 
the federal government is in a position to pack the chamber with its 
sympathisers. The process of nomination by the federal government 
precludes the Senate from being an “effective voice of regional or 
provincial interests”.175   
 
The appointment system is slightly different in Spain but with the same 
effect. The majority of senators are elected from the provinces.176 Each 
province appoints four senators while each autonomous community 
appoints only one senator, with an additional one senator for every one 
million inhabitants in the territory. The problem with this particular system 
is that representation is largely based on provinces and not autonomous 
communities, which are ‘the true representatives’ of ethnic groups in Spain. 
As Tierney notes, “this heavy bias in favour of the provinces belies political 
                                                 
174  Simeon 1998: 54.  
175  Hogg 1997: 251. See also Keating 2001; Tierney 2004. 
176  Guibernau 1995: 248. 
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reality given that the autonomous communities are the far more important 
tier of government”.177 With only a few of the senators being elected from 
the autonomous communities, it is difficult to consider the Senate as an 
organ that represents regional interests.178 
 
Belgium, unlike Canada and Spain, has a senate that represents the language 
communities. Forty senators are elected directly with provision for 
linguistic balance between Flemish and French speakers.179 The other 
twenty one members come from the three linguistic community councils 
while ten are co-opted by the other senators. Similarly in Nigeria, each State 
is divided into three senatorial districts, with each electing senator.180 Abuja, 
the federal capital territory, has one senator. Each state is thus equally 
represented in Nigeria’s Senate. 
 
                                                 
177  The absence of formal representation of the autonomous communities in the  
Senate can be partly explained by the fact that the whole state–autonomous 
communities’ relation was the result of bilateral agreements that merely focused 
on the autonomy of the latter. As Heywood aptly puts it, the autonomous 
communities enjoy self rule in a number of areas while “there exists few 
institutional mechanisms to allow shared rule with central government, which 
severely limit regional involvement in national legislative and executive 
decisions” ( As quoted in Tierney 2004: 221). 
178  Efforts have been underway to reform the senate but in vain. In 1994, the General  
Commission for the Autonomous Communities was established in the senate. The 
main function of this Commission was to facilitate the transformation of the senate 
into a Chamber of Autonomous Communities. Although there is an emerging 
consensus that the senate should be a reflection of the autonomous communities, 
there is disagreement on whether senators should be directly elected by citizens of 
the autonomous communities or appointed to the senate by the legislature among 
their members (Conversi 2001: 126 ).  
179   Keating 2001: 120   
180   Ayua and Dakas 2005: 258. 
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An important issue related to the composition of second chambers is 
whether the constituent units should be represented equally. In the United 
States and Australia, the constituent units are represented equally. Other 
federations, unlike the USA and Australia, have rejected the equality 
principle and adopted a weighted representation that nevertheless favours 
smaller subnational units. The degree of weighting varies from one 
federation to another.181 At one end is Switzerland where the second 
chamber or the Council of the States, as it is known in Switzerland, is 
composed of two members from each full canton and one member each 
from the so-called half-cantons. At the other end of the extreme is India 
where the weighting is determined by a formula that is largely based on the 
respective populations of states. The largest state has 31 members while the 
smallest states have one member each. Belgium and Canada similarly 
follow a weighted representation that fall between these two extremes.   
 
6.3.2.2. Powers of second chamber 
In addition to the appointment system, the effectiveness of second chambers 
in representing regional interests depends on the specific powers allocated 
to these institutions by the constitution. This especially relates to their 
effectiveness in protecting the jurisdictions of the constituent units. The 
Belgian second chamber seems to be in a better position to protect regional 
interests. A special majority provision regarding laws pertaining to cultural 
and regional matters is specified in the Constitution requiring that such laws 
get a two thirds overall majority of the Senate before they become a law.182 
Moreover, if three-quarters of the members of the Senate’s linguistic 
group183 consider that a decision in a legislative matter, not covered by the 
                                                 
181  Watts 20005: 12. 
182   Peeters 1994: 204-205 
183   The Constitution provides for the creation of linguistic groups in both houses of  
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special majority provision, can be harmful to their community, an additional 
mechanism-the so-called ‘Alarm Bell Procedure’- providing parliamentary 
exceptional procedure comes into effect. In addition, the Senate in Belgium 
enjoy powers over constitutional matters, international relations, the 
organisation of the courts and relations among the federal government and 
the regions and communities. This shows that the Senate in Belgium, by and 
large, is in a position to effectively represent the interests of the federated 
units. Similarly, the Senate in Canada has almost co-equal powers with the 
lower house.184 The lower house may not override the Senate’s vote except 
in the case of constitutional amendment, where it exercises only suspensive 
veto. The capacity of the Senate to vigorously protect regional interests is, 
however, greatly constrained by the fact that the regional composition of the 
Senate is nominal. 
 
6.3.2.3. Concluding remarks 
Second chambers form a critical component of an institutional response to 
the challenges of ethnic diversity as they represent the major institutional 
translation of the principle of shared rule. A major point that emerges from 
the foregoing is that the effectiveness of the second chamber in protecting 
the interests of the constituent units is the function of its composition and 
the power entrusted to it by the constitution. 
 
6.3.3. Representation in the national executive 
Shared rule can also get practical expression through the representation of 
the constituent units in the central executive, what political scientists call 
consocitional or power sharing practices in the executive.185 Most multi-
                                                                                                                            
parliament. 
184   Knopff and Sayers 2005: 121 
185    Executive power sharing practice constitutes the core of consociationalism.  
 
 
 
 
 139  
ethnic federations including the oldest federations have incorporated 
consocitional tradition in their constitutional or political practices.  
 
In Canada, conventionally, it has always been considered important that the 
Cabinet reflect some degree of balance with ‘credible team of ministers’ 
coming from Quebec.186 Switzerland’s executive is, on the other hand, 
constitutionally structured as a seven–member Federal Council. The 
Constitution mandates the Federal Council to represent the country’s 
geographic and linguistic diversity.187 In Belgium, the Cabinet is 
constitutionally mandated to be composed of equal numbers of Flemish and 
Francophone ministers.188 Representation of regional interests in the central 
executive is less significant in Spain. However, there has usually been 
prominent Catalans and Basques in the central Cabinet.189 It is also argued 
that “India has been at its most stable when its executive has been 
                                                                                                                            
 
According to Lijphart, the leading theorist of consociation, consociationalism has 
four features: a power sharing coalition which enjoys more than a simple majority 
of voters; the different communities must have some degree of autonomy; there 
must be proportionality in the public sector in government institutions, public 
employment, public expenditure and finally, there is required to be a system of 
protection for minorities by mutual vetoes or concurring majorities (Thompson 
2000: 236 – 237). Consociational decision-making bodies is understood in this 
thesis in the narrow sense of ensuring representation of the different ethnic groups 
in the institutions of the national government as opposed to the wider notions of 
consociationalism and a strict quota system. 
 
186  Peeters 1994: 204. 
187  Schmitt 2005: 360-361. 
188  Keating 2001:121.  
189  Keating 2001: 121.  
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descriptively inclusive of the state’s diverse religions and linguistic 
communities”.190 
 
A more extensive and constitutionally mandated regional representation in 
the central executive comes from Nigeria, which has adopted what it calls 
‘the federal character’.191 This constitutional principle requires the 
composition and conduct of public institutions to reflect the country’s 
ethnic, religious, regional and related diversities. The president must win 
regionally dispersed support, not just a simple national majority. This means 
the president can be elected only on obtaining a plurality of voters plus at 
least a quarter of the votes in two thirds of the states. The principle also 
requires the appointment of at least one minister from each state and 
stresses that the minister should be an ‘indigene’ of such state.192  The 
federal character must also be reflected in the other federal executive 
bodies.  Thus, an ‘indigene’ of each state of the federation must also be 
represented in several other important federal bodies, including the National 
Economic Council, the Revenue Allocation Commission and the Federal 
Character Commission.  
 
One of the major criticisms levelled against power sharing practice is that it 
mainly aims at accommodating elites. It assumes that ethnic depoliticisation 
can be achieved through the actions of their incorporated elites. There is 
some truth in the argument that consocitional practice mainly benefits elites 
who do not necessarily stand for the interests of their constituent units. 
However, consocitional practice within a federal arrangement is one among 
many of the ethnic managing devices that are adopted to accommodate 
                                                 
190  Adeney 2002:.8-33  
191  Suberu 2004: 11. 
192  Suberu 2004: 11. 
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ethnic diversity. That limits some of the pitfalls of consocitional practice.  
Moreover, the political practice in most federations has become much more 
open to public scrutiny that elites can no longer afford to ignore the interest 
of their regional constituency.193 As noted by Bakvis, “political elites are 
finding it difficult to move away from publicly stated positions or to bridge 
differences in public opinion”.194 A remaining question is whether the 
representation of different ethnic groups in the national executive should be 
a constitutional mandate or a political practice. This is something that can 
be determined on case by case basis taking into account the saliency of 
ethnicity in the state under consideration.  
 
6.3.4. Fiscal equalisation as fiscal glue of national unity 
Disparities in income and wealth among constituent units exist in most 
federations. These differences may be traceable to “historical, stochastic or 
geographic sources”.195 The uneven territorial distribution of capital and 
natural resources as well as the differences in the cost of providing public 
services greatly contribute to this fact.196 This causes specific types of fiscal 
disparities which are usually referred to as horizontal imbalances. These are 
variations occurring across constituent units in their ability to raise revenue 
to meet the public expenditure needs of their residents.  
 
                                                 
193  Smith 1995: 15. 
194  Bakvis 1987:  279 -305. 
195  Buchanan 2002: 9  
196  Dafflon and Vaillancourt (2003: 396-397) distinguish the reason for fiscal  
disparities as reasons on the expenditure side and those on the revenue side. 
Included on the expenditure side are demography, high population and/or 
scattering, topography etc. On the revenue side are listed differences in economic 
development, industrial specialisation, central versus peripheral positions, 
availability of natural resources etc.  
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Disparities in wealth among the constituent units are one of the most 
common causes of grievance in multi-ethnic federations. They often have a 
“corrosive effect on internal cohesion”.197 They can undermine political 
stability and pose a threat to the continued existence of the federation. The 
problem is acute in countries where fiscal disparities are the result of 
geographically concentrated high-revenue resources such as oil.198 A state 
that seeks to promote state wide solidarity has to address disparities in 
wealth. It has to use fiscal equalisation policies, which seek to reduce fiscal 
disparities among constituent units by using transfers of monetary 
resources,199 as the ‘fiscal glue of national unity’.200 Hence the reason why 
such policies are sometimes referred to as “solidarity” or “cohesion” 
policies.201 
                                                 
197  Watts 2001b: 44.  See also Knopff and Sayers 2005: 125. 
198  Knopfff and Sayers 2005: 125 
199  Dafflon and Vaillancourt 2003: 397. Equalization schemes in most federations are 
effected by federal transfers to the poorer units of government. The only exception 
is Germany which constitutionally provides for inter-state transfers. The source of 
the revenue that is to be shared and redistributed for the purpose of an equalisation 
scheme may also come from different sources following different procedures. In 
some cases, the revenue to be used for an equalisation scheme comes out of the 
general resources of the paying unit(s) and established in their annual budget. In 
some other cases, the exact calculation of the amount is explicitly stated in the 
constitution or in a law, in the form of revenue sharing from at least one but 
preferably several or all tax sources used at the central level. Still, in some other 
cases, the constitution establishes an equalisation fund fuelled with several tax-
sharing sources written in the law. See Dafflon and Vaillancourt 2003.  
200  Kincaid 2005: 426. 
201  Kincaid (2005: 426 – 427) remarks that such fiscal equalisation policies can be  
viewed as “covert bribery whereby wealthy constituent units entice poorer units to 
remain in the federation or, alternatively, as covert extortion whereby 
independence-minded constituent political communities extract redistributive 
payments as a price for peace or union”.  
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Most multi-ethnic federations have some formal equalisation scheme. In 
Canada, for example, the central government makes unconditional transfers 
to address the horizontal imbalance between rich and poorer province; the 
Constitution Act of 1982 has further entrenched this commitment to the 
principle of equalisation payments and to promoting equal opportunities.202 
The federal government in Switzerland engages in financial equalisation by 
redistributing revenues from most taxes based on the financial strength of 
the cantons.203  In countries like Belgium, Canada, Spain and Switzerland, 
equalisation schemes are based on agreed formula while in India and 
Nigeria they are based on periodic recommendations of permanent or 
temporary, and usually independent, commissions.204  
 
Equalisation schemes may not, however, be seen favourably by all 
communities. Catalonia, which is one of the richest regions in Spain, has 
continuously complained on revenue matters. It claims that it contributes 
“far more to the central Spanish purse”205  than it receives. A major cause of 
disgruntlement among the Flanders community in Belgium is also a similar 
claim that “national fiscal policies effectively put inhabitants of Flanders in 
the position of subsidising Wallonia”.206 
                                                 
202  Section 36 of the Constitution Act 1982 states that the federal government is  
committed to the principle of  making equalisation payments to ensure that 
provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably 
comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation. 
203  Schmitt 2005: 372.  
204  Kincaid 2005: 426 
205  McRoberts 2001: 69 
206  A member of the Flemish nationalist Student Union, in 1992, was widely quoted  
for claiming that every Flemish family could buy a new automobile every four 
year if it were not for annual revenue transfers from Flanders to Wallonia 
(Murphy 1995: 92). 
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Even when there is consensus on the need for an equalisation scheme, 
disagreements ensue with regard to the process and especially the 
representation of constituent units in the process of allocation. For example, 
in some cases, where an equalisation scheme is based on agreed formula, 
the federal government dominates the process of arriving at an 
agreement.207 Some of the processes do not involve representatives of 
constituent units.  In federations where independent commissions, which are 
usually expert commissions, are established to provide recommendations on 
allocations after hearing representations from the constituent governments, 
there is no guarantee that the central executive implements the 
recommendations of these commissions. The need to involve constituent 
units in the processes of allocations is, however, being increasingly 
recognised in most federations. This is reflected in the plethora of 
intergovernmental councils, commissions and committees established to 
deal with such financial arrangements.   
 
6.4. Federalism and the challenges of dispersed ethnic groups and 
intra-substate minorities 
The translation of the principles of self rule and shared rule into tangible 
institutional arrangements goes a long way in terms of accommodating 
ethnic diversity within the context of geographically concentrated ethnic 
groups. It is, however, now accepted that it is impossible to create an 
ethnically homogenous subnational unit. Both assimilation and the extreme 
measure of ethnic cleansing have not been able to leave us with ethnic 
groups that neatly and precisely fall into separate geographical units. 
Neither has any territorial federal arrangement been successful in 
demarcating the territorial matrix of the federation into separate ethnically 
                                                 
207  Watts 2001: 34-35. 
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defined territorial units. In cases where territorial autonomy within 
federalism is possible for concentrated ethnic groups, there has usually been 
ethnic minorities scattered in the midst of regional majorities. In the case of 
India, for example, the federation “has done a lot in containing ethno-
linguistic diversity tension by reorganizing the states to reflect language 
diversity, yet such reorganization has still left minorities within the state 
boundaries at the mercy of the states”.208 The extensive movement of 
citizens across internal borders also contributes to the rarity of an ethnically 
pure political unit. Intra-substate minorities are therefore present in most, if 
not all, federated units. As Cairns remarks, the vision of a federal system 
with coinciding ethnic and ‘provincial’ boundaries is “chimerical”.209 This 
brings to the fore issues about the majority-minority tension210 at the level 
of the constituent units. It invokes the problem of the status and treatment of 
those who do not belong to the empowered regional majority. 
 
6.4.1 The plight of intra-substate minorities 
There is often a fear that minorities face stronger discrimination from 
regional authorities than they usually encounter from central government. 
As Preston King points out 
 
We cannot be sure that federalism will do more than protect the 
interests of that sub-state section of the overall community which 
controls or dominates the locality…the power accorded to local 
oligarchy to rule, whatever its description, will always in some 
                                                 
208  Brass 1991: 117. 
209  Cairns 1995: 26. 
210  As Cairns (1995: 33) puts it, regionally empowered majorities are prone to see  
regional minorities in their midst as practical challenge to their cultural integrity – 
as the enemy within - while regional minorities may see “power wielding regional 
ethnic majorities as potentially hostile to whatever cultural or other difference the 
minority individual possesses” Cairns 1995: 33. 
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degree permit it to deal unfairly, sometimes grossly so, with those 
subjects to it and most especially where the latter take no part in, or 
are automatically denied any significant impact upon, local 
deliberations.211 
 
This especially becomes visible in the areas of language policy and 
education. In states whereby each constituent unit is allowed to promote its 
own language, the vexing question has been whether intra-substate 
minorities have to assimilate to the language of the regionally dominant 
group or would they still be allowed to use their language. Should members 
of the intra-substate minority send their children to a school where the 
medium of instruction is the language of their community or are they simply 
forced to take them to the school that uses the regional majority language as 
a medium of instruction?  
 
The issue becomes more problematic in situations where a regional 
government adopts a policy or linguistic normalisation laws that attempt at 
elevating the regional language to a majority status or seeks to promote the 
regional language by reversing the disproportionate place it occupies in its 
own region. The Charter of the French Language in Quebec, which is 
famously known as Bill 101, is a good example that illustrates this situation. 
Adopted by the Parti Quebecois government in 1977, Bill 101, following 
the territorial model of language planning, sought to promote the use of 
French and at the same time restrict the use of English. It obliges both 
immigrants and Canadians moving to Quebec to send their children to a 
French school and mandated the display of commercial signs in French 
only.212  
                                                 
211   King 1982: 54-55. 
212  Court decision has abrogated part of this legislation. The Supreme Court, in 1979,  
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The treatment of intra-substate minorities has also been the cause for some 
of the most violent conflict the world has witnessed in modern times. In the 
former Yugoslavia, the territorial structure was arranged along ethnic lines 
but failed to completely coincide territorial boundaries with patterns of 
ethnic settlement resulting in disgruntled minorities. As a result, “the 
breakup of Yugoslavia has produced unstable successor states with internal 
minorities, and has led to savage warfare and genocide in the service of 
ethnic cleansing”.213  
 
Of particular importance in any multi-ethnic federation is thus the need to 
take into account the interest and rights of intra-substate minorities. As 
Preston King noted, account must be taken of whether the adopted federal 
arrangement prejudices the rights and interests of the non-dominant 
communities within the constituent units. Securing the rights of minorities 
which are created by autonomy arrangements is very crucial for the long 
term success of any federal arrangement.214  
 
6.4.2 Bill of Rights as a device to protect minorities  
Judicially enforceable bill of right are often regarded instrumental in 
protecting intra-substate minorities. Canada, for example, relies on the 
                                                                                                                            
decided that provisions making French the only official language of legislation 
and justice violate section 133 of the British North America Act, 1867, which 
guarantees legislative and judicial bilingualism in Quebec. Part of the law that 
restricted the rights to education in English was struck down entitling not only 
people who had been educated or whose parents had been educated in English in 
Quebec but also those who had been educated English elsewhere in Canada  to 
have their children receive education in that language. The Court in 1988 also 
struck down the rule that imposes French as the only language to be used on 
commercial signs (see generally Swinton 1995). 
213  Carins 1995: 27. 
214  Ghai 2001: 22. 
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constitutionally entrenched bill of rights in order to protect regional 
minorities. An array of both individual and groups rights are included in the 
1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Among the included groups rights 
are rights of minority language and educational rights, which are judicially 
enforceable.  
 
The issue of intra-substate minorities is also a problem in the linguistically 
divided Belgium. When the linguistic border was fixed in 1963 in Belgium, 
members of the Francophone community found themselves demarcated into 
the Flemish speaking part of the country. In order to accommodate these 
minorities, “language facilities” were introduced in the Flanders along the 
language border.215 In a clear exception to the rule of territoriality and with 
a view to protect linguistic minorities, these facilities allow individual 
inhabitants the right to communicate in their own language with a public 
authority, even if the authority is not from the same linguistic group. And 
the local municipality, upon a request from a minimum number of parents, 
has to offer primary education in the language of the minority group. 
 
Many agree that a bill of rights, enforced with a strong and independent 
judiciary, can provide some level of protection to regional minorities. The 
major criticism leveled against this approach is that it only provides for 
                                                 
215  There is a controversy with regard to the status of these facilities and rights. For  
the Flemish region, these facilities are seen as temporary exception to the principle 
of territoriality, something that have to be abandoned after the linguistic minorities 
learn the language of the region sufficiently to be able to communicate with the 
public authorities.  For the Walloons, on the other hand, the French speakers in 
Flanders are minorities that need to be provided with formal protection. The 
facilities are not a transitional measure. Disagreement continues between the 
Walloons and the Flemish over the interpretation of the language facilities 
(Deschouwer 2005). 
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negative rights, which protect individuals against discrimination and 
majoritarian abuse. The only positive right that such a bill of rights can 
provide is a constitutionally guaranteed minority language education right. 
This becomes especially insufficient when there is an important minority 
that may not be satisfied with negative rights. They may demand power that 
allows them to participate in the management of the constituent unit. They 
don’t want to be treated as guests whose rights must be respected. They, as 
a result, often emphasise the deficiency of the bill of rights in protecting 
regional minorities and call for other complementary protective 
mechanisms. 
 
6.4.3 Non-territorial autonomy 
Another mechanism that focuses on guaranteeing self rule to regional 
minorities is what is generally referred to as non–territorial autonomy. This 
form of autonomy offers regional minorities autonomy over certain 
functions of relevance to them, which recognises their different culture and 
identity.216 Russia is known for its application of this form of autonomy. 
Non-territorial autonomy arrangement has been adopted in Russia in 1996 
with the passing of the National Cultural Autonomy Act.217 The Act allows 
individuals to form National Cultural Associations which exercise 
jurisdiction over culture, language, education and the media. It is argued 
that such an arrangement of self rule responds to the concerns of minorities 
that are ‘too dispersed or few in numbers’ to exercise territorial 
autonomy.218 
                                                 
216  Moore 2004: 1330. This form of autonomy comes in different names: “cultural  
autonomy”, “corporate autonomy”, “corporate federalism” and “functional 
autonomy”. This form of autonomy was used by the Ottomans originally to 
manage religious diversity. 
217  Moore 2004: 1330. 
218  Estonia is also known for its application of non-territorial autonomy. It first  
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6.4.4. Representation of minorities  
Some multi-ethnic federations go beyond self-rule to protect intra-substate 
minorities. In these federations, the position of intra-substate minorities is 
enhanced by a system that allows them to be represented in the subnational 
decision-making bodies.  In Switzerland, for example, all cantons have a 
high degree of proportional representation.219 No political party enjoys 
absolute power in any canton. The collegial cantonal governments provide 
adequate representation for minorities. In Valais, one of the Cantons, for 
instance, the cantonal constitution provides that members of the cantonal 
government be elected in a manner ensuring that the three regions of the 
canton are taken into account. This suggests that the electoral system as well 
as other institutions and processes can be used to ensure the representation 
                                                                                                                            
applied this form of autonomy in 1925 with its Cultural Autonomy Law.  Ethnic 
groups that number at least 3,000 were, according to this law, allowed to establish 
a cultural council capable of taxing the groups’ members and exercising 
jurisdiction over a wide range of cultural activities, including education, culture, 
libraries, theatres, museums and sports. This was again reintroduced in Estonia in 
1993 (Coakley 1994: 297- 307). The 1960 Constitution for Cyprus also provided 
for non-territorial autonomy for the geographically scattered Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot communities. The communities were given separately elected communal 
chambers with exclusive legislative powers over the religious, educational and 
cultural matters (Moore 2004 1330). 
219  Schmitt 2005: 363. In Sri Lanka, the protection of provincial minorities is ensured  
through a system of power sharing that is extended to the political executives of 
the region based on the system of proportional representation. According to this 
system, “the governor would call upon the leaders of the political party in the 
council who commands the confidence of the council to become the chief 
minister, the other position in the board of ministers would be shared on the basis 
of proportionality’”. Political parties represented in the council would be entitled 
to a number of positions in the board of ministers, proportionate to the votes that 
they had received (Tiruchelvam 2001: 213 – 214). 
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of intra-substate minorities in the decision making bodies of the subnational 
units.   
 
6.4.5 Concluding remarks 
A multi-ethnic state, if it is to effectively accommodate ethnic diversity, can 
address the concerns of intra-substate minorities using judicially 
enforceable bill of right, non-territorial autonomy and/or representation 
rights. As the experience of these same federations also reveals, these 
institutional measures are not mutually exclusive.  
 
7. Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was not to come up with a model of federalism that 
responds to the challenges of ethnic diversity. The aim was rather to 
introduce the various options and discuss the implications of those options 
on the institutional recognition and accommodation of ethnic diversity and, 
in the process, develop an analytical framework. As a result, it has refrained 
from prescribing or endorsing a particular territorial and institutional 
arrangement that must be adopted in order to meet the challenges of ethnic 
diversity. It has limited the discussion to producing a template of 
institutional arrangement that are usually used in multi-ethnic states and 
demonstrate how the principles of recognition and accommodation can be 
translated into institutional reality within the context of a federal 
arrangement. 
 
Using the template produced in this chapter, the thesis now proceeds to 
examine the two case studies. Based on the institutions and processes 
discussed in this chapter, the study proceeds to evaluate the constitutional 
framework of South Africa and Ethiopia in managing ethnic diversity. The 
evaluation of the institutional framework of each federation is preceded by a 
chapter that outlines the historical and political development of the country. 
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This is very important as it gives insight into the different historical and 
political forces that has informed the establishment, structure and function 
of each federation. 
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Chapter Four 
Ethnicity in South Africa’s political and constitutional development 
 
1.  Introduction 
Many depict South Africa as a country of minorities. This may not always 
be easily subscribed to as there is little agreement about the cleavages of 
South African society. As Maphai commented, “there are as many groups as 
there are group ideologues in South Africa”.1 Some may base their analysis 
on the race divide and reject the conclusion that South Africa is a country of 
minorities. This frame of analysis considers black Africans as an 
undifferentiated homogenous group, making them a numerically dominant 
segment of the society.2 Those that regard South Africa as a country of 
minorities adopt, by contrast, ethnicity as the relevant fault line, which, in 
the South African context, is, more or less, identified with language groups. 
Analysis of South African society based on this fault line would indicate 
that no single ethnic or language group commands a numerical majority.3 
                                                 
1  Maphai 1995: 78. 
2  Racially speaking, the country has been divided into four racial groups: Blacks,  
Coloureds, Indians and Whites. Black, which is interchangeably used with 
Africans, refers to people of solely African ancestry. Coloureds are usually people 
of mixed race though it includes people of Khoi origin who are not of mixed race.  
Whites refer to people of European origin, who are mainly of Afrikaner or English 
origin, but also including Germans, Portuguese and other people of European 
origin. Indians are largely of South Asian descent, largely descended from 
‘indentured servants’ brought from the Indian subcontinent by the British to work 
in the sugar plantation of Natal. According to a recent census, 79.3% are regarded 
as African, 9.3% White, 8.8% and 2.5% Indian (Stats in Brief 2006). 
3  Justice Sachs, based on the same frame of analysis, depicted South Africa as a  
country of minorities. “[T]here is no clear majority population in South 
Africa….Linguistically and culturally speaking, there are only minorities” (In re: 
the School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng), 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC)). In terms 
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Eleven major languages are spoken in South Africa. This includes isiZulu, 
isiXhosa, Setswana, siSwati, Pedi, Sesotho, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, 
Tshivenda, isiNdebele. The African languages are broadly divided into 
Nguni and Sotho languages. IsiXhosa, isiZulu, siSwati and isiNdebele 
belong to the Nguni languages while Setswana, Sesotho and Pedi are Sotho 
languages. The other two, Xistonga and Tshivenda, do not belong to any of 
the two language groups. According to the 2001 census, Zulu speakers, the 
largest linguistic group in the country, account for 22.87% of the population 
followed by isiXhosa (17.89%), Afrikaans (14.45%), Sepedi (9.19%) 
English (8.59%), Setswana (8.21%), Sesotho (7.72%), Xitsonga (4.37%), 
siSwati (2.52%), Tshivenda (2.18%) and isiNdebele (1.46%).4 Others 
account for 0.57 of the population.5  
 
This study, as indicated in the introductory chapter, focuses on ethnicity. In 
South Africa, the African language groups at the same time refer to ethnic 
groups. This is not, however, the case with Afrikaans and English speakers. 
Afrikaans speakers, for example, includes both white Afrikaners, who can 
be defined as ethnic Afrikaners, and members of the Coloured community, 
                                                                                                                            
of religion, the Christian community, which is composed of Protestant, Roman 
Catholic and African Independent Churches, is numerically dominant. It accounts 
for 84% of the population with the African Independent Churches being the 
largest group of Christian churches. Muslims and Hindus each account for 1.5 and 
1.2% of the population respectively. 0.3% of the population ascribe to traditional 
African beliefs (Statistics South Africa: Census 2001). 
4  Statistics South Africa: Census 2001.    
5  This includes the Indian community. The conglomeration of these groups makes  
South Africa a country of huge diversity. It is a racially, ethnically and religiously 
diverse country. Sachs (1991: 23) thus describes South Africa as a “multi-lingual, 
multi-faith, multi-cultural, and multi-political” country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 155  
who do not necessarily share an ethnic attachment with white Afrikaners. 
The English category similarly includes people other than English-origin. 
 
This chapter traces the role and place of ethnicity in South Africa’s 
constitutional and political development. Being cognisant of the fact that 
constitutions are informed and shaped by political and social forces that 
play out on the political terrain of a state, this chapter seeks to explore the 
political role of ethnicity in South Africa’s constitutional development. This 
is especially important in South Africa as the major decisions on and 
perceptions of ethnicity are deeply affected by the political and social 
tensions that in the past, have, and continue to characterise South African 
constitutional dialogue. Past policies and actions of the State, as we shall 
see, have left their mark on the concepts of ethnicity and the political role it 
has in preset-day South Africa.  
 
Despite the widely held predictions that ethnicity will become primary 
political cleavage in post-apartheid South Africa, especially among the 
black community, ethnicity, this thesis maintains, is still not the most 
politically relevant divide in present-day South Africa. It must, nevertheless, 
be acknowledged that there are ethnic groups that demand the recognition of 
their distinctive identities. The thesis further argues that the explanation for 
the insignificant nature of the political relevance of ethnicity in post-
apartheid South Africa lies in the particular historical and political context 
of the South African state and society.   
 
The chapter has seven related parts. Part two discusses the ascendancy of 
Afrikaner ethnic nationalism. The third part looks at how the apartheid 
government attempted to entrench ethnicity by coupling the latter with 
territory. The fourth part concentrates on the constitutional options 
presented for post-apartheid South Africa and specifically examines how 
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ethnicity featured in the negotiations for a new South Africa. The fifth part 
focuses on the Interim Constitution and examines its response to the 
demands for the accommodation of ethnic diversity. The final part brings 
together the discussions on the general implications of these actions and 
policies of the apartheid government by focusing on the debate on ethnicity 
and its relevance in modern day South Africa before it concludes with a few 
general remarks. 
 
One important caveat is in order. The objective of this chapter is to lay the 
foundation for a discussion of the present South African constitutional 
order. By discussing the role and place of ethnicity in South Africa’s 
constitutional development, it serves to bring the present political and 
constitutional development in South Africa into perspective. As the aim of 
this chapter is to provide the basis for a discussion in the next chapter, the 
depth of the discussion is limited accordingly.  
  
2. The ascendancy of Afrikaner ethnic nationalism 
The birth of the Union of South Africa was realised when the four British 
colonies (Cape, Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal) were merged in 
1910. With the view to establishing a strong union between the four 
colonies, especially between the British colonies (Cape and Natal) and the 
two recent additions (Transvaal and Orange River Colony), the white elites 
established a strong unitary state as opposed to a federal state.6 This was 
                                                 
6  Steytler 2005: 313. The only remnant of federalism in the 1910 Constitution was  
the establishment of an upper house in which each province had equal 
representation. The upper house, which is called the Senate, was established to 
protect provincial interests. The Province’s executive was, nevertheless, appointed 
and responsible to the central government. Although each province had elected 
councils, the power of these councils was also very restricted. Legislative acts had 
to be approved by the governor general and they were also subject to the 
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despite the fact that the Natal delegation, in the 1909 Convention that led to 
the formation of the Union, demanded a federal structure. The demand for a 
federal state was a manifestation of the anxieties of English speakers in 
Natal that they would be dominated by the numerically dominant 
Afrikaners.7  
 
The dominance of Afrikaners came to fruition only in 1948 when the 
National Party ascended to power. The Afrikaners gained political control 
by the ethnic mobilisation of their community. Many authors trace the 
origin of Afrikaner ethnic consciousness to the second half of the nineteenth 
century and relate its hasty development to the British rule and the impact it 
had on the Dutch speaking colonists who later became known as 
Afrikaners.8 The Great Trek and the Anglo–Boer war are especially 
regarded by many as the defining milestones in the history of Afrikaner 
ethnic nationalism. The large sections of the Afrikaners in the Cape, with 
the prime objective of escaping the British cultural hegemony, ventured on 
what has famously came to be known as the Great Trek in the 1830s.9 The 
                                                                                                                            
overriding powers of the central government. The state generally established “an 
all-powerful government consisting only of white men” (Ebrahim 1998: 10) and 
eventually withdrew voting rights from blacks in 1936 and from Coloureds in 
1956. 
7  Klug 2000: 100. See also Welsh 1989: 250 – 279.  As noted by Lemon (1996:  
108), “there were sporadic revivals of federal proposals and even a threat to ‘go it 
alone’ at the time of the Republican referendum in 1960, when Natal was the only 
province to vote against the Republic”. 
8   Others explain Afrikaner ethnic nationalism in economistic terms. For more, see  
Leatt et al 1986: 67-88. See also Giliomee (1989:116-121) especially on the 
critique of the economistic explanation of the Afrikaner ethnic nationalism. 
9  Other writers indicate that the Great Trek of the 1830s was precipitated by the  
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long and difficult journey was undertaken by a group of about 15,000 
Afrikaners. It resulted in the creation of two so-called Boer republics, 
namely the Zuid Afrkaansche Republiek (Transvaal) and Orange Free State. 
The establishment of the two Boer republics did not, however, bring to an 
end the contact with the ‘British imperialists’. The ongoing tensions and 
attempts at expansion eventually led to the Anglo–Boer war of 1899–1902, 
which lasted for three years. The war experience heightened bitterness 
among the two communities. The concentration camps organised by the 
British for the Afrikaner women and children added to the bitterness of 
Afrikaners. 
 
The National Party, which projected itself as the representative of Afrikaner 
national interests since its founding in 1914, immediately began a process of 
Afrikaner upliftment by reinforcing Afrikaner ethnic identity and promoting 
Afrikaner interests. Afrikaans replaced Dutch as an official language 
alongside English in 1926. After 1948, it became the openly favored 
language.10 The Afrikaner community also benefited from a striking 
improvement in economic status: 
 
The capital accumulated in farming flowed into financial institutions 
which helped greatly to diversify the range of Afrikaner commerce. 
New investment in education, especially at university level, expanded 
Afrikaner involvement in the whole range of professions. Those in 
agricultural occupations dropped from about 30 percent in 1946 to 8 
                                                                                                                            
issues of gelykstelling (i.e. equalisation of Khoikhoi before the law in terms of 
Ordinance 50 of 1828) and the emancipation of slaves. For more, see Leatt et al 
1986: 70.  
10  From the time the National Party came to power, government business was mainly  
conducted in Afrikaans despite the fact that English was equally regarded as an 
official language. Afrikaans benefited from the allocation of state resources (see 
generally Silva 2006). 
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per cent in 1977 on the eve of the reform area. Afrikaners in blue-collar 
and unskilled work dropped from 40 to 27, while those in white-collar 
employment increased from 29 to 65 percent…Of the half a million 
whites in public sector employment, the great majority were 
Afrikaners.11  
 
With the help of state powers, Afrikaners, within a few decades, were 
brought to almost equal socio-economic status with their English-speaking 
compatriots.12 The dominance of Afrikaners in the political arena was 
firmly established.  
                                                 
11  Beinart 1994: 172. See also Adam and Giliomee 1979: 169.   
12  “Per capita income amongst Afrikaans-speakers, less than half that of English- 
speakers in 1946, had risen to 80 per cent in the late 1970s and was heading 
towards parity” by 1994 (Beinart 1994:173). Along with ethnic nationalism 
advanced by the National Party came racial ideology, which, in the form of 
apartheid, introduced race-based group classification as an official policy of the 
state. The National Party, with its series of complex statutes, institutionalised the 
practice of apartheid. These included legislation such as the Mixed Marriages Act 
(1949), the Group Areas Act (1950), the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 
(1953), the Separate Representation of Voters Act (1951), the Population 
Registration Act (1950) and the Bantu Education Act (1953). The apartheid 
government divided the population into four major racial groups: White, 
Coloured, Indian and African. Every South African was compulsorily categorised 
as belonging to one or the other race, which determined all future rights and 
entitlements. The state spending process on services differentiated according to 
racial lines. The white community benefited the most while black Africans 
received the least. The Coloured and Indian community were granted an 
intermediate level, which was a deliberate act of the apartheid government aimed 
at avoiding the emergence of a unified resistance movement. Although the two 
population categories have suffered under the apartheid regime, they were not 
affected at the same level as the African population as they benefited from 
preferential treatment. This created divisions among the non-white population. 
The racial categorisation was also given strict spatial dimension by the enactment 
of the 1951 Group Areas Act, which institutionalized the residential segregation of 
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3. The Black homelands: ‘coupling ethnic differences and 
territory’ 
Race was not the only fault line the apartheid government used to divide 
South African society. It further divided the black African community along 
ethnic lines. This was realised through the introduction of the homelands 
which came into effect with the enactment of the Promotion of Bantu Self-
Government Act (Act 42 of 1959).13 The Preamble to the Act read: “The 
Bantu people of the Union of South Africa do not constitute a homogenous 
people but form separate national units on the basis of language and 
culture”. The idea was that each homeland,14 demarcated along ethnic lines, 
becomes an independent state and establishes itself as a nation-state, with its 
inhabitants eventually losing their South African citizenship.15 This policy 
                                                                                                                            
races. In 1983, the National Party government introduced a new constitution. One 
of the major changes introduced by that Constitution was the introduction of a tri-
cameral parliament: the House of Representatives (for Coloureds), the House of 
Assembly (for Whites) and the House of Delegates (for Indians). The scheme 
excluded black Africans, claiming that they are accommodated through the 
homelands. Each parliament had jurisdictions over “own affairs” of the 
community it ostensibly represents while a joint house of the three parliaments 
had to deliberate over “general affairs”. 
13  Some, however, trace the establishment of separate homelands for black Africans  
to periods long before the advent of the 20th century. In the Eastern Cape, Natal 
(including Zulu-land), the Free State, and the Northern and western Transvaal, a 
series of reserves or locations had been demarcated for exclusive African 
occupation. Over these areas tribal authority was exercised (see Leatt et al 1986: 
121). 
14  These areas were interchangeably referred to as Bantustans, homelands and self  
governing states.  
15  Much of the policy reason and the idea behind the establishment of the homelands  
was laid out in the 3,755 page Tomlinson Commission Report of 1955. The report 
emphasised the existence of ethnic divisions among the black African community. 
It argued that “there were a number of ‘Bantu’ national organisms falling into 
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of ‘separate development’, according to the Afrikaner leaders, was the sole 
means of eschewing inter–ethnic conflict which characterised plural 
societies throughout the world.16 This justification, taken at a face value, 
appears to rely on ethnic enclaves as a means to avoid ethnic conflicts.  
 
Ten homelands, based on ethnic lines, were established. Only four of them – 
Transkei (26 October 1976), Bophuthatswana (6 December 1977), Venda 
(13 September 1979) and Ciskei (4 December 1981) – infamously known as 
the “TBVC” states – became nominally independent. These four homelands 
had, as any other sovereign state, their own state apparatus including 
armies, passports and border posts. The relation between the homeland 
governments and the South African government was also conducted through 
embassies both in Pretoria and the homelands. The remaining six were 
considered as self governing homelands: Gazankulu, KaNgwane, 
KwaNdebele, Kwazulu, Lebowa and Qwaqwa.17 Each of the homelands 
was given its own national symbols, flag and emblem.18  
                                                                                                                            
various main ethnic groups, each of which should be able to run its own affairs” 
(Egan and Taylor 2003: 101). It was based on the aspects of this report that Prime 
Minister Hendrik Verwoerd formulated the 1959 Act (see Lijphart 1985: 38-39). 
16  Egan and Taylor 2003. 
17  The homeland solution was not sought for black Africans only. There were also  
attempts to establish a cape homeland to the Coloured community, which was 
considered by the apartheid government as ‘a nation in the making’. Although, a 
Coloured Representative Council, with limited legislative powers, was set up to 
advance this objective, it failed. With regard to the Indian community, the 
government first attempted to repatriate them to India. When that failed, the 
government established the South African Indian Council as a forum that 
represents the Indian community. The forum was given no effective or legislative 
power (Steytler 2005: 314). 
18  The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, in a speech he made to  
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The Bantustan policy had, more or less, created ethnically homogenous 
homelands.19 In Kwazulu, for example, 98% of the people are Zulus.  The 
same is true in Transkei and Venda where the majority of the residents are 
Xhosas and Vendas respectively. Lebowa has two ethnic groups (i.e. the 
Pedis, the North Ndebeles) while Bophuthatswana has a population that is 
about one third non-Tswana. The black Africans that lived in homelands 
other than their own accounted for only 10 % of the black African 
population.20 
                                                                                                                            
the House of Assembly in May 1963, stated that “[i]t is one of the basic desires of 
the Bantu to have his own flag” (Mr M.C. de Wet Nel, Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development; House of Assembly, 3 May 1963 quoted in 
1948 -1994 The apartheid years available at 
http://www.sedibafountain.org.za/pebble.asp?relid=4098&t=168&translated=false
&Culture=English, accessed on 4 September 2006).  
19   Lijphart 1985: 37.  
20  According to the national policy, all black African people must be allocated to  
their ‘own’ ethnic Bantustan, irrespective of the fact that they never lived there. 
Egan and Taylor (2003: 102-103) refer to ‘the disjuncture between the de facto 
and de jure population of the Bantustans’. In Transkei, for instance, only 39% of 
the people allocated to it were actually living in that specific Bantustan. This was, 
however, to be changed by 1980s as large scale population removals and 
resettlements forced Africans into the Bantustans, with the latter eventually 
housing over half of the country’s population.  Egan and Taylor (2003: 102-103) 
provide a vivid account of the situation: “Fundamental human rights were violated 
through the policy of forced removals. Regulated by the ‘scientific’ classifications 
of government ethnologists, millions of African people were uprooted to 
Bantustan locations. Over a period of 25 years nearly four million people were 
forced to move, many of them several times over. Forced removals aimed to 
ensure that certain categories of African people were permanently placed in the 
Bantustans: women and children, the old and sick, and the unemployed. In reality, 
Bantustans were a dumping ground for white South Africa…this was a form of 
‘ethnic cleansing’ by another name.” 
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The ethnic basis of the homelands was further strengthened by the 
juxtaposition of their creation with the empowerment of traditional 
authorities. Traditional authority was preferred to formal parties in all the 
homelands; chiefs played an important role as unicameral legislatures that 
were mainly composed of chiefs or their representatives were established in 
all the homelands.21 A brief glimpse at the political manifestos of the 
political parties in the homelands also confirms the strong value attached to 
this tradition of chieftainship and tribal identity as an important source of 
legitimacy. The Transkei National Independence Party, in its manifesto, 
guaranteed “just and equal treatment to the various tribes living in the 
Transkei, and promises to foster a spirit of true Transkeian loyalty…bearing 
in mind the sanctity of its special customs and traditions for each tribe.”22  
Similarly, the Ciskei National Independence Party’s principle was “the 
preservation of the institution of enlightened chieftainship, which serves as 
a symbol of traditional leadership and a rallying point for tribal unity; and 
the operation of such chieftainship along modern democratic lines”.23 The 
close association of the homelands with traditional authorities had the effect 
of strengthening the entrenchment of ethnicity in each homeland.   
 
3.1 The homeland policy: An exercise of self-determination? 
The apartheid government justified this grand apartheid in terms of the right 
to self-determination. It regarded the homelands policy as an exercise of the 
right to self-determination. In a letter submitted to the United Nations’ 
Security Council, it argued that the aim of the homeland policy is “to make 
it possible for each of the various nations, black and white, to achieve its 
fullest potential, including sovereign independence, so that each can enjoy 
                                                 
21  Leatt et al 1986: 127. 
22  Leatt et al 1986:127. 
23  Leatt et al 1986: 128. 
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all the rights and privileges which his or her community is capable of 
securing”.24 In 1976, the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
lamented:  
 
[S]urely we are also striving for the peaceful realization of self-
determination and majority rule. But we are going further and we 
are acting in the spirit of the UN Charter which refers so pointedly 
to “self–determination of peoples”. Our objective is self– 
determination of all the peoples in Southern Africa.25  
 
In an ostensibly considerate approach to members of other communities, 
Verwoerd said that it would be wrong to “retain control over what belongs 
to other people”,26 suggesting that the homeland policy was designed to 
give the different black African communities the right to manage their 
‘own affairs’. The homeland policy was generally presented by the South 
African government as a measure that fulfills the desire among black 
Africans for self government. 
 
3.2 Assessment 
A serious evaluation of the homeland policy would show that the policy did 
not muster the self-determination test. First, the homeland policy, as pointed 
out by many, did not entail an equitable division of resources.27 The 
homelands were established in a significantly smaller geographical space 
compared to the area left for ‘white South Africa’. Only 13% of the total 
land area of South Africa was allocated for the homelands despite the fact 
that black Africans constituted over 70% of the total population. The land 
reserved for the homelands was still way below the optimum even if it is 
                                                 
24  As quoted in McCorquodale 1994: 13.  
25  As quoted in McCorquodale 1994: 13. 
26  Leatt et al 1986: 123. 
27  Biko 2002.  
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assumed that only half of the African population (i.e. 37%t) actually resided 
in the homelands.28 Added to this was the fact that less industrially 
developed parts of the country were left to the homelands.29 
 
The other problem was lack of territorial contiguity or fragmentation of 
most homelands. KwaZulu, with its 48 separate territorial components, was 
the most fragmented homeland. Some analysts like Munger referred to 
countries like Indonesia, West Berlin (during the Cold War era) and USA 
(considering Alaska, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Virgin Islands) and 
argued that ‘noncontiguity’ is not necessarily bad.30 While one may, with 
great degree of reluctance, accept the argument that the lack of territorial 
contiguity was not necessarily unique to South Africa, this may, however, 
belie the reality that the fragmentation had deeply afflicted the homelands. 
What is rather problematic is that this line of argument simply misses the 
point. It confuses the accidental and historical products of territorial 
noncontiguity with the deliberate and manipulative construction of non-
contiguous homelands.31 
 
The major shortcoming of the policy lies, however, in the fact that it was 
not a project based on free choice. It was a unilateral policy of the apartheid 
                                                 
28  Lijphart 1985: 40. 
29  “The Bantustan policy was never economically viable….only 5% of gross  
domestic product was produced by the Bantustans….Mainly owing to such 
appalling agricultural and industrial conditions. Bantustans were financially 
dependent on the South African parliament for over 70% of their budgets.. In 
return, the Bantustans provided South Africa with a huge army of cheap migrant 
laborers” (Egan and Taylor 2003: 105). 
30  Munger 1978: 260.  
31  White farmers benefited from the fragmentation of the bantustans as it made it  
possible for them to keep their profitable lands (see Biko 2002: 86). See also Egan  
and Taylor 2003: 114. 
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government that was simply imposed on black Africans. Without engaging 
those affected, the government simply ascribed identity and accordingly 
divided the inhabitants of South Africa into various groups and decided for 
those groups where they should have their own territory. The inescapable 
conclusion is that homeland policy was not an exercise in self-
determination.  
 
The fact that homeland policy was not really an exercise in self-
determination becomes clearer when one considers the fact that the self-
determination principle was not even applied consistently. As indicated 
earlier, dividing the South African society along ethnic lines and creating 
nation-states was the formula adopted by the government to implement its 
so-called ’self–determination exercise’. One would thus expect the creation 
of ethnically homogenous states throughout the territory of South Africa 
including in the white community which is ethnically segmented.32 Despite 
this fact, the white community was not subjected to ethnic divisions. The 
homeland policy was rather confined largely to black Africans. This 
grotesque distortion of the policy of self-determination and its 
contradictions is laid bare by Archbishop Tutu when he said: 
 
Blacks find it hard to understand why the whites are said to form one 
nation when they are made up of Greeks, Italians, Portuguese, 
Afrikaners, French, Germans, English, etc.; and then by some tour 
de force Blacks are said to form several nations – Xhosas, Zulus, 
Tswanas, etc. The Xhosas and Zulus, for example, are much closer 
to one another than, say, the Italians and the Germans in the white 
community.33 
                                                 
32  Lijphart noted a higher level of ethnic voting among white voters in South Africa  
than ethnic voting in plural societies like Belgium, Canada Switzerland and 
Cyprus (Lijphart 1985). 
33   Tutu 1994: 8. 
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Some may argue that most of the ethnic groups within the white community 
could not be regarded as a nation. This may be true except for the 
Afrikaners. But the same can be said of the ethnic groups in the black 
African community. The contradictory nature of the policy is also evident in 
the fact that the system created two homelands for Xhosas: Transkei and 
Ciskei. This flies in the face of the claim advanced by the government that 
the objective of the policy is to create one homeland for each ethnic group. 
What, then, was the objective of the homeland policy? 
 
The prime objective of the homeland policy was to ensure ‘white rule over 
white South Africa’. Safeguarding white rule by driving out black Africans 
from the geographical and eventually political terrain of South Africa was 
the main objective of the policy. Black Africans who were deemed to 
belong to one of the homelands would, according to this policy, eventually 
lose their South African citizenship and accept citizenship of the homelands. 
They had to exercise their political rights in the homelands.34 What occurred 
in South Africa, as aptly pointed out by Beran, was thus a case of 
‘expulsion’ rather than an exercise of the right to self-determination: “If the 
parts of the state which challenge its unity include the central government 
and lays claim to the legal identity of the existing state, we have a case of 
expulsion rather than [self-determination]”.35 A concrete manifestation of 
the ‘expulsionist’ nature of the homeland policy was that black Africans, 
                                                 
34  Speaking in the House of Assembly in 1978, Dr. Connie Mulder, then Minister of  
Information, said that “[i]f our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as 
black people are concerned, there will be not one black man with South African 
citizenship…Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated 
in some independent new state in this honorable way and there will no longer be a 
moral obligation in this parliament to accommodate these peoples politically” (as 
quoted in Leatt et al 1986: 124). 
35  Beran 1984: 21. 
 
 
 
 
 168  
who were living in the urban areas, were denied political rights. A policy of 
expelling black Africans from South Africa under the guise of self-
determination was implemented on a wide scale. Black South Africans 
became foreigners regardless of their place of birth or preference. As 
Dugard has succinctly put it, this was a resort to “international–law fictions 
as a substitute for constitutional–law solutions”.36 
 
Only the failure to fully appreciate the true nature and motive of the 
homeland policy can explain the conclusion reached by some authors that 
the rejection of the so–called self-determination by black Africans was 
‘unusual’. Adam, for example, considered the rejection of the homeland 
policy a paradox in Africa where communities in the peripheries of African 
states wage an ethnic conflict to secede from the larger states: “It is 
probably safe to say that the majority of people in independent Africa would 
welcome greater self-determination at the periphery, including secession 
from existing states, while the black majority of South Africans clearly 
favors preserving the unitary [i.e. unified] state”.37 Adam seemed to be 
comparing the incomparable. His argument was dangerously close to 
suggesting that black Africans were presented with a choice of autonomous 
self government or staying together under one larger state. The bottom line 
is that there were little or no options presented to black Africans as the 
policy was imposed unilaterally and forcefully by the apartheid government. 
                                                 
36  Dugard 1980: 26. The presentation of the homeland policy as an exercise of self- 
determination was not accepted by the United Nations. The Security Council of 
the UN issued an extraordinary statement calling all governments “to deny any 
form of recognition to the so–called “independent Bantustans” (McCorquodale 
1994: 13). According such recognition was considered a breach of international 
law for violating a binding decision of the Security Council. Only South Africa 
recognised these homelands as independent states.  
37  Adam 1983: 132. 
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This makes it clear that the situation in South Africa at that time was not 
comparable to the situation in the peripheries of other African states. Hence, 
it is not a paradox that the majority of black Africans rejected the homeland 
policy. 
 
3.3 The homeland policy and ethnicity  
In view of the foregoing discussion about the homeland policy, the question 
arises as to whether the government succeeded in creating a strong ethnic 
identity among black African communities. Some authors tried to gauge the 
effect of the homeland policy by examining the responses of political actors 
and especially homeland leaders to the policy. Based on their response to 
the government’s policy of homelands, Leatt et al identified two types of 
homeland leaders.38 These were leaders that accepted the homelands as the 
practical tool to fight apartheid, on the one hand, and those that used the 
homeland to forge ethnic unity, on the other, with the latter, knowingly or 
unknowingly, contributing to the realisation of the objectives of the 
homeland policy.  
 
For some in the Transkei, the independence of the Transkei state was a 
reaffirmation of their existence as a nation, which, they claimed, existed 
long before the formation of the Union of South Africa.39 The dominant 
party in Transkei viewed Transkei’s independence as “nothing more than 
regaining sovereignty over its traditional authority”.40  A similar sentiment 
                                                 
38  Leatt et al 1986: 27. 
39  Kaiser Matanzima, leader of Transeki, alluded that Transkei received its name in  
the 1880s suggesting that it is older than the Union of South Africa which was 
formed only in 1910 (Leatt et al 1986:127).  
40  There was even a reference to Transkeians as is evident from the following extract  
from a speech made by Matanzima: ”Just as Jews everywhere gained a new 
stature with the coming into being of the Promised Land, Israel, so too we 
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resonated among the leaders in the Ciskei homeland. Multiple identities 
seem to be identified by some of the leaders of that homeland. Sebe said:  
 
We Ciskeians are not prepared to lose that which identifies us not 
only as Ciskeians, but in the broader context as South Africans. 
Indeed, I know positively that the aspirations of my people are to 
achieve nationhood for themselves as Ciskeians and citizenship for 
themselves as South Africans.41  
 
Leaders of other homelands regarded the homeland as a power base from 
which they can wage their political struggle against apartheid. Chief 
Mangope of Bophuthatswana declared that “the main reason for choosing 
independence is that we utterly abhor racial discrimination…… [choosing 
independence makes us] a catalyst for accelerated change, so as to 
overcome…racialism on the sub-continent”.42  He wanted ‘to use apartheid 
to abolish apartheid’. Chief Mangostu Buthelezi was also especially known 
for using the homeland system as a political platform to promote the interest 
of black Africans in general. He refused to accept independence for 
KwaZulu and spoke against the homeland partition.  
 
The other major manifestation often mentioned to indicate the success of the 
Bantustan policy in fostering ethnic identity relates to the ethnic 
discrimination that was reportedly prevalent within the Bantustans. 
Members of an ethnic group that do not belong to the major ethnic group for 
which the Bantustan was established were often subjected to discrimination 
in terms of access to jobs and social services. This was, for example, the 
                                                                                                                            
Transkeians have given all blacks in South Africa a new dignity by blazing the 
trail and founding a black Transkei” (Leatt et al 1986:127).  
41  Leatt et al 1986: 127.  
42  Lijphart 1986: 41. 
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case in the Winterveld area of Bophuthatswana where the non-Tswana 
population was constantly subjected to harassment by Bophuthatswana 
police on the grounds of being “illegal squatters”.43   
 
3.4 Assessment 
Measuring the success of the homeland policy in entrenching ethnic identity 
by looking at the positions of the leaders of homelands could be tricky. For 
most of these leaders, the homelands policy gave them a material basis to 
advance ethnic claims. They developed benefits and stakes in the promotion 
of ethnic-based national identity.44 This was evident from the ‘patronage, 
nepotism and bribery’ that characterised most Bantustans.45 The workings 
of patronage, welfare provision and resource distribution played an 
important role in fostering class stratification and gave certain groups a 
reason to promote the Bantustan system. The major beneficiaries were the 
chiefs, Bantustan political and business elites. The desires of these leaders 
could, for obvious reasons, be at odds with the wishes of the majority of the 
population. The same is true even in the case of those that rejected the 
homeland policy or claimed to have adopted it for strategic reasons. These 
leaders quickly rallied around ethnic identity when they perceived a threat 
against their political power. It was, for example, the same leader of 
Bophuthatswana, who allegedly accepted independence for strategic reasons 
that presented strong resistance to the re–incorporation of the homelands 
into the new South Africa. This shows the difficulty of relying on the 
statements of the leaders of the homeland to determine the effect of the 
Bantustan policy on the formation of ethnic identity.  
                                                 
43  Lijphart 1986: 41.  
44  Butler 2007. 
45  Egan and Taylor 2003: 105. 
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Of course, individuals who were not ‘indigenous’ to the homeland they 
inhabited were, on occasion, subjected to discrimination in terms of access 
to jobs and social services. The problem with such indicators is that they do 
not tell us much about the political mobilisation of ethnicity. At best, they 
point to the prevalent ethnic stereotypes and prejudices which are rather 
common in many ethnically plural societies. 
 
The weight of evidence on the impact of the homeland policy tends to 
suggest that most black Africans, the artificially designated ‘citizens’ of the 
bantustans, had rejected the homeland policy. Sociological research and 
public opinion surveys revealed a widespread opposition to the homelands 
and to its underlying principle on making ethnicity as a basis for political 
activity. The majority of black Africans did not consider themselves as 
‘ethnic subjects’. Most opposed to the homelands were urban Africans.46 
The opposition was strongest amongst anti–apartheid activists. The leader 
of the Black Consciousness Movement, Steve Biko, wrote in the 1970s: 
“...At this stage of our history we cannot have our struggle being tribalised 
through the creation of Zulu, Xhosa and Tswana politicians by the 
system”.47 The policy of the National government that attempted to entrench 
the saliency of ethnic differences amongst black Africans was rejected by 
all major African movements including the ANC, Pan–Africanist Congress 
and Black Consciousness Movement. For them, it was only a means to 
continue the policy of apartheid and suppress the emergence of a common 
resistance front. 
 
It would, of course, be naive to categorically suggest that the homelands and 
their leaders did not make any contribution to the creation of ethnic politics. 
                                                 
46  Leatt et al 1986: 134. 
47  Biko 2002: 86. 
 
 
 
 
 173  
The apparent utilisation of the homelands for ethnic mobilisation was 
evident in KwaZulu where the leadership spoke against the homeland’s 
‘independence’. The major work of ethnic mobilisation around the Zulu 
ethnic identity was done by the IFP under the leadership of Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi since 1975. Buthelezi, despite his claim for non- 
racialism, mobilised around ethnicity and his party used the KwaZulu 
homeland for political gain. As Egan and Taylor note, “[i]n the final years 
of apartheid, KwaZulu was being subsidised by Pretoria to around 1, 8 
[billion] rands per annum, and those millions of Zulu-speakers who wanted 
to qualify for KwaZulu welfare and employment schemes had little choice 
but to join Inkatha”.48 As the discussions that follow will reveal, the appeal 
to ethnic sentiment among the Zulus by the IFP forms a central part of the 
identity politics that emerged in the early transition process.   
 
4. Towards the Interim Constitution: The emergence of politicised 
ethnicity? 
Following the dramatic announcement of the release of Nelson Mandela and 
other prominent political prisoners from prison in February 1990 along with 
the unbanning of the ANC,49 the stage was open for negotiating the future 
of South Africa. One of the major issues that many academics and 
politicians grappled with, and continue to grapple with, as South Africa 
moved away from the apartheid era, is the role and place of ethnicity in 
post-apartheid South Africa. The central issue at the time was whether the 
ethnic identity that the apartheid government attempted to promote would 
continue to be muted or would emerge with the end of the white 
domination. 
                                                 
48  Egan and Taylor 2003: 105. 
49  The release of Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC was preceded by secret  
talks between unofficial representatives of the South African government and the 
banned ANC, which started in November 1985. 
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4.1 Ethnic conflicts? 
For some, the conflicts that engulfed the country in the transition process 
suggested the resurgence of ethnic mobilisation. In the early 1990s 
transition process, the country was marred by conflicts which were 
cynically referred to as ‘black on black’ violence. It is estimated that more 
than 14,000 people were killed in political violence in the four year period 
spanning from the beginning of the negotiations until the elections were 
finally held in April 1994.50  Guy provides a vivid picture of that period: 
 
In recent years …ethnic conflict has moved from remote rural areas, 
the alleyways in South African slums, and the inaccessible 
compounds, onto the streets and the homes of the world in 
newspaper photographs and on the television screen. These pictures 
of ethnically organised bands, their ‘cultural weapons’ in their 
hands, pursuing their enemies through the streets with horrifying 
results, is now a familiar image  of South Africa in many parts of the 
world.51  
 
These major conflicts in black communities were considered by some as 
ethnic conflicts between the Xhosas and the Zulus. Although originally 
confined within the regional boundaries of KwaZulu–Natal, the conflict 
later spread to the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area. It was also 
then that the conflict started to take ‘ethnic overtones’. Communities that 
lived side by side for as long as they could remember started to split along 
ethnic lines. Xhosas had to leave the hostels and Zulus had to flee the 
townships and take sanctuary in IFP-controlled hostels. The conflicts were 
regarded by some as the early signs of the political mobilisation of ethnicity 
and ethnic conflicts.  
 
                                                 
50  Shaw 1997. 
51  Guy 1992: 2-3.   
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Ethnic mobilisation was especially evident among the Zulus. In making an 
appeal for ethnic sentiment among the Zulus, the IFP and particularly its 
leader, Chief Mangoostu Buthelezi, heavily relied on the history of the Zulu 
Kingdom. Buthelezi claimed that the KwaZulu homeland was a legitimate 
successor to the Zulu Kingdom and presented the call for the abolition of 
the homeland system and their incorporation into South Africa as an assault 
on Zulu political and cultural survival.52 The IFP claimed, on many 
occasions, that the special history and culture of the Zulu people was at risk 
of obliteration.  
 
What might have possibly fed into the argument that claimed the emergence 
of ethnic mobilisation was the claim that the ANC was a Xhosa 
organisation. Of course, this is not without merit. The most prominent ANC 
leaders predominantly have been Xhosa–speakers.53 Despite the fact that 
Chief Albert Luthuli, President of the ANC from 1952 to 1967, was a Zulu, 
both Nelson Mandela and the incumbent president of the country, Thabo 
Mbeki, are Xhosas. The other prominent leaders of the ANC, including 
Oliver Thambo, Walter F. Sisulu and Chris Hani, were Xhosas. In the early 
1990s, the composition of the ANC’s national executive Committee 
displayed a disproportionate representation of the Xhosas. Of the twenty 
black members of the ANC’s national executive committee, ten were Xhosa 
with the other ten divided between Tswana (5), Pedi (4) and Zulu (one).54  
                                                 
52  In September 1992 the ANC proposed (but never in fact organised) a march  
protesting the continued existence of KwaZulu. Buthelezi responded by stating 
that “At no time since the conquest of Kwazulu….has there been a greater threat 
against us as Zulus” (Manby 1995: 41). 
53  Horowitz 1991: 48-49. See also Lemon 1996: 96. 
54  Horowitz 1991: 54. Horowitz, in presenting the composition of the ANC’s  
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It was not only the ‘Zulu question’ that drove the muted ethnic question 
home. Like the IFP, Afrikaner related right-wing parties mobilised around 
ethnic identity. As negotiations began, right-wing parties55 started to 
become more militant in rejecting the changes of the status quo. When it 
eventually became clear that apartheid was coming to an end, right–wing 
parties, which, in 1993, created the Afrikaner Volksfront alliance, started to 
demand an “Afrikaner” homeland. The Afrikaner Resistance Movement 
(Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging - AWB), a paramilitary group, threatened 
‘the horror of civil war’ to create a “Volkstaat”.56 The violence by the right-
wings escalated as negotiation proceeded.57 Right–wing leaders, in making 
                                                                                                                            
National Executive Committee concedes the potential for a margin of error. Due 
to the reluctance to discuss ethnicity, Horowitz indicated that the data on identity 
was largely collected through informants. 
55  A major right wing party, the Conservative Party (CP) was established  
immediately after the National Party made a proposal to grant limited rights to 
Indians and coloureds in 1982. A group of ministers left the National Party and 
established the C P.  
56  The ability of the right-wing parties to destabilise the country was not something  
on which there was a consensus. Zille, writing in 1988, argued that “the right wing 
is not a paper tiger”. The Conservative Party’s spokesperson similarly lamented 
that “it is possible to turn...South Africa…upside down with 500 strategically 
placed people….The price of ignoring the demands for a separate state could be so 
high that no majority government would be able to ignore them in the long term” 
(as quoted in Zille 1988: 91-92). On the contrary, some political analysts like 
Booysen considered whites, including Afrikaners, too bourgeois to take up rifles 
and engage in liberation war. The only possibility is when “the ownership of 
private property is not enshrined in a bill of rights and white owned land is 
redistributed on a massive scale” (as quoted in Garson 1993:13).   
57  On the date the elections were to be announced, close to 3,000 members of the  
AWB stormed the building where talks were being held. A series of bombings in 
the Northern and Northwestern Transvaal – ‘one of the most conservative areas in 
the country’ – targeted government institutions. Black individuals were also 
targeted, especially in rural areas. The most dramatic event was when members of 
 
 
 
 
 177  
their demand for self-determination and an Afrikaner homeland, invoked 
“the need for sacrifice in the face of the new threat to the Volk”.58  
 
The ethnic mobilisation that was evident among members of the Zulus and 
Afrikaners was also reflected in the constitutional options proposed by those 
that claimed to represent the interests of these communities during the 
negotiations for a new South Africa. The challenge of accommodating 
diversity was one of the most crucial questions in this process.  
 
4.2 Ethnicity in the constitutional options for a new South Africa 
The negotiations for the future of South Africa in the form of the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) started on 20 
December 1991 but ended without agreement in May 1992. One year after 
the collapse of CODESA, negotiations were resumed at the Multi Party 
Negotiation Process (MPNP), which finalised a negotiated settlement on 18 
November 1993.59 As Currie noted, the problem of accommodating 
diversity “dominated the lengthy constitutional negotiations”. 60 
                                                                                                                            
the AWB invaded Bophuthatswana to defend the Mangope homeland government. 
Three were killed (two of them summarily executed) in their abortive attempt. A 
spate of bombs orchestrated by the same group also killed more than twenty–one 
people in and around Johannesburg just days before the election. 
58  The two major nationalist movements, the IFP and the Afrikaner related right- 
wing parties seemed to complement each other as well. Buthelezi, for example, 
drew parallels “between Zulu and Afrikaner history and the response of each 
‘nation’ to oppression. It is also a fact that members of the right–wing paramilitary 
organizations openly took part in the paramilitary training of IFP ‘self– protection 
units’ in rural Natal, which were mostly composed of young men. This ‘sense of 
solidarity” shared among the IFP and the right wing parties, as we shall see later, 
was elevated to a formal coalition through the establishment of the Freedom 
Alliance (Manby 1995: 37). 
59  It was agreed that the non–elected negotiating political parties would draft an  
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The National Party initially argued that the accommodation of the 
heterogeneous South African society in some form of countermajoritarian 
settlement was a constitutional imperative.61 It strongly rejected a pure 
majoritarian system. This emphasis on group identity reflected the fact that 
the National Party viewed the South African society as consisting of groups. 
Based on this view, the party proposed a number of countermajoritarian 
principles, which could generally be couched in terms of power-sharing and 
self-determination. It first called for the adoption of a consocitional system 
of government in which all groups should be represented in legislative and 
executive state powers, participating in decisions that affect the whole 
society. The party, in addition to a power-sharing scheme, demanded a 
devolved system of government. Supported by similar demands of the 
leaders of the homelands, especially Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, the party 
called for strong regional units.62 Strong regional government, argued F.W. 
de Klerk, was “the only way in which we can successfully accommodate the 
                                                                                                                            
Interim Constitution which would govern the country during the transitional 
phase. Afterwards, a democratically elected Constitutional Assembly, composed 
of the upper and lower houses, would determine the ‘final Constitution’. The 
drafting of the ‘final Constitution’ would have to comply with 34 Constitutional 
Principles which were agreed upon by the negotiators. For the ‘final Constitution’ 
to come into effect, it was agreed that the Constitutional Court would have to 
certify that it was in conformity with all the Constitutional Principles. The 
Constitutional Principles were adopted as a guarantee for the negotiators that the 
‘final Constitution’ would not affect the basic principles contained in Interim 
Constitution. 
60  Currie 1998: 35.2. Steytler (1999) claimed that federalism was an important,  
though not dominant, issue in the Constitutional negotiation between the two 
parties. 
61  Klug 2000: 104. See also Currie 1998: 35.2 
62  At the same time, the NP emphasised the need for the bill of rights  as a bulwark  
against state interference into the private realm (Steytler 2005). See also Manby 
1995: 35. 
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heterogeneous nature of our society in a meaningful manner”.63 The idea 
was to build regional alliances with some of the Bantustan leaders and 
capture some of the regions.64  
 
The strongest demand for federalism as an instrument to protect territorially 
based ethnic interests came rather from the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP). The IFP proposed an ‘extreme form of federalism’ which 
would involve the devolution of extensive powers to the provinces. The 
country, the Party argued, should be called the “Federal Republic of South 
Africa”. The Constitution of the State of KwaZulu-Natal, which was 
adopted by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, the homeland parliament, in 
December 1992, regarded KwaZulu a member state of a Federal Republic 
of South Africa, in which “no federal law would be able to override any 
                                                 
63  Egan and Taylor 2003: 109. 
64  Some, however, emphasised that the National Party’s focus was primarily on  
shared rule rather than self rule (Steytler and Mettler 2001). See also Currie 1998: 
35.4. The demand by the party for a devolved form of government was not 
necessarily motivated by the urge to protect territorially based ethnic interests as 
its supporters, except for the provinces of Western Cape and Northern Cape where 
Afrikaans speakers are in the majority, were dispersed across the country. 
Decentralisation “was seen as a brake on a strong central government” (Steytler 
and Mettler 2001: 94). The National Party, according to this view, focused on 
securing a power-sharing deal at the level of the central government: “At the first 
round of negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA), and subsequently at the Multiparty Negotiating Forum, the key area 
of contention between these two parties was the control of the power to be wielded 
by the national executive. The breakthrough in negotiations was not the agreement 
on the creation of provinces and the limited devolution of power to these 
subnational units, but the creation of a government of national unity. The NP thus 
placed its faith primarily in shared rule (literally through the device of a 
government of national unity) rather than self rule” (Steytler and Mettler 2001: 
94). 
 
 
 
 
 180  
state law and no federal taxes levied without the permission of the state”.65 
Buthelezi, in agreement with F.W. de Klerk, argued that “….federalism is 
the only form of government which will bring peace and harmony to South 
Africa.”.66 The party also demanded a special recognition of the Zulu 
monarchy. The party threatened secession if its demands for the political 
recognition of the ‘Zulu Nation’ in a federal arrangement were not met. 
 
The Afrikaner based right-wing parties sought for the establishment of a 
separate Afrikaner homeland, a Volkstaat. The parties pledged war if their 
demand for an Afrikaner Volkstaat was not met. These parties were later 
joined with leaders of some of the homelands and the IFP to establish a 
loose coalition known as the Freedom Alliance in 1993. In this ‘odd 
                                                 
65  Manby 1995: 42. The hallmark of the model of federalism proposed by the IFP  
was that member units of the federation decide the nature and scope of the powers 
of the national government. “The national government would not only be a 
government of limited, enumerated powers but also that the national constitution 
would remain subject to the constitutions of the individual states of the 
federation”. The proposed draft constitution which declared the sovereignty of 
KwaZulu–Natal to be “indivisible, inalienable and untransferable (section 3) 
required South African armed forces to obtain permission before entering 
Kwazulu–Natal (section 67(b)), required South Africa to obtain consent before 
levying taxes (section 67(d)), created an autonomous central bank (section 81) and 
granted a KwaZulu– Natal Constitutional Court exclusive jurisdiction to decide 
whether South African laws were valid within the regions (section 67(c) and 77). 
This led authors like Klug and Ellmann to conclude that what the IFP was 
proposing was confederalism although it was presented as a form of federalism 
(Klug 2000: 104; Ellmann 1993:166). Ellmann (1993:166) remarked that the 
Constitution was “indeed reminiscent of the notion of inter-state relations that 
prevailed in the United States before [the present American constitution] was 
adopted in the years of 1780’s when the United States lived under the ‘Articles of 
Confederation’”.  
66  Manby 1995: 42. 
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assortment of parties’ were included, from the right-wing side, the 
Conservative Party led by Ferdi Hartzenberg, the small but strongly vocal  
Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) led by 
Eugene Terreblanche and the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF) led by the former 
SADF General, Constand Viljoen, and the IFP.67 The objective of this 
alliance was to reject the individual-rights based new democratic 
constitution and advocate for the inclusion of ethnic identities in the 
Constitution.68  
 
As a direct result of the experience of the Bantustans, the ANC, on the other 
hand, expressed a great deal of objection to the idea of adopting a federal 
constitution that institutionalises ethnic differences. Proposals for the 
devolution of power to strong regional governments in the form of 
federalism was seen as a neo-apartheid scheme that could be used to thwart 
majority rule by drawing boundaries along the lines of race and ethnicity to 
maintain “white minority privileges”.69 The ANC rather reiterated its long–
standing commitment to develop a state that is racially and ethnically 
neutral.70 It emphasised a policy of nation-building based on common 
                                                 
67  Maphai 1995: 113. This alliance, which at the beginning called itself the  
‘Concerned South Africans Group’ (COSAG), initially included the 
Bophuthatswana leadership, represented by President  Mangope who was 
determined to secure the survival of a Tshwana–dominated region, and Brigadier 
Gqozo of Ciskei. The two, however, left the alliance, with Ciskei first 
withdrawing in January 1994 and Mangope after the overthrowing of his 
government in March 1994 (Ebrahim 1998). See also Lemon 2003. 
68   Ebrahim 1998: 163. 
69  Creating strong federal units, the party argued, “would legitimate the homelands  
and create a separate white Volkstaat” (Steytler 2005: 316). See also Simeon and 
Murray 2001: 316. 
70  The ANC’s ‘antipathy’ to “any recognition of ethnic claim was explicitly stated in  
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citizenship and national identity, protected by a system of individual rights 
that is enshrined in a constitutional bill of rights. South Africa, according to 
the position of the ANC, shall be a ‘unitary, democratic and non-racial 
state’. It considered the establishment of a unitary centralised state essential 
in order to transform South African society into a non-racial society and to 
address the legacies of the apartheid state.71 
 
4.3 Concluding remarks 
Ethnic claims have dominated the early transition process. Ethnic 
mobilisation was notable among members of the Zulu and Afrikaner ethnic 
community. It is also clear that the major forces that dominated the 
transition process had divergent conceptions of South African society. It 
was thus evident that a successful transition required the accommodation of 
these divergent views of South African society and an all-inclusive election 
that involved the major forces. 
 
Reconciling these divergent views was not, however, easy. In fact, initially, 
the different views of the political parties and the policy options they 
entailed appeared difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. Owing to the 
significant changes in the position of the parties that was the result of 
painstaking negotiation process, the first political deal was signed between 
the ANC and the National Party on 2 December 1993 at Kempton Park. 
This was then adopted as an Interim Constitution after securing “legal form” 
by the tri-cameral parliament. The deal was, nevertheless, rejected by the 
major proponents for the recognition of ethnicity, namely the IFP and the 
Afrikaner right-wing parties.   
                                                                                                                            
its 1988 constitutional guidelines which went so far as to suggest the future 
prohibition of political parties which advocate or incite ethnic or regional 
exclusiveness or hatred’’ (Klug 2000: 104). 
71  Steytler 2005. 
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Opposed to the deal concluded at Kempton Park, both the IFP and the 
Afrikaner related right-wing parties walked out of the negotiation process. 
They refused to take part in the elections. In view of the political violence 
that these organisations were associated with, their decision to abandon the 
process was not to be taken lightly. As indicated earlier, most of the 
conflicts in KwaZulu-Natal had involved IFP supporters, which indicated 
the capacity of the party to destabilise the political process. The right-wing 
parties, with their retired but still powerful Generals from the armed forces, 
who commanded the loyalty of serving members of the armed forces, were 
also forces to reckon with. Eventually, with the view to accommodating the 
demands of the IFP and conservative Afrikaners, amendments were made to 
the Interim Constitution in March 1994, before it even came into force.72 
The next section focuses on the contents of the Interim Constitution and 
looks at how the Constitution attempted to accommodate the demands of 
ethnic-based groups.  
 
5. Accommodating ethnic diversity in the Interim Constitution 
There is no clear agreement about the kind of state established by the 
Interim Constitution. Some regarded it as a federal structure while others 
referred to it as a unitary state. What is, however, clear is that the form of 
state introduced by the Interim Constitution, as amended in March 1994, 
had important federal features. More importantly, for our purpose, the 
Interim Constitution presents a difficult balance between the centralists who 
sought to establish a common national identity, on the one hand, and the 
federalists who insisted on the distinctiveness of their respective ethnic 
identity and the protection thereof, on the other.  Aspects of self rule and 
shared rule that were incorporated in the Interim Constitution support this 
                                                 
72  Act 2 of 3 March 1994.  
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conclusion.73 The discussion in this section commences by looking at the 
status and use of language in the Interim Constitution. 
 
5.1 The status and use of language 
The clauses of the Interim Constitution that regulated the use of language 
represent recognition of the diverse ethnic groups that inhabit the country. 
In this regard, the ‘Fundamental Rights’ chapter included a provision on the 
use of language in education. In order to provide a complete picture of the 
status and use of language in the Interim Constitution, the discussions in the 
following two sub-sections deal with the regulation of language both for the 
purpose of government and education.  
 
5.1.1 Language for the purpose of government 
Section 3 of the Interim Constitution listed eleven official languages of the 
Republic at the national level: isiZulu, isiXhosa, Setswana, siSwati, Pedi, 
Sesotho sa Leboa, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, Tshivenda, isiNdebele.74 
The recognition of these eleven languages, according to the same section, 
did not diminish the rights and status of languages, which existed at the 
commencement of the Interim Constitution, a provision meant to address 
the anxieties of Afrikaners who feared the marginalisation of their language 
in post-apartheid South Africa. 
  
                                                 
73  It must be noted that this study does not intend to engage in a detailed discussion  
of these elements of the Interim Constitution. The discussion is limited by the 
objective of this specific chapter, which is laying the foundation for a discussion 
of the present South African constitutional order in the next chapter.  
74  Section 31 further emboldened the right by stating that “every person shall have  
the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of his or her  
choice.” 
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A person, when dealing with public administration at the national level, had 
the right to use and be addressed in an official language of his or her choice 
as long as it was practicable.75 The use of official languages for the purpose 
of the functioning of government, stated the Interim Constitution, can be 
decided by parliamentary acts and provincial laws “taking into account 
questions of usage, practicality and expense”.76 The Interim Constitution 
specifically stated that a member of parliament may address Parliament in 
an official South African language of his or her choice.77 More importantly, 
this right of parliamentarians was not limited to what was ‘practicable’.78 
 
Language rights were also recognised at the provincial level. According to 
section 3 (4) and (5) of the Interim Constitution, a provincial legislature 
could adopt any of the official languages as the official languages of the 
province. This was considered by some as “an attempt to recognise and 
accommodate the regional concentration of various linguistic groups”.79 
There were, however, a few conditions that, according to section 3(5) of the 
Constitution, need to be fulfilled. First, the language policy proposed by the 
provincial legislature must be approved by two thirds of its members. 
Second, the proposed language policy must not negatively affect the status 
of an official language existing at the time of the commencement of the 
Interim Constitution. This provision was designed to protect the official 
                                                 
75  Section 3(3) Interim Constitution. 
76  Section 3(8) Interim Constitution. 
77  Section 3(7) Interim Constitution. 
78  Section 25(3) of the Interim Constitution recognised  the right to use an official  
language of one’s choice in criminal proceedings. The right to demand that 
proceedings are conducted in a language understood by them is accorded to 
litigants, an accused, or a witness. Failing this, they have the right to have the 
proceedings interpreted in a language they understand. 
79  Brand 1997: 692. 
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status of the languages of Afrikaans and English which enjoyed a privileged 
status during the apartheid era.  
 
Section 3(9) lists a number of principles to which any legislation, official 
policy and practice in relation to the use of language at any level of 
government must comply: 
 
? The creation of conditions for the development and for the 
promotion of the equal use and enjoyment of all official languages; 
? the extension of those rights relating to language and the status of 
languages which at the commencement of this Constitution are 
restricted to certain regions; 
? the prevention of the use of one language for the purpose of 
exploitation, domination or division; 
? the promotion of multilingualism and the provision of translation 
facilities; 
? the fostering of respect for languages spoken other than the official 
languages and the encouragement of their use in appropriate 
circumstances; 
? the non-diminution of rights relating to language and the status of 
languages existing at the commencement of the Interim Constitution.  
 
Contrary to the position it adopted in respect of education, the Interim 
Constitution envisaged positive action on the part of the state in matters of 
language. The government was obliged to create conducive conditions for 
the development and promotion of the equal use and enjoyment of the 
eleven official languages.80 This obligation should not be interpreted as 
conferring the duty of enforcing the equal use of all eleven official 
                                                 
80  Section 3(1) Interim Constitution. 
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languages but rather that efforts must be made to develop and promote their 
equal use.81  
 
5.1.2 Language in education policy  
Section 32(b) of the Interim Constitution guaranteed instruction in the 
language of one’s choice as long as it remains reasonably practicable. The 
subsection that followed recognised the right “to establish, where 
practicable, educational institutions based on a common culture, language or 
religion provided that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of 
race”.82 Three important consequences followed from this provision. First, 
the right to instruction in a mother tongue was not necessarily a given 
priority. The provision simply allowed people to choose their language of 
instruction. As noted by Kriel, the key element was the notion of choice: “It 
is not about the language of a person’s birth or a person’s mother tongue”.83 
Second, education based on common culture, language or religion was 
relegated to private educational institutions. Third, both the right to 
instruction in the language of a person’s choice and the right to establish 
educational institutions based on common language, culture or race were 
limited to “where this is reasonably practicable”. 
                                                 
81  Currie 1998: 37.1. Related to this obligation of the State was section 3 (10) of  
the Interim Constitution, which provided for the establishment of an independent 
Pan South African Language Board.  The Board, which was subsequently 
established by parliamentary legislation, was entrusted with the duty to promote 
respect for the principles set out in section 3 (9), to further the development of the 
official languages and to promote respect for and development of other languages 
used by communities in South Africa including languages used for religious 
purposes. An advisory role with regard to legislation on language issues was also 
entrusted to the Board as it must be consulted and provide recommendations in 
relation to language related legislation.     
82  Section 32 (c) Interim Constitution. 
83  Kriel 1998: 38-1. 
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The establishment of such educational institutions was the main subject of 
contention in a case brought before the Constitutional Court. The case 
concerned a dispute in the Gauteng Provincial Legislature relating to the 
constitutionality of certain provisions of a bill dealing with language and 
religious issues in schools.84 In that case, the petitioners, members of the 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature, argued that the Interim Constitution, under 
section 32 (c), imposed a positive obligation on the state to establish, where 
practicable, schools based on a common culture, language or religion. As 
found by the Court, and rightly so, this was an incorrect interpretation of the 
Interim Constitution. No such positive obligation was envisaged in the 
wording of section 32(c) of the Constitution. The provision did not confer 
an obligation on the state to establish such institutions. What the Interim 
Constitution made provision for was the right of every person to establish 
“such educational institution”. Section 32(c), argued Justice Sachs, created a 
“constitutionally guaranteed space for private individuals to set up and 
maintain their own schools if they feel that their special cultural, language 
or religious needs are not being sufficiently catered for in the state 
system”.85 What was envisaged by the Interim Constitution was thus a 
‘defensive right’. This was a right that could be used by a person who wants 
to establish such educational institution to resist any interference by the 
state.86 This presented a liberal view of the state where the it was only 
expected to refrain from interfering in matters of culture and not burdened 
with any positive obligation in that regard. The state, according to this view, 
had only negative obligations. Tolerating the collective goals and 
                                                 
84  Gauteng Provincial Legislature in Re: Dispute concerning the constitutionality of  
certain provisions of the School Education Bill of 1995, 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC). 
85  In re: The School Education Bill, 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC). 
86  Strydom 1999: 890. 
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aspirations of cultural communities was where the state’s obligation begun 
and ended.87 
 
5.2 Self rule 
As indicated earlier, the ANC was strongly opposed to the idea of 
federalism. As a result of the negotiations, however, the ANC softened its 
position on federalism, which eventually made the introduction of federal 
elements into the system possible. The National Party joined the ANC in the 
election process while the right-wing Afrikaner parties and the IFP refused 
to join the process. In a bid to bring these two major forces on board, some 
important concessions were made,88 which ultimately allowed the 
incorporation of certain important aspects of self rule into the Interim 
Constitution. 
 
5.2.1 Powers and functions 
The self rule elements of the Interim Constitution were evident in the 
constitution and law making powers that were entrusted to the provinces. 
 
5.2.1.1 Provincial constitution-making 
One of the fundamental elements of the Interim Constitution pertaining to 
provincial powers was contained in the provisions relating to provincial 
constitution-making power. The Interim Constitution, even in its original 
form in 1993, allowed the provinces to draft and adopt their own 
                                                 
87  Strydom 1999: 890.  
88  Important concessions were made to the IFP and the right-wing Afrikaner Parties  
in the form of two constitutional amendments to the Interim Constitution that were 
introduced in March and April 1994. The amendments of March 1994 addressed 
the demands of both the IFP and the Afrikaner related parties while those of April 
responded to the demands of the IFP only. The details of the amendments are 
mentioned in the course of the discussion outlined in this section. 
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constitutions. The contents of provincial constitutions were, however, 
extensively regulated by the Constitution. The March 1994 amendment 
relaxed the regulation by providing provinces a measure of discretion in 
structuring their legislative and executive branches. Provinces were allowed 
to depart from the procedures which the national Constitution originally 
mandated for the province’s governance.89 This created room for 
asymmetrical constitutions. 90 
 
One of the symbolic but very important accommodative features of the 
Interim Constitution was that it envisaged the possibility of a constitutional 
monarchy within a republic. The April 1994 amendment, driven by the 
demands of the IFP, explicitly permitted provincial constitutions to provide 
for the institution, authority and status of a traditional monarch in provinces 
anywhere in the country; it even made the establishment of such institutions 
for the Zulu King in the province of KwaZulu-Natal mandatory.91 This 
symbolic but very important addition to the Interim Constitution gave the 
province of Kwazulu Natal the right to adopt a constitutional monarchy 
within the Republic of South Africa. Although these concessions were 
considered by some as too minimal to have actually convinced Buthelezi to 
join the process,92 he finally decided to participate in the election following 
these amendments that were enacted only two days before the election. 
                                                 
89  Section 8(a) of Act 2 of 1994. See also Ellmann 1994. 
90  Steytler and Mettler: 2003.  
91  Section 1of Act 3 of 1994. 
92  Steytler and Mettler (2003:8) suggested that the Zulu monarch, King Zwelithini,  
may have played a decisive role in changing Buthelezi’s mind: “There was little 
love lost between them, and the transfer of tribal land by the South African 
government to the King a day before the election, may have swayed Buthelezi. 
Without royal support and facing the prospect of an uncertain future outside 
government office, there may have been little option left for them”. 
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The constitution–making power of the provinces was contested in a case 
that was brought before the Constitutional Court. The KwaZulu–Natal draft 
Constitution, which was adopted unanimously by the provincial legislature, 
was brought before the Constitutional Court for the purpose of 
certification.93 The Court, citing many flaws, refused the certification of the 
Constitution on the ground that the KwaZulu–Natal legislature, in drafting 
the provincial Constitution, had usurped the powers and functions of 
Parliament and the national government. The Court stated that some of the 
provisions in the draft Constitution appeared to have “been passed by the 
KZN legislature under a misapprehension that it enjoyed a relationship of 
co-supremacy with the national Legislature and even the Constitutional 
Assembly”.94 The Court rejected the extreme option of provincial 
sovereignty on the ground that the assertion of recognition was 
“inconsistent with the Interim Constitution because KZN is not a sovereign 
state and simply has no power or authority to grant constitutional 
“recognition” to what the national government may or may not do”.95 
 
5.2.1.2 Provincial legislative autonomy 
A cursory glance at the contents of the Interim Constitution might give the 
impression that provinces were provided with extensive areas of 
competence on which they could legislate. A long list of functional areas on 
which provinces can pass legislation was included under Schedule 6 of the 
Interim Constitution. From the long list of functional areas, however, only 
the following were relevant for the protection of ethnic communities: 
cultural affairs, education at all levels (but excluding universities and 
technikons), language policy and the use of official languages within the 
                                                 
93  In re: Certification Interim Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996  
1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC). 
94  At para 15. 
95  At para 34. For more, see Williams 2002. 
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province (subject to the provision of section 3), provincial public media and 
traditional authorities. In contention was the scope of provincial legislative 
power over these and other functional areas.  
 
Initially, section 126 provided expressly for the so-called concurrent 
legislative competence of parliament with regard to all the functional areas 
mentioned above and accorded explicit supremacy to parliamentary 
legislation over provincial laws. This specific section was revised when the 
Interim Constitution was subsequently amended in March 1994 in order to 
meet the demands of the IFP. The IFP argued that the powers provided to 
the provinces were only concurrent powers that can be overridden by 
national legislation.96 The amendment removed the explicit statement that 
accords concurrency and legislative supremacy to national laws and granted 
provinces prevailing powers in a range of areas of legislative authority. A 
close scrutiny reveals, however, that the amended provisions of section 126 
did not, in effect, change the power relation between the national and 
provincial government as it accorded supremacy to the former in a wide set 
of circumstances.97 The wide circumstances under which national 
                                                 
96   Klug 2000: 108.  
97  The legislative competences of the provinces was circumscribed by the fact that an  
Act of Parliament that falls within the designated legislative functional area of the 
provincial legislatures could still prevail over provincial legislation in so far as the 
Act of Parliament deals with matters that cannot be regulated by provincial 
legislation. Matters included in this category are those which, to be performed 
effectively, requires regulation or co-ordination through uniform norms or 
standards that apply generally throughout the Republic or through an Act of 
Parliament, which is necessary to set minimum standards across the nation for the 
rendering of public services. In addition, an Act of Parliament would prevail if the 
Act is necessary for the maintenance of economic unity, the protection of the 
environment, the promotion of inter-provincial commerce, the protection of the 
common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital or labor, or 
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legislation could prevail over provincial legislation watered down the 
legislative authority of provincial legislatures to a great degree.98 
 
The scope of provincial powers was contested in a case brought before the 
Constitutional Court. The case related to a dispute over the National 
Education Policy Bill which was tabled for adoption before the National 
Assembly. It was alleged that the Bill imposed national education policy on 
the provinces, thereby impinging upon the autonomy of the provinces and 
their executive authority.99 The IFP contended that KwaZulu-Natal is in a 
position to develop and regulate its own policies and, as a result, the Bill 
could have no application in the province. The fact that education, as a 
functional area, was assigned concurrently to the national and provincial 
governments was not disputed. The disagreement lay in the effects of 
concurrency - what should follow when a subject matter is concurrently 
assigned to both provincial and national government. The assumption on the 
part of KwaZulu–Natal and the IFP was that a form of pre–emption doctrine 
precludes the national government from enacting in an area of concurrent 
jurisdiction as long as the provinces have the capacity to design and regulate 
their own policies. The Court, however, rejected the notion of pre-emption.  
The Court stated that the legislative competences of the provinces and 
parliament to make laws in respect of Schedule 6 [concurrent] matters  did 
                                                                                                                            
the maintenance of national security. A provincial law would not prevail over an 
Act of Parliament if “it materially prejudices the economic, health or security 
interests of another province or of the country as a whole or impedes the 
implementation of national economic policies” (section 126 Interim Constitution). 
98  Some authors like Basson (1999) and Ellmann (1995) went to the extent of  
concluding that the provinces lack autonomous powers with regard to their 
allocated areas of legislative competences. . 
99  Ex parte Speaker of the National Assembly: In re: Dispute Concerning the  
Constitutionality of certain Provisions of the National Education Policy Bill 83 of 
1995 1996 (3) SA 289 (CC); 1996 (4) BCLR 518 (CC). 
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not hinge upon section 126 (3), which regulated the conditions under which 
a national or provincial law prevails. Section 126 (3) came into operation, 
according to the Court, only if it was necessary to resolve a conflict between 
inconsistent national and provincial laws. As Klug aptly remarked, the 
Court, by rejecting the notion of pre-emption, enabled “both national and 
provincial legislators to continue to promote and even legislate their own 
imagined solutions to issues within their concurrent jurisdictions without 
foreclosing on their particular options until there is an irreconcilable 
conflict”.100 
 
In delivering judgment, the Court made some important remarks regarding 
the nature of provincial autonomy under the Constitution. It outlined the 
outer limits of provincial autonomy by cautioning that the provinces in 
South Africa, “unlike their counterparts in the United States of America”, 
were not “sovereign states”.101 Nothing in the Interim Constitution allowed 
a province to regulate its own status.  
 
5.2.2 Volkstaat  
As indicated earlier, Afrikaner-based right–wing parties insisted on the 
establishment of an Afrikaner homeland where whites would be a majority. 
                                                 
100  Klug 2000: 109. 
101  National Education Policy Bill 83 of 1995 at para 23. The Court also made  
remarks with regard to the conflict of provincial and national legislation. The 
Court stressed that even if a conflict was resolved in favor of either the provincial 
or national law the other was not invalidated, it was merely subordinated and to 
the extent of the conflict, rendered inoperative. The Court thus made a distinction 
between laws that were inconsistent with each other and laws that were 
inconsistent with the Constitution and thereby argued that, even if the National 
Education Policy Bill dealt with matters in respect of which provincial laws would 
have paramountancy, it could not for that reason alone be declared 
unconstitutional.  
 
 
 
 
 195  
Although establishing such a province was considered not feasible by many, 
different ‘innovative’ suggestions were made to realise an Afrikaner 
homeland. These included providing ‘financial incentives’ to induce blacks 
to leave the Volkstaat once its borders were laid out, Volkstaat 
constitutional provisions entrenching an Afrikaner majority in the Volkstaat 
legislature, and inducing more whites to move to the new Volkstaat.102 
Opposed to any dispensation that does not provide for the establishment of a 
Volkstaat, the right–wing parties walked out of the negotiation process and 
threatened to destabilise the country. When the Interim Constitution was 
amended in March 1994, provisions were made to accommodate the 
demands of the Afrikaner-based right wing parties. 
 
Two provisions in the amended Interim Constitution provided for the 
establishment of a Volkstaat Council. Section 184A (1) authorised the 
establishment of a Volkstaat Council of 20 members who were “elected by 
members of parliament who support the Volkstaat idea”. As was stated 
under section 184B (1), the major objective of the Council was to serve as a 
constitutional mechanism to enable those who support the Volkstaat idea to 
‘constitutionally pursue the establishment of such a Volkstaat’. Although 
these provisions were only permissive and did not constitutionally oblige 
the creation of such a Council, the Parliament adopted the Volkstaat 
Council Act 30 of 1994, which gave effect to the establishment of a 
Volkstaat Council in May 1994. This is regarded by many as a good 
demonstration of the good will of South Africa’s new leaders and their 
“desire for domestic peace and their willingness to fashion compromises to 
achieve that goal”.103  
                                                 
102  See Ellmann 1995: 31. 
103   Ellmann 1995: 32. This was objected by the CP “as inadequate provision for the  
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As indicated in the establishing section, the Volkstaat Council was provided 
with limited powers. It was mandated only “to gather process and make 
available information with regard to possible boundaries, powers and 
functions and legislative, executive and other structures of “a Volkstaat.’’ 
Its responsibility was to undertake and submit to the Constitutional 
Assembly and the Commission on Provincial Government feasibility and 
other relevant studies on the establishment of a Volkstaat.104 These 
responsibilities defined the nature of the work of the Council as that of a 
mere advisory body which had the mandate to ‘study, propose…advocate’ 
and eventually “sell its idea of a Volkstaat to the Constitutional 
Assembly”.105 It had no real decision-making powers.  
 
The incorporation of the Volkstaat clauses in the Interim Constitution would 
undoubtedly went a long way in terms of managing a potential ethnic 
conflict. The incorporation of the Volkstaat Council in the Interim 
Constitution also succeeded in bringing some elements of the white right-
wing parties into the negotiation process. General Viljoen, after breaking 
ranks with the AVF, established his own party, the Freedom Front, which 
eventually participated in the election.  
 
5.3 Shared rule 
Important aspects of shared rule also found their way into the Interim 
Constitution both in the legislative and executive arena. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
establishment of the Volkstaat. They were seeking their own territory, constitution 
and government. They wanted a guarantee prior to the election that they would 
receive their own state” (Steytler and Mettler 2003: 97). 
104  Strydom 1997. See also Van Wyk et al: 1994.  
105  Ellmann 1995: 32. 
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5.3.1 The National Assembly 
The principle of shared rule found its way into the legislative arm of 
government as a result of the system of proportional representation that was 
adopted for the election of the National Assembly, the lower and most 
powerful house of Parliament. Section 40 of the Constitution stated that the 
National Assembly consisted of 400 members elected in accordance with 
the system of proportional representation of voters. The specific system of 
proportional representation adopted by the Constitution did not place a 
threshold that parties needed to achieve in order to obtain a representation in 
Parliament.106 No group, however small, was excluded from obtaining a seat 
in the National Assembly. This had the obvious effect of strengthening the 
power-sharing scheme institutionalised in the executive arm of 
government107  
 
5.3.2 The Senate 
A Senate representing nine provinces was established by section 48 of the 
Constitution. Irrespective of the size of the population in a province, each 
province was represented by ten senators. This resulted in the 
overrepresentation of smaller provinces. Unlike many other senates where 
                                                 
106  The system introduced the list system of proportional representation which offers  
to the voters only one choice, to vote for the political party of his or her choice. 
107  The issue of enforcing the principle of proportional representation was also raised  
in relation to the functioning and organisation of the parliament itself. The debate 
was raised in relation to the committees of the parliament when the ANC 
legislators proposed the chairing of twenty–three of the twenty-seven 
parliamentary standing committees overseeing cabinet ministries, leaving only the 
chairs of four ‘housekeeping’ committees and one of the twenty-seven portfolio 
committees to the National Party. Johnny de Lange, back then a prominent ANC 
legislator, argued that “[t]here is no reference whatsoever in the constitution 
forcing the legislature to be part of the government of national unity” (Ellmann 
1994: 18). 
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members are assigned by the provincial legislature, the senators, in this 
particular case, were nominated by political parties.108 The political parties, 
in order to nominate senators, had to be represented in a provincial 
legislature. Each party was entitled to nominate a senator in accordance 
with the principle of proportional representation.  
 
The Senate was given an important power in the passing of bills affecting 
provincial matters. According to section 61 of the Interim Constitution, the 
Senate was entitled to exercise a veto on Bills affecting the boundaries or 
the exercise or performance of the powers and functions of the provinces. 
Both the Senate and the National Assembly, sitting separately, had to pass 
such Bills. The veto power enjoyed by the Senate, however, did not include 
bills amending the Interim Constitution, which, according to s 62(1) of the 
Interim Constitution, needed to be approved at a joint sitting of both the 
National Assembly and the Senate by a majority of at least two–thirds of the 
total number of members of both houses. More importantly, any bill that 
affected the legislative competence of provinces as well as the executive 
authority of the same had to receive a separate blessing of the two houses.109 
As noted by Basson, this amounted to a clear veto power by the Senate in 
the legislative process.110  
                                                 
108  Section 48(2) Interim Constitution. 
109  Section 62(2) of Interim Constitution. 
110  Basson 1994. It was also provided that a bill that affects the boundaries or the  
exercise of the powers and functions of a particular province or provinces must be 
approved by a majority of senators of the province or provinces affected only. The 
Interim Constitution, under section 62(2), further stated that the boundaries and 
legislative competence of a province shall not be amended without the consent of 
a relevant provincial legislature. This, commented Basson (1994: 95), introduced 
“an extra–parliamentary procedure into the legislative process in Parliament by 
awarding such national legislative competence (amounting, in fact, to a legislative 
veto) to the relevant provincial legislature”. 
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5.3.3 Government of National Unity 
An important feature of the Interim Constitution was the power sharing 
scheme introduced in the Government of National Unity. The scheme was 
focused on the executive arm of government. Two paths through which this 
scheme could be realised were provided in the Interim Constitution. First, 
any party winning at least one-fifth of the seats (i.e. 80 seats) in the National 
Assembly was guaranteed the position of an executive deputy president.111 
It was as a result of this rule that F.W.De Klerk, the last president of the 
apartheid government, became a second executive deputy president and 
joined President Mandela and his deputy, Thabo Mbeki, in government. 
Second, the proportional representation system was applied in the Cabinet 
where, according to the Interim Constitution, every party that won 20 seats 
in the National Assembly (that is, essentially, at least 5% of the vote) was 
entitled to representation in proportion to its seats in the Assembly.112 The 
power sharing scheme was complemented by the constitutional rule which 
instructed the cabinet to seek consensus in making decisions. The Cabinet, 
according to section 89(2) of the Constitution, was obliged to function in a 
manner which gives consideration to the consensus-seeking spirit 
underlying the concept of a government of national unity as well as the need 
for effective government. 
 
Although the phrase “government of provincial unity” was not explicitly 
stated in the Interim Constitution, the same principle of shared rule had 
found its way into provincial executive structures. The principle of 
proportional representation was, for example, applied in the election of 
members of the Executive Councils. According to section 149(2) of the 
Interim Constitution, any party with at least 10% of the seats in a provincial 
                                                 
111  Section 84 Interim Constitution. 
112  Section 88(3) Interim Constitution. 
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legislature was entitled to such representation on the province’s council. 
The provincial Executive Councils, the counterparts to the national cabinet, 
were similarly obliged by section 150(2) of the Interim Constitution to 
function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensus–seeking 
spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity as well as 
the need for effective government.  
 
5.4 ‘Fundamental Rights’  
The Interim Constitution, in its chapter on ‘Fundamental Rights’, provides 
for a number of rights that are often regarded as instrumental in the 
accommodation of the needs of individuals that belong to different ethnic 
groups.113 It declared a right to equality and prohibited unfair discrimination 
based on grounds of language, race and ethnicity. Section 31 of the Interim 
Constitution prohibited the state from interfering with an individual’s right 
to speak the language or practice the culture of his or her choice. 
 
5.5 Constitutional Principles 
An important extension of the accommodative feature of the Interim 
Constitution was the adoption of principles which guaranteed that the 
counter-majoritarian elements of the Interim Constitution would be 
maintained in the final constitution. In this regard, the Interim Constitution 
included, even as adopted originally in 1993, Constitutional Principles 
which guaranteed the provinces protection against the diminution of their 
powers.  
 
For the purpose of this study, four Constitutional Principles need to be 
mentioned. Constitutional Principle XI stated that the diversity of languages 
and cultures would be acknowledged and protected, and conditions for the 
                                                 
113  Section 8 Interim Constitution. 
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promotion shall be encouraged. The final constitution, according to 
Constitutional Principle XII, would also “recognise and protect” provincial 
constitutional provisions that are adopted with respect to the status of 
traditional monarchs. Constitutional Principle XVIII ensured that in the 
final constitution the province’s powers, including their power to write their 
own constitutions, “shall not be substantially less than or substantially 
inferior to those provided for’’ in the Interim Constitution.  
 
Constitutional Principle XXXIV provided for the right to self-
determination. This Constitutional Principle outlined the right to self-
determination that implied a measure of territorial autonomy. It stated that 
the Constitution recognises “…a notion of the right to self-determination by 
any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, whether 
in a territorial entity within the Republic or in any other recognised way”. It 
further stated that “the Constitution may give expression to any particular 
form of self-determination, provided there is proven support within the 
community concerned for such form of self-determination.” More 
importantly, it guaranteed the entrenchment of a territorial entity in the final 
constitution if it is established in terms of the Interim Constitution in order 
to give expression to the notion of the right to self-determination.  
 
The final settlement represents a fine balance between the need to 
accommodate the demand of an ethnic group, on the one hand and the 
danger of opening a can of worms conducive for ethnic entrepreneurs, on 
the other. As noted by Hendricks, “[b]y not closing off the avenue to ethnic 
groups who seek self–determination, and instead, to assert that they need to 
show proven support, the state effectively accommodated ethnic demands 
without running the risk of every ethnic group seeking secession.”114 
                                                 
114  Hendricks 1997: 100. 
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The general aim of the Constitutional Principles was to ensure that the final 
Constitution would not be less accommodative than the Interim 
Constitution. As we shall see later, the Constitutional Court, which, 
according to these principles, was given the power to ensure that the final 
constitution complied with these Constitutional Principles, refused to certify 
the first draft presented for certification on the basis that it did not accord 
sufficient power to provinces. 
 
5.6 Assessment 
The Interim Constitution could, in many respects, be considered an 
important document that attempted to accommodate the demands of both 
centrifugal and centripetal forces through a balanced incorporation of both 
individual and group rights. The Interim Constitution had included rights 
that are individualistic in their orientation. As the provision on education 
illustrates, the Interim Constitution provided for a negative right even in 
matters that are relevant to ethnic groups. However, in as much as the 
document emphasised individual rights, it made important concessions with 
the view to addressing the anxieties of ethnic groups. The provision on 
language required positive action on the part of the state to promote the use 
and development of languages. The clauses relating to the Volkstaat and 
self-determination were also important safeguards that the Interim 
Constitution provided to those who perceived a threat to their ethnic 
identity. The constitutional provision for a monarchy within a republic, 
albeit symbolic, represented a brilliant inclusion of an element of self rule. 
The establishment of a government of national unity with executive power- 
sharing at its centre was also an important concession to those who relied on 
shared rule to promote the interests of the community they represent.  
 
It is, however, important to note that the shared rule system enshrined in the 
Interim Constitution did not represent a full-blown consocitionalism. This 
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is, first, because the Interim Constitution fostered a government of national 
unity but did not guarantee that the government would function as ‘a grand 
coalition’. The power of the executive deputy president was limited to 
consultation and did not include the power to veto. The clause that injected 
the spirit of consensus decision making was also soft as it only required 
members to give due consideration to the ‘consensus-seeking spirit’ without 
obliging them to actually make decisions by consensus. 115  
 
The general assessment is that the Interim Constitution had, more or less, 
fashioned a compromise that balanced the demands of those that perceived a 
threat to their identity, on the one hand, and those that sought the 
centralisation of power under a unitary state, on the other. There is no doubt 
these aspects of the Interim Constitution went a long way in quelling the 
anxieties of those who perceived a threat to their ethnic identity.  
 
6. The political saliency of ethnicity in post-apartheid South Africa 
Discussing the concept of ethnicity and posing claims based on the same is 
one of the most onerous jobs that any politician in South Africa can ask for. 
Anyone who wants to analyse ethnicity and champion ethnic identities can 
easily be mistaken for a neo-bantustan architect who attempts to reintroduce 
‘the ugly past’ under the guise of accommodating diversity.116 Especially 
                                                 
115  Ellmann 1994. 
116  The maligned nature of the concept of ethnicity has been apparent in the fact that  
many scholars have, for a long time, avoided the discussion of ethnicity. Bekker 
(1993, 63-95), in his book Ethnicity in Focus, analysed several relevant scholarly 
works with the view to examine scholarly interest in the area of ethnicity. In the 
areas of sociology, most scholarly works, he noted, rarely considered ethnicity as 
a basis for analysis. Even studies focusing on incidents that involved inter-ethnic 
conflict and pre-supposed the consideration of ethnicity as a relevant factor have 
eschewed the latter as a framework for analysis. During the apartheid era, any 
serious engagement of the concept of ethnicity in the South African context was 
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Afrikaners that posit ethnic questions are often accused of clinging to the 
apartheid era’s privileges, however genuine their claims may be.117 The 
past, with its dire connotations of ethnicity, has caused ethnic entrepreneurs 
in South Africa to be looked upon with suspicion. As Maphai aptly points 
out, “ethnicity seems to have become a euphemism for racism”.118  The 
question, however, remains whether ethnicity is a politically relevant divide 
in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
6.1 Contesting views about the political relevance of ethnicity 
Many scholars and politicians, despite the great deal of reluctance to engage 
in any serious discussion of ethnicity, insisted on the relevance of ethnicity 
in South Africa. Horowitz was, for example, confident enough to 
prophesises that ethnicity will become the central question in post-apartheid 
                                                                                                                            
equated with doing intellectual work for the apartheid government. For Bekker, 
the avoidance of the discussion of ethnicity was also a matter of ‘political 
correctness’, as this particular evasion was common among those that were 
opposed to the apartheid regime, especially liberal and Marxists scholars. Lijphart 
(1989) adds similar political reasons to the ‘list of factors’ that lead to the evasion 
of addressing ethnicity. As much as the government can stand to benefit from 
stressing ethnicity, he argued, so does the opposition from de-emphasizing it. For 
the latter, the discourse on ethnicity is considered as ‘a discourse of domination’. 
It is a discourse that serves the interests of those who sway power. For the 
apartheid government, on the other hand, it is an instrument to maintain minority 
rule. The net effect of all these has been, as Horowitz noted, “the studied neglect 
of ethnicity” (Horowitz 1991: 28). 
117  In some cases, this can be explained  by what  is usually referred to as 
‘dogmatic non–racialism’, which, to a large extent, seems to be prevalent in the 
present day South Africa. A typical characteristic of this dogmatism is that it has 
the strong tendency to deny or repress those who harbor strong feelings about their 
ethnic identity. 
118  Maphai 1995: 73. 
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South African politics.119 Lijphart made similar predictions. For him, the 
most ‘accurate view of the South African plural society’ is one that views 
South Africa as a state that is characterised by a multiple division of ethnic 
groups. When the white domination comes to an end, he predicted, the black 
African society of South Africa can be divided into ten ethnic segments and 
the whites into Afrikaners and English–speakers.120 This position is also 
shared by David Welsh who, writing back in 1980, predicted the weakening 
of black solidarity in the post–apartheid South Africa: “It may very well 
occur that ethno-linguistic differences among Africans will become 
politicised”.121  
 
Others relied on the experience of heterogeneous countries and similarly 
argued that South Africa cannot be an exception to the saliency of ethnicity 
in ethnically plural societies. Giliomee, for instance, argued that “studies of 
other African societies show the persistence of ethnicity despite the absence 
of any policy resembling apartheid”.122 He, supporting his argument with 
data collected among black people in South Africa, expressed strong doubt 
about the assumption that the distinctive ethnic identities nurtured by the 
apartheid government and institutionalised by the homeland policy would 
‘promptly fade away’.123 Arguing against what he called the ‘end–of– 
ethnicity myth’, Lijphart also relied on comparative observations: 
                                                 
119  Horowitz 1991. 
120  Lijphart 1985.   
121  Welsh 1980: 161. 
122  Giliomee 1991: 66. 
123  Giliomee and Schlemmer accused the liberals, who emphasised inequality and  
disregarded ethnic heterogeneity as of prime importance in South Africa, of being  
“apologetic”. They argue that the de-emphasising of the importance of ethnicity in 
the liberal school goes down to the growing belief that “constitutional proposals 
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Ethnicity and ethnic divisions are facts of life in South Africa. It is 
tempting to play down the ethnic factor both because it superficially 
appears to  have been declining in importance during the last decades 
and because it would be much easier to find a democratic solution for 
South Africa if the country were a basically homogenous or an only 
mildly divided society. Unfortunately… the latter image does not stand 
up to sober comparative scrutiny. South Africa’s ethnic divisions 
cannot be wished away. 124 (Emphasis added). 
 
Many thus predicted that with the dismantling of apartheid, the common 
oppression that muted intra-group rivalries among the different ethnic 
groups in the black community will fade away. The offshoot of this 
argument is that the architects of post-apartheid South Africa must guard 
themselves from the wrong assumption that the tensions that exist between 
black Africans are too insignificant to serve as raw material for ethnic 
mobilisation. More importantly, however, it suggests that the post apartheid 
government cannot avoid the entrenchment of ethnic identities in the 
Constitution. 
 
Those who predicted ethnic-mobilisation in post-apartheid South Africa felt 
vindicated by the major events that unfolded in the early 1990s transition 
process discussed above. The conflicts confirmed, for them, the prediction 
that ethnic mobilisation and ethnic conflicts are an inevitable spin-off of the 
fall of the apartheid system. For some, “[n]ow that the possibility of the end 
of apartheid is a reality…the ethnic divisions in South Africa will emerge, 
                                                                                                                            
needed to be acceptable to the Black majority” (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989: 
160). 
124  Lijphart 1989: 22-23. See also Welsh 1980; Lemon 1996.  
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and we are now seeing the first signs of this fight between the Xhosa and 
Zulu on the reef”.125 
 
Others simply rejected ethnicity as a relevant factor in South Africa.  
Sparks, writing in 1990, predicted that ideologically defined political bases 
rather than ethnic power bases will be the rallying point for any power 
struggle within the black community in the post-apartheid South Africa.126 
A good number of liberal scholars have also considered ‘the structural 
inequality of wealth, status and power’ and the statutory racial system as the 
most important divide and not the ethnic diversity that characterises South 
African society. 127   
 
6.2 Assessment 
The conflicts in the early transition, adduced above to support the 
emergence of ethnic mobilisation, do not necessarily substantiate the claim 
that ethnicity is a politically relevant factor in post apartheid South Africa. 
To begin with, a closer scrutiny would reveal that the categorisation of the 
conflicts in the early transition period as ethnic conflict between the Xhosas 
and the Zulus is a mere simplification. As Maphai aptly comments, 
 
[o]riginally the violence was confined to the Kwazulu-Natal 
region, almost an exclusively Zulu speaking area. Most of the 
non-Zulus who settled there have virtually been assimilated. 
                                                 
125      As quoted in Guy 1992: 84. Maphai objected to the categorisation of the 
conflict in the Witwatersrand area in the Transvaal as a Xhosa–Zulu conflict. He 
argued that this conclusion is based on the wrong assumption that the townships 
are exclusively or predominantly dominated by Xhosas while the townships 
which were close to the hostels where Zulus dwelled were ethnically 
heterogeneous (Maphai 1995: 91). 
126  Sparks 1990: 391. 
127  Slabbert and Welsh 1979: 153.   
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How anyone could objectively describe this as a Zulu–Xhosa 
conflict, defied imagination.128  
 
The conflict was largely between members of the same ethnic group: 
‘Between rural, often, older, Zulus committed to their tribal identity and 
traditional systems of government, and those younger, township-based 
Zulus, less strongly tied to ethnic loyalties, who supported the ANC’s 
demands for modernisation and homogenisation of the South African 
people’. As some aptly commented, the conflicts were more of a ‘Zulu civil 
war’. 
 
Related to this is also the revelation of the existence of a ‘third force’ 
behind the conflicts witnessed in the early transition phases. A judicial 
commission of inquiry, chaired by Judge Goldstone, revealed that members 
of security police were involved in engineering the conflicts.129 Senior 
South African Police officials, according to the report, had been involved in 
supplying IFP with weapons and financial support.130 This indicated that 
political violence will become less common “as those who engineered so 
much of it lose their access to the levers of power”.131 The revelation of the 
“Inkathagate”, as it came to be known, cast doubt on the position that 
claimed the potential resurgence of ethnic identity in the new South Africa. 
The revelation vindicated the view that the conflicts were not ethnic 
conflicts per se. 
 
                                                 
128  Maphai 1995: 91. 
129  Ellmann 1994. This was denied by both IFP and General Bassie Smit, the  
second-highest ranking police officer in South Africa and one of those accused in 
the report. 
130  Manby 1995. 
131  Ellmann 1994:10. 
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The ANC’s overwhelming victory in the general election of 1994 also 
shows that ethnicity is not the most relevant political divide in South Africa. 
In as far as the black African communities were concerned, the election 
results tended to suggest less ethnic divisions.132 The ANC received its 
strongest support, 91.6%, from a region where there are hardly any Xhosa 
speakers: The Northern Transvaal Region which is composed of Pedis, 
Shangaans and Vendas. The party garnered 83.3% of the vote in the North 
Western Regions which is dominated by Tswana-speakers. Likewise, it 
polled 76.6 and 80.7% of the vote in the Sotho–speaking Orange Free State 
and the Eastern Transvaal respectively. The latter is home for the Ndebele 
and Swazi speakers. Despite the fact that the ANC’s leadership, as noted 
above, is dominated by Xhosa speakers, the 1994 elections indicated that 
the party enjoys a great deal of support across ethnic groups. This left little 
substance in the claim that the ANC is a ‘Xhosa organisation’.  
 
Equally notable is the fact that parties which contested the election on an 
ethnic ticket performed poorly in the elections. The Luso (Portuguese)-
South African Party, representing the approximately 500,000 South 
Africans of Portuguese ancestry, failed to gain a single seat in Parliament. 
Similarly, the following ethnic parties were not able to secure significant 
place in Parliament: the Minority Front Party (Indians in the Kwazulu–Natal 
region), Dikwankwelta Party of South Africa (Southern Sotho in the Orange 
Free State), African Democratic Movement (Xhosa in the Eastern Cape) and 
Ximoko Progressive Party (Shangaan in the Northern Transvaal).133  
 
The revelation of the “third forces”, together with the winning of elections 
by the ANC across ethnic groups and the poor performance of ethnic parties 
                                                 
132  Maphai 1995: 95. 
133  Maphai 1995. 
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in the elections suggests the continuing solidarity among black African 
people. It confirmed the prediction that ‘Blacks will not vote with their 
tribal feet’. To be precise, however, the voting trend was not entirely 
ethnically neutral. Voting patterns, to some extent, have also been partly 
ethnic. This is especially true in KwaZulu-Natal where the IFP received the 
majority of the votes (i.e. 50.8%), with 83% of the vote coming from the 
Zulus. Another ethnic–based party is the Freedom Front, Afrikaner-based 
party, which received 83% of its votes from Afrikaners although it only 
garnered only 2.7% of the national vote in a country where Afrikaners 
account fro almost 5.5% of the population.134 More Afrikaners voted for the 
National Party whose votes, however, came from other population groups as 
well. Of the 20.39 % of the national vote that the National Party secured, 
only 30% came from Afrikaners, another 30% from Coloured,135 20% 
English-speaking white and the rest from other groups.136 These figures 
suggest that the exceptions to the ‘ethnically neutral voting pattern’ are 
limited.   
 
7. Conclusion 
The solidarity of the black communities that, to a large extent, has muted 
inter–ethnic rivalry seems to have persisted into post–apartheid South 
Africa. Mobilisation around ethnic identity is rare among the different 
                                                 
134  Of the 9.3% white population in South Africa, approximately 550,000 are  
Portuguese speakers and people who speak other European languages.  The rest 
includes Afrikaans and English speakers in the ratio of approximately 60:40 (see 
Lemon 1996). 
135  Almost two-thirds of the Coloured vote in the Western Cape voted for the  
National Party (see Giliomee 1995). 
136  Republic of South Africa 1994 General Election available at  
http://www.electionresources.org/za/1994/, accessed on 03 June 2008. See also 
Reynolds 1999. 
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ethnic groups within the black community. This, some may argue, does not 
necessarily rule out the argument that relied on comparative observations 
(i.e. experiences of other ethnically plural societies) and predicted the 
politicisation of ethnic differences among the black community. It might 
only mean that it is too early to expect the weakening of black solidarity and 
the revival of ethnic rivalry in the state of affairs where race and class 
divides reinforce each other, thus, making the statutorily determined and 
historically reinforced racial cleavage sharp and very strong.  
 
A more plausible explanation for the gap between the widely held 
predictions and the actual societal reality lies, however, in the limitations of 
the arguments based on comparative observations. The argument seems to 
simply suggest that ethnic divisions will necessarily be reproduced in the 
political arena. It fails to consider the role of historical and political 
circumstances in bringing parallelism between social cleavages and political 
mobilisation. The political experience of the different ethnic groups in 
South Africa has created solidarity among the different ethnic groups within 
the black community. The absence of ethnic traits in the identity and 
organisation of the post apartheid state seems to have further contributed to 
the rarity of ethnic mobilisation. It may not thus be surprising that ethnic 
mobilisation is rare in a situation where political and historical experiences 
have resulted in the emergence of solidarity across the ethnic divide and 
where there is no particular pattern of state-driven ethnic stratification.   
 
Yet, as indicated earlier, important exceptions are notable. Ethnic demands 
were articulated and vociferously pursued by groups belonging to the 
Zulus137 and Afrikaners. The Interim Constitution represents a negotiated 
                                                 
137  It is , however, important to note there is not even clear support for the political  
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settlement that, to a large extent, responded to the claims of these two 
groups. The question is whether the final Constitution has equally 
accommodated the demands of the different ethnic groups. The next chapter 
focuses on the final Constitution of South Africa as well as the legislation 
and other practices that developed thereafter, with the view to examining 
their implications for the accommodation of its ethnically diverse 
population. 
                                                                                                                            
party that appeals to ethnic sentiment among the Zulus. This is evident in the not-
so-strong support that the IFP secured during the first election and in the 
successful incursion of the ANC in the IFP’s traditional power base, which 
eventually resulted in the dominance of the ANC in KwaZulu Natal in the 
elections that followed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Institutional Recognition and Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity in 
South Africa 
 
1. Introduction 
The politics of identity was at the centre of the governance policy of the 
apartheid regime. Through its homeland policy, the apartheid government 
introduced ethnicity as the organising principle of the black community. Its 
race based policy, on the other hand, entrenched the hegemony of the white 
race and sought to weaken the solidarity of the non-white communities. It is 
with this historical baggage that the architects of the new South Africa came 
together to draft a constitution. To the surprise of many, they agreed on an 
Interim Constitution, dubbed by many as the ‘negotiated revolution’. They 
agreed on a constitution that represented a balance between the ‘centralists’ 
who insisted on building a common national identity, on the one hand, and 
the ‘federalists’ that stressed the need to recognise and accommodate 
distinctive ethnic identities, on the other. By including a set of 34 
Constitutional Principles1 that the 1996 Constitution had to comply with, 
they further ensured that the inclusive elements of the Interim Constitution 
were not lost in the final compact. This chapter focuses on the 1996 
Constitution and the legislative and other institutional developments that 
unfolded thereafter and examines how it seeks to manage the tension 
between national unity and ethnic diversity. 
 
The chapter examines the 1996 Constitution along the lines of the three 
basic institutional principles developed in the previous chapters: 
                                                 
1  Of the 34 Constitutional Principles, four are specifically relevant for this study,  
namely Constitutional Principles XI, XII, XVII and XXXIV. For a further 
discussion of these principles, see section 5.4 of Chapter Four. 
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recognition, self rule and shared rule. It first seeks to determine how the 
Republic of South Africa views itself, as manifested in the Constitution and 
other major legislation. Does it recognise its multi-ethnic character or 
present itself as homogenised society that seeks to transform itself into a 
nation-state? The chapter then proceeds to the second institutional principle, 
self rule, and examines the South African constitutional perspective on 
providing ethnic communities with autonomy to manage their own affairs. 
Finally, the focus shifts to the third institutional principle, shared rule, and 
discusses how this particular institutional principle, which conceptualises 
the co-management of the society, has received institutional expression in 
the South African Constitution.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to determine and assess the position of South 
Africa in the continuum of states that are engaged in a nation-state building 
project, on the one hand, and those that readily recognise their ethnic 
diversity and organise their state accordingly, on the other. It is from this 
perspective that each theme is examined. While each of these themes are 
broad enough to be the subject of a full thesis, the discussion of each topic 
is limited to the above stated objective of this chapter.  
 
Before proceeding into the main subjects of this chapter, however, a few 
words on the general features of the state structure are in order. The aim is 
to briefly introduce the constitutional context within which the state’s 
response to ethnic diversity is situated. 
 
1.1 Introducing the structure of government 
The Constitution states that government is constituted of three ‘distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated’ spheres of government.2 This is a reference 
                                                 
Section 40(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1996.   (Hereafter  
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to the constitutionally autonomous national, provincial and local 
governments. The use of the term ‘sphere’ as opposed to the more common 
‘level’ is deliberate. It is meant to denote the non-hierarchical relationship 
between the three spheres of government.  
 
1.1.1 National government 
South Africa has adopted a parliamentary system of government with some 
elements of a presidential system. The Constitution vests the executive 
authority of the Republic in the President,3 who is both head of the state and 
of the national executive.4 The President, who, once elected, ceases to be a 
member of the National Assembly,5 exercises the executive authority 
together with the other members of the Cabinet.6 Members of the cabinet 
are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament,7 which has the 
power to pass a motion of no confidence in both the President and the 
Cabinet, immediately resulting in his or her resignation.8 
 
The legislative authority of the national government is vested in the 
Parliament,9 which consists of the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces.10 The National Assembly is a directly elected body. 
The National Council of Provinces, the second chamber, on the other hand, 
is not a popularly elected body but consists of provincial delegates. 
                                                                                                                            
Constitution). 
3  Section 85 Constitution. 
4  Section 83(a) Constitution. 
5  Section 87 Constitution. 
6  Section 85(2) Constitution. 
7  Section 92(2) Constitution. 
8  Section 102 Constitution. 
9  Section 43 Constitution. 
10  Section 42 Constitution. 
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1.2.2 Provincial government 
South Africa is divided into nine provinces. The executive authority of a 
province is vested in the premier of that province, who is elected by the 
provincial legislature from among its members.11 Like the national 
President, the premier exercises the executive authority together with other 
members of the Executive Council, an equivalent of the national Cabinet. 
Like members of the national Cabinet, members of the Executive Council 
are accountable, collectively and individually, to the provincial legislature 
for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions. A 
motion of no confidence by the provincial legislature on the Executive 
Council will result in the premier having to reconstitute the Council. If the 
motion of no confidence includes the premier, however, the premier and all 
the other members of the Executive Council must resign. 
 
The legislative authority of a province resides in its provincial legislature, 
which may consist of between 30 and 80 members.12 Members of the 
provincial legislature are fully elected by the residents of the province. 
 
1.1.3 Local government 
Local government in South Africa, unlike in many other federations, is not 
subordinate to the other spheres of government. It is recognised as a distinct 
level of government by the Constitution. As such, it is a government in its 
own right. It is directly elected and exercises constitutionally entrenched 
original legislative and executive authority in its areas of competence. 
 
Both the executive and legislative authority of local government resides in 
the municipal council.13 A municipal council has ‘executive authority in 
                                                 
11  Sections 125-141 Constitution. 
12  Sections 104-124 Constitution. 
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respect of and has the right to administer’ local government functional areas 
as listed in Schedule 4B and 5B of the Constitution.14 It also enjoys 
legislative authority in respect of the same matters.15 The Constitution 
provides for a two-tiered local government outside metropolitan areas: 
district and local municipalities. 
 
2. Recognition of ethnic diversity 
This section examines how the state of South Africa views itself by 
focusing on the preamble to the Constitution, language related sections of 
the Constitution and the various state symbols like national anthem, flag and 
coat of arms.  
 
2.1 Preamble to the Constitution 
The opening paragraph to the preamble of the South African Constitution 
begins with the homogenisation solution of “We the people of South 
Africa”. It presents the Constitution as a social contract entered into by 
South Africans acting in their capacities as individuals, unconstrained by 
their ethnic or other group allegiances. Far from viewing South Africa as a 
state divided into different groups, section 1 of the Constitution describes 
South Africa as ‘one, sovereign, democratic state’ (emphasis added). A 
clear emphasis on the promotion and achievement of national unity is also 
visible both in the preamble and other parts of the Constitution. The 
preamble, seeking to achieve national solidarity, identifies “building a 
united…South Africa” as one of the principal objectives of the Constitution. 
Section 41 (1) (a) also enjoins all spheres of government and all organs of 
state to preserve “the national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic”.  
                                                                                                                            
13  Section 151(2) Constitution. 
14  Section 156(1) Constitution. 
15  Section 156(2) Constitution. 
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Given the political history of South Africa, the preamble’s emphasis on 
national unity should not come as any surprise. The preamble and the 
various sections of the Constitution that emphasise national cohesion 
represent a clear break from the previous dispensation that segmented the 
population into different groups. This, for example, explains why the 
Constitution needed to explicitly describe South Africa as ‘one state’, a 
direct rejection of the bantustanisation of the South African state. That also 
explains why it eschews the apartheid style identity ascription and the 
expression of diversity in terms of explicitly identified groups and 
corresponding territories. The Swiss model, which, through the preamble to 
the Constitution (i.e. ‘We the people of the cantons’), recognises the 
division of the Swiss population into different territorial groups, is rejected 
as it would echo the old apartheid dispensation. It is based on this 
perspective that some considered the emphasis on national unity as the only 
sensible option in the context of South Africa. Brown commented that “a 
simple retreat from nationalism into multiplicity, division and difference 
can be immensely disabling in contexts, such as [South Africa], in which 
the rebuilding of society requires a common commitment and a shared sense 
of responsibility”.16  
 
Many may readily interpret the emphasis on national unity as a reluctance to 
fully recognise the internal diversity that characterises the South African 
society. The preamble does not, however, go without acknowledging the 
multi-ethnic character of South African society, albeit with no reference to 
territoriality. It explicitly declares that “South Africa belongs to all who live 
in it, united in their diversity”, the catchphrase being ‘united in their 
diversity’. This recognises that South Africa is composed of diverse 
peoples. Out of this has also developed a commonly used phrase in South 
                                                 
16  Brown 2001: 757-758. 
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African constitutional discourse: ‘Unity in diversity’. Archbishop Tutu’s 
description of South Africa as the ‘rainbow nation’ is also often used to 
describe the diverse character of the South African society.17 Although the 
description of South Africa as the ‘rainbow nation’ embodies an element of 
togetherness, it does not envisage the realisation of national unity at the 
expense of diversity. In fact, it represents the possibility of building national 
unity without destroying cultural distinctiveness and diversity.18 This phrase 
is borrowed by many including Mandela who, in his inauguration speech, 
said that “we shall build…a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the 
world”.19 
 
The preamble to the Constitution emphasises national unity and the 
indissolubility of the state while at the same time recognising the diversity 
of its population. The Constitution therefore mirrors the Spanish 
constitution which attempts to maintain the difficult balance between unity 
and the need to recognise diversity. The South African Constitution, unlike 
the Spanish constitution, does not explicitly refer to the different groups that 
make up the South African society.20 Its recognition of the diverse character 
of the society, however, represents an implicit acknowledgment of the fact 
that South African society is divided into different groups.  The nation-
building discourse one often encounters in South Africa also indicates a 
tacit recognition that South Africa is not a nation, although the emphasis on 
national unity and nation building might suggest an aspiring nation-state.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17  Tutu 1994. 
18  Lenta 2004.  
19  As quoted in Ramsamy 2002: 208 
20  The Spanish Constitution refers to nationalities and regions. 
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2.2 Symbolic codes 
The symbolic codes of the South African state reflect an emphasis on 
national unity while at the same time acknowledging the diversity of the 
South African society. 
 
2.2.1 Formal description of the state 
The official name of South Africa is the “Republic of South Africa”.21 
Despite the fact that the state reflects many of the characteristics of a federal 
state,22 the Constitution does not describe the country as a federal country. 
Nowhere in the text of the Constitution can one found the term ‘federalism’. 
In fact, this was the major bone of contention during the making of the 
Constitution. The use of the term federalism was seen as promoting a 
system that would frustrate the majoritarian democracy, introducing 
apartheid through the backdoor. It was associated with the 
‘bantustanisation’ of South Africa and the retrenchment of ethnic divisions. 
Later, an agreement was reached to drop the ‘F’ word and focus on an 
appropriate system of a constitutional government that provides for “good 
and effective government”.23 The name of the state does not, therefore, 
reflect the institutional realties of the state, which incorporates important 
federal features. 
 
2.2.2 National anthem  
The national anthem24 is a combination of the African hymn Nkosi sikelel’ 
iAfrika (God Bless Africa) and the old national anthem, Die Stem van Suid-
                                                 
21  Section 1 Constitution 
22  Haysom (2001: 43) remarks that “if the South African constitutional scheme were  
to be analyzed against a formal federal checklist, it could, with justification, be 
classified as federal”.  
23  Murray 2006: 263. 
24  Section 4 Constitution; see also Government Gazette 18341 of 10 October 1997. 
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Afrika (the Call of South Africa). The African song Nkosi sikelel’’ iAfrika 
was usually referred to as the unofficial anthem of South Africa during the 
apartheid era and it was sung at all anti-apartheid rallies and gatherings. It 
was regarded as a symbol of independence and resistance to apartheid.  The 
first part is sung in isiXhosa or isiZulu and then in Sesotho. The old anthem 
is sung in Afrikaans and finally a verse in English. By merging the two old 
anthems and using four languages, the Constitution has recognised both 
sides of South African history as well as the different linguistic groups that 
inhabit the country. 
 
2.2.3 Flag 
The new South African flag, which is provided in Schedule 1 of the 
Constitution, is envisaged as an attempt to bring together the past and the 
present. It is indicated that the colours of the National Flag include the 
colours of the old South African flag with the superimposition of the 
colours of the ANC flag. For example, the chili red (red/orange), white and 
blue appeared in the Ducth and Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek flags while 
the green, black and gold appear in the ANC flag. This makes the current 
flag a national symbol that combines the past and the present.25 An official 
government website that describes the symbolism of the flag states that the 
‘unity in diversity’ theme is also reflected in the central design of the flag, 
which “begins as a 'V' at the flag post and joins together in the centre of the 
flag and extends further as a single horizontal band to the outer edge of the 
                                                 
25  A government website states that “the design and colors of the National Flag are a  
synopsis of the principal elements of South Africa’s flag history” and maintains 
that “individual colours or colour combinations represent different meaning for 
different people and therefore no universal symbolism should be attached to any 
of the colours” (see National Flag available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/symbols/flag.htm, accessed on 15 May 2008). 
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flag”.26 This is seen as representing the coming together of the diverse 
population groups in South African society, which then take the road ahead 
in unison. 
 
2.2.4 Coat of arms   
In line with the new constitutional dispensation, South Africa has replaced 
the coat of arms it has been using since 1910. The current Coat of Arms is a 
series of elements organised in two distinct circles placed on top of one 
another. Relevant to the purpose of this study is to note the theme it 
embodies. In the Coat of Arms are included two human figures from 
Khoisan rock art. The figures are depicted as facing one another in greeting 
and in unity. Below is the motto that is written in the Khosian language of 
the /Xam people: !ke e: /xarra //ke. Literally interpreted, it means diverse 
people unite. It is remarked that the coat of arms “calls for the nation to 
unite in a common sense of belonging and national pride - Unity in 
Diversity”.27  
 
It is also important to note the symbolism of choosing the Khosian 
language, spoken by a mere 12,000 people. This choice of language may 
reinforce, on the one hand, the constitutional ideal that everyone has a place 
in South Africa. On the other hand, it may represent a deliberate decision by 
the government to avoid the language problem it would have likely faced if 
it had used any of the eleven official languages. It is also important to note 
that unlike the national anthem and the flag, the Coat of Arms, which was 
only adopted in 2000, four years after the Constitution was enacted, does 
                                                 
26  National Flag available at http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/symbols/flag.htm,  
accessed on 16 May 2008.  
27  National Coat of Arms available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/symbols/coa/index.htm, accessed on 15 May 
2008. 
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not include symbols that signify the representation of Afrikaners and other 
members of the white community.   
 
2.2.5 Assessment 
Other symbolic codes that affect inter-ethnic relationships include public 
holidays which sometimes may represent the cultural, political and 
historical experiences of different ethnic communities. In this regard, it is 
important to note that South Africa provides a creative approach towards 
managing public holidays. For example, in the apartheid South Africa, 
December 16 represented a commemoration of the Vooortrekkers victory 
over a Zulu army in 1838 in what is usually referred to as the Battle of 
Blood River.28  December 16 is also the day on which the ANC began its 
armed struggle in 1961. In the post-apartheid South Africa, the government 
maintained December 16 as a public holiday. In view of the nation-building 
and reconciliation spirit it seeks to promote, however, the government 
declared December 16 as the Day of Reconciliation. This marks a departure 
from ‘divisive symbolism’.29 This unique adoption of a public holiday in a 
manner that is inclusive and reconciliatory of the warring factions of the 
past is often regarded as a very good example of ‘accommodative 
symbolism’.30 
                                                 
28  The Battle of Blood River was fought near the Ncome river, which became red  
with blood. The river was thereafter named Blood River. For a detailed discussion, 
see Ehlers 2000.   
29  Ehlers 2000: 17-18.  
30  Another holiday that represents a creative attempt to reconcile the culture and  
history of the different ethnic groups is the Heritage Day, which is celebrated on 
September 24. In KwaZulu, 24 September was usually celebrated as a Shaka day, 
in memory of Shaka, a Zulu King that played an important role in brining together 
the different Zulu clans under ‘a united nation’. In post-apartheid South Africa, it 
is declared as the Heritage day, a day on which South Africans are encouraged to 
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 The symbolic codes adopted by South Africa reinforce the ‘unity in 
diversity’ theme adopted by the preamble of the Constitution. Both the 
recognition of the diversity of the society and the emphasis on national 
unity are apparent in the symbolic codes. The national anthem and the flag 
of South Africa represent the recognition of the diverse communities of the 
country. A common theme of these symbolic codes is also national unity. 
Each symbolic code that celebrates the diversity of the population equally 
presents a countervailing concern for national unity. The symbolic codes do 
not present South Africa as a mere collection of diverse groups (living in 
their enclaves) but as diverse groups that seek to live in unison. Its decision 
not to abolish a public holiday that was celebrated by a particular group of 
the society but to turn that holiday into a day where the different groups 
come together to reconcile their differences and thereby promote national 
unity is an illustration of the state’s choice for inclusive symbolism. The 
decision to recognise diversity while desisting from encouraging ethnic 
particularism is also reflected in the nomenclature of the state. The aversion 
to using the ‘F’ word (i.e. federalism) while incorporating important federal 
features indicates a decision to recognise ethnic diversity without 
encouraging centrifugal tendencies. 
 
Some suggest that the symbolic codes do not adequately accommodate all 
communities. This point is, for example, raised in reference to the national 
anthem: “Now this might satisfy speakers of those four (or five) languages, 
                                                                                                                            
celebrate the cultural diversity that characterises their society. The idea behind the 
celebration of this particular holiday is to foster reconciliation and promote “the 
notion that variety is a national asset as opposed to igniting conflict” (Public 
holidays available at http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/holidays.htm, accessed on 02 
May 2008).   
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but what about the other seven official languages not represented?”31 
Obviously, it is not practicable to ensure the representation of each and 
every community in the symbolic codes of the state. What is important is 
that the state, to the extent possible, has strived to ensure that its symbolic 
codes, including the national anthem, reflect the cultures, histories and 
identities of a wide range of communities. No particular group should 
prevail at the symbolic level as doing so would alienate other ethnic groups 
from the state. Although the national anthem does not make use of all 
official languages, the use of four official languages by itself represents a 
creative approach towards ethnic accommodation. The point is that the 
symbolic code the state adopts signifies an attempt to represent a broader 
range of communities as opposed to a particular group of the society 
gaining prominence in the designing of national symbols.32  
  
2.3 Language 
Section 6 of the Constitution regulates the use of language. It determines the 
official language of the Republic as well as the provinces and 
municipalities.  
 
2.3.1 The language clause of the Constitution 
Section 6 of the Constitution, like the Interim Constitution, recognises the 
eleven languages as the official languages of the Republic. The conferring 
of official status on all eleven languages sends the message that all 
linguistic groups are regarded equally by the South African Constitution. 
                                                 
31  Neethling 2001: 6. 
32  Counter indications are moves afoot to remove the part reflecting the old  
anthem (i.e. the Afrikaans and English sections), which may prove to be divisive 
(Neethling 2001). 
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Symbolically, it reinforces the normative guide set by the preamble that 
‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it’.33 
 
Section 6 of the Constitution departs from its counterpart in the Interim 
Constitution in important ways. First, the stipulation of the Interim 
Constitution which mandated the government to ‘create conditions for their 
equal use and enjoyment’ of all official languages is, to some extent, 
qualified in the 1996 Constitution by the introduction of a preferential 
treatment clause that applies in relation to some of the official languages. 
The Constitution, under section 6(2), emphasises “the historically 
diminished use and status of the indigenous languages” and mandates the 
government to “take practical and positive measures to elevate the status 
and advance the use of these languages”. The special treatment afforded to 
the previously marginalised indigenous languages is further entrenched in 
the Constitution as it, under section 6(4) (2), subjects the enjoyment of 
‘parity of esteem and equitable treatment’ of all official languages to “the 
state’s obligation with regard to indigenous languages”. Obviously, 
‘equitable treatment’ in this context does not mean equal treatment. As 
Currie aptly notes, it is “a treatment that is just and fair in the 
circumstances”.34 This, at least, means that a language policy has to take 
into account the structural inequalities of the different languages spoken in 
the country, entailing a special treatment of some of the official languages.  
                                                 
33  Another language related clauses of the Constitution, though individualistic in its  
orientation, is section 9(3) which states that “the State may not unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including […] language”. In addition, section 30 provides that “[e]veryone has the 
right to use the language and participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no 
one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision 
of the Bill of Rights”. 
34  Currie 2002: 65-6. 
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The special treatment of previously marginalised indigenous languages is 
even symbolically expressed in the manner in which the eleven official 
languages are listed in section 6(1). Unlike in the Interim Constitution in 
which the official languages are listed alphabetically, the 1996 Constitution, 
under section 6(1), lists the eleven official languages starting with the 
language that lacks widespread usage and ending with the one that enjoys 
extensive usage.35 In other words, usage informs the listing order of the 
eleven official languages. This symbolic expression can, in fact, serve as a 
guide for interpretation.  Strydom argued that “[t]he purpose of the structure 
is to change the order preference in a deliberate attempt to give textual 
prominence to languages lacking widespread usage”.36  
 
Second, the language clause of the 1996 Constitution introduces a plethora 
of considerations that were not included in the Interim Constitution and 
which must now be taken into account when the different spheres of 
government decide their official languages.37 The newly added 
considerations are usage, practicality, expense, regional circumstances, and 
balancing the needs and preferences of the population. A third point of 
departure is that the Interim Constitution stipulation, which prohibited the 
downgrading of rights relating to languages and the status of languages 
existing at the commencement of the Interim Constitution, is omitted. That 
specific clause was of special concern to the Afrikaner community who 
feared the marginalisation of their language in post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
 
 
                                                 
35  See also Strydom 1997.   
36  Strydom 1997: 898. 
37  Strydom 1997. 
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2.3.2 The use of language for the purposes of government 
The use of language for the purposes of government is a major 
manifestation of the officialisation of a language.38 According to section 
6(3), which outlines the use of language for the purposes of government, the 
national and provincial governments can select any of the official languages 
for the purposes of their administration. Their decision to use any of the 
official languages must be based on “usage, practicality, expense, regional 
circumstances and the balances of the needs and preferences of the 
population as a whole or in the province concerned”.39 In this regard, local 
governments are spared from the complexities of these considerations as 
they are only required to take into account language usage and the 
preferences of their residents. The subsection injects a minimum condition 
by enjoining the national government and each provincial government to 
use at least two official languages.40 In South Africa, where the different 
ethnic groups are relatively geographically concentrated, the regional 
preference to language usage provides ample opportunity to promote 
regional languages and facilitate the promotion of self-management of 
ethnic communities. 
 
 
 
                                                 
38  As aptly argued by Strydom (2002: 25), “officialising a language is meaningless  
unless that language is used in all or most of the primary tasks of government–
legislative, executive and judicial”. 
39  Section 6(3) Constitution. 
40   According to one interpretation, the minimum number of languages to be used for  
purposes of government is three and not two: English and Afrikaans (as the spirit 
of the Constitution precludes that their status be diminished) plus at least one 
African language because the state must, in terms of Section 6(2), take practical 
positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages 
(Kriel 2002). 
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2.3.3 The Pan South African Language Board 
The 1996 Constitution also maintained the Pan South African Language 
Board which was established by the Interim Constitution. As stated in the 
Interim Constitution, the Board is mandated to promote and create 
conditions for the development and use of all official languages.41 The list 
of languages which the Board is mandated to promote and develop is, 
however, amended to include the Khoi, Nama and San languages, as well as 
sign languages.42 In addition, the Board is entrusted with the additional task 
of promoting and ensuring respect for all languages commonly used by 
communities in South Africa, including German, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi, 
Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu and Urdu.43 This duty of the Board is also 
extended to languages used for religious purposes in South Africa including 
Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and other languages.44 The 1999 South African 
Language Board Amendments Act added the responsibility of preparing a 
dictionary for all eleven official languages.   
 
2.3.4 “Impractical egalitarianism”? 
The conferring of official status to all the eleven languages is criticised by 
some as counterproductive. They argue that this policy is not practically 
realisable and may eventually result in unilingualism; they consider the 
policy as an “impractical egalitarianism”.45 This fear is compounded by the 
fact that the Constitution, as mentioned earlier, subjects the equal treatment 
and use of all eleven languages to a plethora of practical considerations. 
Although scholars like Alexander concede to the unavoidability of the use 
of such ‘safety clauses’, he strongly warns that clauses, which are “allegedly 
                                                 
41  Section 6(5) Constitution. 
42  Section 6(5) (a) Constitution.  
43  Section 6(5) (b) (i) Constitution. 
44  Section 6(5) (b) (ii) Constitution. 
45  Sacks 1997: 683. 
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based on technical and economic grounds, are more usually the perfect 
loopholes for reducing the principle of equal treatment to mere lip 
service”.46  
 
2.3.5 Assessment 
Theoretically, the Constitution introduces a variant of the territorial model 
of language planning at a provincial level. Unlike the traditional territorial 
model, however, it does not simply grant an official status to the language 
of the majority of the locality and limit the use of other local languages. It 
rather allows provincial governments to consider the factors listed in section 
6 (3) from a provincial context and adopt at least two official languages for 
the purposes of provincial government. The province of the Western Cape, 
which is predominantly inhabited by Afrikaans and Xhosa speakers, has, for 
example, adopted three official languages: Afrikaans, isiXhosa and English. 
It is not, however, clear if this variant of territorial model automatically 
applies to national departments operating in the provinces.  
 
It is, however, important to note that a reading of section 6(3) does not 
reveal which of the considerations listed therein should be given paramount 
importance when determining an official language. In the absence of such 
clear guidance, it all depends on the level of importance that policy makers 
attach to these determining factors. For those that stress practical and 
economic considerations, the official multilingualism policy serves no 
purpose beyond ‘a symbolic gesture’. A recommendation by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in June 2000 suggested that Afrikaans be abolished 
and English becomes the sole medium of communication, training and 
examination. The institute’s annual expenditure of R600, 000 on translation, 
reproduction and printing is cited as the main reason behind the 
                                                 
46  Alexander 1998: 16. 
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recommendation.47 From the perspective of ethnic accommodation, on the 
other hand, practical considerations should not be used as an excuse to 
trample on the constitutionally sanctioned official multilingualism. This 
perspective underemphasises the considerations of ‘practicality […and] 
expense’ in the use of official languages. It rather stresses the importance of 
the constitutionally declared official multilingualism and the normative 
guidelines that declare the enjoyment of “parity of esteem and equitable 
treatment of all official languages”.48  
 
In practice, government seems to have given considerable weight to 
practical considerations. English has become the lingua franca of 
government administration to the extent that the policy of multilingualism 
adopted by the Constitution has only come to represent a mere symbolic 
value. English has become the language for internal and external 
communication in government departments.49 Even when members of the 
public communicate with government in a language other than English, 
government departments invariably respond in English.50 Both in the 
                                                 
47  Kriel 2002.   
48  Du Plesis and Pretorious 2000.  
   49  Very recently, the decision of the Western Cape Provincial Police that only 
English be used for all internal, including radio, communication has faced protest 
from a group Afrikaans speaking police and also among the wider Afrikaans-
speaking community. Some threatened legal action against the province’s police 
language policy. The authorities said that their aim was to improve 
communication between the province's different language groups by encouraging 
the use of English. The new policy was later removed (FW: Afrikaans is under 
threat available at 
http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,9294,2-7-
1442_2060508,00.html, accessed on 20 March 2007). 
50  Strydom 2002. 
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National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, the dominance 
of English is clear. Major policy documents are often produced only in 
English. The situation is no different in the courts. The constitutional 
promises relating to the parity of eleven languages are not given effect to.51  
 
The establishment of the Pan South African Language Board has not, as yet, 
had any significant impact on ensuring the implementation of the official 
language clause. On many occasions, the Board, after investigating 
complaints with regard to the violation of language rights, has found that the 
language policies and practices of the government and state corporations 
violate the Constitution. The findings and recommendations of the Board, 
however, often fall on deaf ears. The government is broadly criticised for 
failing to give adequate attention to the Board.  On one occasion the Board 
felt compelled to write an open letter to President Nelson Mandela 
criticising and expressing its concern about the tendency towards 
monolingualism at all levels of government.52  
 
Generally, the discussion on the use of language for the purposes of 
government reveals a trend that reinforces the suspicion of the critics of the 
officialisation of all eleven languages. The officialisation of the eleven 
languages might send the symbolic message that all groups are regarded 
equally in the public sphere. However, this symbolic message has not been 
                                                 
51  After examining the use of African languages in courts, Hlophe (2001:94)  
concluded that “[t]he courts continue to lay too much emphasis on practical 
considerations. Practical considerations in effect are convenience to the presiding 
judicial officer! The noble goal of language parity will remain elusive as long as 
the courts continue to adopt this approach, and the legacy of English and 
Afrikaans as the sole court language will continue…In the result, indigenous 
African languages are undermined”.  
52  Giliomee 2003.  
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given practical effect. Despite the multilingual reality that characterises 
South African society and a Constitution that declares official 
multilingualism, monolingualsim seems to be the emerging trend.53  
 
2.4 Recognition of traditional law and traditional leadership 
Traditional communal way of life continues to define the lives of many 
South Africans, especially in rural areas. For many, it is linked to their 
culture and identity. This begs the question of accommodation of 
traditional leadership within the constitutional system of government. As 
the following brief discussion reveals, the constitutional position adopted 
by South Africa represents an attempt to recognise the cultural identity of 
traditional authorities without implying a role for traditional authorities in 
government. 
 
2.4.1 Constitutional recognition of traditional leadership 
The Constitution recognises the role of both traditional law and traditional 
authorities.54 This is explicitly stated in section 211 which provides for the 
                                                 
53  The practice of monolingualism with its promotion of English as the sole language  
of communication has caused an outcry from communities, especially the 
Afrikaner community. In an open letter addressed to President Thabo Mbeki, 
twenty-four prominent speakers of Afrikaans complained that “the South African 
government commitment to a philosophy of multilingualism and cultural 
pluralism was paying lip service only, as was the commitment to the promotion of 
the African languages including Afrikaans”(Insig 1999:24). English, they claimed, 
is what is actually being promoted. The dominance of English is, in fact, conceded 
by the government. The Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, when 
establishing a Language Plan Task Group (LANGTAG), noted the increasing 
tendency towards unilingualism despite the multilingual reality that characterises 
South African society and a Constitution that declares official multilingualism 
(Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology 1996).  
54  Under the Interim Constitution, the traditional rulers were allowed to retain the  
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recognition of the institution, status and role of traditional leadership as 
defined by customary law. Section 211(2) states that a traditional authority 
that observes the system of customary law may function subject to any 
applicable legislation and customs. The recognition of traditional law and 
traditional leadership is given further expression through the obligation 
imposed on the courts to apply customary law when it is applicable.55 The 
Constitution also provides the possibility for the adoption of a traditional 
monarch. Section 143(2) of the Constitution provides that a provincial 
constitution may provide for “the institution, role, authority and status of a 
traditional monarch, where applicable”.  
 
The recognition of traditional leadership is not, however, absolute. The 
recognition of traditional leadership is subject to the Constitution and 
legislation. This is also true with regard to the application of customary 
law. Although the courts are mandated to apply customary law when that 
law is applicable, the application is made subject to the Constitution and 
any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.56  
 
The Constitution appears to envisage a role for traditional authorities at a 
local level. This is indicated in section 212 of the Constitution which 
allows for the enactment of a national legislation that may provide “for a 
                                                                                                                            
powers and functions they held under customary law and ‘applicable laws’. At the 
municipal level, they were given an ex officio membership status to the municipal 
council. The provinces, where there are traditional authorities, were mandated to 
establish houses of traditional leaders. The national government was also obliged 
to establish a council of traditional leaders, which is now called the house of 
traditional leaders. (sections 181-184 Interim Constitution; for more discussion, 
see Bennett and Murray 2007). 
55  Section 211(3) Constitution. 
56  Section 211(3) Constitution. 
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role for traditional leadership as an institution at local level on matters 
affecting local communities”. Although not couched in a mandatory form, 
this represents recognition of the traditionally important role that 
traditional authorities play in local communities. 
 
2.4.2 The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 
The limited role of traditional authorities in local government was further 
defined with the enactment of the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act in 2003.57 The major objective of the Act is to regulate 
“the place and role of traditional leadership within the new system of 
democratic governance”.58 A traditional community is defined by the Act 
as a community that is subject to a system of traditional leadership in 
terms of that community’s customs and observes a system of customary 
law.59 The authority of identifying a community as such is vested in the 
premier of the province who has to carry out this power in accordance with 
provincial legislation and in consultation with the house of traditional 
leaders in the province, the community concerned and, if applicable, the 
king or queen under whose authority that community would fall.60 A 
traditional community must establish a traditional council whose mandate 
is “to administer the affairs of the traditional community, assist the 
traditional leaders, support municipalities in the identification of the 
community needs, contribute to development and service delivery and 
promote indigenous knowledge systems for sustainable development”.61 
Without denying some of the important roles that the traditional council is 
entrusted with, Murray aptly comments that “[t]he functions that the Act 
                                                 
57  Act 41 of 2003. 
58  Preamble Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003. 
59  Section 2(1). 
60  Section 2(2). 
61  Section 4(1). 
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sets out are generally soft, including, for instance, activities like 
‘facilitating’, ‘supporting’ and ‘promoting’ various things”.62 
 
The Act also seeks to bring the institution of traditional leadership in line 
with the imperatives of a state that is based on constitutional democracy. It 
requires a traditional community to transform and harmonise customary 
law and customs with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Departing 
from the traditional mode of organisation which limits membership to few 
selective members of the community, the Act requires the inclusion of 
elected members and women in the membership of the traditional councils. 
It mandates that a third of the members must be women and 40% of the 
members must be democratically elected.63 
 
2.4.3 Houses of traditional leaders 
The provisions of the Constitution and the Act provide for the 
establishment of houses of traditional leaders that deal with matters 
relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders, customary 
law and the customs of communities observing a system of customary 
law.64 Unlike the Interim Constitution, which mandates the establishment 
of such houses, the provisions of the Constitution has made the 
establishment of houses of traditional leaders optional. When the 
Constitution came into effect, however, all provinces, with the exception 
of the Western Cape, Gauteng and Northern Cape, had already established 
houses of traditional leaders as required by the Interim Constitution. 
Furthermore, the Council of Traditional Leaders, which is composed of 
                                                 
62  Murray 2004: 15. 
63  Section 3(2).   
64  Section 212 (2) Constitution. 
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three representatives from each provincial house, was established in 1997, 
later renamed as the National House of Traditional Leaders in 1998.  
 
The power of the National House is generally limited to providing advice 
to the government or the President, and to make recommendations on 
questions of traditional leadership, customary law and the customs of 
communities observing systems of customary law. This does not impose a 
corresponding duty on the national government to seek the advice of the 
National House. Even in cases where advice has been sought and given, 
there is no obligation on those that sought the advice to take that into 
account. As noted by Bennett and Murray, the House “plays a strictly 
advisory role, even in matters concerning traditional leadership and 
customary law”.65 The only exception is that a national bill that deals with 
customary law or customs of traditional communities must be referred to 
the National House, which is given 30 days to provide its comment, before 
it is passed by Parliament.66   
 
2.4.4 Assessment 
The recognition of traditional leadership represents an important 
acknowledgement of the culture and tradition that underlie traditional 
forms of government. It symbolises the recognition of the culture and 
identity of those that adhere to the traditional communal African way of 
life. The place of traditional authorities, as the Constitutional Court noted, 
does not, however, extend beyond the cultural realm. In fact, the 
constitutional recognition is described by the Constitutional Court, as 
“recognising a degree of cultural pluralism with legal and cultural, but not 
                                                 
65  Bennett and Murray 2007: 26-27. 
66  Section 18(1).  
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necessarily governmental consequences”.67  The constitutional recognition 
does not thus extend beyond the acknowledgment of cultural pluralism to 
give traditional leaders a role in government. 
 
A closer look at the developments that unfolded after the adoption of the 
Interim Constitution would show even the limited role that traditional 
authorities enjoyed in local government has also gradually declined. As 
indicated earlier, traditional leaders were provided municipal council 
membership ex officio by the Interim Constitution.68 They lost this status 
with the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. Eventually, their role was 
reduced to an advisory (non-voting) role following the enactment of the 
Municipal Structures Act, which outlines the structure of local 
government.69  
 
The establishment of wall-to-wall municipalities, as pointed out by 
Murray, has also cast doubt on the exercise of local powers by traditional 
leaders. She mentions two circumstances that undermined the role of 
traditional authorities in local government. The first relates to the 
demarcation process that led to the establishment of wall-to-wall 
municipalities without regard to traditional bonds. In a demarcation 
process that she describes as “reminiscent of the way in which Africa was 
carved up in the 19th century”,70 the boundaries of traditional communities 
were frequently disregarded in creating the new municipalities. The 
second, and most important reason for the decline of traditional leaders, 
relates to the “usurping of traditional chiefly powers by local 
                                                 
67  In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996  
(10) BCLR 1253 (CC) para 195. 
68  Section 182 of the 1993 Constitution. 
69  Section 81 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. 
70  Murray 2004: 14. 
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government”.71 Many of the service delivery responsibilities that 
traditionally belonged to the local chiefs have become the constitutional 
responsibilities of local government. Yet functions like resolving disputes, 
allocating land, convening initiation schools and presiding over national 
festivals remain under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders.72  
 
In sum, the constitutional recognition of traditional leadership is limited to 
the cultural realm. With the establishment of democratic local government 
across the country, the traditional authorities have lost some of their 
governance responsibilities. This, however, should not dent the symbolic 
significance of the recognition of traditional leaders by the Constitution. 
 
2.5 Concluding remarks on recognition 
The South African Constitution portrays a state that seeks to build a 
common national identity; a state that emphasises national unity. It does not, 
however, portray a state that aims to promote national unity at the expense 
of ethnic diversity. With its central theme of unity in diversity, it assures 
those with ‘ethnic anxieties’ that it does not aim at conflating all identities 
into one whole and mould a new common national identity. It rather 
recognises that subnational identities are an important part of the South 
African make-up. In the arena of recognition, this is especially visible in the 
image of the state that the various state symbolic codes portray. They reflect 
an image of a state that strives to build national unity based on the premise 
that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it’. This balancing act is also 
visible in the language clause of the Constitution.  
 
                                                 
71  Murray 2004: 14. 
72  Bennett and Murray 2007. 
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The official recognition of all the eleven languages as equal at the national 
level could be considered as a reflection of a state that emphasis national 
unity by assuring that all language groups have a place in South Africa 
while the regional preferences in language usage represent recognition of 
the need to provide for regional languages. Furthermore, the decision not to 
advance one particular language but to, at least, recognise two official 
languages at the provincial level is an important recognition of intra-
provincial diversities. Yet this same aspect of the provincial language policy 
portrays a state that discourages the identification of a single language with 
a particular territory and promotes social cohesion and national unity 
through its language policy. The language clause of the Constitution has 
thus the dual role of promoting national unity and accommodating ethnic 
diversity. 
 
In as much as the Constitution does not portray a state that seeks to suppress 
ethnic diversity, it does not, however, present a state that actively promotes 
ethnic diversity. South Africa is not presented as an amalgamation of 
politically relevant ethnic or national groups. The preamble does not portray 
a case of different territorial groups coming together to draft the South 
African Constitution. As is also evident from the language clause, the state 
attempts to eschew the territorialisation of linguistic diversities. In so far as 
ethnic relationships are concerned, South Africa is presented by the 
Constitution as one state that happens to be composed of eleven linguistic 
groups. This vision of the state does not officially recognise ethnicity as an 
organising principle of society.  
 
There are, however, notable discrepancies between the constitutional 
narration of recognition and actual practice. This, as discussed earlier, is 
evident in the area of language where monolingualism is the emerging trend 
despite the constitutional declaration of official multilingualism. This is, 
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however, countervailed by the fact that the emerging dominant language, 
which is English, is a culturally neutral language except, of course, for the 
Afrikaners for whom the dominance of English is reminiscent of the ‘British 
cultural hegemony’. A general evaluation of elements of the Constitution 
that impact on the vision of the state suggests that the different ethnic 
groups that inhabit the country have received affirmation in the public 
sphere.    
 
3. Self rule 
The focus of this section is to evaluate how the South African constitutional 
framework dealt with the issue of subnational autonomy. As indicated in 
Chapter Three, the institutional arrangements through which self rule finds 
practical expression include the territorial structure of the state, the division 
of powers and financial autonomy. It is against these same institutional 
arrangements that the South African approach is examined. 
 
3.1 Geographical configuration of the state 
This section examines whether the geographical organisation of the 
subnational units in South Africa accommodates ethnic diversity. It is 
submitted that the territorial structure of the state provides the various ethnic 
groups a territorial space that can potentially be used to promote the self-
management of their own communities without posing a threat to the 
political and territorial integrity of the state. 
 
3.1.1 The process of provincial demarcation 
Once an agreement was reached among the negotiated parties to devolve 
powers to the subnational units, the process of provincial demarcation 
ensued immediately, with the criteria for demarcation emerging as a key 
issue. The fifteen-member Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of 
States, Provinces and Regions (hereafter the Commission) was established 
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on 28 May 1993. With time against it, the Commission carried out the 
demarcation process in an extremely short period of time between May and 
November 1993. As the 1996 Constitution simply confirmed the outcome of 
the 1993 provincial demarcation, it is necessary to examine the process that 
led to the adoption of the delimitation of nine provinces.  
 
The mandate of the Commission was to make recommendations on the 
demarcation of provinces/states/ regions for the purpose of the electoral 
process, as well as the structures of the Constitution.73 Only a period of six 
weeks was given to the Commission to come up with a report.74 The 
Commission was also mandated to hold public hearings within the limited 
period of time.75 The Commission regarded the aim of the provincial 
delimitation as “the reduction of territorial disparities in social and 
economic development”.76 Expectedly, it also regarded “the prevention of 
negative forms of competition between regions, particularly with regard to 
ethnic and chauvinistic forces” 77 as the aim of the provincial delimitation.  
 
The Commission’s brief, which was mandated by the Multi-Party 
Negotiating Council, included ten criteria that had to be used in the 
demarcation of the regions. The Commission categorised the ten criteria 
                                                 
73  Khosa 1993. 
74  The Commission was mandated to complete and table the report from 8 June to 31  
July 1993.  This had a negative effect on the ability of the Commission to ensure 
the participation of local communities, adequately scrutinise the various 
submissions and investigate all local disputes regarding demarcation. See De 
Coning 1994. 
75  Welsh 1994. 
76  Egan and Taylor 2003: 110-111. 
77   Egan and Taylor 2003: 110-111. 
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into four broad groups.78 Economic aspects (i.e. the necessity of limiting 
financial and other costs, the need to minimise inconvenience to the people, 
the need to minimise dislocation of services and development potential), 
geographic coherence (i.e. historical boundaries, including provincial, 
magisterial and district boundaries and infrastructures), institutional and 
administrative capacity (i.e. administrative considerations, including the 
availability and non-availability of infrastructures and nodal points for 
services, the question whether to rationalise existing structures, including 
the TBVC states, self-governing territories, and regional governments 
including the criteria mentioned in the economic aspect category) and socio-
cultural issues (i.e. demographic considerations and cultural and language 
realities). It was agreed by the Commission that no criteria is more 
important than the others. The Commission regarded all criteria as ‘equally 
material’ and decided to adopt a “balanced view on criteria”.79  
 
In the negotiations, the parties agreed to take the nine ‘development 
regions’ that had been delimited by the Development Bank in the early 
1980s as a point of departure. After a series of public hearings and the 
drafting of reports, the Commission presented its final report to the Multi–
Party Negotiating Council on 18 October 1993 which then adopted it as a 
point of departure. The Commission’s proposed map was accepted, with 
few modifications, by the Coordinating Committee on the 
Demarcation/Delimitation of Regions (CCDR). This committee, composed 
of multi-party representatives, adopted, after a series of failures to reach a 
compromise, the delimitation of nine provinces with some changes to the 
Commission’s map.  
 
                                                 
78  De Coning 1994. 
79  De Coning 1994. 
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The making of the final map of nine provinces involved the splitting of the 
provinces that constituted the original Union of South Africa (i.e. Cape, 
Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State) and the incorporation of the 
homelands.80 The Cape Province was partitioned into the Western Cape, 
Northern Cape, and Eastern Cape, with the latter incorporating the former 
homelands of the Transkei and Ciskei. The Transvaal was divided into the 
Northern Province (renamed Limpopo), Gauteng (the Johannesburg-
Pretoria-vereniging area) and Eastern Transvaal (renamed Mpumalanga), 
and its western parts were merged with parts of the northern Cape and the 
former homeland of the Bophuthatswana to become the province of the 
North West. Natal became KwaZulu-Natal, and the Orange Free State was 
simply renamed the Free State.  
 
3.1.2 The impact of provincial demarcation on ethnic diversity 
Many scholars regard the present provincial delimitation as the rejection of 
ethno-national politics.81 They remark that ‘there is no ethnically contrived 
pattern’ in the delimitation of the provincial boundaries. This, they argue, is 
visible in the fact that most of the provinces are heterogeneous. The 
consideration of ethno-national politics in provincial boundary delimitation 
would have brought quite a different territorial configuration of the state. 
Egan and Taylor remark:  
 
If [ethnonational politics was the primary motivation behind 
regional delimitation], demographic patterns suggest that the 
current Western and Northern Cape provinces would have been 
joined into a more predominantly Afrikaans-speaking region, with 
eastern parts of the Western Cape ceded to the mainly Xhosa-
speaking Eastern Cape and northern parts of the Northern Cape 
                                                 
80  Egan and Taylor 2003. 
81  Egan and Taylor 2003. 
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ceded to North West, which might also have gained north-west 
Free State and far-western Gauteng. Gauteng would have been 
more ethnically homogenous if it had been merged with 
Mpumalanga and possibly even with KwaZulu-Natal.82 
 
At the time of writing, the South African government has embarked on a 
review process on provinces and local government where fundamental 
questions about the future of provinces are currently being asked. To date, 
there are no clear indications on how the government has decided to go 
about this.83  
 
3.1.3 Assessment 
Although it is true that the provinces in South Africa are characterised by 
heterogeneous population, this should not be overstated. While overt 
ethnic consideration might not have been the primary motivation in the 
making of the provinces, most of them are nevertheless inhabited by an 
ethnic group that is numerically dominant. Although almost all ethnic 
groups are dispersed throughout the nine provinces (which is usually the 
case in many other multi-ethnic states) there is a clear concentration of 
each ethnic group in a particular province as shown in Table 5.1.  
 
 
 
                                                 
82  Egan and Taylor 2003: 110. 
83  A document prepared by the Department of Provincial and Local Government  
(DPLG), which sets out the policy process on the review of provincial and local 
government, states that the “government does not have a position or foregone 
conclusion on this matter. It has not taken a decision on reducing or rationalising 
the number of provinces” (DPLG (2007) Policy process on the system of 
provincial and local government: Background: Policy questions, process and 
participation, available at www.dplg.co.za, accessed on 19 May 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 246  
While pockets of Xhosa speakers can be found in the Free State, Northern 
Cape and Western Cape, it is in the Eastern Cape that they have 
disproportionate concentration. The same applies to the Zulu-speakers who 
are numerically dominant in KwaZulu-Natal, although they are dispersed 
throughout the country. In fact, over two-thirds of the residents in the 
Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and the North West speak a single 
language.84  The numerical dominance of the Sesotho speakers in Free 
State (64.4%) and Sepedi speakers in Limpopo (52.1%) cannot also be 
disputed. 
 
As Table 5.1 shows, the majority of ethnic groups in South Africa thus have 
a ‘mother province’ with pockets of their ‘cousins and nieces’ scattered in 
other provinces. It is only Afrikaners and people of English-origin that are 
dispersed throughout the country without being numerically dominant in 
any of the nine provinces. Although Afrikaans speakers dominate the 
Northern Cape and Western Cape, it is the Afrikaans-speaking Coloured 
community that are numerically dominant in those two provinces. Provinces 
that lack a dominant ethnic group and which can accurately be characterised 
as truly heterogeneous are Gauteng and Mpumalanga.85  
 
The tendency on the part of many scholars to regard the South African 
provincial boundary demarcation as a rejection of ethno-national politics 
                                                 
84  Simeon and Murray 2004. 
85  A constitutional amendment (i.e. the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act of  
2005 and the Cross Boundaries Municipalities Laws Repeal and Related Matters 
Act 24 of 2007), which aimed at eliminating cross-boundary municipalities, has 
brought some change in the demographics of some of the provinces. KwaZulu- 
Natal has, for example, incorporated a municipality that is largely inhabited by 
isiXhosa-speakers. Similarly, the Northern Cape has seen an increase in the 
number of its Setswana-speakers. 
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seems to be based on the assumption that ethno-national political 
considerations necessitate the absolute coincidence of ethnic groups and 
provincial boundaries. Although the consideration of ethno-national 
politics might entail a congruence of ethnic groups and territory, it should 
not necessarily be so in an absolute exclusivist term. The consideration of 
ethnonational politics does not necessarily result in or require the adoption 
of the principle of ethnic-exclusivism. It does not necessarily imply the 
segmentation of the territory by granting each ethnic group one exclusive 
territorial ‘homeland’.  What it may require is that ethnic groups, to the 
extent possible, have a province in which they are in a majority, that they 
are provided with a territorial space that is necessary to advance their 
interests in areas of language culture and education. The two major regions 
in Belgium are not ethnically microcosm regions. They have important 
minorities. The same is true of subnational states in Spain and Canada. 
After all, as it has been stressed several times in this thesis, it is not even 
practically possible to carve out a purely ethnic province.  
 
Furthermore, some scholars indicate that technical considerations relating 
to natural and economic resources were not given any specific priority 
over other considerations in the South African provincial boundary 
demarcation.86 The political gerrymandering, which was allowed as a 
result of the critical role played by the negotiation council in the 
demarcation process, has, in fact, allowed ethnic consideration into the 
making of provincial boundaries. As noted by Lemon,   
 
[t]he process was far more complex, and strategic calculations of 
the potential for racial and ethnic regional bloc voting and electoral 
                                                 
86  De Coning 1994. 
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alliances did play a part. In particular, there was little attempt to 
territorially divide the Bantustans…..87  
 
Be that as it may, the fact that most provinces are dominated by a single 
ethnic group has not yet given rise to strong exclusive provincial identity. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that the recent protests against the 
decisions of the government to transfer certain municipalities to other 
provinces were not motivated by a provincial identity but rather by 
concerns related to service delivery. Residents of the Matatiele community 
applied to the Constitutional Court protesting their incorporation into the 
Eastern Cape from KwaZulu-Natal. They wanted to be incorporated back 
into KwaZulu-Natal because of the perception that KwaZulu-Natal offers 
better services than the Eastern Cape.88 The same is true about Kutsong 
municipality whose residents objected to their transfer from Gauteng, the 
wealthiest province, to the resource-poor North West.89 
 
Generally speaking, ethnic considerations might not have played a larger 
role in the geographical reconfiguration of South Africa. It must, however, 
be conceded that the present territorial configuration of the state can 
potentially be used to promote the self-management of most ethnic groups. 
This also means that the demographics of most of the provinces make 
them potentially amenable to the often emotionally charged and contrived 
appeals of ‘ethnic brokers’. As the foregoing discussion indicates, 
however, the potential amenability of the territorial structure to the 
manipulation of ethnic brokers has not translated the provinces into 
                                                 
87  Lemon 1996: 112. 
88  ‘Mufamadi gave ‘wrong’ reasons for demarcation’ Mail and Guardian, 31 March  
2006. 
89  Atkinson 2007. 
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bedrocks for advancing demands that are centrifugal in nature.90 By 
contrast, the current territorial matrix of the South African state have 
provided ‘regional elites’ with the means for political participation and 
representation in the leadership structure of their respective provinces, 
promoting the self-management of communities. This is further facilitated 
by the Constitution that allows regional preferences in language usage.  
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that the current territorial structure of South 
Africa has given the various ethnic groups a territorial space to manage 
their own affairs without posing a threat to the territorial integrity of the 
state. The territorial configuration works to restrain centrifugal tendencies 
and encourage the presentation of territorially based ethnic/regional 
demands in a ‘centripetal spirit’. Given the current review of provincial 
boundaries, which, as indicated above, is currently underway, the fear is 
rather that should a decision be taken to abolish provinces, regional elites 
and others with vested provincial interests will pull out the ethnic card, 
introducing explicit ethnic mobilisation in the political arena. Take 
provinces away, and there is a likelihood that ethnic concerns will rise to 
the surface.   
 
3.1.4 Self-determination 
Constitutional Principle XXXIV of the Interim Constitution provided for 
self-determination of a community sharing a common cultural or language 
heritage. It further bound the 1996 Constitution to “give expression to any 
particular form of self-determination”. The Volkstaat Council, which was 
established to explore the idea of a Volkstaat and provide alternatives for 
                                                 
90  The absence of strong provincial ethnic identity is also clear from the fact that  
ethnic ascriptions are rarely attached to the provinces. The public discourse does 
not usually associate ethnic identity with particular territory/provinces, with the 
exception of KwaZulu-Natal 
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its implementation, failed to come up with “a viable blueprint for an 
independent Volkstaat”.91 The Constitution simply implemented the 
promise of the Interim Constitution by reproducing the same 
Constitutional Principle in section 235: 
 
The right of South African people as a whole to self-
determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not 
preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the 
notion of the right of self-determination of any community 
sharing common cultural and language heritage, within a 
territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, 
determined by national legislation.  
 
Many regard this specific constitutional stipulation as ineffectual. First, the 
section does not recognise the right to self-determination but the notion of 
the right to self-determination. The implication is that self-determination is 
not recognised as a constitutional right. Second, national legislation has to 
be enacted to give effect to the notion of the right to self-determination.  
 
Strydom argues that this section imposes on the government the duty to 
enact legislation to give effect to the right to self-determination.92 It is not 
clear, however, if the wording of the section does indeed suggest so. The 
Constitution merely emphasises the non-preclusion of the recognition of 
the right to self-determination. This is not the same as obliging the national 
government to give effect to the right to self-determination. The 
Constitution simply keeps the door open for the national government to 
recognise, in its own terms, the right to self-determination through national 
legislation, putting ‘the ball of the right to self-determination’ in the 
                                                 
91  Currie 2002: 35-34. 
92  Strydom 2002. 
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national legislature’s court. The implication is that the Parliament, if it so 
wishes, cannot only overburden the conditions under which the right to 
self-determination can be exercised but it can also refuse to give effect to 
this right. The permissive nature of section 235 must thus be noted. 
Although the government may not necessarily take the ‘outright 
rejectionist route’, that remains a constitutional option. In this regard, 
Steytler and Mettler commented aptly when they wrote: 
 
The right to self-determination, in the legal sense, was reduced to, 
at most, a political claim. Any federating process along the route of 
self-determination would not be in the hands of any self-selected 
community, but will be governed by the Parliament itself.93  
 
The Constitutional Court, when it responded to a submission made by the 
Volkstaat Council and the Conservative Party in the certification process 
of the 1996 Constitution, also confirmed the permissive nature of section 
235. The Volkstaat Council and the Conservative Party argued that the 
1996 Constitution failed to fulfil the expectation established by 
Constitutional Principle XXXIV “about the creation of a Volkstaat among 
a significant number of Afrikaners; it has subjected the internationally 
recognised right to self-determination to the discretion of Parliament”.94 
The Constitutional Court, however, regarded Constitutional Principle 
XXXIV as a permissive rather than an obligatory provision.95 
                                                 
93  Steytler and Mettler 2001: 102. Strydom (2002:27) suggests that the Constitution  
does not attach importance to the right to self-determination by indicating that 
section 235 “falls under the sub-heading ‘other matters’ in a chapter entitled 
‘general provisions’…During the negotiations all attempts to have self-
determination included in the Bill of Rights, as a third generation right in 
accordance with international law, were unsuccessful”. 
94   Steytler and Mettler 2001: 101. 
95  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the  
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Furthermore, had a territory that gives effect to the right to self-
determination been established in terms of the Constitution, the Court 
stated, the situation might have been different as the Constitutional 
Principle XXXIV required the entrenchment of such territory in the 1996 
Constitution. In the absence of such territory, the Constitution, the Court 
concluded, had fulfilled the promises of Constitutional Principle XXXIV 
by keeping the door on the right to self-determination open through section 
235.  
 
The Constitution does not as such provide for the right to self-
determination. Neither does it shut the door for self-determination 
completely. It rather leaves it open for the exploration of the possible 
realisation of the right to self-determination for those that insist on going 
that route. It is important to note that the Constitution recognises the 
possibility of expressing the right to self-determination both in a territorial 
form ‘within the Republic’ and in ‘any other way’, thus, suggesting that 
self-determination can be exercised in a non-territorial form, which may 
include what is usually referred to as cultural-based non-territorial self-
determination.96 In fact, the potential implementation of the right to self-
determination within such a non-territorial framework, as we shall see 
later, is already envisaged in section 185 of the 1996 Constitution, which 
provides for the possible establishment of cultural councils. What section 
235 brings to the table is an element of territorial self-determination. The 
enforcement of this constitutional stipulation depends on the interplay 
between the level of support for a claim of self-determination in any of 
                                                                                                                            
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 BCLR 
1253 (CC). 
96  Woolman (2007),on the other hand, suggests that the ‘other way’ of  
realising the right to self-determination does not exclude secession.  
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South Africa’s ethnic groups and the government’s disposition towards the 
politics of accommodation. For now, the doors for a politics of self-
determination and autonomy designed in either territorial or non-territorial 
framework are left open by section 235 of the Constitution.97  
 
3.2 Powers and competences of provincial governments 
The potential relevance of the provinces in responding to particular ethnic 
claims and, hence, accommodating ethnic diversity, cannot be solely based 
on the nature of the territorial configuration of the state but also on the 
powers and competences that the Constitution accords to provincial 
governments. The provinces in South Africa have both a constitution 
making and law making power. It is submitted that the provinces enjoy a 
very limited legislative autonomy. It must nevertheless be admitted that 
the South African system of provinces does offer a framework that can 
absorb greater ethnic demands for autonomy, if necessary. 
 
3.2.1 Provincial Constitution 
A provincial government, according to section 142 of the Constitution, has 
the power to adopt a constitution for its province. Although provincial 
constitutions must be consistent with the national constitution, the 
discretion of adopting provincial legislative or executive structures and 
procedures that differ from those provided in the national constitution is 
guaranteed.98 Where applicable, a provincial constitution can also provide 
                                                 
97  As noted by Alexander (1996: 15), “[t]he amphibolous language of section 235 of 
the new Constitution leaves the door ajar for a politics of cultural-national 
autonomy, and conceivably even for a politics of territorial self-determination”. 
98  Section 142 Constitution. The Constitutional Court, when examining the draft  
constitution of the Western Cape that proposed the introduction of an alternative 
electoral system for the province, adopted a restrictive interpretation of provincial 
constitution making by holding that designing an electoral system does not fall 
 
 
 
 
 254  
for the institution of a traditional monarch including the role, authority and 
status of the traditional monarch.99 The recognition of traditional monarch 
represents an important recognition of self-government of cultural 
communities, albeit symbolic. As indicated earlier, the recognition does 
not necessarily have “governmental consequence”.100 
 
A provincial constitution cannot, however, simply confer powers and 
competences on provincial government. Section 143(2) of the Constitution 
limits the powers and functions of provincial governments to what is 
already provided in the Constitution. Thus, first, a provincial constitution 
cannot confer on the province any power or function that falls outside the 
area of provincial competence listed in Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 of the 
Constitution.101 Second, it cannot confer on the provincial government any 
power or function that falls outside the powers and functions conferred on 
the provinces by other sections of the Constitution.102  
 
3.2.2 Provincial law making power 
In terms of legislative authority, the national government enjoys extensive 
authority as all law-making powers, unless expressly granted to provincial 
or local government, are vested in its legislative arm. Provincial 
competence, as mentioned above, is listed under Schedule 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution. Schedule 4 provides a long list of functional areas of 
concurrent national and provincial legislative competences. Only some are 
                                                                                                                            
under the jurisdiction of the provinces (In re: Certification of the Constitution of 
the Western Cape, 1997, 1997 BCLR 1167 (CC)). 
99  Section 143(1(b) Constitution. 
100  In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 
(10) BCLR 1253 (CC) para 195. 
101  Section 143(2) (b) (i) Constitution. 
102  Section 143(2) (b) (ii) Constitution.  
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relevant to the protection of the identity of an ethnic group. This includes 
education at all levels (excluding tertiary education), indigenous law and 
traditional leadership (subject to chapter 12 of the Constitution). In 
addition, language policy, the regulation of official languages at the 
provincial level and all media service controlled or provided by the 
provincial government are also provincial competences.  
 
Schedule 5 of the Constitution, on the other hand, provides, albeit limited, 
functional areas of exclusive legislative competence. Almost more than 
half of the functional areas listed under this Schedule are identity-related 
matters. This includes libraries (i.e. other than national libraries), 
provincial cultural matters, archives (i.e. other than national archives), 
provincial sport, museums and provincial recreation.  
 
As indicated by the Constitutional Court, both the provincial and national 
spheres of government can legislate in a matter that falls within the final 
area of concurrent national and provincial legislative competences.103 The 
doctrine of preemption does not apply as legislation enacted by both 
spheres of government can bear on the same matter in so long as they are 
not inconsistent. The predominance of national legislation becomes clear, 
however, as soon as a conflict ensues between national and provincial 
legislation.  
 
Section 146 of the Constitution regulates circumstances in which there is a 
conflict between national and provincial legislation. Since the section 
begins with outlining the conditions which national legislation must meet 
                                                 
103  Ex Parte Speaker of the National Assembly: In re: dispute concerning the  
constitutionality of certain provisions of the National Education Policy Bill 83 of 
1995 1996 (4) BCLR 518 (CC). 
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in order to prevail over provincial legislation, it creates the impression that 
provinces are granted more autonomy. The seemingly predominant 
position of provincial legislation is also stated in section 146(5) which 
clearly states that provincial legislation prevails over national legislation if 
the conditions listed under the same section are not met. The diluted nature 
of this provincial autonomy becomes apparent, however, when one looks 
at the broad circumstances under which national legislation can prevail 
over provincial legislation in areas of concurrent competencies. National 
legislation, according to section 146(2) of the Constitution, can prevail 
over provincial legislation if, for example, the national legislation is 
necessary to maintain uniform standards, national security, economic 
security or to protect the common market, to promote economic activities 
across provincial boundaries or to protect the environment, among others. 
Moreover, the same section states that national legislation prevails over 
provincial legislation if the national legislation is aimed at preventing 
unreasonable action by a province that is “prejudicial to the economic, 
health or security interest of another province or the country as a whole or 
impedes the implementation of national economic policy”.104 
 
The predominance of national legislation is not only limited to areas where 
the two levels of government enjoy concurrent authority. The national 
government can also enact laws in the case of Schedule 5 matters over 
which exclusive jurisdiction has been vested in provincial government. 
Section 44(2) of the Constitution lists almost the same broad criteria of 
national economic unity, national security, national uniform and standards 
as well as other circumstances that allow the national legislature to pass 
legislation with regard to matters falling within a functional area of 
exclusive provincial competence.  
                                                 
104  Section 146(3) Constitution. 
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In extreme circumstances, the national government can exercise powers of 
intervention as permitted by section 100 of the Constitution. If a province 
fails to fulfil an executive obligation under the Constitution or other 
legislation, the national executive can take ‘any appropriate steps to ensure 
the fulfilment of that obligation’. This ranges from the rather soft measure 
of writing a directive to the provincial executive, ‘describing the extent of 
the failure to fulfil its obligations and stating any steps required to meet its 
obligations’, to the more extreme measure of taking over the 
responsibilities of the provincial executive with regard to the relevant 
obligation. 105 
 
3.2.3 Assessment 
The general assessment is that the provinces enjoy limited legislative 
autonomy. First, they are provided with a limited area of exclusive 
legislative competence. Most areas of competences are included in the 
category of concurrent competences including matters like education, 
media service, indigenous law and language policy, which are all relevant 
for promoting ethnic identity. The long list of concurrent competences and 
the limited exclusive provincial powers attest to the integrated system of 
government adopted by the Constitution which “places less emphasis on 
geographical autonomy and more on the integration of geographic 
jurisdictions into separate functionally determined roles in the continuum 
of governance over specifically defined issues”.106 The minimal emphasis 
on provincial autonomy is also apparent from the fact that the national 
government enjoys overriding power over almost all legislative areas of 
provincial government. This position of provinces is a reflection of the 
ANC’s political aversion against the notion of provinces, which, it feared, 
                                                 
105  Section 100 Constitution. 
106  Klug 2000: 114.  
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could be used to promote ethnicity or ‘tribalism’ as it often referred to by 
ANC officials. It is also a manifestation of the constitutional emphasis on 
national unity.  
 
The predominant position of the national legislature in the law-making 
arena is further strengthened by the fact that the provinces have not 
exploited their competences. Except for the early years of the transition 
(and even then limited to the provinces of Western Cape and KwaZulu-
Natal) provincial law making is almost non-existent. Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal107 were the only two provinces that were engaged in 
drafting provincial constitutions and using their provincial legislative 
competence.108  
                                                 
107  Prior to the 2004 elections, the only two provinces that were not controlled by the  
ANC were Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. It is these two provinces that 
challenged the national government on matters of legislative competence, with 
some of the legal disputes ending up in the Constitutional Court. (See 
Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 (1) SA 732 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); 
Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v President of the RSA 1999 (4) 
BCLR 382; 1999 (4) SA 657(CC); Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v 
the Electoral Commission 1999 (11) BCLR 1209 (CC); Executive Council of the 
Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development of 
the Republic of South Africa; Ex Parte Speaker of the National Assembly: In re: 
dispute concerning the constitutionality of certain provisions of the National 
Education Policy Bill 83 of 1995 1996 (4) BCLR 518 (CC); Executive Council of 
KwaZulu-Natal v President of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (12) BCLR 1360 
(CC). It was also these provinces that drafted provincial constitutions. While the 
Western Cape constitution has been certified by the Constitutional Court with 
some amendments, the draft constitution by KwaZulu-Natal, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, was rejected by the Court on the ground that it usurped national 
powers. 
108  With the ANC consolidating its hegemony in all provinces, the provinces have  
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Notwithstanding the failure of the provinces to make use of their 
legislative powers, the identity-related and other relevant competences 
entrusted to the provinces, albeit limited, coupled with the relative 
concentration of ethnic groups in the provinces put the latter in a position 
to absorb ethnic claims as they arise. More importantly, the constitutional 
and territorial framework within which the distribution of powers and 
functions is outlined serve as a safety valve for accommodating emerging 
ethnic interests and responding to ethnic-based claims that have territorial 
dimension.   
 
Considering the scheme of distribution of power as it is currently adopted, 
however, it would only be fair to conclude that provinces enjoy a 
circumscribed legislative autonomy, which is further weakened by the 
passive role the provinces have assumed in the arena of law-making. As 
we shall see shortly, the limited legislative autonomy of the provinces is 
watered down by a lack of financial autonomy.  
 
3.3 Financial autonomy 
The revenue-raising capacity of the national government in the form of 
taxation is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution. On the other hand, 
the provinces, although explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, enjoy a 
very limited taxation power. According to section 228(2) of the 
                                                                                                                            
limited themselves to implementing legislation passed by the national legislature 
rather than engaging in law making in their areas of legislative competence 
(Simeon and Murray 2004). Surprisingly, the discontent with the limited 
autonomy of the provinces did not only come from the opposition but also from 
within the ranks of the ANC. The Premier of the Western Cape province, 
Ebrahim Rasool (2004) complained about the diminishing role of provinces: 
“[F]rankly Mr. President, we might have to talk about provincial 
Administrations or Agencies as opposed to provincial Government.” 
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Constitution, a provincial legislature may impose taxes, levies, duties other 
than income tax, a value added tax, a general sales tax, rates on property 
and custom duties. This provision denies provinces access to broad-based 
taxes like income tax and sales taxes that are strong sources of revenue. 
Main sources of own provincial revenue are limited to road traffic fees, 
hospital fees, horse racing and gambling fees, which collectively account 
for less than 4% of total provincial revenue.109 While provinces, according 
to the same section, can expand their revenue sources by enacting a flat-rate 
surcharge on any nationally imposed tax, levy, or duty other than a 
corporate income tax, value-added tax, rate on property, or customs duty, 
subject to national legislation,110 no province has done so.111 This leaves the 
national government with extensive powers of taxation, making it the 
fiscally dominant sphere of government. The inadequate own-source 
revenue has compelled provincial governments to rely heavily on transfers 
from the national government, which account for 96% of provincial 
government revenue.112 
 
In terms of transfers, the Constitution, under section 214(1), envisages an 
‘equitable division of revenue raised nationally’ among the three spheres 
of government through an Act of Parliament. The division of revenue, 
according to the same section, must take into account the “need to ensure 
that the provinces and municipalities are able to provide the basic services 
and perform the functions allocated to them”.113 The fiscal capacity and 
the ‘developmental needs’ of the provinces must also be taken into 
                                                 
109  Khumalo et al 2006. 
110  The Provincial Tax Regulation Process Act 53 of 2001 regulates the introduction  
of such taxation powers. 
111  See Rao 2003. 
112  Khumalo et al 2006.   
113  Section 214(2) Constitution. 
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account.114 Furthermore, the Constitution injects an element of 
equalisation into the allocation process by demanding that the division of 
revenue takes into account “the economic disparities within and among the 
provinces”.115  
 
The understanding that one would have from reading section 214 of the 
Constitution is that a provincial share from the ‘equitable division of 
revenue’ comes with no strings attached; that it represents an 
unconditional allocation to provinces. Murray and Simeon, however, list a 
few reasons why the claim that the equitable share is an unconditional 
allocation should be qualified.116 By stating the objectives of the equitable 
share for provinces (i.e. enabling provinces ‘to provide basic services and 
perform the functions allocated to it’), they argue that section 227 spells 
out the purpose of the equitable share, implicitly limiting its use. It is, 
however, not clear if this can actually be considered as a condition 
imposed on the use of the equitable share as the latter are usually specific. 
                                                 
114  Section 214 (2) Constitution. 
115  Section 214(2) (g) Constitution. With regard to revenue allocation process, the  
Constitution has established the Finance and Fiscal Commission (FFC), an 
independent body that is composed of members appointed in consultation with the 
premiers of provinces and organised local government. The FFC plays an advisory 
role with regard to the allocation of revenue by submitting recommendations to 
the Houses of Parliament and the provincial legislatures as well as to the national 
minister of finance. The other mechanisms through which provinces can ensure 
the accommodation of their concerns involve executive forums for 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. One such forum is the Budget Council, which 
is institutionalised by the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997. This 
forum, which must meet at least twice in each financial year, is composed of the 
National Minister of Finance and the MECs for finance of each province. The 
institution enables the national government to discharge its constitutional 
responsibility of consulting provinces on the division of revenue.  
116  Murray and Simeon 2000. 
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What the Constitution simply reiterates is a basic principle of revenue 
allocation that is common in multilevel governments, namely that 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers are designed to enable subnational 
governments to discharge their expenditure responsibilities.117 The more 
specific conditionality, however, comes, as Murray and Simeon aptly 
indicate, from the practice of the Department of Finance, which requires 
the allocation of a bulk of the provincial share to health, education and 
welfare. Generally, the ‘informal conditions’ that are imposed on the 
provincial share leave the provinces with very few discretionary funds, 
reinforcing the lack of financial autonomy that characterises South African 
provinces.118 
 
In sum, the national government have extensive taxation powers. The 
provinces, on the other hand, have little own source of revenue. The total 
dependence of the provinces on intergovernmental transfers is further 
reinforced by the fact that the provinces have little control over the use of 
the transfers. The provinces have thus little or no financial autonomy. 
Notwithstanding that, the absence of strong exclusive provincial identity 
has made financial autonomy a non-issue in so far as inter-ethnic 
relationships are concerned. Of course, the likelihood of financial issues 
emerging as a heavily contested area in the event that provinces become 
custodians of ethnic interests cannot be ignored. For now, however, the 
impact of financial autonomy or the lack thereof on the accommodation of 
ethnic diversity is not significant.  
 
                                                 
117  Steytler (2005: 336) similarly argues that “there are no constitutional restrictions  
on how provinces use their equitable share”. 
118  “The end result”, according to Steytler (2005: 336), “is that 85 percent of all the  
funds a province receives have already been preallocated by the national 
government”. 
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3.4 Concluding remarks on self rule 
Although the territorial configuration of provinces in South Africa does 
not purely coincide with the ethnic division of the country, it can still be 
used to accommodate the demands of particular ethnic groups for self-
management. It is, for example, conducive to promote the languages of the 
respective ethnic groups. It also creates, as it does now, the opportunity for 
ethnic groups to be represented in provincial legislatures and executives.  
 
Of course, the adopted system of distribution of powers might suggest a 
constitutional system that is less bent on subnational autonomy. Yet the 
exclusive provincial competences and the long list of concurrent powers, 
considered with the Constitutional Court’s analysis of concurrent powers, 
indicate room for provinces to assert their power and entrench their 
autonomy.119 Although the powers and functions entrusted to the provinces 
do not make the latter engines of ethnic expression, they provide them 
with a scope, albeit limited, to enact on identity-related matters.  
 
The self rule elements of the Constitution do not encourage the expression 
of ethnic sentiment or reward the political mobilisation of ethnicity. 
However, neither do they preclude the accommodation of ethnic diversity. 
They rather provide an institutional framework that can be used and, when 
necessary, readjusted, as in the case of the self-determination clause, to 
give ethnic sentiments a sense of accommodation. In the context of South 
Africa where the significance of the political role of ethnicity is not 
widespread, the fact that there are provinces with a relative concentration 
of ethnic groups and a system that prefers regional use of language goes a 
                                                 
119  The Court is, of course, criticised for its narrow interpretation of provincial  
powers. For more on this, see Malherbe 2002. Yet its rejection of preemption has 
left enough space for active law making for both spheres of government. 
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long way in managing ethnic anxieties. That is also why any decision to 
trample the provinces can be dangerous as it might take away an important 
institutional bulwark against the emergence of politicised ethnicity. 
 
4. Shared rule 
This section, using the same institutional arrangements discussed in 
Chapter Three, examines whether the South African constitutional 
framework has given expression to the institutions and processes of shared 
rule.  
 
4.1 The National Assembly and the electoral system 
The National Assembly, the lower house of the South African Parliament, 
consists of 400 members that are elected from a closed party list.120 Each 
party has both a national and provincial list. Half of the members of the 
National Assembly come from provincial lists provided by the parties, with 
population size used as a basis to determine the number of seats that are 
allocated to each province. The provincial list is designed to ensure “some 
links between parties and their provincial votes”.121 
 
The Constitution explicitly instructs that the electoral system must result, in 
general, in proportional representation.122 Members are, therefore, elected 
based on a proportional-representation system, which is designed to 
enhance representation in the National Assembly. In practice, the electoral 
system has enabled even parties that attracted an insignificant percentage of 
the national vote to secure seats in the Assembly as it does not specify a 
threshold in order to secure seats. A party that receives 0.25% of the 
                                                 
120  Voters cast their vote not for individual party candidates but for the party of their  
choice. 
121  Murray 2006: 265 
122   Section 46 (1) (d) Constitution. 
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national votes is entitled to one seat. As commented by Reynolds in relation 
to the 1994 election, 
 
[i]t is probable that even with their geographic pockets of electoral 
support the Freedom Front (nine seats in the National Assembly), 
Democratic Party (seven seats), Pan Africanist Congress (five 
seats), and African Christian Democratic Party (two seats) would 
have failed to win a single parliamentary seat if the elections had 
been held under a single-member district ‘first past the post’ 
electoral system. While these parties together only represent six 
percent of the new Assembly, their importance inside the structures 
of government far outweighs their numerical strength.123   
 
In addition to the Freedom Front, other small ethnic-based parties like the 
Minority Front (MF), which seeks to represent the Indian community, the 
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), which claim to represent the 
Tswana ethnic interests, and the Afrikaner Eenhidsbeweging (AEB), an 
Afrikaner-based party that separated from the Freedom Front, were able to 
secure seats in the national parliament after the 1999 election. The 2004 
election saw, in addition to the three large parties (the ANC, Democratic 
Alliance and the IFP), the representation of eight other small parties 
including ethnic-based parties like the Freedom Front, the UCDP and the 
MF that continued to secure seats in the National Assembly.124. The 
inclusion of these parties in the National Assembly reaffirmed an important 
contribution of the system towards the accommodation of diverse interests 
including ethnic diversity. The adoption of proportional representation in 
South Africa after 1994 is especially important given the dispersal of ethnic 
                                                 
123  Reynolds 1997: 12.  
124  Republic of South Africa General election results available at  
http://electionresources.org.za/provinces.php?election=2004, accessed on 20 July 
2006. 
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communities like the Afrikaners. If the single-member district ‘first past the 
post system’, which puts geographic concentration of support as a 
precondition for electoral victory, had been adopted, the likelihood of 
parties that represent the wide array of Afrikaner interests securing a seat in 
the Assembly would have been minimal. The same applies to the 
representation of other ethnic groups that are either geographically 
dispersed or small in size. 
 
4.1.2 Assessment 
Some analysts hold a different view with regard to the effect of the 
proportional electoral system on racial/ethnic relations. They suggest that 
the proportional electoral system, even if it is not the major cause, has 
contributed to the re-entrenchment of racial cleavages in the new South 
Africa. It has encouraged parties to mobilise the electorate along racial 
lines and target pockets of members of a racial community that are 
scattered all over the country. Piombo, for example, argues that 
 
[a] different electoral system, perhaps combining elements of 
constituency and proportionality principles, could have forced 
political parties to seek support from among the country’s black 
voters. This not only would have avoided ethnic mobilisation, but 
would also have discouraged the racial mobilisation that has 
become the signature of opposition politics in South Africa.125  
 
Murray, on the other hand, is critical of the role of the National Assembly 
in promoting shared rule. She commented that “the National Assembly 
plays little role in reflecting federalism and regionalism”.126 She supports 
                                                 
125  Piombo 2005: 466. 
126  Murray 2006: 266:  
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her point by indicating that “even those members selected from provincial 
lists do not see themselves as provincial representatives”.127  
 
The proportional electoral system has clearly enhanced the representative 
character of the National Assembly. Parties that would not have secured a 
seat in the Assembly under a different electoral system are now 
represented. The fact that the Assembly, to the extent possible, has 
included parties that represent different communities goes a long way in 
accommodating diversity. In addition, the argument that the proportional 
electoral system facilitates inclusivity by not only allowing the 
representation of different parties but also by encouraging intra-party 
diversity holds true for South Africa. The ANC national list is, for 
example, “usually reviewed by party leaders and adjusted to ensure that 
seats are secured, [among other things], for representatives of diverse 
groups”.128   
 
As can be seen from above, there are diverse views on the shared rule role 
of the National Assembly and the impact of the electoral system on 
political mobilisation. As indicated above, Murray claims that the National 
Assembly has thus far played little role in reflecting ‘federalism and 
regionalism’. Given that there is little provincial interest articulation in the 
National Assembly, her comment represents an accurate observation of the 
                                                 
127  Murray 2006: 266. 
128  Murray 2006: 266. This practice, however, should not be overemphasised.  
Although it might promote inter-community solidarity, it all depends on the 
credibility of the person alleged to represent the diverse groups in his or her 
respective community. Some of these alleged representatives might not have 
support in their respective communities. As we shall discus shortly in relation to 
the representation of the national executive, meaningful representation must be 
distinguished from what is often referred to as the ‘illusion of representation’. 
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practice. Yet the propriety of designing the National Assembly as a house 
where provincial interests can be articulated is questionable. Lower 
houses, like the National Assembly, do not traditionally represent diversity 
in its territorial form. That is usually the work of second chambers. The 
design of the National Assembly, which allows for the introduction of 
territorial views in an open PR system, removes the latter from the ranks of 
lower houses that usually serve as a body that represent ‘the people as a 
whole’ in which issues are articulated on non-territorial basis and citizens 
are represented as individuals. This particular aspect of the design of the 
National Assembly tends to blur the distinction between the lower and the 
upper house and overlooks the reason behind the creation of two houses. 
This will especially become evident with the advent of political pluralism 
and the emergence of strong provincial parties.    
 
Of course, it is important that constitution makers are increasingly seeking 
for inclusivity in the lower houses and ensure that the faces of this most 
important institution of national government reflect the diverse characters 
of the state. This does not, however, mean that members of the lower 
house have to articulate their positions in territorial terms except with the 
long held tradition that they speak on behalf of their respective small and 
localised constituencies. Constitution makers are rather seeking inclusivity 
in the lower house  to ensure that political parties that represent a segment 
of the society, who, has it not been for the electoral system would not have 
taken a seat in the Assembly, voice the concerns of the community they 
represent. It is in this regard that the lower house plays a role in 
accommodating diversity. This has clearly been the case in the South 
African National Assembly, where ethnic-based opposition parties like the 
Freedom Front, often make submissions and present complaints in matters 
that affect their constituency.    
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Piombo’s argument pertaining to the impact of the electoral system on 
political mobilisation is also problematic in some respects. First, it is not 
clear if political factors other than the sheer adoption of the proportional 
electoral system have not informed the decision of the parties to pursue 
race-based political mobilisation. As indicated in the previous chapter, 
despite predictions to the contrary, black solidarity has continued in post-
apartheid South Africa in the form of support for the ANC. Opposition 
political parties, either because of the perceived difficulty of making 
inroads into the ANC traditional power base129 or owing to the relatively 
easy mobilisation of the non-black community on the grounds of real or 
perceived threat of racial/African nationalism, opted to target the racial 
minority communities. The political campaign of the opposition targeted 
the white, Coloured and Indian communities. The party politics of the 
ANC, with its rhetoric of black-white, advantaged-disadvantaged, has also 
contributed to the continuing of political discourse along racial dichotomy. 
These and other political factors may largely account for continuing race-
based political mobilisation. There is no doubt, however, that the electoral 
system may play into the hands of political parties that decide to pursue 
identity-based political mobilisation. Nevertheless, this is not the same as 
considering the electoral system as an incentive for the adoption of race-
based political mobilisation by political parties.   
 
Second, Piombo’s comment focuses on how the adopted electoral system 
affects political mobilisation and neglects the very reason why the system 
                                                 
129  Opposition parties in South Africa seem to be confronted with a catch 22 situation.  
In the context of South Africa where the history of institutionalised racism is like 
‘the gift of the Nile to the ANC’, attempting to attract black voters might not be 
that rewarding in the short term. It is also clear that the opposition parties like the 
DA, for example, will not be able to “consolidate support among conservative 
whites and win the black vote at the same time” (Matshiqi 2007). 
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was adopted in the first place. The choice for a PR electoral system is 
usually motivated by the need to establish an inclusive lower house. 
Inclusivity, in turn, is sought because of the existence of fundamental 
differences that need to be accommodated. This relies on the argument that 
the best way of promoting national unity in a deeply divided society is not 
to use political institutions to suppress those divisions and attempt to 
create an overarching identity but to accommodate them. In the South 
African context, the fundamental differences run along the lines of racial 
cleavage, mainly caused by the socio-political factors that have dominated 
the country for decades. It is in order to accommodate these differences 
that the constitution-makers chose the proportional representation electoral 
system as the appropriate system of election. In the South African context, 
a different electoral system, at least in the near future, in which racial 
politics will endure, would have resulted in the permanent marginalisation 
of groups that claim to represent Afrikaners and other racial minorities 
from the political process. The Constitutional Court pointed out this pitfall 
in the case of United Democratic Movement v President of the RSA when 
it commented on the electoral system: 
 
It is acknowledged that a constituency-based electoral system 
would operate to the detriment of smaller parties…This 
would be the result of precisely the socio-political factor, 
namely that smaller parties probably command majority 
support in very few areas and would for that reason win less 
seats in a territorially- based system than in a proportional 
system.130 
 
It must also be not feared that the electoral system promotes racial 
cleavages in situations where those cleavages do not represent the realities 
                                                 
130   2002 11 BCLR 1179 (CC) para 47. See also Malan 2005: 399  
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of the society concerned. The decline of ethnic parties in the early 
transition period of South Africa illustrates this very well. Ethnic 
entrepreneurs who sought to use the system to secure a place in national 
politics were not able to secure a significant place in Parliament as they 
were attempting to mobilise communities around an identity that is not 
politically relevant for most sections of the society. Racial cleavages, thus, 
will continue to characterise election campaigns and normal politics only 
because they represent a politically and socially relevant divide. 
Allegiance to a racial group and political mobilisation based on that line of 
allegiance was a reality before the introduction of the PR system and a 
change in an electoral system will not necessarily guarantee a change in 
that regard.    
 
Third, it is not clear if the party’s mobilisation would have taken a 
different line had the Constitution adopted the suggested combination PR 
and constituency principles. In fact, local government elections in South 
Africa combine elements of both the proportional and constituency 
electoral systems. The political mobilisation adhered by the parties is, 
however, no different from the strategy they adopt at a national and 
provincial level. For that matter, the voting trend is also similar.  
 
Generally, the proportional electoral system has made the representation of 
different communities a possible reality. Of course, the relative strength 
and influence of the parties is limited owing to the dominance of the ANC. 
Yet, as Reynolds commented, their presence in this nationally important 
institution “far outweighs their numerical strength”.131 More importantly, it 
provides for a structure which can be put to a better use of accommodating 
ethnic diversity when political pluralism becomes the order of the day. 
                                                 
131  Reynolds 1997. 
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4.2 The National Council of Provinces 
The National Council of Provinces (NCOP) is the second chamber of the 
South African Parliament. As the name of the institution itself suggests, 
this is the house of provinces. The Constitution, in section 42(3), explicitly 
states that the NCOP “represents the provinces”. As its primary function is 
to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the national 
sphere of government, the NCOP’s role is to “represent provinces as 
political entities, not to represent citizens as such”.132 The NCOP 
accomplishes this task first by “participating in the national legislative 
process” and, second, by “providing a national forum for public 
consideration of issues affecting the provinces”.133  
 
As indicated in Chapter Three, the capacity of second chambers to 
represent the interests of the constituent units depends, first, on the 
composition and the manner in which members are appointed or elected to 
the chamber and, second, on the powers allocated to the chamber. 
 
4.2.1 Composition of the NCOP 
In the NCOP, each province is represented by a single delegation that is 
composed of ten delegates, headed by the premier of the province or a 
person nominated by the premier and drawn from members of the 
provincial legislature and the executive.134 Of the ten delegates, six are 
permanent delegates while the other four are special delegates.135 The 
provincial legislature appoints the permanent delegates based on the 
nominations it receives from parties represented in the legislature. The 
special delegates, who are members of the provincial legislature, are 
                                                 
132  Murray and Nijzink 2002: 8. 
133  Section 42(3) Constitution. 
134  Section 60(2) (a) Constitution. 
135  Section 60(1) Constitution. 
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appointed from time to time by the provincial legislature in consultation 
with the concurrence of the premier and the leader of the parties entitled to 
special delegates in the province’s delegation.136 Members of the 
provincial delegation have to reflect the representation of parties in the 
provincial legislature; the Constitution specifically enjoins the need to 
ensure the participation of minority parties both in the permanent and 
special delegates’ components of the delegation.137   
 
4.2.2 Functions and powers of the NCOP 
In addition to the appointment system, the effectiveness of the NCOP in 
representing the provinces depends on the relevance of its constitutional 
powers in protecting provincial interests. In this regard, the NCOP, first, 
participates in the passing of bills that amend the Constitution. In 
amending certain sections of the Constitution, the NCOP must accept the 
bill with a supporting vote of at least six provinces. This includes the 
amendment of section 1, the entire chapter 2 containing the Bill of Rights 
and the amendment of section 74(1) of the Constitution.138 Any other 
amendment of the Constitution that relates to a matter that affects the 
NCOP, alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions and 
amend provisions that deal specifically with a provincial matter must also 
be passed by the NCOP with the supporting vote of at least six 
provinces.139  
 
With regard to ordinary legislation, the role of the NCOP is stronger in 
respect of bills that affect provinces, the so-called section 76 legislation. 
Any bill that deals with subject matter that falls within a functional area 
                                                 
136  Section 61(4) Constitution. 
137  Section 61(2) (a) (1), 61(3) Constitution. 
138  Section 74(1 and 2) Constitution. 
139  Section 74 (3) Constitution. 
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listed in Schedule 4 of the Constitution (i.e. the concurrent legislative 
competency of the national and the provincial spheres) is automatically 
considered as a bill that affects provinces. The NCOP, with each 
provincial delegation having one vote, can either reject or pass with 
amendment bills that affect provinces. If the NCOP rejects the bill or if the 
Assembly refuses to pass the bill as amended by the NCOP, the bill or the 
amended bill, as the case may be, must be referred to the Mediation 
Committee,140 which consists of nine members each from the National 
Assembly and the NCOP.141 In the event that the Mediation Committee 
fails to come up with a bill acceptable by both houses, the National 
Assembly can pass the bill, either as originally passed by it or as amended 
by the Mediation Committee, but only if it can secure the vote of at least 
two thirds of its members.142 
 
The NCOP also plays a limited role in the passing of national legislation 
that falls outside the explicitly provided spheres of provincial competence, 
the so-called section 75 bills. A rejection of a section 75 bill by the NCOP 
only results in the reconsideration of the bill by the National Assembly.143 
                                                 
140  Section 76 (1) Constitution. 
141  Section 78 Constitution. 
142  Section 76(2) Constitution. According to section 146(4) of the Constitution, the  
decision of the NCOP to accept or reject a section 76 bill must be taken into 
account by a court that has to decide whether the national legislation overrides the 
provincial legislation in the event of a conflict between national and provincial 
legislation. Accordingly, “[i]f the bill was passed by the NCOP, a court is likely to 
accept that the national legislation is necessary for any of the purposes stated in 
section 146 (economic unity, etc). Where the NCOP voted against the bill but a 
two-thirds majority was obtained in the National Assembly, the court may take 
that as an indication that the necessity test has not been met” (Levy, Tapscott and 
Steytler et al 1999: 91). 
143  Section 75 Constitution. 
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When reconsidering the bill, the National Assembly must take into account 
any amendment proposed by the NCOP. The final decision, however, rests 
with the Assembly. As Murray put it, this limits the role of the council to 
“an arena of second sober thought”.144 It is also important to note that the 
delegates of each province vote as individual members when the NCOP 
considers bills that do not affect provinces.145  
 
The NCOP can also exercise “veto powers over national executive 
action”.146 First, an intervention by the national government in a province 
ends if the NCOP disapproves.147 Second, all international treaties entered 
into by the national executive must be ratified both by the National 
Assembly and the NCOP. Third, a declaration of a ‘state of defence’ must 
also be approved by the NCOP.148 Finally, the NCOP can overrule the 
decision of the National Treasury to cease the transfer of funds to a 
province for want of compliance with sound financial management.149 
 
4.2.3 Assessment 
The representation system in the NCOP generally provides an opportunity 
for voicing provincial preferences and protecting provincial interests. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that members of the NCOP will vote 
along the interests of their provinces as voting along political–party lines is 
usually common. Nevertheless, the fact that the power to appoint 
representatives to the NCOP resides with the provincial legislatures 
themselves does put members in a better position to defend and advance 
                                                 
144  Murray 2006: 266.  
145  Section 75(2) (a) Constitution. 
146  Steytler 2005: 330. 
147  Section 100(2) (b) Constitution. 
148  Section 203(3) Constitution. 
149  Section 216 Constitution. 
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provincial interests. More important in this regard is also the fact that the 
Constitution enjoins the provincial legislature to ensure that the delegation 
of the provinces to the NCOP is as representative as possible. This 
facilitates inclusiveness and the projection of the province in the national 
forum as a single entity. This is further reinforced by the fact that each 
provincial delegation, when dealing with bills that affect provinces, has 
just one vote that must be casted based on the instructions of the provincial 
legislature. The NCOP’s role as a protector of provincial interests is 
further facilitated by the fact that it is entrusted with important powers that 
ensure the effective participation of provinces in national decision-making. 
Generally, the institutional design of the NCOP, which is modelled after 
the German Bundesrat, makes it a truly provincial body. It has the 
potential capacity to ensure the consideration of provincial interests in 
provincial legislation, on the one hand, while enabling the national and 
provincial governments to develop a common understanding of national 
interests, on the other.  
 
In practice, the NCOP has not been that successful in relation to its ability 
to influence the passing of national bills, which is one of its primary 
functions. Since the establishment of the NCOP, only a handful of 
amendments have been proposed by provincial legislatures to cater for 
provincial interests.150 The legislative contributions of the NCOP have 
been “limited to the corrections of textual errors and some fine-tuning”.151 
This is partly attributed to the dominance of the ANC in both houses of the 
Parliament and in almost all provinces. The fact that the two houses do not 
differ from each other in partisan composition has limited the capacity of 
the NCOP to influence national bills. The dominance of the ANC also 
                                                 
150  Murray 2006. 
151  Levy, Tapscott and Steytler et al 1999: 91. 
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means that most important decisions are decided through party structures 
and executive intergovernmental structures. Long before bills are tabled 
for consideration before the NCOP, provincial concerns have already been 
communicated by the relevant provincial officials in the different 
intergovernmental structures.152 Given this political context, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, for the NCOP to fulfil the potential its institutional 
design promises. However, given that “party dominance is not a permanent 
state”,153 the effectiveness of the design of the NCOP will likely come into 
its own right when competitive politics replaces the political space that is 
currently characterised by ‘one-party dominance’.  
 
4.3 Co-operative government and intergovernmental relations 
As much as a federation must be arranged to accommodate ethnic diversity, 
it must also promote state-wide solidarity. Constitution makers must be 
careful not to be swept away by the sheer desire of responding to the 
demands of ethnic groups and end up creating a system whereby each 
community operates in isolation from others; a system where there are little 
or no “institutional links between levels of government – each is its own self 
–contained system”.154 This is about multi-ethnic federations providing a 
common space whereby the different levels of government work towards 
shared purposes and common objectives. It is about maintaining a joint 
space through which the different communities can communicate and foster 
mutual understanding. This can only be done when the national 
government, together with the constituent governments, engages in the co-
management of the federation. This is where intergovernmental relation, as 
                                                 
152  See Murray and Nijzink 2000: 44-45. See also Levy, Tapscott and Steytler et al  
1999. 
153  Steytler 2005: 343. See also Friedman 1999. 
154  Simeon and Conway 2001: 345. 
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a process and structure that provides the context to engage in the co-
management of federation, becomes relevant.155 
 
Intergovernmental relation within the normative framework of cooperative 
government is one of the most important and unique features of the shared 
rule elements in the South African Constitution. The Constitution 
explicitly requires all spheres of government to act in the spirit of 
cooperative government as opposed to in competition with each other. As 
stated by the Constitutional Court in its First Certification judgment, the 
Constitution has rejected competitive federalism and instead chose to 
adopt ‘cooperative government’.156 Chapter three of the Constitution is 
dedicated to outlining the normative principles of cooperative government.  
 
 
                                                 
155  The nature of intergovernmental relations in a federation depends on the particular  
normative framework within which this relation operates. It depends on whether 
the core of the normative work is based on competitive federalism or cooperative 
federalism. Competitive federalism assumes “the inherent competition for power 
between the federal and state governments and one can gain power only at the 
expense of the other” (Nice 1995: 5-6). According to this view, federalism is 
essentially a zero-sum game. Cooperative federalism, on the other hand, 
emphasises cooperation and coordination in contrast to inter-jurisdictional 
competition. This model is based on a sharing of power and responsibility, with 
the various participants working towards shared goals. In many multi-ethnic 
federations, intergovernmental relations are, by and large, operating within the 
normative framework of cooperative federalism. In fact, as noted by Kincaid 
(2005:433), no federal constitution endorses intergovernmental competition; 
“instead to the extent that intergovernmental relations are mentioned, the emphasis 
is on cooperation and coordination”. It is within this same normative framework 
that this study discusses intergovernmental relations.  
156  In Re: certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996  
(10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para 290. 
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4.3.1 The principles of cooperative government 
Section 41(1) of the Constitution lists the principles of cooperative 
government and intergovernmental relations that all spheres of government 
and organs of state must adhere to. The principles can be broadly 
categorised as principles that promote and emphasis national unity, respect 
for autonomy and a duty to cooperate.  
 
The first half of the principles of cooperative government stress the need to 
promote national unity: the three spheres of government must “preserve 
the peace, national unity and indivisibility of the Republic”;157 they must 
collectively work to “secure the wellbeing of the people of the 
Republic”;158 they must also maintain their loyalty “to the Constitution, the 
Republic and its people”.159  
 
The second part of the principles reaffirms the distinctiveness of each 
sphere and promotes respect for autonomy: The three spheres of 
government must “respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers 
and functions of government in the other spheres”;160 they must “not 
assume any power or functions except those conferred on them in terms of 
the constitution”;161 furthermore, they must “exercise their powers and 
perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another 
sphere”.162  
 
                                                 
157  Section 41 (1) (a). 
158  Section 41 (1) (b). 
159  Section 41 (1) (d). 
160  Section 41 (1) (e). 
161  Section 41 (1) (f). 
162  Section 41 (1) (g). 
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The bridge between the two elements of cooperative government is the 
principle that underpins the duty to cooperate. According to this principle, 
the three spheres of government must “co-operate with one another in 
mutual trust and good faith by (i) fostering friendly relations; (ii) assisting 
and supporting one another; (iii) informing one another of, and consulting 
one another on, matters of common interest; (iv) co-ordinating their 
actions and legislation with one another; (v) adhering to agreed 
procedures; and (vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another”.163 
 
Equal respect for national integrity and autonomy are therefore the essence 
of these principles. Relations between the different spheres of government 
must be underpinned by these two basic elements of cooperative 
government. On the one hand, the exercise of autonomy should not 
jeopardise or undermine the national unity of the Republic. At the same 
time, the need to promote national unity should not compromise 
subnational autonomy. The territorial, functional and institutional 
autonomy of subnational units must be respected. All spheres of 
government are obliged to observe and adhere to these principles of 
cooperative government and conduct their activities within the parameters 
of these same principles.164 
 
The Constitution envisions the establishment of forums and structures that 
facilitate cooperative government. It mandates, under section 41(2), the 
enactment of an Act of Parliament that must “establish or provide for 
structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental 
                                                 
163  Section 41 (1) (h). 
164  Section 40(2) Constitution. A fourth principle of cooperative government 
emphasises the need for effective government. The three spheres of government 
are mandated to provide ‘effective, transparent, accountable and coherent 
government for the Republic as a whole’.  
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relations”. The envisaged Act of Parliament must also “provide for 
appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate settlement of 
intergovernmental disputes”.165  
 
This constitutional mandate was not immediately responded to. Instead, 
informal communications and ad hoc forums were used to facilitate 
intergovernmental relations.166 A plethora of intergovernmental structures 
were established in all spheres of government. The constitutional mandate 
was eventually responded to when Parliament, after a decade, enacted the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (hereafter the ‘Act’ or the 
‘IRFA’). This Act, which came into effect on 15 August 2005, provides for 
the institutional structures of intergovernmental relation in each of the three 
spheres of government.167  The Act provides for the establishment of four 
types of executive intergovernmental structures. By establishing these 
structures, the Act has moved intergovernmental relations from the informal 
domain of interaction through telephones, letters and informal meetings into 
a more formal arena of communication and interaction.  
 
4.3.2 Assessment 
The promotion of co-operative government as opposed to intergovernmental 
competition is a reflection of the constitutional emphasis on national unity. 
                                                 
165  Section 41(2) (b). 
166  See Steytler, Yonatan and Kirkby 2006.  
167  The Act recognises the fact that other Acts of Parliament have created specific  
forums contemplated in section 41(2), and limit its role to establishing a general 
legislative framework. The Act, with the ultimate aim of enhancing 
intergovernmental cooperation, formalises the relations between the three spheres 
of government Thus the IRFA gives concrete form to the principles of co-
operative government by establishing the structures of intergovernmental relations 
and providing mechanisms for settling disputes between the three spheres. 
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The emphasis on cooperative government “is consistent with the 
requirement […] that national unity be recognised and promoted”.168 As can 
be gathered from the principles of cooperative government outlined by the 
Constitution, the obligation to promote national unity is equally underlined 
by an obligation to respect the autonomy of each sphere of government. 
That means the duty of cooperative government cannot be used to 
circumscribe provincial autonomy; cooperative government should not be 
used as a ‘centralising device’. 
 
South Africa, by adopting the IRFA, has taken further the 
institutionalisation of cooperative government and intergovernmental 
relations that it had already embarked upon, albeit to a limited extent. It is 
not, however, clear if the design and practice of these intergovernmental 
structures have fully given effect to the two pillars of cooperative 
government, namely national unity and respect for autonomy. Giving 
practical effect to these two pillars of cooperative government would 
require the establishment of intergovernmental relations that are based on a 
‘negotiated, non-hierarchic exchange’ between the different spheres of 
government. It would require the realisation of a forum where equal 
partners of government come together to consult on matters of common 
interest in mutual respect. The system of intergovernmental relations 
envisaged by the IRFA presents, by contrast, “hierarchical and rule-bound 
structures and procedures”.169 This, as aptly argued by Steytler,170 clearly 
manifests in the fact that the national IGR forums are designed not as 
forums of both national politicians and their provincial counterparts but 
rather as a ‘consultative forum for national politicians’. The President’s 
                                                 
168  In Re: certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996  
(10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para 290 
169  Steytler 2007: 9. 
170  Steytler 2007: 9-10. 
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Coordinating Council, which brings together the President with the 
Premiers of the provinces, is considered as a consultative forum “for the 
President”.171 The same is true for the MinMECs, sectoral 
intergovernmental forums that brings together the relevant national minister 
with their provincial counterparts. These forums are regarded as 
“consultative forums for the Cabinet member responsible for the functional 
area”.172 This hierarchical relation seems to be further strengthened by 
practice. Admittedly, there is not enough evidence to assess the practice of 
structures established after the adoption of the Act from this perspective. 
However, if the practices of the pre-IRFA intergovernmental structures and 
preliminary researches on structures established based on the IRFA are 
anything to go by,173 the structures are far from representing this principle 
of ‘negotiated, non-hierarchic’ interaction. The forums are used as a 
platform for the national government and its officials to present their 
policies, without an equal level of involvement from the provinces. The 
functioning of the structures does not give an impression of the central 
government and the provinces engaging in equal terms in the co-
management of the federation. The domination of the forums by the 
national government and the lack of active engagement from the provinces 
pose a real danger of turning intergovernmental relations into ‘centralising 
devices’. 
 
                                                 
171  Section 6 IRFA. 
172  Section 11 IRFA. As noted by Steytler (2007), the objectives of the IGR, which re 
“hierarchically slanted”, also indicate that the IRFA does not envisage the 
intergovernmental relations between the national government and the provinces as 
an interaction among equals. See also sections 4, 7, 8(1) (a) and 8(2) of the IRFA, 
which signal the hierarchical nature of the intergovernmental relations that the 
IRFA espouses between the national government and the provinces. 
173  See Fessha and Steytler 2006. 
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4.4 Representation in the national executive 
The Interim Constitution provided for a government of national unity. 174 
The 1996 Constitution, on the other hand, does not make power sharing a 
requirement in organising the national executive. The cabinet is not 
constitutionally required to be composed of different groups or reflect 
multi-party representation. In the absence of a constitutional mandate, the 
remaining question is whether the representation of the different groups in 
the national executive is ensured through political practice. 
 
4.4.1 Representation through political practice 
The composition of the ANC, some argue, caters for the broader 
representation of the different ethnic and racial groups, making the ANC a 
‘consociational party’. Lijphart argues that “the ANC is a strongly multi-
racial and multi-ethnic party; in particular, its members of parliament and 
its cabinet ministers have been broadly representative of the major racial 
and ethnic groups in South Africa”.175 He equates the ANC with that of the 
Indian National Congress, “which has been so inclusive of all religious, 
linguistic and regional groups in India that it has embodied the essence of 
a grand coalition within the party and within the long succession of 
Congress cabinets”.176 He, though not in many words, advises us not to be 
wary of the ANC governing alone in such a deeply divided society.  
                                                 
174  As a result, the National Party and the IFP joined the ANC in government. Two  
years later, the National Party withdrew from the arrangement on the ground that 
“its close identification with the majority ANC restricted its ability to build its 
own constituency, and that it would be more effective in opposition” (Murray 
2006: 271). Murray indicated that “this assessment proved wrong. In the 2004 
national elections, the National Party received just 1.7 percent of the vote. In 1994 
it had commanded 20.4 percent” (Murray 2006: 286). 
175  Lijphart 1998: 148. 
176  Lijphart 1998: 148. 
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A simple look at the racial composition of the ANC may tend to confirm 
the view that the ANC is a ‘consociational party’. Unlike the other 
predominantly black parties, like the Pan African Congress, the ANC, 
based on its commitment to non-racialism, opened its door for people of 
all racial groups. The leaders of the ANC are also mindful of the need for 
political accommodation of different racial groups within the ANC 
leadership structure.  Nelson Mandela, in his speech at the 1991 National 
Convention of the ANC, said that  
 
… [t]he ordinary man, no matter to what population 
group he belongs, must look at our [ANC] structures 
and say that ‘I, as a Coloured man, am represented. I 
have got Allan Boesak there whom I can trust. And an 
Indian must also be able to say: There is Kathrada – I 
am represented.177  
 
This is also reflected in the different institutions that the ANC controls. 
The provincial ANC in the Western Cape, according to the tradition of the 
party, is largely representative of the different groups that inhabit the 
province.178 Boggards, writing in 2002, noted the overrepresentation of 
non-blacks in the ANC caucus as well as the fact that “[t]hirty percent of 
its deputies come from the Coloured, Indian and white communities 
despite the fact that these communities contributed only six percent of the 
overall ANC vote”.179  
                                                 
177  Ramsamy 2002: 208. 
178  Hendricks 2005: 117. 
179  Boggards 2002: 13. This, in fact, has caused an outcry among some members of  
the ANC. Peter Mokaba, then deputy minister of Environmental Affairs, said: 
‘[T]he need to consolidate power in our country must first and foremost entail the 
imperative of consolidating power base. On the basis of that strength we must 
move to consolidate the Black power base…If 60% of the 62% that voted the 
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Unlike the case of racial representation, the relevance of the representation 
of different ethnic groups in the ANC does not receive official recognition. 
The official position of the ANC with regard to its ethnic composition 
does, in fact, signal a hostile attitude towards ethnicity. The ANC has 
considered ethnic divisions as artificial and, as indicated earlier, the 
manipulation of ethnicity by the apartheid government has further 
discredited the concept of ethnicity. In so far as public pronouncements are 
concerned, the ANC has continued to present the black African 
community as an undifferentiated homogenous segment of the South 
African society. That is not, however, totally true. Ethnic considerations, it 
seems, have played a role in organising the leadership structure of the 
party and the government. Butler, writing shortly before the ANC’s 52nd 
Conference in Polokwane,180 indicated that “[e]thnic balance is a 
cornerstone of ANC party lists and National Executive Committee (NEC) 
elections”.181 He also points out that ethnic representation is clear in the 
core leaders of the ANC (i.e. the ANC president, the deputy president, 
chairperson and secretary-general) which come from different ethnic 
groups.182  
                                                                                                                            
ANC into power is African, why is it that the percentages of other national groups 
in the leadership structures is more than their contribution to the democratic vote?’ 
(as quoted in Ramsamy 2002: 208). A similar claim is recently made by members 
of the provincial ANC in the Western Cape who, in similar fashion, argued that 
“representivity should be reflective of the majority of people who voted the ANC 
into power in the province” (Hendricks 2005: 117). 
180  The 52nd ANC Conference has brought a dramatic change in the leadership  
structure of the ANC including the election of Jacob Zuma as a president of the 
party. How this new turn of events will affect the demographics of the leadership 
structures of the party and the government is yet to be seen. The discussion here 
does not include post-Polokwane developments. 
181  Butler 2007: 38.  
182  Butler 2007. Despite the absence of constitutional requirement for ensuring  
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According to Butler, representation of ethnic groups is also taken into 
account in organising the state presidency where the minister, policy 
coordination director and director-general belong to the numerically 
smaller ethnic communities.183 Despite the absence of constitutional 
requirement for ensuring multiparty representation in the cabinet, the ANC 
government, under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki, has also included 
members of minority parties including the IFP and AZAPO in cabinet.184 
 
The difference between the role of ethnicity and race in the organisation of 
the leadership structure of the ANC and the government, it seems, is that 
the former does not often receive public recognition as opposed to the 
latter about which leaders of the party are not shy to express their 
sensitivity. Ethnicity, it seems, is an implicit element of both party and 
government structures organisation. Of course, one may reasonably argue 
that there is no evidence to regard the representation of the different ethnic 
groups in the government and the party as an outcome of a deliberate 
policy. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the diversified face of the 
party and the government takes ethnic traits away from the most important 
and often contested political space in a multi-ethnic context. 
 
4.4.2 Assessment 
Despite the absence of the constitutional requirement for the representation 
of the different ethnic groups in the national executive, the ANC’s 
sensitivities to ethnic and racial balance in its leadership structure and the 
                                                                                                                            
multiparty representation in the cabinet, the ANC government, under the 
leadership of Thabo Mbeki, has also included members of minority parties 
including the IFP in cabinet (Steytler 2001; Murray 2006). 
183  Butler 2007.  
184  Steytler 2001. See also Murray 2006. 
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national executive has, to some extent, ensured the representation of 
different ethnic groups. It is also important to note the approach it adopted 
with regard to ethnic representation as opposed to racial representation. Its 
decision to explicitly recognise the need to ensure the representation of the 
different racial communities is consistent with the fact that race is the 
primary cleavage for political mobilisation in South Africa. On the other 
hand, its refusal to recognise ethnic representation as an explicit principle 
of political organisation goes in tandem with the fact that ethnicity is not 
the relevant divide that warrants public recognition; yet the representation 
of different ethnic groups in the leadership structure of the party indicates 
an acceptance of the important principle that an ethnically diverse state 
must be sensitive about ethnic balance by, among other things, providing a 
sense of representation in important leadership structures.185 This also 
suggests that accommodating ethnic diversity does not necessarily or 
usually require a constitutional or formal obligation of providing 
representation to the different ethnic groups.  
 
It must, however, be important to note developments that have cast doubt 
on the claim that the ANC have successfully maintained ethnic balance 
both within the party and the government. Some have alluded to the 
growing concern about the overrepresentation of particular ethnic groups 
within the leadership structures of the ANC and the government. 
Archbishop Tutu, in one of the public speeches he made in 2006, warned 
against the rise of ethnic divisions because of the perceived dominance of 
the ANC and the government by particular ethnic groups. He specifically 
stressed the need to “hear the cry of those who complain about a Nguni-
                                                 
185  Butler (2007: 38) discusses how the ANC “has made ethnicity almost invisible”  
by providing, among other things, due consideration to ethnic balance. 
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ocracy186 and even of a Xhosa-ocracy”.187 Some suggest that this claim is 
not without merit. Writing in 2007, Calland points out that twelve of the 
fifteen member National Working Committee of the ANC come from 
Nguni group, with “three from minority groups”.188 The domination of the 
same groups in other key government positions and especially the cabinet 
is also noted by other authors. Murray, in a typical South African academic 
style that eschews direct reference to ethnicity, indicates the growing 
concern “about what is perceived as the overrepresentation of two 
provinces in cabinet”.189 The references are to the Zulu and Xhosa-
speaking provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape respectively. 
Similarly, Butler refers to Thabo Mbeki’s second-term reshuffle in which 
he appointed 13 Xhosa-speaking cabinet ministers and 6 deputy ministers 
as “an insensitive tilt away from ethnic balance”.190  
 
The succession debate within the ANC, which preceded the 52nd ANC 
policy Conference in Polokwane, has also brought the issue of ethnicity to 
the fore. After the axing of Jacob Zuma from the position of Deputy 
President of the country, following allegations of corruption, there was no 
clear favorable candidate that emerged to lead both the ANC and the 
government after 2007 and 2009 respectively.191 It was reported that 
                                                 
186  The Nguni group, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, includes the Zulu, Xhosa  
and Swati speakers. 
187  Tutu 2006. 
188  Calland 2006: 123. Mosiuoa Lekota, the national chairperson of the ANC before  
2008, “after winning the ANC national chairmanship in the 1997 Mafikeng 
conference, pronounced his election a victory for the Sotho-speaking people” 
(Calland 2006: 124). 
189  Murray 2006: 272. 
190  Butler 2007: 42. 
191  As indicated earlier, the ANC held its national conference in December 2007 in  
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supporters of Jacob Zuma advanced a conspiracy theory that that there is a 
plot by a group of Xhosa-speaking leaders of the ANC to prevent a Zulu-
speaker from becoming the next president of the party and the 
government.192 Central to this is also that the top job of both the ANC and 
the government has for a long time been in the hands of Xhosa-speakers. 
An ANC national executive committee member, reacting to the possible 
nomination of Thabo Mbeki for the leadership position of the party for a 
third time, expressed the possible revival of ethnic concerns because of the 
continued dominance of the ANC and government leadership structure by 
particular group/s: “We need to accept the reality that, if we want to build 
a united nation, we need to allow other people from other provinces to lead 
the ANC and government”.193 This is obviously a reference to the 
dominance of the leadership of the ANC and the government by Xhosa-
speakers.  
 
Although these claims cast doubt on the success of the ANC and the 
government in achieving ethnic balance in the national executive, they do 
not necessary lead to the conclusion that there is a deliberate tendency to 
establish the hegemony of a particular ethnic group/s. This, however, 
should not detract the government and the party from giving the issue the 
serious consideration that it deserves. After all, these claims at least 
“signal the beginning of increased public demands for diversity in the 
executive”.194 They signal the need to be sensitive about ethnic balance 
lest that it creates the impression, perceived or real, that a particular ethnic 
group is rushing to entrench its hegemony.   
                                                                                                                            
which it elected Jacob Zuma as a President of the party. The next national election 
is scheduled for early 2009.   
192  Butler 2007. 
193  ‘Zuma on the back foot’ Mail& the Guardian (8 December 2006). 
194  Murray 2006: 272. 
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Finally, it must be noted that the mere existence of members of different 
groups in the leadership structure of the party and the government does not 
necessarily amount to representation of the different groups. This is 
especially true of the representation of the different racial communities. 
Although members of the racial minority communities appear 
disproportionately in the leadership structure of the ANC, it is difficult to 
readily consider them as representatives of those communities. It is often 
argued that most White, Coloured and Indian candidates of the ANC 
“would have great trouble winning a seat in their respective ethnic 
communities under the first-past-the-post plurality system”.195 With regard 
to the Indian members of the ANC and the Indian community, Ramsamy 
specifically indicated that “although there are a number of Indians in the 
hierarchy of the ANC, the frequent rejection of Indian identity by Indian 
ANC activists has…contributed to the community’s misgiving about the 
ANC”.196 This further illustrates the gap between the ostensible 
representatives and the represented. It is contended that this picture of 
composition of the ANC creates ‘a dangerous illusion of representation’ 
more than it reflects an actual representation of the different South African 
communities. 
 
4.5 General remark on shared rule 
The institutional design for shared rule facilitates inclusiveness. The 
electoral system has ensured the representation of different groups in the 
National Assembly while the institutional design of the NCOP provides 
meaningful space for national-provincial dialogue as well as for the 
injection and protection of provincial interests in national decision- 
making. Quite unique to South Africa is also the detailed constitutional 
                                                 
195  Herman and Simkins 1999a: 31. 
196  Ramsamy 2002: 206. 
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framework that outlines the process of shared rule in the form of 
cooperative government. This is also supported by the institutional 
framework for intergovernmental relations, which is designed to help all 
spheres of government comply with their constitutional obligation of 
working in cooperation as opposed to in competition with each other. The 
institutional designs as well as the constitutional framework for processes 
of shared rule are consistent with the constitutional emphasis on national 
unity. 
 
In practice, the effects of the processes and institutions of shared rule have 
been very limited. The reason for this is attributable not so much to 
institutional design as it is to the political context. At the centre of this is 
the unassailable position that the ANC holds in the body politic. The ANC 
dominance in the lower house has limited the relative strength and 
influence of other parties in the National Assembly. Its control of all the 
provincial governments and thus the seats of the NCOP have turned the 
latter into an ineffective institution. The domination of intergovernmental 
structures by the national government has limited the contribution of the 
latter for the co-management of the society. A point should nevertheless be 
made that the Constitution, notwithstanding the current political context, 
does provide an adequate system of shared rule. The political dynamics are 
likely to change from time to time although that does not seem to be likely 
in the near future in the case of South Africa.    
 
5.  The challenges of accommodating dispersed ethnic groups 
As argued in Chapter Three, the territorial solution that federalism provides 
for has limitations as it cannot, for example, respond to questions that arise 
in relation to the anxieties of ethnic groups that are not territorially 
concentrated. This section examines two important elements of the South 
African Constitution that are often deemed relevant to accommodate the 
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concerns of dispersed ethnic groups and individuals that belong to such 
ethnic groups: the Bill of Rights and non-territorial autonomy.  
 
5.1 The Bill of Rights and the multi-ethnic challenge 
The ‘Bill of Rights’ contains an exhaustive list of rights, including the 
traditional civil and political rights as well as the often controversial socio-
economic rights.197 A number of rights are relevant, directly or indirectly, to 
accommodate the needs of persons that belong to the different ethnic 
communities. The following sections discuss some of these rights very 
briefly. 
 
5.1.1 The right to equality and non-discrimination 
By way of emphasising the departure from the injustices of the apartheid 
era, the Bill of Rights section commences by outlining the right to equality. 
Section 9 states that “everyone is equal before the law and has the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law”. As opposed to formal equality, it 
emphasises substantive equality by envisaging the adoption of legislative 
and other measures that help to “advance persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination”.198 This provides room for the adoption of affirmative 
action measures. It also gives effect to the constitutional view of substantive 
equality as including “the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms”.199 
                                                 
197  With regard to the application of Bill of Rights, section 8 provides that it binds all  
organs of state, be it at the national, provincial or local level. The Bill of Rights 
also protects against private infringements of rights; rights are applicable 
horizontally to natural and juristic persons, “taking into account the nature of the 
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right” (section 8(2) Constitution).  
198  Section 9(2) Constitution 
199  Section 9(2) Constitution. 
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As a corollary of the equality right, the state is enjoined not to “unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth” (emphasis added).200 The prohibition of such 
unfair discrimination is also extended to private persons. The Constitution 
also mandates the adoption of national legislation to prohibit unfair 
discrimination which was eventually realised through the enactment of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.  
 
It is important to note that the Constitution does not prohibit discrimination 
per se but only unfair discrimination. As stated in section 9(4), 
discrimination on one of the grounds listed in subsection 3 automatically 
becomes unfair discrimination unless it is established that the discrimination 
is fair. This means discrimination based on language and culture is 
automatically regarded as unfair discrimination. This also implies that the 
Constitution’s adherence to substantive equality may entail differential 
treatment. Special measures might be necessary in order to ensure that those 
that were disadvantaged by unfair practices in the past also benefit from 
“the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms” that the 
Constitution promises. 
 
5.1.2 Associational rights 
Of particular importance to the protection of the identity of members of 
ethnic groups are the so-called associational individual rights. These are 
rights “which cannot be fully or properly exercised by individuals other than 
in association with others of like disposition”.201 Section 18 of the 
                                                 
200  Section 9(3) Constitution 
201  In re: certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of  
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Constitution guarantees the right of everyone to freedom of association 
while section 17 stipulates the right to assemble.  
 
Freedom of association can be used to advance the identity of a particular 
group. In the context of South Africa, however, the extent to which this 
right can be used to advance identity-claims seemingly faces a challenge 
from the equality principle which prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, culture, language, or religion. It is argued by some that 
“[a]ssociations that would promote and embody discriminatory practices on 
the grounds of race, ethnicity, culture, language, or religion will probably be 
precluded…”.202 This challenge is explicitly pronounced in relation to two 
other sections of the Bill of Rights, which are also associational rights that 
directly deal with identity-related matters: sections 30 and 31. 
 
Section 30 deals with rights to language and culture and provides that each 
individual “has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural 
life of their choice”. A more extensive protection of similar nature is 
stipulated under section 31, which states that “[p]ersons belonging to a 
cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with 
other members of that community… to enjoy their culture, practice their 
religion and use their language”. The section also recognises the right of 
such persons “to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society”.203   
 
                                                                                                                            
South Africa 1996, 1997 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para 23. 
202  Henrad 2002: 153. 
203  Section 31 (19) (b) Constitution. 
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Brinkel regards the rights stipulated in section 31 as group rights.204 He 
bases his argument on the stipulation of the provision which indicates that 
the rights in question are enjoyed by the persons belonging to a community 
“with other members of that community”. He therefore concludes that 
groups are granted rights. Currie makes similar remarks: 
 
The section 31 right requires for its exercise the existence of an 
identifiable community practicing a particular culture or religion or 
speaking a particular language. Therefore, if as a result of state action 
or inaction that community loses its identity, if it’s absorbed without 
trace into the majority population, the individual right of participation 
in a cultural or linguistic community will be harmed. Section 31 
therefore certainly requires non-interference with a community’s 
initiative to develop and preserve its culture. In addition, it is likely that 
it requires positive measure by the state in support of vulnerable or 
disadvantaged cultural, religious and linguistic communities that do not 
have the resources for such initiatives.205 
 
When considered in light of the international instruments which provide for 
the same right, in almost the same exact words, the argument that section 31 
represents group rights is hardly convincing. The section, like article 27 of 
the ICPR, makes reference primarily to persons belonging to a cultural, 
religious and linguistic community and not to the groups themselves. This 
puts the right in the realm of individual rights that can be exercised by 
persons belonging to such minorities and not rights that can be invoked by 
groups as such. The reference to the fact that the right can be enjoyed with 
other members of the community makes the right an associational but 
individual right only.  
 
                                                 
204  Brinkel 2006: 207. 
205  Currie 2002: 35-18. 
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It is also important to note that section 31 formulates the right in a negative 
manner. This means the duty that section 31 imposes on the state is 
negative. The government has only the duty to respect and protect these 
rights, which means it has to merely refrain from interfering with the 
enjoyments of these rights. The section does not impose a positive 
obligation on the state. This further affirms the individualistic nature of the 
rights provided by section 31. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the rights provided both in section 30 and 
31 cannot be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provisions of the 
Bill of Rights.206     
 
5.1.3 Language in education  
Another identity-related right contained in the Bill of Rights is section 
29(2), which deals with the issue of medium of instruction or often referred 
to as language in education policy. Language in education was one of the 
most controversial clauses during the making of the 1996 Constitution. It 
almost disrupted the talks as the political parties representing the interests of 
Afrikaners insisted on the recognition of the right to education in minority 
language. Section 29(2) represents a compromise that was finally agreed 
upon by the political parties after long painstaking negotiations.    
 
After reiterating the right to receive education in the official language(s) of 
one’s choice, section 29(2) enjoins the state to consider “all reasonable 
educational alternatives including single medium institutions, subject to 
considerations of equity, practicability and the need to redress the results of 
past racially discriminatory laws and practices” (emphasis added).  From the 
                                                 
206  Sections 30 and 31(2) Constitution. 
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wording of this section, it is clear that the 1996 Constitution imposes a 
positive obligation on the state to implement linguistic rights with regard to 
the medium of instruction in schools and other educational institutions. This 
is in contrast to the Interim Constitution, which only provided permissive 
rights to private individuals to establish single medium institutions that cater 
for the cultural and linguistic needs of their particular community. This 
departure from the Interim Constitution is confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court which stated that section 29 imposes on the state a positive obligation 
which did not exist under the Interim Constitution.207 The SCA has further 
confirmed this right in Western Cape Minister of Education and others v 
Governing Body of Mikro Primary School and another:208 
 
The right of everyone to receive education in the official language or 
languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that 
education is reasonably practicable is a right against the state. The 
Constitution recognises that there may be various reasonable educational 
alternatives available to the state to give effect to this right and has left it 
to the state to decide how best to do so. In order to ensure the effective 
access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must, in terms of the 
provision, consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including 
single medium institutions. Section 29(2) therefore empowers the state to 
ensure the effective implementation of the right by providing single 
medium educational institutions. This is a clear indication that in terms of 
section 29(2) everyone has the right to be educated in an official language 
of his or her choice at a public educational institution to be provided by 
the state if reasonably practical, but not the right to be so instructed at 
each and every public educational institution subject only to it being 
reasonably practicable to do so. 
 
                                                 
207  In Re: certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996  
(10) BCLR 1253 (CC) para 12- 13. 
208  [2005] 3 All SA 436 (SCA) para 31. 
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The imposition of a positive obligation on the state to implement linguistic 
rights with regard to medium of instruction in schools and other educational 
institutions is, in fact, a major departure from the Interim Constitution. It 
should not, however, be overstated as single medium schools are but one 
option that must be weighed against a plethora of other considerations. 
Importantly, educational alternatives, according to section 29, should be 
evaluated by taking into consideration factors like ‘equity, practicality and 
the need to redress past injustices’, which, in the South African context, are 
often given considerable weight.209 This, in fact, has been clearly indicated 
both by the government and the Constitutional Court. Kader Asmal, the 
former education minister, argued that “our Constitution [in section 29(2)] 
speaks directly to the need to receive education in the official language of 
choice and yet links this to other basic rights such as equity and the need to 
redress the inequalities of the apartheid legacy”.210 Similarly, Sachs, in one 
of the language in education related cases brought before the Constitutional 
Court, held that access to education has more cogency than diversity in 
South African Constitution.211 The prominence given to access to education 
                                                 
209  Woolman (2007: 57-60), with the view to point out the weakness of the  
concession made to single medium schools in section 29(2), goes to the extent of 
arguing that what we have in section 29(2) is “not really a right at all. It is, 
perhaps, best described as a right to have reasons or an entitlement to justification 
for the state’s refusal to sanction a single medium public school”.  
210  Asmal 2002. 
211  Ex Parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature in Re: Dispute concerning the  
constitutionality of certain provisions of the School Education Bill of 1995, 1996 
(4) BCLR 537 (CC). For a similar comment see Laerskool Middelburg & ‘n ander 
v Departementshoof, Mpumalanga Department van Onderwys, & andere 2003 (4) 
SA 160 (T). Yet it is important to bear in mind that an argument merely based on 
equity does not automatically result in the rejection of single medium schools. 
Drawing on the Mikro case, Woolman (2007: 57-70) aptly notes that “a 
community’s interest in maintaining its linguistic and cultural integrity may – 
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over diversity is, in fact, the driving principle behind the decision of the 
government and courts212 to force single medium schools to change into 
parallel medium schools or dual medium schools,213 including tertiary 
institutions.214 
                                                                                                                            
under a very narrow set of conditions – legitimately trump purely ideological 
commitments to equity”. 
212  See Laerskool Middelburg & ‘n ander v Departementshoof, Mpumalanga 
Deparetment van Onderwys, & andere 2003 (4) SA 160 (T); Seodin Primary 
Schools v MEC Education, Northern Cape 2006 (4) BCLR 542 (NC); High School 
Ermelo &Another v The Head of Department &Others [2008] 1 All SA 139 (T). 
For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Woolman and Bishop 2007.  
213  The establishment of double–medium schools is advocated by prominent  
South African language activist Neville Alexander. He argued that all public, 
including private schools, with some unavoidable exceptions should use two 
languages as a medium of instruction. He regarded single-medium schools as 
prohibitively wasteful and expensive projects that would entrench existing racial 
and ethnic divisions. He is however mindful of the fact that the state has to heed, 
to a certain extent, to the demands of the more conservative elements in South 
Africa. (Alexander 1998). A report of a working group on values in education, 
established by the Department of Education, provided some recommendations on 
how the policy of the Department can be implemented. Their recommendation, 
which suggests that South Africans be at least bilingual if not trilingual, demands 
“that all learners acquire at least one African language as a subject throughout 
their school years”; the particular language should be determined at a provincial 
level (Working Group on Values in Education (2000) Values, Education and 
Democracy, Report of the Working Group on Values in Education, available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2000/education.htm, accessed on 20 February 
2007). 
214  The use of languages in tertiary education has been one of the most contentious  
issues. The debate has especially been played out in the formerly Afrikaans 
universities, and more specifically at the University of Stellenboch. In June 2002, 
Kader Asmal, then Education Minister, announced that the five historically 
Afrikaans-medium universities in South Africa have to implement dual or parallel 
medium tuition in Afrikaans and English. He invoked the same argument of 
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5.1.4 Limitation of rights 
The relevance of the Bill of the Rights to provide protection to the different 
groups, whether they are directly or indirectly related to identity-related 
concerns, depends on the extent to which the rights are protected from 
infringement or subjected to limitations. Of course, none of the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights are absolute. The limitation clause under 
section 36 provides for circumstances under which these rights may be 
curtailed: 
 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
terms of law of general application to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including  
(a) the nature of the right;  
(b) the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation;  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its 
purposes; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
 
As in many other constitutions, the Constitution also provides that the 
declaration of states of emergency can result in a temporary suspension of 
some rights. However, some rights including the rights to equality with 
respect to unfair discrimination “solely on the grounds of race, colour, 
                                                                                                                            
access and other basic rights such as equity and the need to redress the inequalities 
of the apartheid legacy. This was not received well among the Afrikaans 
community. An Afrikaans pressure group, Groep van 63, “has declared war on 
[the Minister’s…] decisions to force English on historically Afrikaans 
universities” (Kriel 2002: 13).                                                                  
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ethnic or social origin, sex, religion or language”,215 the right to human 
dignity and the right to life are non-derogable.216 
 
Without delving in detail into the discussion of the limitation clause, for the 
purpose of this study it suffices to note that the nature of rights is one of the 
first factors that must be taken into account in determining whether the 
limitation imposed on a particular right is “reasonable and justifiable”. As 
noted by some authors, “[a] right that is of particular importance to the 
constitution’s ambitions to create an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, freedom and equality will carry a great deal of weight in the 
exercise of balancing rights against justifications for their infringement”.217 
The place of identity-related rights in the constitutional scheme thus 
determines the extent of protection that these specific rights in the Bill of 
Rights provide to the protection of the identity of a particular group. As the 
discussion of language in education policy reveals, other rights are given 
precedence over identity-related rights. For example, the ‘hierarchy of 
norms’ applied when confronted with the problem of language in education 
tends to put access to education at the top and diversity at the bottom.218 
 
5.1.5 The enforcement of the Bill of Rights 
The South African courts play an important role in the enforcement of the 
Bill of Rights. Anyone who alleges that his or her right has been infringed 
or threatened can seek redress from a competent court who may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.219 The courts can also 
                                                 
215  Section 37(5) (c), Table of non-derogable rights, Constitution.  
216  Section 37(5) (c), Table of non-derogable rights, Constitution 
217   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus 2001: 156. 
218   See also Strydom 2002: 27-28. 
219  Section 38 (1) Constitution. 
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declare invalid any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights to the extent of the inconsistency.220  
 
The protection of rights is not, however, limited to the courts only. There 
are also other independent institutions, commonly referred to as Chapter 
Nine institutions, which are established by the Constitution to play an 
important role in the promotion and protection of the Bill of Rights. These 
are the Human Rights Commission, the Public Protector, the Commission 
for Gender Equality and the Commission for the Promotion and Protection 
of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (discussed 
below), the Auditor General and the Electoral Commission. The terms of 
reference of these institutions mandate them to promote the culture of 
human rights and democracy. The South African Human Rights 
Commission is, for example, tasked with promoting respect for human 
rights and, in particular, with monitoring the measures taken by government 
to the protection and promotion of rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. It 
has the power to investigate and to report on the observance of human 
rights. It is also mandated to take steps when rights have been violated. 
 
5.1.6 Assessment 
Almost all the rights included in the Bill of Rights are individualistic in their 
orientation with the sole exception of the provision on the medium of 
instruction. They do not have a group element. Individual rights are 
regarded as the bottom line or threshold for the equal treatment of all South 
Africans.221 This marks the heavy emphasis which the Constitution has 
placed on an individualistic orientation of rights. It signals a firm belief in 
individual rights and equality. 
                                                 
220  Section 172 (1) Constitution  
221  Meyer 2007. 
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The Bill of Rights does provide for all individual rights that are often 
deemed relevant to protect the identity of individuals that belong to different 
ethnic groups within liberal democracies. As the discussion on the limitation 
of rights reveals, however, these rights are subject to limitations. Other 
rights are also given precedence over identity-related rights as it is evident 
in the case of language in education in relation to which courts held that 
access to education has more cogency than diversity in South African 
Constitution.222 This limits the effectiveness of the individual rights regime 
to protect identity-related concerns of persons belonging to an ethnic group.   
 
As argued in Chapter Two, universal individual rights are not enough to 
protect identity-related concerns in a multi-ethnic society. The adoption of 
fundamental civil and political rights, it is argued, needs to be supplemented 
by institutional measures that reflect the state’s commitment to respond to 
the anxieties of ethnic groups that are not territorially concentrated. The 
next question is thus whether the South African institutional response 
includes other non-territorial measures that can be used to respond to the 
claims of such groups.    
 
5.2 The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the 
Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities: A 
commission for dispersed and intra-provincial minorities? 
In addition to judicially enforceable Bill of Rights, the Constitution 
provides for non-territorial protection of language and culture by providing 
for the establishment of a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of 
the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (hereafter 
the Commission).223 The clause that provides for the establishment of the 
                                                 
222  See the discussion on language in education in section 3.3 of this chapter. 
223  Section 185 Constitution. 
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Commission was included in the last hours of the adoption of the 
Constitution in order to accommodate the demands of sections of the 
Afrikaner community. The fact that some Afrikaner-based parties were the 
major reason behind the establishment of this Commission invokes the 
relevance of this specific Commission to the protection of the rights of 
dispersed ethnic groups and intra-provincial minorities. This issue 
becomes pertinent in light of the power of the Commission to recommend 
the establishment of cultural councils. In this section, we shall determine 
the relevance of this Commission, and especially the establishment of 
cultural councils, to advance the rights of ‘cultural and linguistic 
communities’. Before that, however, a brief description of the structure 
and functions of the Commission is in order.   
 
The Constitution lays out, very briefly, the structure and function of the 
Commission and mandates Parliament to enact legislation that provides for 
the establishment of the Commission. This mandate was eventually 
responded to when Parliament, six years after the adoption of the 
Constitution, enacted the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of 
the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 
2002 (hereafter the ‘CRLC Act’).224 According to section 186 of the 
Constitution, the Commission must “be broadly representative of the main 
cultural, religious and linguistic communities in South Africa”. The 
Commission is also required by the same constitutional stipulation to 
“broadly reflect the gender composition of South Africa”.225 This is true of 
all the Chapter Nine institutions, which are required to reflect the race and 
gender composition of the population. 
 
                                                 
224  The Commission was established only in 2003. 
225  Section 186(2) (a) Constitution. 
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Section 185 of the Constitution and provisions of the Act provide for both 
the normative framework, which guides the activities of the Commission, 
and the mechanisms by which these normative guidelines can be translated 
into institutional realities.  
 
5.2.1 The normative framework 
The normative framework for the activities of the Commission is stated in 
the form of the two constitutional objectives of the Commission. The first 
is to “promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic 
communities”.226 This normative guideline has two implications. First, it 
recognises the existence of cultural, religious and linguistic communities. 
The objects of the Commission are not individuals who are members of 
ethnic and linguistic groups but the communities themselves. This 
represents an important recognition of the diverse communities of South 
African society. Second, it recognises that these communities have rights 
that have to be promoted by the state. This amounts to an equivalent of 
recognising group rights in contrast to individual rights that the 
Constitution highly emphasises. This has provoked many to express the 
concern that the Commission may have the effect of entrenching ethnic 
identity and ‘even strike tensions’ where it did not exist before.227  
 
The mandate of the Commission to recognise and promote the rights of 
cultural, religious and linguistic communities is not, however, without 
qualification. The Commission, according to its other primary object, must 
also work towards ensuring the development of harmonious co-existence 
and shared identity. This normative guideline requires the Commission to 
“promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national 
                                                 
226   Section 4 Act No 19 of 2002. 
227  Carrim 1999.  
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unity among the different communities on the basis of equality, non-
discrimination and free association”.228 This represents a countervailing 
concern for national unity. The inclusion of religious communities in the 
mandate of the Commission also indicates an effort to dilute the potential 
centrifugal effects of protecting cultural communities. As indicated by 
Steytler and Mettler, “[w]ith religion not being territorially, culturally or 
linguistically based, but cutting across such cleavages, the focus of the 
Commission is dispersed”.229  
 
In sum, the Commission has to achieve the difficult balance between the 
recognition and promotion of the diverse South African communities and 
the need to promote and maintain national unity.   
 
5.2.2 Functions of the Commission 
Section 185(2) of the Constitution provides for functions through which 
the Commission can translate its objectives into realities. One of the 
primary functions is the establishment of cultural councils. The 
Commission is also empowered to monitor, investigate, research, educate, 
lobby, advise and report on issues concerning the rights of cultural, 
religious and linguistic communities. In more detail, the establishing Act 
of the Commission provides it with an advisory role. Accordingly, the 
Commission is empowered to “receive and deal with requests related to 
the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities”.230 The 
requests are mostly likely to come from the different spheres of 
government and organs of state that may call on the Commission to advise 
                                                 
228  Section 185(1) (b) Constitution. 
229  Steytler and Mettler 2001: 100. 
230  Section 5(1) (h) Act 19 of 2002. 
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them on legislation and policies related to cultural, religious and linguistic 
matters.  
 
A more reactive role is also assigned to the Commission in that it can 
make recommendations to the appropriate organ of state regarding 
legislation that impacts, or may impact, on the rights of cultural, religious 
and linguistic communities. Furthermore, it is empowered to “bring any 
relevant mater to the attention of the appropriate authority or organ of state 
and, where appropriate, make recommendations to such authority or organ 
of state in dealing with such a matter”.231 Although the Act does not shed 
much light as to what these ‘relevant matter[s]’ might be, it can only be 
assumed that the matter must relate to the protection of the rights of 
cultural, linguistic and religious communities. As Carrim232 aptly 
indicated, this may include matters like “the development of art, music, 
literature, drama, sculpture, museums, monuments and other 
representations of culture”.233  
 
Finally, the Commission is also entrusted with a dispute-settling function. 
It has to facilitate “the resolution of friction between and within cultural, 
religious and linguistic communities or between any such community and 
an organ of state where the cultural, religious or linguistic rights of a 
community are affected”.234  It may also report any matter which falls 
                                                 
231  Section 5(k) Act 19 of 2002. 
232  It is important to note that Carrim was the chairperson of the relevant portfolio  
committee that steered the enabling legislation of the Commission through 
Parliament. 
233  Carrim 1999: 264. 
234  An issue that was debated in the Parliament was whether the Commission should  
have the power to protect the cultural, religious and linguistic rights of 
communities. The majority of parliamentarians deemed it sufficient to limit the 
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within its powers and functions to the South African Human Rights 
Commission for investigation.235  
 
5.2.3 Cultural Councils 
Section 185 (1(c)) of the Constitution states that the Commission can 
“recommend the establishment or recognition, in accordance with national 
legislation, of a cultural or other council or councils for a community or 
communities in South Africa”. This means the power of the Commission 
in the establishment of cultural and other councils is limited to 
recommendation. The final decision to establish such council rests with the 
national Parliament that has the power to enact national legislation to that 
effect.  
 
Paradoxically, neither the Constitution nor the Act provides for the nature 
and functions of cultural councils. A comparative observation would, 
however, reveal that cultural councils have traditionally been used to 
advance the interests of ethnic communities and exercise jurisdiction over 
matters that are relevant for the protection and promotion of ethnic 
                                                                                                                            
function of the Commission to the role of a mediator between communities. As 
Woolman (2007: 58-74) noted, “[t]his role as mediator, rather than litigator, meant 
that the [Commission] was only granted the power to bring matters of concern to 
the attention of ‘appropriate authorities’ and to request an appropriate response”. 
235  It is more likely that the mandate of the Commission may clash with other  
institutions established by the Constitution. This is more likely to be the case 
with the Pan South African Language Board which deals with language matters. 
Coincidently, it is important to note that the provision on the Commission is 
located in Chapter 9 which provides for the establishment of the six ‘State 
Institutions supporting constitutional democracy’. As a chapter 9 institution, the 
Commission, which is accountable to the National Assembly, is bound to be 
independent, subject only to the Constitution and the law, to act impartially and 
to perform its functions without fear, favor or prejudice. 
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communities. This includes exercising jurisdiction over a wide range of 
identity-related activities, such as education, culture, libraries, theatres, the 
media, museums and sports. Yet the fact that both the Constitution and the 
Act do not elaborate in sufficient detail on the nature of cultural councils 
(except for the general statements of purpose outlined under section 36-38 
of the Act) has made many of these issues subject to speculation. Some of 
these issues are discussed below.  
 
5.2.3.1 Subjects of cultural councils 
Both the Constitution and the Act give little indication of the kind of 
communities that can legitimately ask for the establishment of or 
participation in cultural council/s. Two minimum conditions can be 
inferred both from the Constitution and the establishing Act. First, the 
community must fall in any of the three types of communities (i.e. 
religious, linguistic and cultural communities). Second, it should be 
established through voluntary association of individuals without any 
ascription of identity from the state or any other group.236 The establishing 
legislation, when defining a community/cultural council, stresses that the 
community must be “a voluntary association of persons or community 
organisations based on the principle of freedom of association”.237  
 
Carrim argues that “ethnic, not racial, communities would qualify to 
participate in a cultural council”.238 He then illustrates this by stating that 
                                                 
236  The Commission may use different methods to ascertain that a claim for a cultural  
council is supported by the majority of people who identify themselves with the 
community for which protection in a form of cultural council is being sought. 
This, as Carrim (1999), suggested, may include referenda, petitions, elections or 
other mechanisms. 
237  Section 1 Act 19 of 2002. 
238  Carrim 1999: 263. 
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Afrikaners, if they “were to qualify for participation in a cultural council 
on linguistic grounds…Afrikaans-speakers, irrespective of race, would be 
represented”.239 Carrim is correct in pointing out that the Commission 
caters for ethnic as opposed to racial communities although the term ethnic 
has deliberately been avoided from the Constitution and replaced by the 
more vague ‘linguistic and cultural communities’. This should not, 
however, imply that Afrikaners cannot qualify to establish cultural council 
based on linguistic and cultural criteria as the latter could arguably 
differentiate between Afrikaners and Afrikaans-speaking Coloured 
community. Most members of the Coloured community, for example, do 
not share the same concern as Afrikaners about the status of Afrikaans. 
Carrim’s outright rejection of the eligibility of the Indian community for 
consideration of cultural councils unless based on their religion (i.e. a 
Muslim or Hindu community) is also problematic as it is reminiscent of 
ascribed identity where individual’s identity is determined solely based on 
some objective criteria His view is dangerously close to the apartheid’s 
static view of identity and risks the problem of imposing identity. It is up 
to members of that community to select the identity that defines them best 
(be it cultural, linguistic or religious) with the clear exception of, of 
course, race.  
 
5.2.3.2 Cultural council to all communities or to specific minorities 
Related, but not limited, to cultural councils is the issue of whether the 
Commission will be available to all linguistic and cultural communities or 
only to minorities. The Constitution does not distinguish between 
communities when it makes the services of the Commission available for 
cultural, religious and linguistic communities. Carrim suggests that the 
Commission will be available for “cultural, linguistic and religious 
                                                 
239  Carrim 1999: 263. 
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communities generally – which means ‘majority’ communities as well”.240 
This position, which stresses the availability of the services of the 
Commission including the potential establishment of cultural councils for 
all cultural, linguistic and religious communities, finds support in the 
wording of the Constitution which does not make such distinction.  
 
Of course, the Commission, as indicated earlier, was originally designed to 
accommodate the demands of some Afrikaner-based parties. This, 
considered with comparative experiences, might suggest that cultural 
councils should be established for communities that require special 
protection because of their historical, demographic or settlement features. 
This especially includes communities that are either too dispersed or few 
in numbers to promote their rights as a group within some form of 
territorial framework. Although the Constitution does not make such 
distinction, the Commission, one may thus reasonably argue, has to take 
these considerations into account. It may have to focus, for example, on 
communities that, because of various reasons, are not adequately 
accommodated through the national and subnational state systems. This, 
however, does not necessarily exclude ‘majority communities’ from the 
mandates of the Commission as the latter could be minorities in some 
provinces. This means although Zulu speakers in KwaZulu-Natal may not 
qualify for a cultural council, the same cannot be said of Zulu speakers in 
other provinces where they are in minority. On the other hand, to simply 
require the Commission to extend its services to ‘majority communities’ 
might give rise to a situation where the Commission is faced with demands 
from a plethora of communities as a result of which it may not be able to 
achieve its constitutional mandate.  
 
                                                 
240  Carrim 1999: 265. 
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Considering the heavy emphasis on national unity, the proposal to focus on 
specific minorities might not be the route that the Commission chooses to 
follow. The extension of the services of the Commission to all cultural 
communities may also have the effect of diluting the special claims of 
particular cultural groups. Depending on the strength of the claims of 
particular ethnic groups and their response to the Commission’s ‘coffee to 
all approach’, the Commission’s decision to extend its service to all 
cultural communities may promote national cohesion or exacerbate ethnic 
tension. 
 
5.2.3.3 One or many cultural councils 
It is not clear whether the Constitution provides for the establishment of 
one cultural council that represents the diverse communities in South 
Africa or a cultural council for each distinct cultural community. Carrim, 
dealing with the same issue, argues for one national cultural council. 
 
By interacting in the same forum the different communities will get 
to know each other better and will develop mutual respect. They 
will have the opportunity to mediate their differences. They will 
also gradually realize that whatever their cultural differences, they 
share a broad core of values – and in this way a sense of South 
Africanness will be fostered. On the other hand, separate councils 
will serve to isolate the communities from each other, fossilise 
their ethnic identities and create unnecessary suspicion and 
competition among them. A single council will also save 
considerably on costs.241 
 
At first glance, this argument finds support in the wording of the 
Constitution, which envisages the establishment of “a cultural or other 
                                                 
241  Carrim 1999: 264.  
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council or councils for a community or communities in South Africa”.242 
The argument also finds support in the other object of the Commission, 
namely the promotion of national unity. The question is whether the 
establishment of one cultural council for the all the different communities 
would provide for adequate protection and promotion of the rights of 
cultural communities. Although the alternative defended by Carrim cannot 
be easily dismissed as ineffective, a brief comparative observation would 
reveal that cultural councils are often established for a specific community 
to provide for some form of non-territorial autonomy over matters that are 
of particular relevance to the concerned community.  It might be difficult, 
if not impossible, for a single cultural council to do what cultural councils 
are traditionally supposed to do for the communities they represent. 
 
5.2.4 Assessment 
The government’s lack of enthusiasm about the Commission was evident 
in the fact that the Commission, whose establishment is envisaged by the 
Constitution, had not been established until 2003. In fact, the enabling 
legislation was only enacted six years after the adoption of the 
Constitution, indicating the scant attention that the government had given 
to the Commission. The lack of political will to give effect to the 
constitutional promises of the Commission is evident.  
 
In addition, the Act that finally established the Commission as well as the 
practice of the Commission suggests an emphasis that is skewed in favour 
of promoting national cohesion rather than protecting cultural diversity. 
The emphasis on national unity comes out clearly right from the beginning 
in the preamble to the Act. The preamble enjoins the Commission to play a 
key role in “assisting with the building of a truly united South African 
                                                 
242  Section 185(1) (c) Constitution. 
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nation bound by a common loyalty to our country and all our people”.243 
Another object of the Commission, which is added by the Act, instructs the 
Commission to “promote the right of communities to develop their 
historically diminished heritage”.244 This brings into the equation redress 
and equity thus watering down diversity-based claims of other groups. The 
effect of this is noted by Murray when she commented that: 
 
[t]here is something of an irony in the fact that the ‘cultural rights 
commission’ established to convince right-wing Afrikaners that 
their language and culture would not be destroyed by ‘majority 
rule’ will, in fact, be an institution primarily representing the many 
black ethnic groups which were turned into political entities by 
apartheid and whose political identity the new order has sought to 
downplay in its nation-building project.245 
 
The extension of the services of the Commission to groups that have not 
sought such particular protection is a reflection of the government’s 
ambivalence to use the Commission to fulfil the purpose it is established 
for.246 The constitutional possibility for establishing cultural councils 
seems to be also muted both by the Act and the practice of the 
Commission. This is clear from the fact that the Act or any other 
legislation has not clearly indicated the criteria for the establishment and 
                                                 
243  Act 19 of 2002. 
244  Section 4(d) Act 19 of 2002. 
245  Murray 1999: 273.   
246   When Chris Nissen, the former ANC leader in the Western Cape, was appointed  
by the Minister of Constitutional Development to investigate the establishment of 
the Commission, his first visit was a meeting with a San community, a group that 
are often referred as ‘indigenous people’ of South Africa, as opposed to the 
Afrikaner community that demanded the establishment of such system in the first 
place (Steytler and Mettler 2001). 
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recognition of these councils.247 With the confusion that surrounds the 
nature and function of these councils and the patently clear lack of political 
will, the establishment of cultural councils is unlikely to be on the cards in 
the near future. In a nutshell, the general trend puts the Commission in the 
ranks of ‘transformative institution’ and not the ‘diversity commission’ 
that the Constitution, though in broad terms, envisaged it to be. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The post-apartheid South Africa, compared to other multi-ethnic societies, 
has a unique advantage in so far as ethnic relationships are concerned. The 
majority of the populations of South Africa, despite their ethnic diversities, 
seek to belong to one political unit.  The majority of the black community 
that belong to ten different ethnic groups and whose ethnic identity the 
apartheid government promoted have refused to champion political parties 
that invoke ethnic identities. As the increasing incursions of the ANC into 
the traditionally power bases of the IFP reveals, even among members of 
the Zulu ethnic group, there is no clear support for those that use ethnicity 
for political mobilisation. The power base of Afrikaner parties that claimed 
to promote Afrikaner identity has also diminished over time as they failed to 
convince their constituency to rally behind a nationalist agenda. The 
incremental gain of white and especially Afrikaner voters by the 
Democratic Alliance (DA), a party with no nationalist agenda, implies the 
unpopularity of centrifugal demands among Afrikaners. It indicates the 
decline in support for a separate Afrikanerism. There is thus no single 
political organisation with a nationalist or separatist agenda that commands 
significant support from any particular section of the South African 
                                                 
247  See Henrad 2007; Murray 1999. Woolman (2007: 24F-19) states that the  
Commission “has not registered a single cultural council because it still lacks 
criteria and procedures for their establishment”. 
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society.248 This provides South Africa with an important ingredient of 
national cohesion. The issue is how the institutional model adopted by 
South Africa responds to this social reality. Does it still simply try to build a 
single national identity or provide adequate recognition and accommodation 
to the ethnic diversity that characterises the society?   
 
Few general observations can be made with regard to the institutional model 
that South Africa has adopted in response to the multi-ethnic challenge. 
First, the Constitution gives recognition to the ethnic diversity that 
characterises South African society. It has provided for the introduction of 
projects that signify the recognition of the diverse ethnic groups that inhabit 
the country. The preamble, the national anthem, the flag and the official 
recognition of all the eleven languages is indicative of a state that wants to 
build national unity out of its ethnic diversity. Notwithstanding its emphasis 
on promoting national unity, the South African approach does not deny or 
suppress ethnic diversity. An important aspect of the Constitution is also 
that it refrains from actively promoting ethnic diversity. It does not use 
ethnicity as a constitutional organising principle of state institutions. It 
eschews the territorilisation of ethnic differences. In a nutshell, it does not 
reward political mobilisation along ethnic lines. 
 
                                                 
248   The Freedom Front Plus, despite its reconstitution as the Alliance of three  
Afrikaner parties, was only able to increase its support from a dismal 0.80% in 
1999 to 0.89 in the 2004 election despite the fact that almost 60% of the 9.3% 
whites in South Africa are Afrikaans speaking. The same is true about the United 
Christian Democratic Party (UCDP), which claim to represent the Tshwana ethnic 
interests. In the North West, where almost two-thirds of the population belongs to 
the Tswana ethnic community, the UCDP’s support in the 2004 election stood at 
8.49%. The Minority Front, which claim to represent the Indian community, 
secured only one seat in the National Assembly in 2004. For more, see Hoeane 
2004.    
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Second, territorial autonomy does not figure prominently in the South 
African multi-sphere government.  This is not so much because of the 
geographical configuration of the state which does not provide for territorial 
expression to ethnic diversity as it is because of the limited legislative role 
that provinces are made to assume in the political process. It is important to 
note that the system still provides room for ethnic accommodation. The 
provinces play an important role in providing the different ethnic groups 
representation in the leadership structure of the provinces. In most respects, 
the door for using the provinces to accommodate ethnic interests is also kept 
ajar. The open system of provinces allows the latter to serve as a safety net, 
which, with some adjustments, can respond to new ethnic challenges. It is 
also important to note that the seemingly limited role of provinces has not 
made the latter less significant for political parties that want to capture the 
provinces. 
 
Third, the processes and institutions of shared rule that are used to advance 
common national harmony and national unity are adequately provided by 
the Constitution. These range from the proportional electoral system to the 
NCOP and the principles of cooperative government. The institutional 
design allows for both the representation of group and regional interests in 
the national decision making and the development of common interests. The 
fact that these institutions have thus far not been used effectively should not 
be considered as the weakness of the constitutional framework but more so 
as a result of the political context.  
 
What becomes clear from this review of the South African constitutional 
approach is that South Africa has shied away from the policies of both 
suppressing ethnic identity and actively promoting ethnic diversity. The 
South African response goes in line with both the political relevance of 
ethnic identity among the South African society and the general principles 
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pertaining to the accommodation of ethnic diversity. The decision to avoid 
ethnicity as the explicit principle of political organisation is consistent with 
the fact that ethnicity in South Africa is still not the most relevant political 
divide, which warrants an explicit constitutional recognition. The emphasis 
on shared rule as opposed to self rule is also consistent with the prevailing 
desire of belonging to one state. On the other hand, the decision not to adopt 
a policy against ethnic diversity but rather to leave space for ethnic 
accommodation represents the recognition of the reality that there are 
groups, albeit numerical minorities, that demand the recognition of their 
ethnic identities. Moreover, it represents the basic principle that any multi-
ethnic country, like South Africa, needs to recognise and be sensitive about 
ethnic diversity. Generally, the approach adopted in South Africa, which 
refrains from actively encouraging ethnicity while at the same time falling 
short of totally shutting down avenues for ethnic accommodation, resonates 
of a cautious pragmatic approach towards ethnic diversity; an approach that 
has set South Africa on a pedestal of prevention, the basic aim of which is 
to protect the mushrooming of conditions that precipitate the emergence and 
consolidation of strong centrifugal tendencies. In the context of South 
Africa, where centripetal forces are strong, the decision of the state to 
manage the emergence of centrifugal tendencies by using the constitutional 
and legislative framework as a ‘preventive tool’ seems appropriate.  
 
In as much as the preventive approach has managed to remove ethnic traits 
from the constitutional and political system, it has not been totally 
successful. Although there are no strong evidences to suggest that the 
national executive is dominated by a particular ethnic group, some have 
alluded to the ethnic imbalance that is prevalent in the current cabinet. 
Unless addressed immediately, these claims are likely to feed into the 
contrived appeals of ethnic brokers eventually putting strain on inter-ethnic 
relationships. A preventive approach does not require making ethnicity a 
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prime principle of organising the cabinet but that enough attention should be 
paid to ethnic balance.  
 
Furthermore, as the result of the failure to be consistently directed by the 
same spirit of accommodation that made the political transition possible, the 
constitutional representation and commitment is, on occasions, at odds with 
the political practice. There seems to be a widespread tendency to regard the 
‘accommodationist elements’ of the Constitution as transitory measures. 
This sentiment seems to partly underlie the current debate about the future 
of provinces. Accommodationist elements of a constitution can be used to 
reach a peace compact and bring together the protagonists. That may make a 
constitutional arrangement more like what Steytler and Mettler referred to 
the Interim Constitution as a ‘peace treaty’.249 However, an ‘accommodative 
constitution’ goes beyond the settlement of conflicts and guides the 
continuing management and resolution of ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic 
society like South Africa. Unlike a peace treaty, accommodationist elements 
of the constitution should not be transitory in nature. They are built based 
on the premise that a multi-ethnic society must always ensure that the 
different groups are provided with the means for autonomy, political 
participation and representation. Of course, the degrees of autonomy and 
representation may vary depending on the realities of the society at a 
particular point in time. With the dynamics of ethnic identity and ethnic 
relationships, the rules may have to be adjusted here and there. However, 
the basic principles of recognition and accommodation in a multi-ethnic 
society and the rules that translate these institutional principles into a reality 
must, by and large, remain in place. Regarding the provinces as a product of 
compromise that are no longer relevant reveals a failure to note the 
important role that provinces play in providing the different ethnic groups a 
                                                 
249  Steytler and Mettler 2001: 93-106. 
 
 
 
 
 321  
means for political participation, representation and hence self-management. 
 
The disposition to regard the accommodationist elements of the Constitution 
as temporary measures seems to also partly explain the failure to adequately 
act on or give effect to the promises of the Constitution. A case in point is 
the failure of the government to apply the language clause. The 
constitutionally declared official multilingualism has become a mere lip 
service to linguistic equality as English becomes the lingua franca of 
government business and education. The reluctance of the government first 
to establish and then support the activities of the Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities reveals the lack of political will to give effect to the 
constitutional promise of accommodating identity-related concerns. The 
failure to give practical effect to these and other inclusive elements of the 
Constitution represents a disquieting departure from the constitutional 
commitment to build a state that belongs to all who live in it. More 
importantly, it risks rendering the constitutional recognition of ethnic 
diversity a hollow gesture.  
 
South Africa has to capitalise on the lack of strong centrifugal forces in its 
endeavor to build a state that ‘belongs to all who live in it’. Yet, it must 
continue to guard itself from the tempting obsession of implementing a 
nation-building project that is insensitive towards ethnic accommodation. 
Increasing insensitivities towards issues of ethnicity and ethnic identity 
might create room for ethnic tension to replace racial division.  
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Chapter Six 
Ethnicity in Ethiopia’s political and constitutional development 
 
1. Introduction 
Un museo di popoli. ‘Museum of peoples’. That was how Conti Rossini, the 
famous Italian scholar, described the Ethiopian Empire in his book Historia 
di Ethiopia in 1928. To date, that remains an accurate description of the 
multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-faith Ethiopia. A little less than 
eighty ethnic groups, speaking twice as many dialects, inhabit the country. 
Despite its numerous ethnic groups, however, two-thirds of the 70 million 
populations1 belong to three major ethnic groups. The Oromo are the largest 
ethnic group accounting for 32.1% of the population, followed by the 
Amhara (30.1%) and the Tigre (6.2%); the next four numerically strong 
ethnic groups are the Somali (5.9%), Gurage (4.3%), Sidama (3.5%) and 
Welayta (2.4%).2 With no single ethnic group accounting for the majority of 
the population, however, Ethiopia, like most other African states, can be 
appropriately described as a country of minorities.3 On the other hand, as a 
country that has accepted Christianity, in its orthodox form, in the third 
century AD and practiced it as a state religion until 1974, Ethiopian is often 
                                                 
1  According to the last census, which was conducted in 1994, the population in  
Ethiopia was about 54 million. The current estimation, which is about 70 million, 
makes the country the second most populated country in Africa. 
2  Central Statistical Authority 1994. 
3  The languages spoken in Ethiopia are categorised into four language groups:  
Semitic, Cushitic, Omotic and Nilo-Saharan. The first three belong to the broader 
parent language known as proto-Afro-Asiatic. Of the major linguistic groups, the 
Amhara, Tigre and Gurage belong to the Semitic language group while the 
Oromo, Somali, Welayta and Sidama are Cushitic in origin. Most of the languages 
in the South–western Ethiopia, especially those located on both sides of the Omo 
River, belong to the Omotic language group. The western fringes of the country 
are inhabited by Nilo-Saharans (see Levine 2000; Bender et al 1976).  
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portrayed as a Christian state. The description of Ethiopia as a Christian 
state could, however, be misleading as no less than half of the population 
are Muslims by faith. 4  
 
This chapter traces the role and place of ethnicity in Ethiopia’s political and 
constitutional development. The focus is to explore the political role of 
ethnicity with the view to bringing the present political and constitutional 
development into perspective. Although a discussion of the political and 
social forces that played out on the political terrain of a state is usually 
important for an informed diagnosis of a country’s political malaise, these 
discussions are of particular importance in Ethiopia as they are at the centre 
of the current political and constitutional discourse. Ethiopia’s past is a very 
important part of the current debate on the organisation of the Ethiopian 
state. As one author has put it, “differences over the present dispensation are 
fought as battles over historical interpretation”.5 
 
The chapter has seven related parts. Part two discusses very briefly the 
period prior to the imperial expansion that brought about the modern day 
Ethiopia. It especially focuses on the historic Ethiopian state or Abyssinian 
Kingdom, as it is usually referred to, and examines the place of ethnicity 
during that period. Part three looks at how the forceful imperial expansion 
that took place in the last quarter of the nineteenth century culminated in 
transforming a largely homogenous Kingdom into a multi-ethnic empire, 
thereby injecting an ethnic dimension to the backward agrarian feudalism 
                                                 
4  According to the 1994 population census, Orthodox Christians account for 50.6%  
of the population, followed by Protestants (10%) and Roman Catholics (0.9%). 
The Muslims constitute 32.8% of the population (Central Statistics Authority 
1994). It is estimated that the Muslim population has increased significantly and 
estimated to account for 40-45% of the population. 
5  Andreas 2003: 144. 
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under which the Ethiopian peasantry laboured for centuries. Part four 
discusses the consolidation of the domination under the centralisation-
driven HaileSelassie regime.  It also notes the emergence of the ‘question of 
nationalities’ and ethno-nationalist movements. The half-hearted regional 
autonomy solution that was introduced by the 1987 Constitution is briefly 
touched upon in part five.  Part six concentrates on the transitional charter 
and examines its response to the demands for the accommodation of ethnic 
diversity.  The final section, part seven, brings together the discussions on 
the general implications of these actions and policies of the successive 
Ethiopian governments by focusing the debate on ethnicity and its saliency 
in Ethiopia before finally making some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Ethnicity in historic Ethiopia 
The conglomeration of the heterogeneous societies of what is today 
Ethiopia under one state was achieved in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century through conquest and territorial expansion.  
 
2.1 Historic Ethiopia 
The empire builders came from the northern part of the present day 
Ethiopia, historically known as Abyssinia,6 which was largely inhabited by 
                                                 
6  This designation is derived from ‘Habashat’ ‘one of the tribes that inhabited the  
Ethiopian region in the pre-Christian era (see Bahru 2005). Informally, Ethiopians 
tend to refer to themselves as ‘Habasha’ (Abyssinians). Bahru (2005: 1) provides a 
succinct account of how the term Ethiopia came to be applied to the present day 
Ethiopia: “The term Ethiopia is of Greek origin and in classical times was used as 
a generic and rather diffuse designation for the African landmass to the South of 
Egypt. The first known specific application of the term to the Ethiopian region is 
found in the Greek version of the trilingual inscription of the time of Ezana, the 
Aksumite king who introduced Christianity into Ethiopia towards the middle of 
the fourth century AD. This adoption of the term continued with the subsequent 
translation of the Bible into Ge’ez, the old literary language. The Kebra Nagast 
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the Amhara and the Tigre. The Amhara, who speak Amharic and largely 
orthodox Christian, were further divided into regional administrations that 
included Wello, Gonder, Gojjam and Shewa. The Tigre, situated in the 
northern region of Tigray, also including most part of what is today Eritrea, 
maintained their language (i.e. Tigrinya) but adhered to the same religion. 
The rulers of these two groups can trace their origin to the ancient Axumite 
Kingdom that ruled over most of the northern Ethiopia, including Eritrea, 
and the South Arabia coastal areas across the Red Sea. Following its 
collapse in the 8th century, which was precipitated by the growing pressure 
of Islam in the area and the Beja expansion, power shifted to the 
hinterlands. This was followed by the rise to power of the Agaw, a Cushitic-
speaking people that inhabited pockets of northern Ethiopia. Their dynasty, 
known as the Zagwe dynasty, was rather short-lived (i.e. 1150-1270). It was 
overthrown by Yekuno-Amlak, an Amhara from what used to be the Wello 
region. With the aim of legitimising his reign and discrediting the Zagwe as 
usurpers, Yekuno-Amlak declared his dynasty as ‘Solomonic’, marking the 
beginning of the Solomonic dynasty that traced its origins to King Solomon 
of Israel and Queen Sheba of Ethiopia and through them to the House of 
David and ultimately to Jesus.7  
                                                                                                                            
(“Glory of Kings’), written in the early fourteenth century, which gave the 
‘received’ account of the story of the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon, not only 
linked to the Ethiopian kings to the House of Israel, but also sealed the 
identification of the term Ethiopia with the country; since the thirteenth century, 
when a dynasty that claimed to represent the restoration of the Solomonic line 
came to rule the country, its rulers have styled themselves ‘King of Kings of 
Ethiopia’ ”. 
7  The conventional history of Ethiopia is traced back to the alleged visit of Queen of  
Sheba from Ethiopia to King Solomon of Israel in the tenth century BC. Hence, as 
Bahru (2005:7) remarks, “the reference to Ethiopia’s three thousand years of 
history that we hear and read so often”.  The mythology of King Solomon of Israel 
and Queen Sheba of Ethiopia, as indicated by many writers, was a powerful 
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Although the successive kings of the Solomonic dynasty were able to 
extend their military strength and territorial breadth, they did not establish 
effective rule over the whole of the present day Ethiopia.8 Save for the inter-
trade interactions, the frequent raid and the intermittent tribute, the sphere of 
influence of the Christian Kingdom9 was largely confined to the northern 
and central highlands of the country. The lands of the present day Ethiopia 
were not brought under one central authority. In fact, the southern regions 
existed under different political systems. Some had hierarchical Kingdoms 
while others were more egalitarian in their societal organisation. As Bahru 
succinctly summarised, “their organisations ranged from communal 
societies to states with powerful kings and elaborate mechanisms for the 
exercise of authority”.10 The most prominent Kingdoms include Kingdoms 
of Kafa, Walayta and Janjaro. The Oromo, according to some authors, were 
not under the military control and political influence of the Christian 
Kingdom; before their forceful incorporation to the Ethiopian empire, writes 
Mohammed, “the Oromo led an independent existence as masters of their 
                                                                                                                            
source of legitimisation by the Ethiopian monarchs. This legend was instrumental 
in positing the authority of the kings of Ethiopia as a mandate from heaven. This 
continued until 1974 when the popular revolution brought to an end the era of 
emperors and kings (see Merara 2002: 7). 
8  The two Solomonic kings notable for their expansion of military might and  
territorial control were Amda-Tseyon (1314-1344) and Za’ra-Yacob (1434-1468). 
Their sphere of control, according to some writers, extended from the coast of 
Indian Ocean to the Barka valley in western Eritrea and comprising 99 regional 
states and provinces. In addition to the northern and central Christian ones such as 
Hamasen, Nara, Tigray, Amhara, Shewa, and Damot, southern Moslem sultanates 
such as Yifat, Dawaro, Hadiya, Adal and Bali are included (see Fasil 1997: 7-8).   
9  The terms Abyssinian Kingdom and Christian Kingdom are used here  
alternatively to refer to the historic Ethiopian state. 
10   Bahru 2005: 16. 
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destiny and makers of their own history”.11 The originally egalitarian 
Oromo society replaced its age-based republican system of socio-political 
organisation, the famous Gada system, with hierarchical monarchical 
institutions. Five such Kingdoms were established among the Oromo.12  
These groups of people were not directly engaged in the Abyssinian 
Kingdom. They were rather peripheral to the politics of the Abyssinian 
Kingdom that was largely stationed in the northern part of Ethiopia.  
 
The control of the imperial state over the historic Ethiopian state was 
weakened further as a result of a series of events that unfolded in the 16th 
century. First was the rise of Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim, usually known as Ahmed 
Gragn, a warrior that mobilised the Muslim population of Afar and Somali 
against the Christian Kingdom. The Kingdom suffered a series of defeats 
between the periods of 1529-1543, incurring untold destruction including 
the death of its Emperor, Lebna-Dengel, as fugitive. It was only the 
intervention of a 400 strong Portuguese expedition, which came upon the 
request of the late king that put a hold on the rapidly advancing Gragn’s 
army. As the damage had already been done, the support from Portugal 
contributed little to restore the glory and might of the Christian Kingdom.   
 
The end of the conflict with Ahmed Gragn was immediately followed by 
the extensive expansion of the Oromo towards central, northern and western 
Ethiopia. The Christian Kingdom, weakened by the Ahmed Gragn invasion, 
was in no position to check this significant population movement.13 Bahru 
                                                 
11  Mohammed 1994: 1. 
12  Mohammed 1994. 
13  Mohammed (1994) challenges the conventional view that the Oromo expansion  
was made possible by the civil war that ensued after 1559 in the Christian society. 
According to Mohammed (1994: xiii-xiv), “the success of the Oromo was 
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remarks that the fifty years expansion of the warlike Oromo people had 
dramatically changed the demographic shape and political geography of the 
state.14 Some moved to the heartland of the Christian society creating a 
buffer zone between the Christian highland and the Afar of the Red Sea 
plains. The expansion had created “differentiation amongst the Oromo 
themselves”.15   
 
An important feature of the Oromo expansion was that the Oromos did not 
impose their language, culture or religion on the people they conquered. 
They rather assimilated to the community they conquered by adopting the 
religion of the people among whom they settled, which could have been 
either Christianity or Islam.16 They also spoke the language of the 
community they conquered. This capacity to assimilate might explain their 
rise to join the power circles of the ruling class in the Abyssinian Kingdom 
and influence royal politics. A good example is the rise of the Yejju 
dynasty, Oromo nobles17 who were the real rulers of the Abyssinian 
Kingdom beginning from the last quarter of the eighteenth century and 
reaching its peak between the periods of 1803-1825, although members of 
the dynasty did not personally assume the throne. Believing that the 
monarchy belongs to the House of Solomon, they ensured that a ‘Solomonic 
emperor’ was the actual crowned monarch. In most cases, however, the 
crowned emperor was a puppet in whose name the Yejju nobles ruled.  
                                                                                                                            
inevitable and the civil war itself was generated mainly by the inability of the 
Christian leadership to stop the Oromo advance”.  
14  Bahru 2005. 
15  Clapham 1994: 29. 
16  Levine 2000.  
17  Although Muslim Oromos in origin, members of the Yejju dynasty, like most of  
the other Oromos that migrated towards the north in the 16th century, “had become 
Christianised and followed other Amharic customs” (Bahru 2005: 12). 
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Another related effect of the Oromo expansion is what Teshale calls the 
‘Oromisation’ of the traditionally Christian ruling houses.18 A case in point 
is the ‘Oromisation’ of the ruling house of Gojjam. Since the middle of the 
17th century, rulers of the Gojjam dynasty were Oromos that were 
assimilated to the Amhara by converting to Christianity, speaking Amharic 
and practicing the Amhara culture. The list of such Oromo rulers in Gojjam 
extends from “Dajjach Yosedek-the eighteenth century Gurdu Oromo ruler 
of Gojjam–to Ras Hailu the Great, Negus Tekle Haimanot, and Ras Hailu 
Tekle Haimanot”.19 To be precise, however, this can hardly be regarded as 
the Oromisation of the Gojjam ruling house. The Oromo rulers, for all 
practical purposes, had shredded off their Oromo identity. Their action 
could not be regarded as an injection of the Oromo influence into the 
Abyssinian Kingdom. They can appropriately be described rather as 
‘Amharcised’ Oromos that, probably for the same reason that they were 
‘Amharcised’, were able to successfully join the power circles of the 
Christian Kingdom.  
 
The cumulative effect of the Gragn invasion and the Oromo expansion was 
the steady retreat of the political centre to the north. The Christian 
Kingdom, weakened by the war against Ahmed Gragn and the Oromo 
expansion, established a fixed imperial capital in Gonder, departing from 
the tradition of roving camps and marking the beginning of the so-called 
Gondarine period (1640-1770).Those who reigned over the Kingdom during 
this relatively peaceful period are better known for building impressive 
castles and churches. The peaceful period was, however, abruptly 
interrupted by the regional warlords who started to engage in protracted and 
destructive warfare for the control of the throne. From 1769 to1855, a 
                                                 
18  Teshale 1995: 38. 
19  Teshale 1995: 38. 
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period that has come to be known in history as Zemene Mesafint, or the Era 
of Princes, the monarchy was rendered nominal. The king no longer enjoyed 
the supremacy power, a king in name only. Real power resided with the 
regional lords.20  
 
The first attempt at bringing all the regional warlords in the Abyssinian 
Kingdom under one central authority was made by Kassa Haylu who 
subdued the regional warlords and crowned himself as Emperor Tewedros 
II, King of Kings of Ethiopia in 1855. With his ambition to establish a 
modern monarchical empire, he worked towards the creation of a unified 
Abyssinia. In a bid to modernise the state, he introduced new measures 
including, among other things, creating a professional state army which is 
paid a salary, introducing tax and confiscating the amount of land the 
church owned.21 It is important to note that his ambition of unification did 
not include expanding his control beyond Shewa, the southern end of the 
Abyssinian Kingdom and the central region of the present day Ethiopia.22 
The aggressive centralist reforms he sought to implement and his 
intolerance to regional autonomy, however, provoked rebellion from the 
regional nobilities.23 This, coupled with his conflict with the church, 
                                                 
20  As Fasil (1994: 9) comments, the ascendance of the regional lords and the  
weakening of the kings should not imply the existence of a highly centralised 
government prior to the Era of Princes: “Provincial chiefs had their independence, 
especially the further they were from the political center of gravity. Now, 
however, the previous ties had broken down. The central government made no 
effective demand for revenue and offered no real threat of monarchical sanctions. 
The possible conciliatory influence of a monarch on belligerent noblemen was 
also absent, and noblemen plotted against and fought each other continuously”. 
21  Bahru 2005. 
22  Bahru 2005. 
23  This was evident for example, in the fact that he, after subduing shewa, revoked  
 
 
 
 
 331  
frustrated his personal ambitions to build a modernised and unified 
Abyssinia, thereby, contributing to his eventual downfall.24  
 
Tewedros’s successor, Yohannes IV, who had his origin in the Tigray 
region, adopted a different approach in bringing the regions under one rule.  
Underlying his approach to unification was a considerable degree of 
tolerance to regional autonomy. Unlike Tewedros that sought to abolish 
regionalism, Yohannes was ready to recognise the regional hereditary rulers 
and share with them his control over the Kingdom as long as they recognise 
his suzerainty. In a manner that is indicative of an appreciation of the 
challenges inherent in building a unitary state out of the multitude of 
regions controlled by strong regional hereditary rulers, Yohannes pursued a 
policy of ‘controlled regionalism’ and provided a varying degree of 
autonomy. In contrast to Tewedros, he allowed the exercise of power by the 
regional hereditary rulers, confirming on them titles such as Ras and even 
Negus (i.e. King).25 As Bahru commented, “he continued to regard himself 
as primus inter pares (first among equals), a negusa Nagast (King of Kings) 
                                                                                                                            
the title of negus (King) from the shewan ruler and replaced it with the old shewan 
title of mar’ed azmach. This was in defiance of the tradition according to which 
the shewan asserted their regional autonomy by assuming the title of king while at 
the same expressed the supremacy power of the emperors in Gonder by restraining 
from adopting the title of Negusa Nagast - King of kings (see Bahru 2005). 
24  See Gebru 1991: 39. The immediate cause for the downfall of Tewedros was his  
decision to detain European missionaries and consuls in a response to the failure 
of the British to respond to his call for a holy war against Islam. The British then 
sent a military expedition to Ethiopia to set the detainees free from Tewedros’ 
control. The unpopularity of Tewedros at the time was evident in the fact that “the 
British army with cannons and Indian elephants crossed half of [Abyssinia] 
without firing a shot” (see Fasil 1997: 12). In the face of imminent defeat and 
capture in the hands of the British, Tewedros committed suicide.   
25  Gebru 1991: 39. 
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in the strict sense of the word, not an undisputed autocrat”.26 His approach 
was also evident in the way he treated his strongest contender of power, 
Menelik of Shawa. Menelik’s attempt to expand his territorial control was 
disavowed by Yohannes who, after defeating the invading Egyptian forces 
in two successive battles (i.e. Gundat 1875 and Gura 1876), led his army 
against Menelik. A full scale war was, however, averted, when Menelik 
agreed for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. According to the Leche 
agreement, as it came to be known, Menelik renounced the title of negusa 
nagasat (i.e. King of Kings) while keeping the title of negus (i.e. king). He 
also recognised Yohanes’s suzerainty. Yohannes’s utterance immediately 
after the conclusion of the agreement reflects his readiness to tolerate 
regional autonomy, which was the hallmark of his rule over the Abyssinian 
Kingdom: 
 
You are accordingly King and master of a land 
conquered by your forbears; I shall respect your 
sovereignty if you will be faithful to the agreements 
decided between us. Whoever strikes your Kingdom, 
strikes me, and whoever makes war on you, makes it on 
me. You are accordingly my eldest son.27  
 
2.2. Assessment 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, regionalism had played an important 
role in the historic Ethiopian imperial politics. The major fault line in the 
Era of Princes as well as in the era of King Tewedros and that of King 
Yohannes was not ethnicity but regionalism. The Amhara did not mobilise 
themselves as one ethnic group. They were rather divided along their 
regional domains and fought against one another for the control of the 
                                                 
26  Bahru 2005: 43. 
27  As quoted in Bahru 2005: 46. 
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throne. This is also evident in the fact that one cannot trace ethnic 
mobilisation of the Amharic speaking regions against the Tigray regional 
rulers. Emperor Yohannes created both alliance with and fought against the 
different Amharic speaking regional rulers. The linguistic division between 
the Amhara and the Tigre was irrelevant.28 This says that regionalism rather 
than ethnicity was the most relevant divide in the historic Ethiopia. 
 
There is, however, a slight exception to this. An important, but often 
underemphasised, element of Tewedros’s reign over the Abyssinian 
Kingdom was his conviction to put to an end to the influence of the Oromo, 
whom he regarded as outsiders to the Ethiopian throne. In one of the letters 
he sent to Queen Victoria in 1862, Emperor Tewedros declared: 
 
My fathers the Emperors having forgotten our Creator, he 
handed over their Kingdom to the Gallas and Turks. But 
God created me, lifted me out of the dust, and restored this 
Empire to my rule…By His power I drove away the Gallas. 
But for the Turks, I have told them to leave the land of my 
ancestors. They refused. I am going to wrestle with them.29  
 
He was obviously referring to the influence of the Yejju dynasty. Teshale 
argues that the struggle led by Tewedros was not just about creating a 
centralised power.30 It was also a struggle against the Oromo dominance at 
                                                 
28  See also Adhana 1998: 44. 
29  As quoted in Teshale 1995: 38. In the past, the term Galla was often used to refer  
to the Oromos. This is regarded by the Oromos as pejorative. Presently, using the 
term Gala might put one into a serious trouble, causing wide-spread conflict as it 
often happens in universities. Oromo nationalists claim that the name was applied 
by outsiders and the Oromo do not refer to themselves as Galla (see Mohammed 
1994: xi). 
30  Teshale 1994 
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Dabra Tabor, the power capital of the Yejju dynasty at the time. This 
contrasts with Bahru’s assertion that the struggle against the Yejju dynasty 
either by Tewedros or other regional warlords was “dictated less by ethnic 
and religious considerations than by self-interest and regional 
aggrandizement”.31 Tewedros’s direct reference to the Oromos rather than 
to the dynasty they control, in the letter he wrote to Queen Victoria, 
suggests that ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘regional’ considerations underlie his 
contempt for the supremacy of the Oromo nobles in the Abyssinian royal 
politics. As Merara argues, Tewedros “was the first modern Ethiopian ruler 
who explicitly recognised the ethnic factor in his project of empire-building 
and consciously challenged the supremacy of the Oromo princes over the 
Abyssinian Kingdom”.32  This, one may reasonably argue, also shows that 
the Abyssinian Kingdom is regarded as belonging to the Amhara and Tigre 
and that the Oromo are regarded as outsiders to the Christian Kingdom. This 
is also supported by the fact that members of the Yejju dynasty never 
claimed the throne but played a role of king maker when they actually ran 
the monarchy. 
 
Although regionalism was a dominant element of the period prior to the last 
quarter of the 19th century, the resultant mobilisation was not centrifugal in 
nature. The regional warlords were not satisfied with the control of their 
respective regions. They rather fought for the control of the central state. In 
fact, the making and ‘unmaking’ of kings was the major preoccupation of 
the regional warlords during the period of Zemene Mesafint. “The moves of 
the regional warlords were to dominate the centre, not to go away from it”.33   
 
                                                 
31  Bahru 2005: 12 
32  Merara 2002: 59. 
33  Bahru 2005: 4.  
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The cumulative effect of the dominant features of the historic Ethiopian 
state makes the latter a de facto decentralised state. Regional rulers 
exercised autonomy in their respective regions with little influence from the 
monarch. The only requirement was that they recognise the suzerainty of 
the emperor and pay tribute to him. They had the power to collect taxes, 
maintain an army, administer justice and engage in other matters that relate 
to the administration of their respective regions. It is this feature of the 
Ethiopian polity that led Paul Henze to conclude that Ethiopia “has almost 
always been relatively decentralized at many stages in its long history”.34 
This was, however, to change dramatically with the coming to power of 
Menelik, King of Shewa. 
 
3. Ethnicity in the making of the present day Ethiopia 
The death of Yohannes in the war against a Sudanese army in 1889 opened 
an opportunity to the age-old rival of Yohannes, Menelik II King of Shewa, 
to claim the throne. The era of Menelik, unlike that of Tewedros, not only 
saw the consolidation of the historical Abyssinian Kingdom under one rule 
but also its expansion beyond Shewa into the southern part of the present 
day Ethiopia. Motivated by the need to control the source of the lucrative 
long-distance trade, the expanding forces of the Menelik army brought 
under their control most of the people in the south and territories that were 
never brought under the effective control of Ethiopian rulers that came 
before Menelik. “From 1875 to1889 Menelik expanded his empire to four 
or five times its original size”.35 It was during this period that Ethiopia 
                                                 
34  Henze 1994: 124. Fasil (1997: 38) attributes the decentralised nature of the  
Ethiopian state to “the extent of the empire (even at its lowest ebb) and its largely 
mountainous and broken topography, its lack of effective communication, its 
numerous ethnicities, and above all its quarrelsome regional feudal lords”.  
35  Lewis 1993:160 
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achieved its present shape as well as its diverse demographic and social 
character. 
 
The process of expansion took different forms. While some of the groups in 
the South submitted to the Menelik rule peacefully, others had to fight 
brutal wars before they were finally defeated and incorporated into the 
Empire. By way of providing an account of the south west regions that 
submitted to Menelik peacefully, Bahru writes: 
 
With little or no resistance, the Oromo states submitted to 
Menelik one after another. In the years between 1882 and 
1886, Menelik was able to obtain the submission of Kumsa 
Moroda (later Dajjazmach, and baptized Gabara-Egzabhir) 
of Leqa Naqamte, Jote Tullu (also made Dajjazmach) of 
Leqa Quellam, Aba Jiffar of Jimma II, and the rulers of 
other Gibe river states, as well as of Ilubabopur, further to 
the west.36 
 
On the other hand, the Arsi Oromo, located south east of Shewa, resisted 
incorporation and fought fiercely against the expanding Menelik army. A 
four-year long (1882-1886) war was fought before the Arsi Oromo were 
defeated and their rulers submitted to the authority of Menelik. The 
incorporation of western Gurage, Harar, the powerful southern Kingdom of 
Walayta and Kaffa into the Ethiopian empire similarly required the 
expanding Menelik army to fight fierce and sometimes protracted wars, 
which resulted in an untold destruction of human lives.37 The Ogaden and 
some of the peripheral regions, which were brought under the Imperial state 
                                                 
36  Bahru 2005: 62. 
37  “The conquest of these regions gave Menelik access to real wealth - coffee and  
gold among other things - which significantly enhanced his political position and 
military might” (Merara 2002: 61). 
 
 
 
 
 337  
around the end of the 19th century, were incorporated “under conditions 
much worse than those exacted from the Oromo”.38 
 
The manner in which the conquered people reacted to the expanding 
Menelik army had its own impact in the post-conquest treatment of the 
former within the Ethiopian Empire. Those that peacefully submitted to 
Menelik were allowed to keep their own leaders and some amount of 
internal autonomy, thus introducing a semblance of the famous colonial 
modus operandi of indirect rule. Those that resisted the expansion were 
often dealt “with a massacre, expropriation and dislocation”.39 The 
following account of a French national that joined Menelik during his 
conquest of the Welayta in December 1894 illustrates this very well: 
 
As the object of the campaign was to reduce the country into 
submission, there was, from the very beginning, “looting of houses and 
crops, slaughtering of animals, sacking of the country [and] burning”. 
Every day, the conquerors came back to camp with slaves and booty. 
With their superior weapons the Shoans [representing the Abyssinian 
State] slaughtered large numbers of Wollamos [Welaitas]. “It was a 
terrible butchery, a debauchery of living or dead flesh … by the soldiers 
drunk from blood”…By December 11, the resistance of the Wollamos 
had been broken, and on the march that day, “our mules turned aside 
continuously from recently killed corpses which encumbered the 
country. The wounded, horribly mutilated, were trampled by the 
cavalry men”. … On December 18 and 19 Menelik divided up the rich 
booty, keeping eighteen thousand heads of cattle and eighteen hundred 
slaves for himself. He then returned triumphantly to Addis Ababa, 
taking along king Tona [the defeated Welayta king].40 
 
                                                 
38  Merara 2002: 61. 
39  Lewis 1993: 161. 
40  As quoted in Tronvoll 2000: 13.  
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The main drivers of the Menelik expansion into the south were 
predominantly the nobilities of the Shewa Amhara. They were, however, 
also joined by the northern regional elites. The elites of Tigray and the 
regional Amhara elites of Gondar, Gojjam and Wello had no choice but to 
either join the Menelik project of expansion and share the dividends or 
“face the much enhanced shewan military muscle”.41 Non-Amharas also 
joined the conquest. In fact the leading general of the Menelik army and 
architect of the expansion to the South, Ras Gobana, was an Oromo. As 
Teshale aptly points out, however, “the chief protagonists and beneficiaries 
of the drama Pax Menelika were predominantly Amhara”.42  
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Shawan-Amhara led conquest and 
expansion turned the religiously monolithic Amhara/Tigre Kingdom into a 
multi-ethnic and multi-faith country that we now call Ethiopia. 43 
 
3.1 The imperial expansion and the two facets of domination 
The introduction of the imperial rule in the South entailed two facets of 
domination over the conquered people. The first relates to land alienation. 
The northern rulers confiscated two-thirds of the southern lands, leaving the 
remaining one-third to the indigenous population. The confiscated land was 
divided by the state among the northerners, mainly among the Shewa 
Amhara, which included the warlords that led the victorious armies (i.e. 
who, in turn, subdivided it among their officers, soldiers and retainers),44 the 
                                                 
41  Merara 2002: 61. 
42  Teshale 1994: 41. 
43  Teshale 1994: 41 
44  Following the incorporation of the South, the northern rulers started to establish  
Ketemas (garrison towns). Inhabited by northerners who flocked to the areas as 
administrators, court officials, soldiers, interpreters and priests, the garrison towns 
became the centre from which the new rulers exercised control over the newly 
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church and all official and agents of the state who served in the south. The 
imperial palace and members of the royal family were granted vast estates.45 
The remaining one-third was partitioned between the conquered people and 
their traditional rulers, with the latter enjoying either a reduction in tax 
payment or a total exemption. The land that once belonged to the southern 
population was confiscated by the state and distributed to northerners. As a 
result, the majority of the southern populations were basically reduced to 
tenants of the new landlords with no rights to the land they once owned. 46 
 
The second form of domination pertains to cultural and political 
domination. There was a disjuncture between the southern population and 
the northern rulers in terms of language, religion and other aspects of 
culture. Amharic, the language of the Shewa Amhara and most of the 
northerners, was made the lingua franca of government’s business in the 
South, which is home to more than seventy different languages.47 Although 
the expansion of the Empire had brought under its rule a large number of 
Muslims, the monarch continued to present Ethiopia as a Christian state. 
Ascendance to a political office required assimilation to the culture of the 
northerners. In what is usually referred to as Amhariczation, members of the 
                                                                                                                            
subjugated land and the people. This gave rise to the so-called neftega system. As 
succinctly put by Teshale (1995: 44) “[t]he word neftega is derived from the word 
naft (Arabic for gun). Neftega means one with gun. The neftega system refers to 
the exercise of political and economic control by armed northerners over the 
people of the southern region. Neftega and gabar face each other without 
mediation, directly and fiercely. The language of the gun was the means of 
communication”.   
45  Markakis 1978: 23. 
46  Markakis 1978: 24. “The impact of the land expropriation was mitigated by the  
fact that it did not result in mass displacement of population from the land, 
because the new landlords needed peasant Labour” (Markakis 1978: 11). 
47  Markakis 2003: 12. 
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Oromo nobility and other ethnic groups had to speak Amharic, convert to 
Christianity and even in some cases change their names to a 
Christian/Amhara name in order to be accepted among the ruling class of 
Ethiopia. “Subjected to the administrative fiat of the north”, as Bahru 
succinctly summarized, the languages and cultures of the southern 
population “were denigrated”.48  
 
Teshale’s comparison of Menelik’s conquest with that of Oromo expansion 
sums up the nature of the Menelik conquest: 
 
The only analogy to the magnitude of the Menelik expansion 
was the Oromo expansion of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. But the Oromo had occupied land, for they were in 
search of grazing and settlement space; the Amhara occupied 
people, for their aim was tribute exaction, to enhance the life of 
the leisure class. While the Oromo genius for assimilation 
quickly claimed any non-Oromo defeated or otherwise, the 
Amhara conquerors imposed a rigid class system of ruler and 
ruled. The relative egalitarianism of the former and the 
hierarchical order of the latter led to the different results of their 
territorial conquests.49 
 
In sum, economic marginalisation as well as cultural and political alienation 
characterised the rule of the northerners over the newly conquered South. 
 
 
                                                 
48  Bahru 2005: 5. Gebru (1990: 71) states that “[p]aternalistic and arrogant  
Abyssinians looked upon and treated the indigenous people as backward, heathen, 
filthy, deceitful, lazy and even stupid – stereotypes that European colonialists 
commonly ascribed to their African subjects. Both literally and symbolically, 
southerners became the object of scorn and ridicule”. 
49  Teshale 1995: 39. 
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3.2 Contesting interpretations of the Menelik conquest  
Different interpretations are provided to the Menelik conquest that 
expanded the Christian Kingdom beyond Shewa to include what it is today 
regarded as the territory of Ethiopia. Some regard it as the process of 
reunification. One such proponent of this position is the renowned historian 
TekleTsadik Mekuria who, for example, regards the occupation of Harar by 
Menelik as reunification on the ground that Hararghe was part of the 
Ethiopian Empire:  
 
That the southern regions of Ethiopia -Hararge, Sidamo and 
the areas settled by the Oromo - had been part of Ethiopia 
from the time of Aksum, Zagwe and Shawan dynasty, 13-
16th centuries, during the reign of Atse Amda-tseyon, zar-
Yacob until the rise of Gragn Ahmad, is clearly proven by 
documentary evidence.50  
 
By linking the newly conquered people to the domain of Aksum, 
TekleTsadik belongs to those groups of historians who contend that the 
Ethiopian state is some 3,000 years old. According to this view, the 
Ethiopian state has existed for millennia. Others, however, strongly oppose 
this particular interpretation of the Menelik conquest. For them, Menelik’s 
conquest represents a “flagrant imperial conquest and consolidation, not 
‘unification’, let alone ‘reunification’”.51 Others, mainly Oromo nationalists, 
posit Menelik’s military policy as a process of colonisation:  
 
At no time before the conquest by Menelik was the present day 
Ethiopia a single country. What existed were independent polities 
– Kingdoms in Abyssinia to the north, various confederacies in 
Oromyia and others under the Gada system, the southern 
                                                 
50  As quoted in Teshale 1995: 41. 
51  Getahun 1974: 124.  
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Kingdoms of Walayita, Kaficho, and Yem, and various communal 
systems in the Nilotic and Omotic regions. The official Ethiopian 
history that … presents Menelik’s era as “the unification of 
Ethiopia” is a fabrication, pure and simple. As in the rest of Africa, 
the Oromo and other southern peoples were subjugated, their 
peace, their cultural identities and human dignity deprived. … The 
Oromo and other peoples of the south who survived the genocide 
were subjected by Menelik to the most dehumanizing form of 
domination. Their land was confiscated and divided among 
Menelik’s warlords, the clergy, and local “colonial troops” known 
as “neftenya”.52 
 
3.3 Assessment 
It is not clear how TekleTsadik Mekuria argues that areas like Hararge and 
Sidamo were included in the Axumite Empire while, as historical 
documents reveal, the territorial scope of the latter was only limited to the 
northern and central highlands of the present day Ethiopia (i.e. Tigray, 
Northern Wello and southern Arabia) and Eritrea. It is true that following 
the overthrow of the Zagwe dynasty and the “restoration” of the Solomonic 
dynasty, rulers of the latter, especially King Amda-tseyon and king Zara-
Yacob, were able to exact intermittent tributes from regions like Northern 
Hararge, Arsi, Sidamo, Inarya and Kaffa.  As Teshale argues, however, to 
extend this back to the days of the Zagwe dynasty let alone Axumite is a 
historical fiction.53 
 
It is also important, however, to note that the Ethiopian case, unlike some 
would like to argue, is not a case of black-on-black colonialism. Of course, 
the two facets of domination discussed above may lead one, as the Oromo 
and Somali nationalists often argue, to invoke the colonial thesis. There is 
                                                 
52  As quoted in Adhana 1994: 236.  
53  Teshale 1995: 41. 
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no doubt that the empire building during the Menelik era was “violent and 
semi-colonial in nature”.54 The power relation and the cultural stereotypes 
that characterise the relation between the Southern people and the 
northerners had some elements of colonial relations. A close look at the 
relationship between the conqueror and the conquered would, however, 
reveal that the subordination of the southern people to the Shewa Amhara 
cannot be posited as a colonial relation.55 Any analogy of the conquest of 
the South with European colonisation belies the element of racism, which is 
an essential ingredient of European colonisation that underlies the 
relationship between the coloniser and the colonised. The policy of racism 
erects a barrier that rigidly separates the coloniser from the colonised. The 
relationship of the northerners with the people of the South lacks this 
critical element. The divide between the dominant Amhara and the 
subordinate south is not rigid and it can be crossed by, for example, 
baptising into Christianity, speaking Amharic or through marriage. As 
Gebru wrote 
 
There were no culturally defined areas of settlement [in 
southern Ethiopia] and the northerners were far less 
demarcated from the indigenous population than the European 
colonialists elsewhere in Africa. Moreover, settler society [in 
southern Ethiopia] was open, and anyone could become 
thorough Abyssinianzed by adopting Amharic and Orthodox 
Christianity. The French or Portuguese were far less successful 
with their policies of assimilation for, in the final analysis, no 
assimile or assimilado could ever cross the racial barrier. In 
Ethiopia, the “superior-inferior” complex had a cultural 
connotation only.56   
                                                 
54  Fasil 1997: 13. 
55  See Teshale 1995; Gebru 1990; Merara 2002. 
56  Gebru 1990: 72. 
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As Teshale has succinctly put it, unlike a Zulu chief that could not join 
Buckingham Palace in holy matrimony, the traditional rulers of Southern 
Ethiopia were able to join the ruling class that was predominantly 
Amhara.57 
 
The remaining question is whether the Ethiopian state is an ethnocratic state 
based on the hegemony of a single ethnic group. We shall come back to this 
issue when we discuss the saliency of ethnicity in the political history of 
Ethiopia.  
 
4. The HaileSelassie regime and the multi-ethnic challenge  
The expansion of the Ethiopian state was further consolidated during the era 
of Emperor HaileSelassie that presided over unprecedented centralisation of 
the Ethiopia Empire. HaileSelassie is credited for the modernisation of the 
Ethiopian political system. It was during his reign that Ethiopia adopted its 
first written constitution (i.e. 1931). The Constitution established the first 
modern parliament in Ethiopian history. Modern education was expanded 
and slavery was abolished. It was also during his time that Ethiopia joined 
the international political system, by becoming member of, first, the League 
of Nations and then the United Nations. For the purpose of this thesis, 
however, the issue is whether Ethiopia, under his reign, was able to build a 
nation out of the multitude of diverse ethnic groups that were brought 
together under one state in the last quarter of the 19th century. 
 
In many respects, the HaileSelassie administration intensified the 
implementation of policies and practices that militated against the 
construction of an all inclusive state out of the diverse ethnic groups that 
inhabit the country. Land alienation of the southern people was maintained. 
                                                 
57  Teshale 1995: 45. 
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Administration in the southern region continued to be controlled by the 
Amhara and particularly the Shewan aristocracy. With the strong 
centralisation process he unleashed, especially after the Italian occupation,58 
he abolished the regional autonomy that was the hallmark of the Ethiopian 
Empire. The dominance of the Shewan aristocracy that was already 
prevalent in the administrations of southern regions was extended to the 
regions in the north which, for a long time, were administered by their own 
nobilities. The regional rulers of Gojjam, Gondar, Wollo and Tigray were 
replaced by the nobility drawn from the central province of Shewa, who 
were “none other than Menelik’s courtiers, his warrior lords of the south 
(the apex of the neftega) and their descendants”. 59  The Shewan noblemen 
who assumed provincial governorship in almost every region “ruled in 
ruthlessly extractive fashion…aided by officials who were again largely of 
Shewan origin”.60 This ‘shewanization of the state’, as it is referred to by 
some authors61, brought to an end the regional autonomy that in many 
respects was instrumental in ensuring the legitimacy of regional rulers. This 
was, in fact, the prime motive behind the introduction of the 1931 
Constitution - to abolish the political prerogatives and privileges of the 
nobility. Conferring appointments and land grants, administering justice, 
collecting taxes, maintaining armies, declaring wars and entering treaties 
were some of the major political powers that were taken away from the 
                                                 
58  The Italians whose colonial ambition was frustrated by their humiliating defeat in  
the hand of the Menelik-led Ethiopian army at the Battle of Adwa in 1896 came 
back with a vengeance in 1935 and occupied the country for a brief period during 
the Second World War. They were expelled in 1945. 
59  Andargachew 1991: 15. 
60  Clapham 1988: 202. 
61  See Andargachew 1991: 15.  
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nobilities who, in the past, wielded enormous powers in these matters within 
their respective autonomous regions.62 
  
The cultural and linguistic domination also continued unabated during the 
era of HaileSelassie. The government prohibited the use of languages other 
than Amharic.63 In some cases, the Imperial government deliberately 
suppressed the use of indigenous languages and encouraged the use of 
Amharic. The decree that regulated missionary activities in Ethiopia 
mandated missionaries to learn Amharigna and to use it as the general 
language of instruction. They were allowed to teach in local language “only 
in the early stages of missionary work” and until they and their pupils 
acquired Amharic.64 Speaking Amharic was also necessary in order to be 
employed by the state. 
 
HaileSelassie’s policy of centralisation and the continued marginalisation of 
non-Amharic speaking groups provoked a series of resistance from different 
groups. In the 1940s peasants from Tigray rebelled in what came to be 
known as the Weyane rebellion. Although many factors including 
administrative inefficiency and corruption caused the rebellion, it was also 
fuelled by the encroachment of the HaileSelassie’s regime on regional 
autonomy. The nobility of Tigray tried to check the erosion of local power 
and reassert their hereditary privileges.65 An element of “provincialism” 
was evident in the rebellion. Almost after two decades another peasant 
rebellion emerged in Bale, south eastern part of Ethiopia. The major cause 
of the 1963 Bale rebellion, that involved both the Oromo and Somali 
Muslims, related to peasant exploitation and especially to land alienation 
                                                 
62  Andreas 2003: 151. 
63  Markakis 2003: 12. 
64  Markakis 2003: 12. 
65  Bahru 2005: 215. See also Gebru 1990: 125. 
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and increment in taxation. Here, too, issues of nationalities were not totally 
irrelevant. “The imposition of arrogant Christian settlers over a 
predominantly Muslim population” coupled with political and economic 
domination had contributed to the eruption of the rebellion.66 The retention 
of land and the reassertion of ethno-cultural identities were the primary 
goals of the rebellion.67 Before the Bale rebellion was put under control, 
another rebellion broke out in Gojjam, one of the Amhara regions. The 
people of Gojjam, being of Amhara origin as that of Shewa, were not 
subjected to cultural domination like most southerners. Neither did they 
have subjected to land alienation. The 1968 Gojjam rebellion was induced 
rather by the introduction of the new Agricultural Income Tax of 1967. Yet 
their resentment to Shewan domination cannot be ignored in the analysis of 
the rebellion. The fact that the governor of the region was from Shewa had 
contributed to the animosity of the people of Gojjam.68 All the rebellions 
were crushed by force. In the case of the Gojjam rebellion, the Emperor 
eventually removed the new Agricultural Income Tax but it did not avert the 
violent clash that ultimately brought the rebellion to an end. 
 
It was during the same period that another rebellion that was to have a 
lasting and dramatic effect on the Ethiopian political terrain ensued in the 
northern part of Ethiopia, namely Eritrea. Bahru remarks that “[b]oth in its 
own right and in the radicalizing influence it exerted on the Ethiopian 
                                                 
66  Gebru (1990: 125) remarks: “Almost entirely Muslim, the Oromo and Somali also  
resented the special privileges accorded to the northern Christian settlers and the 
bureaucratic abuses that accompanied the extension of state authority.” The Bale 
rebellion also benefited from assistance from the irredentist movement of the 
Liberation Front of Western Somalia (WSLF), which considered Bale part of the 
Greater Somalia.  
67  Gebru 1990: 125. 
68  Bahru 2005: 217. 
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opposition in general, [the armed struggle in Eritrea] played a significant 
role in the regime’s collapse in 1974”.69 Ironically enough, the Eritrean 
question that remained unresolved even after the collapse of the Imperial 
regime in 1974 eventually contributed to the downfall of the military regime 
in 1991.  
 
4.1 The armed struggle in Eritrea 
Deep disagreements, often charged with emotion, characterise discussions 
about the history of Eritrea and its particular place in Ethiopia. Some regard 
Eritrea as an integral part of Ethiopia while other regard it as a creation of 
the Italian colonisation of distinct territories along the African Red Sea 
Coast in the last decade of the 19th century. Resolving this debate is not the 
aim of this thesis. The purpose here is to discuss the armed struggle in 
Eritrea within the context of the opposition to the Ethiopian central 
government. For this purpose, the major focus of this section are the 
developments that unfolded following the expulsion of Italy from the area in 
the Second World War and the United Nations decision to federate Eritrea 
with Ethiopia. This is, however, preceded by a brief introduction to the 
political history of Eritrea.70   
Eritrea came to exist as a state when Italy decided to piece together its 
distinct historical possessions along the African Red Sea Coast.71 Italy’s 
acquisition of land in the area started when an Italian priest, Giuseppe 
Sapeto, bought a harbor at Assab from a local Sultan on behalf of the Italian 
shipping company Rubattino in 1869, which was later bought by the Italian 
government in 1882. That gave the Italian government control over the Afar 
coastline. Italy extended its colonial presence in 1885 when the British, 
                                                 
69  Bahru 2005. 
70  For more on the political history of Eritrea, see Yonatan 2007. 
71  Tekeste 1997. 
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fearing French expansion, encouraged the Italians to take control of the 
Egyptian-controlled Massawa. This completed the Italian control of the 
coastline that stretched over one thousand kilometers.  As the Italians 
advanced to extend their control from the coastlines into the hinterlands, 
they were faced with stiff resistance from the Ethiopian monarch, Emperor 
Yohannes IV, who was also exercising control over the same territory. The 
confrontation resulted in the Battle of Dogali in which the Italians suffered a 
heavy defeat in the hands of the Ethiopian army in January 1887. It was 
only when Emperor Yohannes was killed in a battle against the Dervish in 
the South, and the centre of power shifted to Menelik, the king of Shewa, 
who was already keen to cooperate with the Italians, that a favorable 
condition ensued for the Italians, enabling them to establish their colonial 
presence in Asmara, the current capital city of Eritrea, and the highlands. 
The Italian’s colonial presence in the highlands and their authority over the 
rest of Eritrea was legitimised by the Treaty of Wuchale, which they 
concluded with the new King of Ethiopia, Menelik II, on 2 May 1889. On 
the first of January 1890, the disparate possessions of Italy were brought 
together under one colonial administration and named by the Italians 
Eritrea, after Erythraeum Mare, Latin for ‘Red Sea’.  
 
The Italian fifty year rule over Eritrea came to an end following its defeat in 
the Second World War.72 Eritrea, like the other former colonies of Italy 
including Italian Somaliland and Libya, was put under temporary British 
Military Administration (BMA) for ten years. As the four powers (i.e. 
France, Great Britain, the USA and the USSR) failed to reach an agreement 
on the fate of Eritrea, the matter was referred to the United Nations. On 
December 2, 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 390(V) to 
                                                 
72  Haile 1988. 
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federate Eritrea with Ethiopia as “an autonomous unit…under the 
sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown”. The Constitution, which was prepared 
by the United Nations and adopted by the Eritrean Parliament on 10 July 
1952, provided for political pluralism, the principles of a democratic 
electoral system, due process of law, freedom of speech, association and 
religion.73 Tigrinya and Arabic were recognised as the official languages of 
the country. It also designated a new flag, seals and coat of arms for Eritrea. 
In a system of government that can fairly be regarded as federal,74 the 
Eritrean government was granted authority over ‘internal matters’ while the 
Ethiopian government had jurisdiction over ‘general/external matters’.  
 
The Federation, however, did not last long. The federal status of Eritrea was 
gradually eroded. The Ethiopian government and the Union Party-
dominated Eritrean government75 hastened the full incorporation of Eritrea 
into Ethiopia.76 In 1956, Amharic, the Ethiopian official language, replaced 
Tigrinya and Arabic as the official language of Eritrea. In 1959, Ethiopia 
imposed its laws on Eritrea. The Eritrean Assembly then approved an 
                                                 
73  Iyob 1995. 
74  There is a debate on whether the established structure can be regarded as a federal.  
This is, however, beyond the scope of this study. For more on this particular issue, 
see Tekeste 1997.  
75  At the time, the two major political parties in Eritrea were the Unionist Party and 
the Independence Bloc. Composed of mainly Tigrinya-speaking highland Coptic 
Christians and supported by the Ethiopian government, the Unionist campaigned 
for complete union with Ethiopia. The Independence Bloc was, on the other hand, 
a coalition of pro-independence parties. At the centre of this coalition was the 
Muslim League. The coalition, however, had also included groups like the 
Liberal Progressive Party which originated in the highlands and opposed the 
Unionists.  
76  United Nations 1996. See also Iyob 1995. 
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amendment to the Constitution which changed the names “Eritrean 
government” to “Eritrean administrator”. The most critical measure that 
brought Eritrea’s federal status to an end took place on 15 November 1962 
when the Eritrean parliament declared that the federation is rendered null 
and void and that Eritrea is completely united with its ‘motherland’. This 
represented the abrogation of the Federal Act and the incorporation of 
Eritrea as the fourteenth province of the Ethiopian Empire. 
 
The gradual erosion of autonomy of Eritrea led to increasing resistance.77 
Central to the opposition of the Ethiopian rule was the Eritrean Liberation 
Movement (ELM), which was founded in 1958. Composed of mainly 
students, intellectuals and trade unionists, the ELM focused its strategy of 
struggle on civil disobedience and clandestine political activities. The ELM 
is believed to have been behind many of the early protests held against the 
gradual erosion of the federation. In 1958, Eritrean workers held a general 
strike and demonstration opposing the lowering of the Eritrean flag and the 
introduction of the Ethiopian labour law into Eritrea. Hundreds of students 
also went on strike in Asmara demanding the restoration of the Eritrean 
national symbols including the flag, seal and arms. The struggle in Eritrea, 
however, took a military dimension with the formation of the Eritrean 
Liberation Front (ELF) in 1961 in Cairo.  
 
The ELF was mainly composed of Muslim inhabitants of the Eritrean 
lowlands in the west, the community that was most alienated by the new 
arrangement, which was mainly a function of the appeal to a glorious 
Christian Empire.78 Dissatisfaction with the internal organisation and 
functioning of the front, however, resulted in dissension in the early to mid 
                                                 
77  Iyob 1995. 
78  Iyob 1995. 
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1970s. This eventually led to the emergence of the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1972, a leftist nationalist movement that, unlike 
the ELF, successfully pooled its members from both religions and the 
various ethnic groups that inhabit Eritrea. The ELF and EPLF fought a civil 
war in the early 1970s, and by 1980 the latter emerged as the main 
resistance movement. The Eritrean question is regarded by the Eritrean 
liberation fronts as a question of decolonisation. They regarded the Eritrean 
case as a case of ‘unconsummated decolonisation’. 
 
4.2 The student movement and the question of nationalities 
The issue of nationalities gained momentum when it appeared as an 
important element of the agenda for political reform as the student 
movement joined the opposition against the Imperial regime, beginning mid 
1960s. Initially the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) was concerned 
with the struggle for free speech, assembly and organisation. The movement 
later espoused the revolutionary slogan Land to the tiller thus demanding a 
major agrarian reform. It was only in the beginning of the academic year of 
1969-1970 that students started to address the question of nationalities. The 
right of nationalities to self-determination became the central agenda of the 
movement. Important in this regard is the groundbreaking article that was 
authored by Wallelgn Mequkananet, who challenged the way the state of 
Ethiopia defines itself: 
 
Is it not simply Amhara and to a certain extent Amhara-Tigre 
supremacy? Ask anybody what Ethiopian culture is? Ask 
anybody what the Ethiopian language is? Ask anybody what 
Ethiopian religion is? Ask anybody what is the national dress? It 
is either Amhara or Amhara-Tigray!! To be a ‘genuine 
Ethiopian’ one has to speak Amharic, to listen to Amharic 
music, to accept the Amhar-Tigre religion, orthodox 
Christianity, and to wear the Amhara-Tigre Shama in 
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international conferences. In some cases to be an ‘Ethiopian’, 
you will even have to change your name. In short, to be an 
Ethiopian, you will have to wear an Amhara mask ….79 
 
Departing from the pan-Ethiopianist ideology and inspired by the then 
fashionable Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the movement developed 
consensus on the major question of nationalities, although there were some 
initial disagreements on the ‘correct’ resolution of the national question. 
They all agreed that the different nationalities have been oppressed by the 
‘shewa Amhara nation’. They further held that the different nationalities 
that inhabit the country should be recognised and provided with a right to 
‘self-determination’. Since all the student movements operated within the 
ideological compass of Marxism-Leninism, they juxtaposed the nationalities 
question with class oppression. They attributed the subjugation of the 
different ethnic groups in the country to ‘the class basis of the regime’. Take 
away the class exploitation as represented by the land alienation in the 
South, they argued, the nationalities question will be solved.  According to 
the proponents of this view, “the national question was no other than a 
disguised form of class oppression”.80  
 
The bone of contention lies in the scope of the right to self-determination 
and its method of realisation and especially on the right of secession - on 
whether the right of nationalities to self determination includes the right to 
secede from the state. The divergent views on this issue are reflected in the 
different Marxist-Leninist political organisations that emerged out of the 
movement. Some advocated for the regional autonomy formula (e.g. the 
WAZ league). Others like Mela Ityopia Socialist Niqinaqe (MEISON) 
agued that the nationalities question should be resolved within the larger 
                                                 
79   As quoted in Balsvik 1985: 277. 
80  Clapham 1988:198. 
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Ethiopian framework. The EPRP went further than any of the other groups 
in fully recognising the right to self determination. It proclaimed ‘the right 
of nations to self-determinations without any reservations’.81  
 
4.3 Assessment 
The HaileSelassie regime sought to build a nation out of the multitude of 
diverse ethnic groups that were brought together in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. Homogenisation was its main aim. To achieve its 
objective, the regime ventured on the course of centralising the Ethiopian 
state to a degree that was unprecedented in Ethiopian history. This 
voracious process of centralisation had the effect of not only perpetuating 
the marginalisation of the southern population but also creating grievances 
among the traditionally autonomous northern rulers. 
 
The marginalisation of the southern population continued in the economic, 
cultural and political arenas. The Southern population remained tenants with 
no claim to land. The culturally inferior status that they were forced to 
occupy continued as the ‘one Ethiopian nation one destiny’ project 
advanced by the Imperial regime relied on the development of a single 
language of national communication. Their culture was also considered 
inferior to that of the northerners. The predominance of the Shewa and other 
northerners in the administration of the state in southern areas also meant 
the majority of the population remained peripheral to Ethiopian politics, let 
alone manage their own affairs. The double oppression of the Southern 
population (i.e. national and class oppression) continued with a great deal of 
intensification under the HaileSelassie regime. The Bale revolt is a 
                                                 
81  Clapham (1988: 198-199) draws our attention to the use of the term ‘nation’ as  
opposed to ‘nationality’ in the EPRP proclamation and suggests that the use of the 
term nation caries “the implication of separate national independence”.  
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testimony of the disgruntlement that was prevalent among the southern local 
population culturally, politically and economically.  
 
The absolutist HaileSelassie regime’s extensive centralisation was also 
evident in the fact that it removed the traditional powers of regional rulers, 
thereby, limiting, and in extreme cases, abolishing regional autonomy. The 
different Amhara regions and the Tigray region have traditionally enjoyed 
local autonomy with local authorities drawn from their nobilities. This was 
highly compromised with the increasing ‘shewanization’ of the state, 
creating disgruntlement even among the northern local rulers whose 
language, culture and religion was identical with that of the Imperial state. 
Some of the peasant rebellions, especially the rebellion in Tigray and, to a 
certain extent, the 1968 Gojjam rebellion, are indications of the grievances 
that ensued following, among other things, the concentration of power in the 
hands of the Shewan nobles. In fact, the roots of some of the liberation 
movements from the northern part of the country lie in the gradual erosion 
of regional autonomy and continued marginalisation from the centre of 
Ethiopian politics. 
 
The HaileSelassie regime antagonised both nationalists and regional forces, 
thus, causing the intensification of the struggle against its regime from all 
segments of the society. In February 1974, the students intensified the 
protest against the Imperial regime. With their famous Land to the Tiller 
slogan, they championed the causes of the peasantry and called for the 
abolishment of the feudal regime under which the latter suffered for 
centuries. They were also joined by other sectors of the population. The 
Muslims angered by the continuing unholy alliance between the church and 
the state took to the streets. Workers, taxi drivers, teachers and eventually 
the military joined the ‘revolutionary upheaval’.  
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5. The 1974 revolution, the Derg and ethnic mobilisation 
Led by the Addis Ababa University students, the masses took to the streets 
in February 1974. The mass revolution brought to an end the HaileSelassie 
regime. The revolution was, however, hijacked by the military junta, known 
as the Derg, which deposed the Emperor and assumed power. The student-
based leftist political groups which did not have organised leadership to 
direct the course of the revolution had fallen prey to the attacks of the 
military junta. As a result, they went underground, limiting their activity to 
the ‘student constituency’.82 
 
5.1 The Derg and ethnicity 
Taking on the then fashionable Marxist ideology, the Derg introduced a 
drastic measure by nationalising the economy, including land. The Southern 
population especially benefited from the measure as it freed them from 
paying tributes and providing services to the northerner landlords. It 
abolished the official status of the Orthodox Christian church and 
recognised the practice of Islam by including Muslim holidays in its list of 
national public holidays.  
 
The Derg immediately expressed its commitment to resolve the question of 
nationalities. This commitment of the Derg was clearly outlined in the 
declaration of the National Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia (NDR), 
which was announced on 20 April 1976. Article V, section 1 of the 
document provided that: 
 
 The right to self-determination of all nationalities will be recognized 
and duly respected. . . . No nationality will dominate another one since 
                                                 
82  Merara 2002: 78. MEISON joined the military government as a junior partner,  
mainly providing the ideological rigour that was needed by the government. This 
was, however, short lived as the junta eventually turned against MEISON. 
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the history, culture, languages, and religion of each nationality will 
have equal recognition in accordance with the spirit of socialism. The 
unity of Ethiopia's nationalities will be based on the common struggle 
against feudalism, imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism and all 
reactionary forces. This united struggle is based on equality, 
brotherhood, and mutual respect. Given Ethiopia's existing situation, the 
problem of nationalities can be resolved if each nationality is accorded 
full rights of self-government. This means that each nationality will 
have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal 
affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of 
its political, economic, and social life, use its own languages, and elect 
its own leaders and administrators to head its own internal organs. 
 
The military regime, whose ranks and files included persons that belong to 
the newly conquered southern ethnic groups, did not also follow, at least in 
its early days, the Imperial state in proscribing the use of other languages.83 
It allowed the use of other languages in the areas of printing, broadcasting 
and teaching. 
 
The embracing of the question of nationalities by the Derg was not however 
whole-hearted. It was mainly motivated by the Marxist ideology that was 
prevalent at the time and influenced by its junior partner, the leftist 
MEISON. For that same reason, it was short-lived. In the wake of its victory 
over the invading Somali army84 and its internal contenders,85 the 
                                                 
83  Markakis 2003. 
84  In 1974, the Somali army invaded the eastern part of Ethiopia (i.e. the Ogaden  
region) to realise through military force its irredentist movement of creating 
Greater Somalia by liberating what it regarded as the people and land of Somali 
from Ethiopian colonisation. The Somali army was defeated. 
85  The military government also carried the horrendous Red Terror campaign against  
the urban based leftist political groups., which resulted in the execution of 
thousands of young men and women. 
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emboldened Derg presented itself as a force of unity and went on 
implementing a policy of centralisation. The lofty ideals of the PNDR were 
abandoned and the Derg dumped its initial plans to accommodate the 
demands of nationalities. Declaring its most famous slogan Ethiopia Tikdem 
(Ethiopia First) and emphasising the indivisibility of the Ethiopian unity, the 
Derg was not ready to concede to the national question beyond the cultural 
realm. The different ethnic groups were regarded as no more than cultural 
artifacts that embellish the festivities of the annual revolution day. It 
claimed that national oppression and class oppression are things of the past 
as was the imperial state. The socialist revolution, argued that the Derg, had 
brought national oppression to an end by guaranteeing the ‘equality of all 
people and cultures’ and the rest, including the ‘legacy of cultural 
oppression’, shall be overcome “through the cultural emancipation of 
formerly subordinate groups and the promotion of their culture”.86 The 
political participation of the different nationalities was not open for 
discussion.87 Demands for political autonomy were regarded as the works of 
counter-revolutionaries; ethnic mobilisations were portrayed as serious 
threats to the revolution.88 The strong drive towards centralisation made the 
unity and territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state a prime agenda leaving 
no room for regional autonomy. Any hope that a negotiated solution would 
be achieved with the war in Eritrea faded away. As noted by Clapham, “the 
government sought to impose [military] solution from the centre”.89 
 
It was this position of the Derg that informed its response to the armed 
struggle that was already underway in Eritrea and other nationalist 
movements that took up arms immediately after the revolution, including 
                                                 
86  Markakis 2003: 17. 
87  See Clapham 1988. 
88  Clapham 1988. See also Merara 2002.  
89  Clapham 1988: 200. 
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the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front 
(OLF). The TPLF, which traces back its origin to the early days of student 
movements in Addis Ababa, was formed by students of Addis Ababa 
University from the Tigray region. Disagreeing from the students 
organisations that put class struggle at the apex of the political struggle, the 
students from Tigray contended that national struggle should be the primary 
struggle in Ethiopia.  As most student organisations of that time, the TPLF 
drew its inspirations from the Leninist principle of self-determination and 
espoused the view that “a new and democratic republic of Ethiopia could be 
constructed only through a voluntary and consensual association of its 
parts”.90 TPLF’s view of multinational Ethiopia entails a considerable 
degree of autonomy for different groups that inhabit the country within a 
larger political partnership that is modeled on federalism. It did not, 
however, exclude the possibility of secession. This is clearly stated in the 
political program of the TPLF: 
 
Self-determination does not mean secession; nor does it mean 
unity for the sake of unity. (a) If there is a democratic political 
atmosphere, it means the creation of voluntary integrated 
nations and nationalities whose relations are based on equality, 
democracy and mutual advantage. (b) If the existing national 
oppression continues or is aggravated, then it means the birth 
of an independent Tigray.91 
 
The OLF was formed in January 1974 by members mainly drawn from the 
Mecha-Tuluma Association.92 In contrast to the Mecha-Tuluma Association 
that defined the Oromo question as a question of equality within Ethiopia, 
the OLF regards its struggle as a struggle of the Oromo people against 
                                                 
90  Young 1997: 99. 
91  As quoted in Bereket 1980: 89. 
92  Mohammed 1998: 213-215. 
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Ethiopian colonisation. Its aim is to establish an independent state of 
Oromyia. The Ogaden National Liberation Front that emerged in 1986 in 
the Somali-speaking Ogaden region93 also regards its struggle as an anti-
colonisation struggle that aims at the establishment of an independent 
Ogadeni state, free from “Ethiopian colonisation”.94 Both movements were 
largely operating in the eastern part of Ethiopia. 
 
5.2 The 1987 Constitution and the question of nationalities 
As the different liberation fronts intensified their armed struggle against the 
Derg army, the question of nationalities resurfaced as the agenda of the 
Derg with the establishment of the Institute of Nationalities in 1983, which 
became fully operational in 1985.The institute was required to help “resolve 
minor contradictions among nationalities”95 (emphasis added). The 
institution, whose mandate included the drafting of a constitution, was 
required to research into the national composition of the country, the 
administrative divisions of the regions and comparative constitutional law 
of other countries.96 The institute was, however, supposed to carry out its 
                                                 
93  This region was a battlefield between the Ethiopian and the Somali armies in  
1974. The Somali Republic considered this area as part of the Greater Somalia. It 
first sought to realise its irredentist intention through the Western Somalia 
Liberation Front which was established in 1975 to reclaim a ‘lost Somalia 
territory’.  The area claimed by the WSLF includes much of the Oromo land east 
of the Awash river and Muslim Oromos were simply incorporated into the WSLF 
as “Abo-Somalis”. When the attempts by the WSLF failed to bring the desired 
result, the government of the Somalia Republic sent its army deep into the area. 
The Somalia army was defeated (see Merara 2002: 105-107).  
94  Merara 2002: 106 
95  Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities 1984a: 9. See also Gashaw  
1993. 
96  Owing to the socialist leanings of the Derg, the comparative aspect was limited to  
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tasks based on the principle that “chauvinism and narrow nationalism must 
be eliminated”.97 Furthermore, the government made it clear that the 
questions of nationalities can only be addressed within the framework of 
national unity. These guiding principles are indicative of the normative 
framework within which the institute was obliged to function.98 The heavy 
emphasis on territorial integrity and national unity was thus evident.   
 
A new constitution that established the People Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (PDRE) was adopted in 1987, providing a civilian costume to the 
military junta, which, by then, had already established the Workers Party of 
Ethiopia (WPE). Article one of the Constitution outlined the framework 
within which questions of nationalities could be addressed by declaring the 
“indivisible and inviolable nature of the Ethiopian state” although the same 
article states that “the Ethiopian state has from the beginning been a multi-
national state”. Article two declared the equality of nationalities. The 
languages of the various nationalities were also given equal status. This 
                                                                                                                            
the policies and practices of socialist countries. As a result, members of the 
institution, which were largely university instructors, visited socialist countries 
and also the different parts of the country. The government report, which outlined 
the main features of the intended constitution, had also made it clear that the rights 
of nationalities must be addressed within the framework of the Leninist principle 
of self-determination, which is incorporated in the National Democratic 
Revolution Program (NRDP) and which provides for its implementation within 
the framework of regional autonomy. “The desire to secede from socialist Ethiopia 
is a desire to join imperialism and the reactionary camp” Andargachew, 1993, 
266. This is, however, a contradiction. The USSR constitution, which is also based 
on the same Leninist principle of self determination that the intended constitution 
is supposed to be based on, provided the union republics, albeit formally, the right 
to secede from the Union.  
97  Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities 1984a: 9. 
98  Clapham 1988: 199. 
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meant Amharic no longer enjoyed the formal status of the national 
language. It was rather recognised as the working language of the 
government.  
 
The Constitution established a unitary state that was comprised of 
administrative areas and autonomous regions. Twenty-six administrative 
regions and five autonomous regions were established. The five 
autonomous regions were established in the regions where active liberation 
movements were already underway namely Eritrea, Tigray, Asseb, Dire 
Dawa and Ogaden. Each administrative and autonomous region could 
establish a directly elected regional Shengo (i.e. parliament), which could, 
in turn, elect the executive that ran the administration of the region. The 
difference between the autonomous regions and the administrative regions 
lies in the legislative powers of the two types of regions. The former can 
enact legislation without requiring approval from the central government as 
long as the legislation is consistent with the law of the national Shengo 
while the administrative regions had to secure a prior approval from the 
same organ.99 The autonomous regions jurisdiction included developing 
plans for economic development and providing services such as education, 
health and security.  
 
5.3 Assessment 
Although the PDRE Constitution acknowledged the equality of nationalities 
under article 2, the recognition was watered down by the same article which 
rejected “chauvinism and narrow nationalism”. This signals that the Derg 
had continued to view the demands of recognition and regional autonomy 
with a great deal of suspicion. The formal recognition of the equality of 
languages was also a little more than lip service. In practice, Amharic 
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retained its dominant status as the language through which government 
business was conducted in all parts of the country.100 The autonomous 
regions were not allowed to adopt their own working language, let alone the 
administrative regions. 
 
The territorial structure of the state, which was designed by the Institute of 
Nationalities, was, to some extent, a reflection of the demographical 
settlement of the population. The territorial configuration was, nevertheless, 
done within the broader framework of national unity and territorial integrity. 
The architects sought to ensure that the final outcome of the territorial 
configuration of the state does not pose a threat to the territorial integrity of 
the state. This is visible from the different territorial formula that the 
Constitution followed with respect to small and large nationalities. The 
Constitution provided small nationalities with a region of their own, 
providing them with a territorial space that is necessary to manage their own 
affairs. Clapham notes that these nationalities “were not powerful enough to 
present a viable threat of secession”.101 Large nationalities, by contrast, 
were not demarcated into one region. They were rather divided into 
different regions. This obviously was with the view to “counteract the lure 
of secession”.102  Eritrea, for example, was divided into two regions as a 
result of which Asseb was established as a separate autonomous region.103 
The general impression is that the territorial structure was used to provide 
nationalities with some level of territorial autonomy without posing a threat 
to the territorial integrity of the country. The establishment of separate 
autonomous regions by the Constitution might also imply that the latter 
enjoyed more autonomy than the administrative regions. It might also 
                                                 
100  Baker 1990. 
101  Clapham 1988: 253. 
102  Clapham 1988: 253. 
103  Bereket 1990. 
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suggest that they had more latitude in managing internal affairs. 
Furthermore, the establishment of these regions in the conflict-ridden 
regions might signal a commitment to accommodate the demands of the 
liberation movements that were already underway.  
 
A close look at the constitutional allocation of powers would, however, 
reveal that the changes that the Constitution envisaged were, at best, ill-
defined and at worst, superficial. In fact, there was nothing in the 
Constitution that indicates that the autonomous regions enjoyed more power 
than the administrative regions.104 The Constitution rather envisaged the 
enactment of by-laws that would outline in detail the powers of the 
autonomous regions. Failing to entrench the powers of autonomous regions 
in the Constitution, the degree and scope of the autonomy of the regions 
was left to be determined by the National Shengo, the national legislator 
with over 800 members that are nominated by the WPE and its affiliated 
auxiliary organs (the “mass organisations”) and military units, eventually 
elected through the first-past-the post system.105 This implied that the 
autonomous regions were “entirely subordinated to the national 
government, which, through its power to enact by-laws, has the power to 
change their powers as well as their territorial boundaries”.106 This, it could 
do, without consulting the concerned autonomous region.  
 
Compared to the rigid centralist position advanced by the military 
government, the elements of the PDRE constitution that grappled with the 
question of nationalities represents, at least, a symbolic departure from the 
age-old centralisation. However the fact that these concessions were made 
                                                 
104  Andargachew 1993. 
105  Bereket 1990. 
106  Clapham 1988: 200-201 
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within the framework of a centralised state and after the insurgent 
movements took root in the different parts of the country rendered the 
concession too little, too late. By the time the government introduced these 
measures, most of the areas in the north where the Shengo established 
autonomous regions were totally outside government control.107 Clapham 
wrote 
 
Had such a reorganization [of the territorial structure] been 
carried out early in the revolution, and accompanied by the 
appointment of local administrators  to run the new regions, it 
might well have helped to defuse local nationalism, and 
contribute to an overall sense of national unity. By 1987 and 
coming from a government with rigid commitment to centralism, 
it may well have been too late, especially in the northern part of 
the country. By the end of 1989, five of the eight prospective 
regional capitals in the former regions of Eritrea, Tigray, Gonder 
and Wollo were in the hands of insurgent movements, with only 
Asmara, Gondar and Dessie remaining under government 
control.108 
 
6. The Transitional Charter and ethnicity 
Despite the regional autonomy solution, the Derg was determined to find a 
military answer to ethnic conflicts. It was, in fact, a military solution that 
finally brought the conflicts to an end except that it was the nationalist 
movements that emerged with victory. The fast-advancing nationalist 
movements both in Eritrea and northern Ethiopia eventually led to the 
crumbling of power at the centre causing Mengistu HaileMariam, the 
accomplished dictator of 17 years, to flee to Zimbabwe. On 24 May 1991, 
the EPLF took control of Asmara, the Eritrean capital, marking the end of a 
                                                 
107  Bereket (1990: 127) states that “[e]lections of candidates from these areas were  
announced where none had taken place”. 
108  Clapham 1988: 253. 
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war that lasted for nearly thirty years.109 The TPLF army that ousted the 
Derg from Tigray, northern Ethiopia, and established, in a coalition with 
other liberation forces, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) entered Addis Ababa and removed the Derg on 28 May 
1991.  
 
With the assumption of power by the EPRDF, a new dispensation was 
dawning in the Ethiopian political and constitutional terrain. This was 
already visible in the Peace and Democracy Conference of July 1991 that 
eventually led to the establishment of the Transitional Government (TG) on 
the basis of the Transitional Charter (Charter). The conference was largely 
an assembly of representatives of the different ethnic groups in the country, 
including the OLF, the ONLF and including a few other parties with a state-
wide agenda. The political recognition of ethnicity was evident. The 
                                                 
109  The liberation movement that waged a war for thirty years became the Provisional  
Government of Eritrea with its leader, Isaias Afewerki, as Secretary-General. The 
EPLF declared its intent to hold, within two years, an internationally supervised 
referendum on the question of independence from Ethiopia. The Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia also recognised the right of the Eritrean people to 
determine their political future by an internationally supervised referendum. Upon 
invitation by the Referendum Commissioner, and with the consent of the 
Ethiopian government, the United Nations General Assembly authorized the 
establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum 
in Eritrea (UNOVER), a mission that was mandated to ‘verify the freeness, 
fairness and impartiality of the entire referendum process’. From 23 to 25 April 
1993, Eritrean went to the polls to vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the question: “Do you 
approve Eritrea to become an independent sovereign state?” A voter turn out of 
98.24 per cent was registered. 99.805 per cent of those participating in the 
referendum voted for independence, and only 0.17 per cent voted against.  The 
referendum was described by the UNOVER Chief as well as the OAU observer 
mission as free and fair. On 28 May 1993, the General Assembly admitted Eritrea 
as the Organization’s 182nd Member State (see Yonatan 2007). 
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position was that a democratic transition in Ethiopia is possible only if it 
recognises and accommodates all cultural communities. This made the 
nationalities question the primacy question that needed to be tackled in the 
quest for the democratisation of the Ethiopian state.  
 
6.1 The Charter as a response to the multi-ethnic challenge 
The new dispensation, which championed the rights of nationalities, was 
stated upfront in the preamble of the Charter. The preamble heralds the 
dawning of “a new chapter in Ethiopian history in which freedom, equal 
rights and self-determination of all the peoples shall be the governing 
principles of political, economic and social life”.110 This is concretised by 
article 2 of the Charter which recognises the right of nations, nationalities 
and peoples to self-determination. By way of providing practical expression 
to this commitment, the same article grants “each nation, nationality and 
peoples the right to administer its own affairs within its own defined 
territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of 
freedom, and fair and proper representation”, thus, entrenching elements of 
both self rule and shared rule.111  
 
6.1.1 Self rule 
The constitutional provision that declares the right of each ethnic 
community to administer its internal affairs within its own ‘defined 
territory’ represents an aspect of self-rule. It entrusted each ethnic 
community with the right to regulate its internal affairs thus providing for 
territorial autonomy. This was also facilitated further by the right of each 
subnational unit to determine its working language. Unprecedented in the 
                                                 
110  Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia No.1 Negarit Gazeta 50th year No. 1 Addis  
Ababa, 22 July 1991 (hereafter Charter).  
111  Article 2(b) Charter.  
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Ethiopian constitutional history was also the recognition of the right of 
ethnic communities to secede from the state. An ethnic community can 
exercise its right to opt out of the state if it is convinced that its right to 
preserve its identity, promote its culture and history, use and develop its 
languages, administer its affairs within its own defined territory, and 
effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom and 
fair and proper representation are denied, abridged or abrogated.112 This 
means the right to secession, albeit remedial in nature, was provided for by 
the Charter. Secession without just cause was not recognised by the 
Constitution. 
 
The Charter was silent about the structure and number of subnational units 
that had to be established in order to give effect to the right of ethnic 
communities to self-administration. It left the matter to the legislator. The 
latter gave effect to the right to self-administration by legislating 
Proclamation No 7 of 1991, which provided for the establishment of 
‘National Regional Self-Governments’. The Proclamation organised the 
territorial structure of the state based on the Charter’s commitment to the 
right of ethnic communities to self-determination and to determine their 
own affairs.113 The Proclamation established 14 self-governments. Of these, 
                                                 
112  Article 2 (c) Charter 
113  Preamble, Charter. In discussing the territorial structure of the state, it is important  
to note that the Charter first enumerated 63 identified ethnic communities, which 
it referred to as nations, nationalities and peoples. It then divided these 
communities into two categories. The first group consisted of 48 ethnic 
communities which, according to the Charter, can establish their own self-
government at the wereda level, the lowest administrative unit, and above. The 
second group, comprising of the remaining 17 identified ethnic groups, could not 
establish their own self-government. The criterion was population size. The 
population size of the second group of ethnic communities, which are also known 
as ‘minority nationalities’, were considered too small to establish a self-governing 
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four of them were almost dominated by a single ethnic group. This included 
Amhara, Oromyia, Tigray and Afar. The rest were ethnically heterogeneous 
with some containing three ethnic groups while others had as many as 13 
ethnic groups. Addis Ababa, the capital city, was recognised as a regional 
state on its own, acquiring a status of a city-state. 
 
The legislative authority of each self-government resided with the 
National/Regional Council, whose members are fully elected by the 
population of the concerned self-government. The Council had the power to 
issue the constitution and laws of the self-government. The executive 
authority of the self-government was vested in the Executive Committee, 
which is elected by the self-government legislature from among its 
members. The Committee was chaired by the head of the self-government. 
The head of the self-government exercises the executive authority together 
with other members of the Executive Committee. Both the head of self-
government and members of the executive committee are responsible to the 
self-government legislature for the exercise of their powers and the 
performance of their functions.114 Self–governments were also given the 
authority to establish wereda and a superior court system that operates 
parallel to the central government court system.115 State supreme courts 
were entrusted with the highest and final judicial power over all matters that 
are not explicitly defined by law as the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
the central government. 
 
                                                                                                                            
administration even at the lowest level of the government structure, namely 
wereda. The Charter, however, provided that these nationalities shall be provided 
with appropriate representation in the wereda council.  
114  In addition, the head of government is also made accountable for the Council of  
Ministers of the Central Transitional Government (Article 19 Charter). 
115  Article 78(3) Charter. 
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The distribution of powers was also outlined by the same Proclamation. A 
reading of article 9(1) of the Proclamation tends to suggest that self-
governments had legislative, executive and judicial powers in respect of all 
matters within their geographic area. This did not include matters that 
normally fall under the jurisdictions of the national government, namely 
defense, foreign affairs, economic policy, citizenship, state of emergency, 
deployment of army, printing of currency, establishing and administering 
major development establishments, building and administering major 
communication networks. However appealing, this should not be interpreted 
to mean that self-governments could exercise authority on all matters except 
on the specifically enumerated competences of the central government. 
Some of the nine major areas that are specifically reserved for the central 
government are couched in broad terms (i.e. like ‘major development 
establishment’ and ‘major communication networks’) that the powers of the 
central government extend into vast areas of administration. Furthermore, 
the use of phraseologies like ‘such matters as’ and “the like” at the 
beginning and end of the listing of the nine competences respectively 
suggest that the enumerated powers of the central government are not 
exhaustive.116 This means the residual powers of self-government are 
limited and are not as extensive as they appeared to be. 
 
In addition to residual powers, self-governments were entrusted with 
“special powers”. These special powers included the establishment and 
direction of the police and security forces, the issuance and implementation 
of laws relating to public service, the employment and administration of the 
personnel of the self-government and the establishment of judicial organs 
with regional jurisdictions. Other than these administrative powers, the 
regional self-governments were also entrusted with powers that are ‘fiscal 
                                                 
116  Fasil 1997: 41. 
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and economic’ in nature. For example, they had the power to borrow from 
domestic lending sources and to levy dues and taxes; to prepare, approve 
and implement their own budget; to plan, direct and supervise social and 
economic establishments; administer, develop and protect the natural 
resources of the region; and be the owner of the properties of the self-
government, acquire ownership of and transfer property.117 The exercise of 
these powers should not, however, contradict the policies and laws of the 
central government.118  
 
6.1.2 Shared rule 
The shared rule aspect of the Charter is visible in the right of each 
community to participate in the institutions of the central government. Each 
ethnic community is entitled to receive a fair and proper representation in 
the national decision making bodies, including the legislature, executive and 
judiciary.  
 
An eighty-seven seat legislative council, known as the Council of 
Representatives (the Council), was established. The Council was composed 
of largely ethnic-based political parties that participated in the July 
Conference. Seats were allocated based on the military strength and political 
history of each party. The EPRDF took 32 seats while the OLF was given 
12 seats. The rest were given either one or two seats each. The Chairman, 
Vice-chairman and the Secretary of the Council were elected from different 
ethnic groups. The representation of the different political forces and ethnic 
groups was taken into account in organising the cabinet. Of the 26 cabinet 
members, five were drawn from the OLF. Key ministerial positions, 
                                                 
117  Article 10 Charter. 
118  This is stated in the same provisions that outline the powers of the regional self- 
governments. 
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including prime minister, defense, interior and foreign affairs, were 
controlled by the EPRDF.119   
 
6.2 Assessment 
The TG that was established by the Charter and elaborated by the 
subsequent proclamations was not explicitly designated as federal. Neither 
the Charter nor the Proclamation that provided for the establishment of self-
governments referred to the TG as federal or decentralised, for that matter. 
This is surprising given the fact that the system had incorporated important 
elements of autonomy. Fasil is of the opinion that the transitional 
government is federal; “What is envisaged is nothing short of federation”.120  
 
A defining feature of a federation is that the powers of the constituent units 
emanates not from a statutory reform but direct from the texts of the 
constitution, or in the context of the TG, from the Charter. The member 
states in a federation enjoy original legislative and executive powers. In this 
particular case, the Charter did not outline the division of powers between 
the national government and the self-governments. This was rather left to 
the national legislator. Another important element of a federation, which is 
the provision of ‘effective separate representation of the subnational units’, 
usually in the form of a bi-cameral parliament, was also lacking in the TG. 
Generally speaking, although the TG had incorporated aspects of a 
federation, it could not be regarded federal as such. It is submitted that the 
TG was closer to a decentralised system of government than a federation. 
This is especially true considering that the powers of the self-government, 
as in many other decentralised systems, emanate not from the constitution 
but from the national legislature which means the central government that 
                                                 
119  Bereket 1997. 
120  Fasil 1997: 44. 
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granted the selected powers retains, at least, legally speaking, the option to 
‘recentralise’ powers and functions. Provision of the Charter that made the 
head of self-governments accountable to the Council of Ministers of the 
central government is also another indication of the diluted nature of the 
autonomy that was envisaged in the system for subnational units.121 
 
By whatever name the system is designated, however, it is important to note 
the extent to which the system went in incorporating the ethnic factor in the 
designing of the state. Ethnic balance was seriously taken into account in 
the geographical configuration of the state, the structuring of cabinet as well 
as in the organisation of the legislative council. Ethnic consideration 
permeated the transitional government in its entirety.  Unlike the titular 
gesture of the Derg in the form of nominal regional autonomy, the architects 
of the Transitional Charter demonstrated a strong commitment to the 
upholding of ethnic diversity by establishing an institutional framework that 
allows for the expression of these diversities. In contrast to the selective co-
optation of the imperial state, the Transitional Government provided 
avenues for extensive political participation and representation in the 
leadership structure of both the central government and self-governments. 
 
The system represented a marked departure from its predecessors that 
sought to impose a single Ethiopian identity.122 It represented the 
recognition that injustice had been embodied in the making of the Ethiopian 
state.123 It embodied the declaration that the process that culminated in the 
                                                 
121  Article 19(3) Charter. 
122  Lencho (1998: 58) claims that the July Conference and the Charter that came out  
of it mark the “entitlement to the joint ownership of the emerging country and its 
government by the Oromo and other colonized southern nations was explicitly 
recognised for the first time since their forceful incorporation”. 
123  Lencho 1998: 58. 
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incorporation of vast areas and peoples of the southern region into the 
Ethiopian empire was not only nation-building but also nation-destroying. 
In short, the Charter represented the triumph of ethnic nationalism. Those 
that regarded the question of nationalities as the primacy question in the 
Ethiopian body politic eventually managed to make the same the agenda of 
the state. For the protagonists of the transitional system, Ethiopia’s future as 
a state is bleak unless the question of nationalities is addressed. This, they 
argued, can only be done by recognising ethnicity as the basis for political 
organisation of the state and abolish the age-old national oppression. Not 
everybody agrees with this particular construction of the Ethiopian political 
history (i.e. a history of national oppression). In the following pages we 
shall give an account of the contending views on the saliency of ethnicity in 
the political history of the Ethiopian state before we conclude by analysing 
the different viewpoints in light of the political development that are 
mapped out in the preceding sections.  
 
7. The political saliency of ethnicity in Ethiopia 
Owing to the different interpretation of the historiography accounted in the 
preceding sections, there is no clear agreement on the nature of the 
country’s political malaise. The debate centers around the nation-building 
project advanced by the Imperial state. The issue is whether the successive 
regimes of the Ethiopian state have succeeded in building a nation out of the 
multitude of diverse groups that they brought under their rule in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century or imposed the domination of one ethnic 
group over the rest of the population.  
 
7.1 Divergent views on the place and role of ethnicity  
Donald Levine argues that “despite this stunning diversity Ethiopia has to 
be perceived as a country that is sufficiently unified both ecologically and 
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culturally”.124 The upshot of this argument is that Ethiopia is not an 
ethnocratic state based on the hegemony of the Amhara. Christopher 
Clapham argues that the Ethiopian central government, “far from being the 
Amhara preserve, as the mythology of the opposition movements claims, 
readily provides position of power for Oromo, Gurages, Aderes, wolaytas or 
kambatas”.125 He indicates that some non-Amhara joined the ruling circles 
both before and after the revolution of 1974. He concludes that the system is 
not ethnically exclusive. Gahsaw shares the same view. He claims that “the 
Ethiopian ruling classes cannot be identified with a particular ethnic group” 
as they are a “multi-ethnic group whose only common factors are that they 
are Christians, Amharic speakers, and claim lineage to the Solomonic 
line”.126 
 
For others like Lewis, on the other hand, Ethiopia was an ethnocratic 
state.127 The claim that Ethiopia has successfully achieved nationhood is the 
perception of a very limited but influential elite, mostly confined to the 
north, north west, the capital and other major towns. It is only these groups 
that are the custodians of Pan-Ethiopianism. The Imperial state was a 
conglomeration of various ethnic groups under which the Shewa Amhara 
gained precedence. As indicated earlier, this is the view advanced by the 
student movement in the 1970’s as well as the liberation fronts that emerged 
thereafter.  
 
These polarised debates are not of historical importance only but they 
constitute, as reflected in the 2005 election, a central place in the 
contemporary Ethiopian political and constitutional debate. Contradictory 
                                                 
124  Gebru 1991: 28. 
125  Clapham 1990. 
126  Gashaw 1993: 142. 
127  Lewis 1993. 
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interpretations of the Ethiopian history underlie the country’s alignment of 
political forces. On the one hand are political forces that regard the Menelik 
expansion of the 19th century as the process of ‘nation-building’. For them, 
this is an unavoidable route that any great power has to go through. Based 
on their motto “One Ethiopia”, “[t]hey see themselves as the authentic 
representatives of the indivisible Ethiopian ‘nation’ and consider it 
unpatriotic, or even un-Ethiopian, to argue for the recognition of the rights 
of hitherto marginalized ethnic groups”.128 Merara refers to these groups as 
“Menelikans of the nineteenth century”.129 Some of the member parties of 
the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), the major contender of the 
2005 election, subscribe to the ‘nation-building’ view. On the other side of 
the alignment are those that view the act of Menelik as an act of national 
oppression. They contend that the different nationalities were subjected to 
economic, cultural and political domination. Included in this category are 
the EPRDF, the Oromo National Congress (ONC) and a number of ethnic-
based parties that contested the election in the different regional states. 
 
7.2 Assessment 
It is submitted that it is only the synthesis of these two views that can fully 
explain the nature of the Ethiopian society and inform the appropriate 
course towards the peaceful co-existence of the different ethnic groups that 
inhabit the country. Led by King Menelik, the Amharic speaking shewa 
rulers, in their quest for wealth, subjugated the Southern ethnic groups that 
had their own political and cultural systems. They forcefully diffused their 
culture and language on the southerners. They disparaged them culturally 
and marginalised them economically. To that extent, the Imperial State was 
an ethnocratic state. The fact that people from the other ethnic groups were 
                                                 
128  Merara 2006: 120. 
129  Merara 2006: 120. 
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able to assume position in the hierarchies of the Imperial state is of little 
significance as these people had to fully assimilate to the Amhara culture 
and religion in order to be accepted into the circles of the ruling class. The 
patrimonial alliances that were employed in some cases in order to ease the 
tension had a limited effect. In most cases, it amounted to cutting the 
umbilical cord that connected the local rulers with the subjugated mass, 
discrediting them in the eyes of the local population without facilitating the 
inclusion of the local population into the mainstream society.130  
 
At the same time, it would be a historical blunder to view the country’s 
political malaise in the framework of the question of nationalities only, 
thereby, implying the assumption that ethnicity had been the sole rallying 
point in the political history of the Ethiopian state. First, the predominant 
role of the Shewa Amhara, in contrast to the Amharas in the northern parts 
of the country, in the making of the Ethiopian Empire should be 
emphasised. More broadly, the role that regional identities played in the 
struggle for the center of power mainly in the Abyssinian Kingdom but also 
of the larger Ethiopian Empire must be taken into account. As many argue, 
and rightly so, the Amharic speaking people in the northern part of the 
country primarily identify themselves in terms of their respective regions. 
This was, at least, the case prior to the introduction of the new dispensation. 
They would immediately tell you that they are Woleye, Gondere or 
Gojame-reminiscent of the historical territorial divisions prevalent in the 
Ethiopian Empire-and not Amhara.131 The historical circumstances in the 
                                                 
130  Most of these local rulers “were classed as Amharas by their subject peoples” (see  
Clapham 1994: 33).  
131  This does not mean they are not ethnically Amhara although some contend that  
the Amhara are not an ethnic group. Using objective criteria, an anthropologist 
might readily classify them as belonging to one ethnic group. It is not, however, 
sufficient that an anthropologist classifies them into one ethnic group. More 
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Abyssinian Kingdom were such that regional identities came to play an 
important role. Of course, for the southerners, the regional differences may 
not mean much as they classed their rulers as Amhara, who speak the same 
language and profess the same religion, both of which are largely alien to 
them. But for any constitution maker that seeks to address the nationalities 
question and rebuild the country based on this understanding, this 
distinction is of great importance. Identifying a group by how others define 
them rather than by how they define themselves is reminiscent of an 
ascribed identity that is rooted in a primordial thinking. In any event, a 
simple classification of these groups as Amhara would be a 
superimposed/ascribed identity.  
 
Related to this is also the need to take into account the class consideration 
that was prevalent in the northern part of the country. Unlike the Afrikaners 
of South Africa, where the assumption of political power was accompanied 
with economic upliftment, the Amhara both from the Shewa and the other 
regions did not benefit from the assumption of power by their kinfolk. The 
peasants of the north were subjected to equally harsh conditions by the 
ruling class. In fact, the major difference was only that their oppressors 
spoke their language and practiced their culture. This should be taken into 
account in determining the relevance and saliency of ethnicity in the 
Ethiopian society and the role it should assume in the new constitutional 
dispensation.   
 
Another important factor is also to take into account the section of the 
population, however small that may be, that does not identify with any 
particular ethnic group but with the larger state. This section of the 
                                                                                                                            
important is also the subjective element, which is often shaped by political, 
historical and social circumstances. 
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population is present mostly in the capital but also some other major towns. 
Admittedly, it is not easy to discern this group. Like the Wallons of 
Belgium that identify themselves with the state, some of them claim the 
Ethiopian identity and strongly reject identification with any particular 
ethnic group only to express their opposition against the present 
dispensation, a politically motivated response rather than a true expression 
of one’s identity.  For others, including those that could primordially 
speaking belong to the Amhara or those that have successfully assimilated 
to the Amhara culture, it is difficult, if not impossible, to define their 
identity in separation of the state-wide identity. This is understandable given 
that the state, as alluded to above, is constructed based on the language, 
culture and history of the Amhara. The point is that such kind of identity 
formation and its development should also be given a space in the public 
sphere. As it happened with the case of Brussels in Belgium, residents of the 
capital must be free to develop their own identity, which in most likely case 
would either relate to the state-wide identity or an identity that is peculiar to 
the city. They should not be forced to be classified as belonging to a 
particular ethnic group which currently manifests in the requirement that 
imposes a duty on the residents of the city to identify themselves with a 
particular ethnic group when applying for an identity card. 
 
The foregoing discussion clearly indicates the need to arrive at a synthesis 
of the two views that have dominated the Ethiopian politics for decades. 
The basic thrust of this position is the need to accept the existence of 
different types and levels of identity, which may or may not overlap among 
members of the Ethiopian society. We need to come to grips with the fact 
that some keep their allegiance exclusively with their particular ethnic 
group while others share an overarching state-wide identity. Some identify 
themselves with their regional rather than ethnic identity. And yet, we must 
also note that a multi-layered identity, whereby the embracing of an ethnic 
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identity does not exclude similar allegiance to an overarching state-wide 
identity, is a common reality as is the case with persons belonging to most 
ethnic groups in the southern Ethiopia.  
 
The existence of these different layers of identity is reflected, to a certain 
extent, in the 2005 election. It is clear that one of the reasons why the ruling 
party lost the election in Addis Ababa has to do with the fact that its policy 
of nationalities does not sit well with the residents of the melting pot Addis 
Ababa. It is difficult to conceive a party that champions the cause of the 
ethnic groups wining an election against a party that rejects the 
consideration of the ethnic factor in the Ethiopian politics in a city where 
the majority of them do not consider their ethnic identity as a defining 
element of who they are. Yet to present the successful mobilisation of the 
residents of the capital and other major urban areas against ethnicity as a 
state-wide protest to the inclusion of the ethnic factor in the body politic is 
either being naïve or engaging in a deliberate distortion of the socio-
political realities prevalent in the country. The relative gain of ethnic-based 
opposition parties in the Oromo-speaking parts of the country suffices to 
indicate that the denial of votes to the ruing party cannot be simply 
interpreted as a rejection of the ethnic factor.  
 
8. Conclusion 
The key element for the mutual coexistence of the different groups in the 
Ethiopian society lies in the capacity and willingness of the protagonists of 
the Ethiopian politics to recognise the multi-layered identities that exist in 
the country. It is only when a consensus is achieved to build the Ethiopian 
state based on such recognition that a peacefully co-existing democratised 
Ethiopia becomes a possible reality.  
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The absence of such recognition compromises the capacity to achieve 
arrangements that can be acceptable by all groups. Once this crucial element 
of recognition is realised, however, agreeing on institutional expressions 
that give practical effect to these different types and layers of identities 
should not be a problem. In the following chapter, we shall evaluate 
whether the present constitutional arrangement does recognise these 
realities and provide a space for their expression in the public sphere.
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Chapter Seven 
Marrying federalism with ethnicity: The case of Ethiopia 
 
1. Introduction 
In a significant departure from the tradition of African states, Ethiopia has 
ventured on a bold experiment of marrying of federalism with ethnicity. 
Ethnicity constitutes one of the major features of the Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 1/1995 
(hereafter Constitution) and the basis for the internal organisation of the 
federal state. The point of departure for self government as expressed in the 
federal arrangement is geographical areas based on ethnic criteria. This 
explains why the Ethiopian federalism is often referred to as ethnic or, as its 
detractors sometimes refer to it, tribal federalism.   
 
The present dispensation not only marks a new political watershed in post-
colonial Africa but also represents a major break from the era of 
centralisation that characterised the Ethiopian state for the most part of its 
history. This dispensation has not been without controversy. Critics take 
great pain to stress that the Ethiopian constitutional approach to claims of 
ethnic identity intensifies ethnic loyalty. They, as a result, fear that the risk 
of political disintegration is imminent. Yet others refer to the Ethiopian 
political history, and especially to the making of the present day Ethiopia, 
and argue that any constitution that aims to build a harmonious society 
cannot overlook the need to give due recognition to ‘ethnicity’, whatever 
form that recognition takes.  
 
Focusing on the 1995 Constitution as well as the legislative and other 
institutional developments, this chapter examines how Ethiopia has 
responded to the multi-ethnic challenge. Based on the institutional 
frameworks developed in previous chapters and against the background 
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depicted in Chapter Five, it discusses the present constitutional approach to 
ethnic diversity.  
 
The chapter first seeks to determine how the state of Ethiopia views itself, 
as described in the Constitution and other major legislation and policies. 
The question here is whether the state readily recognises its multi-ethnic 
character or seeks to present a homogenised image of the society it seeks to 
regulate.  The chapter then proceeds to the second institutional principle, 
self-rule, and examines the Ethiopian institutional perspective on providing 
autonomy to the constituent units. Finally, the focus shifts to the third 
institutional principle, shared rule, and discusses how this particular 
institutional principle has received practical expression in the Ethiopian 
Constitution. The chapter then concludes with some general assessment. 
 
1.1 Introducing the state structure 
Focusing on the state structure, this section briefly outlines the main 
features of the 1995 Constitution. The Constitution states that the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia comprises of the Federal Government and 
state members, establishing a two-tier federal government.1  
 
1.1.1 Federal Government 
Ethiopia has adopted a parliamentarian form of government from which the 
President, the Prime minister and the cabinet are drawn. The Constitution 
vests the executive authority of the Federal Government in the Prime 
Minister,2 who is the head of the national executive.3 The highest executive 
powers of the Federal Government are vested in the Prime Minister and in 
                                                 
1  Article 50(1) Constitution.  
2   Article 85 Constitution. 
3  Article 83(a) Constitution. 
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the Council of Ministers. Both the Prime Minister and members of the 
cabinet are accountable to the Parliament,4 which has the power to call and 
question the Prime Minister and other members of the executive. Parliament 
also has the power to investigate the executive’s conduct and discharge of 
its responsibilities.5 As is the case with most parliamentarian systems of 
government like Germany and India, the Federal Government has a 
ceremonial President who, once elected, vacates his or her seat in the 
Parliament.6 The President, who is a head of state,7 has to be elected by a 
two-thirds majority of the joint session of the lower and upper houses of the 
Ethiopian parliament. 
 
The Federal Government is comprised of two houses, which consist of the 
House of People’s Representatives (HPR) and the House of Federation 
(HF).8 The HPR, the lower house, is a directly elected body. On the other 
hand, the HF, the upper chamber, is a body that can be elected directly or 
indirectly by state parliaments and consists of representatives of ethnic 
groups. The HPR is declared by the Constitution as “the highest authority of 
the Federal Government”.9  
 
With regard to judicial powers, the Constitution vests supreme judicial 
authority in the Federal Supreme Court. It also allows the Federal 
Government to establish a Federal High Court as well as first–instance 
                                                 
4  Article 92(2) Constitution. 
5  Article 55(17) Constitution. 
6  Article 70(6) Constitution. 
7  Article 69 Constitution. 
8  Article 53 Constitution. 
9  Article 50(3) Constitution. 
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courts it deems necessary either across the country or in some parts of the 
country only. 10 
 
1.1.2 State government 
Ethiopia is divided into nine states and two self-governing administrative 
cities. The Constitution is, however, silent on the structure of state 
governments. It leaves the matter to state constitutions. Establishing a state 
administration that best advances self government is a responsibility left to 
each state.11 A survey of the constitutions of each state, however, reveals a 
common government structure across the states.  
 
The executive authority of a state is vested in the president of each 
province, who is elected by the state legislature from among its members.12 
Like the national Prime Minister, the president exercises the executive 
authority together with other members of the state cabinet. Members of the 
state cabinet are responsible to the state legislature for the exercise of their 
powers and the performance of their functions.  
 
The legislative authority of a state resides in its state legislature whose 
members are fully elected by the population of each state. Finally, states 
have also established State Supreme, High and first-instance courts.13 State 
Supreme Courts have the highest and final judicial power over state matters. 
 
The structure of government units below the state administration is a matter 
left to the states.  The Constitution simply declares that adequate power 
shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the people to 
                                                 
10  Articles 78-81 Constitution. 
11  Article 52(2) (a) Constitution. 
12  Articles 125-141 Constitution. 
13  Article 78(3) Constitution. 
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participate directly in the administration of such units.14 As a result, 
government units with various powers and functions have been established 
in different states. The common element is that all state governments have 
established three-tier structures (i.e. Zone, Wereda and Kebele). The status 
and powers of these government units, however, varies from one state to 
another. 
 
1.2. Clearing terminological ambiguity: Nation, nationality and 
people 
The Constitution uses the terms nation, nationalities and peoples to refer to 
the different ethnic communities in Ethiopia. Many students of Ethiopian 
federalism are not, however, clear about the meaning of the terms nations, 
nationalities and people as employed by the Constitution.15 Who is a nation? 
Which ethnic communities are regarded as nationalities? What is the 
difference between a nation and a nationality?  
 
The Constitution defines a nation, nationality or people simply as “a group 
of people who have or share a large  measure of common  culture or similar 
                                                 
14  Article 50(4) Constitution. 
15  Bekele (2002: 150) states that “the definition in the Constitution is …impregnated  
with too vague expressions that have made it too hard to understand and identify 
the social category it attempts to characterise – be it as nation, nationality or 
people”. Similarly, Cohen (1999: 99) argues that the Constitution “has employed 
this rather vague terminology in the hope of avoiding highly sensitive questions 
about what the nature, and therefore status, of groups of people in the Ethiopian 
state is”. He shifts his focus from the terminologies to the attitude expressed in the 
Constitution. According to him, “linguistic and territorial criteria are necessary for 
the definition of all groups of people, whilst the other criteria are used to back up 
these two, implying that other factors of a less easily defined nature can remain 
important in establishing the identity of a group, which seeks to assert the states 
rights” (Cohen 1999: 99).  
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customs, mutual intelligibility  of language, belief in common or related 
identities, a common psychological makeup, and who inhabit an 
identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory”.16 Both subjective and 
objective elements constitute the definition. In as much as objective markers 
like common culture, language and territory are regarded as defining 
elements of ‘nations, nationalities and people’, so are the subjective 
elements of collective identity and a common psychological make up. If a 
community is to be regarded as a nation, nationality or a people, it must 
satisfy both the objective and subjective elements of the definition.  
 
Some argue that the Constitution envisages a hierarchy between the 
different ethnic communities by designating some as a nation and others as 
nationalities. Alem, for example, takes the view that “the three words 
denote a hierarchy of ethnic groups from large (‘nation’) through medium 
(‘nationality’) to small (‘people’) in both numerical size and political 
significance”.17  For him, the size of the population and the political 
significance of each ethnic group determine the place of the group in the 
ethnic hierarchy that the Constitution envisages. He further illustrates this 
by stating that the Oromo are a nation, the Agew are a nationality, and the 
Koma are a people. From his illustration, it is clear that he gives greater 
weight to population size.  
 
It is submitted that a meaningful distinction among the three categories 
cannot be inferred from the Constitution. Even the fact that the Constitution 
uses different terms to refer to the different subnational units does not help 
to discern a nation from a nationality. The Constitution, for example, refers 
to Tigray, the almost ethnically homogenous subnational unit, as the state of 
                                                 
16   Article 39(5) Constitution. 
17  Alem 2005: 324. 
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Tigray. The same terminology is used to refer to the other four nearly 
ethnically homogenous subnational units. This might lead one to argue that 
those ethnic groups with a state of their own belong to one category, 
possibly a nation. Arriving at this conclusion is, however, made impossible 
by the fact the Constitution uses the same terminology to refer to 
Benshangul/Gumuz, a subnational unit composed of four ethnic groups (i.e. 
the state of Benshangul/Gumuz). The Constitution further complicates the 
matter by referring to Gambela, also composed of four indigenous ethnic 
groups, as the state of the Gambela Peoples. It then refers to the ethnically 
mosaic subnational unit of the Southern region as the “State of Southern, 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples”.18 The Constitution’s inconsistency in 
the designation of the subnational units makes it difficult to infer 
meaningful constitutional distinction among the three categories.  
 
The question that should be asked is whether the difficulty of understanding 
the difference between the three categories, even with the help of the text of 
the Constitution, means that there is no distinction between these three 
categories. To simply conclude that there is no distinction between the 
                                                 
18  Article 47(1) Constitution. Ismagilova (1999: 8-11) refers to the same problem: 
“…it is difficult to understand who is a ‘nation’ (Amhara, Tigray, Oromo?), who 
is a ‘nationality’? Who is a ‘people’? Because one of the [underdeveloped] states 
is called ‘Gambela Peoples’, one can suppose that this term means the lowest level 
of ethno-social category (synonym of ‘tribe’?). As to the [southern regional state], 
it is called ‘Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’. This State comprises 
[underdeveloped] areas including that inhabited by Nilotic ethnic groups. And it is 
difficult to understand why the term ‘nation’ is applied to these peoples”.  
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terms would mean that the Constitution’s usage of the terms is pointless. 
However, the fact that the constitution makes use of three different terms is 
indicative of the existence of three different types of socio-political 
categories. It at least suggests that the different ethnic groups in Ethiopia 
should be regarded as nations, nationalities or peoples, even if it does not 
explain the difference between these three categories. Holding otherwise 
would also be against the principle of constitutional interpretation which 
requires that each constitutional provision be interpreted as having meaning. 
 
Based on this premise, and using the discussions of the definition of 
ethnicity and nation in Chapter Two, the following distinction is suggested 
between a nation and a nationality. It is submitted that a group of people 
who satisfies the definition provided by article 39(5) of the Constitution 
could be regarded as a nation once they start to rally around a political 
agenda requesting either for a regional state of their own or some sort of 
political autonomy or, in the most extreme case, an independent state of 
their own. This seems also to be the interpretation adopted in practice. The 
Sidama Zone Council, an ethnically defined administrative unit within the 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPR), has 
made it a point to define themselves as a nation rather than as a nationality 
in making a case as to why they should have a regional state of their own 
rather than being lumped together with others under the southern state, the 
SNNPR. Implied in this is the argument that a nation is entitled to have a 
state of its own. According to the definition that we have just adopted, 
however, it is not only ethnic communities like the Sidama, who demand for 
a state of their own, that can be regarded as a nation. The definition of a 
nation also encompasses ethnic groups like the Silte who very recently 
demanded political recognition of their separate identity and some form of 
autonomy to express their identity and manage their own affairs. Ethnic 
groups that fulfil the criteria set by article 39 of the Constitution who, 
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nevertheless, have not developed an ethnically-defined political agenda, 
which is characterised by the absence of ethnically motivated political 
mobilisation, can be regarded as nationalities. 19  
 
The fact that the Constitution envisages differences among the three groups 
and thus the different ethnic communities that inhabit the country does not 
necessarily mean, unlike what Alem suggests, that there is a hierarchy 
among the three groups. The differences are more like phases that each 
ethnic group may or may not go through. An ethnic group may or may not 
develop into a socio-political unit. The development of a political agenda 
among an ethnic community depends on socio-historical and political 
circumstances. These developments define the nature of each ethnic 
community. Furthermore, the absence of a constitutionally significant 
hierarchy among the different ethnic communities is apparent from the fact 
that the Constitution provides ethnic communities, which exist within the 
already established subnational units, the right to establish at any time their 
own states.20 Despite the argument advanced by Alem, the size of the 
population should not matter in differentiating between, for example, a 
nation and a nationality. Even small ethnic communities can be as effective 
                                                 
19  Analysis of the three terms by Ismagilova (1999), in light of the Russian literature,  
seems to support this conclusion. He regards the use of the three terms as an 
influence of Russian scholars, who used to distinguish different categories. After 
explaining how confusing these terminologies are, especially when translated into 
English, he explains that  nation  is an ethno-social category in Russian literature 
while the term ‘nationality’ means ethnic origin and not an ethno-social category 
and coincides with terms ‘ethnic group’, ‘etnie’. 
20  Fasil (1997: 160) shares the same view: “The issue of [explaining the difference  
between a nation, nationality, and a people], intellectually interesting as it is from 
socio-anthropological point of view, has no direct constitutional bearing or 
significance since all three entities are assumed to be equal”.  
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as numerically larger ethnic groups in terms of political mobilisation and the 
articulation of political agenda. 
 
For the sake of brevity, this thesis uses the terms ethnic groups and ethnic 
communities alternatively to refer to nations, nationalities and peoples. 
 
2. Recognition of ethnic diversity 
The act of recognition can find expression in different forms. By focusing 
on the preamble to the Constitution, the state symbols as well as the 
language clause of the Constitution, this section determines how the state of 
Ethiopia defines itself 
 
2.1 Preamble 
The opening paragraph to the preamble of the Ethiopian Constitution begins 
with “We nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia”. Departing from 
the homogenisation solution of “we the people of the…” the Constitution 
presents the Ethiopian state as a compact entered into by the different ethnic 
groups that inhabit the country. As one author has remarked, “[t]his is not a 
constitution of the Ethiopian citizens simply lumped together as a people”.21 
Furthermore, the preamble clearly states that the ‘political community’ that 
these groups agreed to form is premised on the full recognition of their “full 
and free exercise [of the] right to self-determination”.  
 
Based on the opening statement of the preamble (i.e. “we the nation, 
nationalities and people of Ethiopia…”) some describe the Ethiopian 
federalism as a ‘coming together federalism’. Fasil states that “the Ethiopian 
citizens are first categorised in their different ethno-linguistic groupings and 
then these groupings come together as authors of, and beneficiaries from, 
                                                 
21  Fasil 1997: 51. 
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the Constitution of 1994”.22 The stronger advocate of this position is 
Andreas who describes the new political order as a ‘coming-together 
federalism’, albeit with some elements of the constitutional arrangement 
signifying a ‘holding-together federalism’.23 He bases his argument first on 
the fact that the constitution places sovereignty on the nations, nationalities 
and peoples of Ethiopia. He quotes at length the preamble which 
commences with the following paragraph: 
 
We the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia [are] 
strongly committed, in full and free exercise of our right to 
self-determination, to building a political community founded 
in the rule of law and capable of ensuring lasting peace, 
guaranteeing a democratic order and advancing our economic 
and social development.  
 
He also produces two further main arguments to substantiate his conclusion 
that the presentation of Ethiopia as a coming-together federalism is not a 
‘constitutional fiction’. First, the main political actors during the transition 
were, by and large, ethnic-based liberation movements or parties that either 
fought for or politically asserted the right to self-determination, including 
independence. This was especially most apparent in the case of Tigray 
where the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) that had established a ‘de 
facto independent political community’ long before the fall of the military 
government. Second, and this is his strongest argument, by the time the new 
political actors were ready to assume state power, the unitary state had 
ceased to exist. He concludes by stating that the Ethiopian federalism “is a 
                                                 
22  Fasil 1997: 51. 
23  Andreas 2003. 
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coming-together federalism because its advent was the result of a 
revolutionary overthrow of the unitary state”.24    
 
It is submitted that the description of the Ethiopian system as a coming 
together federalism is not convincing. Stephan, whom Andreas also quotes 
in making his argument, regards coming-together federalism as “the result 
of a bargain whereby previously sovereign polities agree to give part of 
their sovereignty in order to pool their resources to increase their collective 
security and to achieve other goals, including economic ones”.25 The key 
phrases in Stephan’s definition of coming-together federalism are 
“previously sovereign polities”. These phrases embody the key element that 
distinguishes coming–together federalism from holding together federalism. 
In the case of coming-together federalism, the constituent units are not the 
creatures of the new constitutional dispensation which could be an outcome 
of either a negotiation or a revolutionary overthrow of an existing state. As 
the case of the USA and Switzerland shows, the constituent units are 
sovereign entities prior to the establishment of the federation. In the case of 
Ethiopia, Tigray was, of course, a de facto independent political 
community. The same cannot, however, be said of the other constituent 
units of the present Ethiopian federation. Yet even Tigray never declared or 
considered itself as an independent state.26 Furthermore, the fact that the 
main political actors in the creation of the federation were ‘representatives 
of ethnic communities’ cannot in any way suggest that the different ethnic 
communities in Ethiopia were sovereign polities that were legitimately 
represented in the process that eventually brought about the new 
dispensation. The participants were mainly organisations that, at most, 
                                                 
24  Andreas 2003: 161. 
25  Stephan 1999: 21. 
26  See also Assefa 2006. 
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actively struggled for the political rights of the ethnic community which 
they ostensibly represented without, of course, having any legal mandate to 
do so. What we had was thus a political compact among the country’s major 
political forces rather than a compact among the ‘sovereign ethnic 
communities’ that inhabit the country. This leaves us with Andreas’s second 
point, namely that by the time the new political forces took power the 
unitary state had ceased to exist and hence the coming-together nature of the 
federation.  
 
It is true that the military junta was no longer a force to reckon with when 
the process for the reconstruction of the Ethiopian state was unleashed. An 
important difference that Andreas overlooks, however, is that it is the 
government, the state apparatus/machinery as we know it, which, 
admittedly, had ceased to exist and not the state. The state of Ethiopia 
remained united but under the control of a new force that was willing to 
negotiate with other forces on the reconstruction of the Ethiopian body 
politic. There was no single part of the Ethiopian state that declared 
independence or even self autonomy following the overthrowing of the 
unitary state. In conclusion, the constituent units of the federation were not 
by any standard sovereign polities that negotiated a coming-together 
federalism. The positing of the Ethiopian federalism as a coming-together 
federalism is no more than a ‘constitutional fiction’.  
 
The Ethiopian federation can appropriately be described as a holding-
together federalism, which, as defined by Stephan, is usually the product of 
unitary states reaching “the decision that the best way – in deed, the only 
way - to hold their countries together in a democracy would be to divide 
power constitutionally and turn their threatened polities into federation”.27 
                                                 
27  Stephan 1999: 160. 
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In the Ethiopian case, it may not be the unitary state that decided to divide 
power constitutionally among the subnational units. Yet the major political 
force that assumed control of the state believed that the best way to keep the 
country together was to rearrange the country based on some federal 
principles. To that effect, it, in negotiation with other political forces, 
divided the country into federal units and devolved power accordingly. This 
means that the Ethiopian case fits more appropriately with the group of 
holding-together federations than within coming-together federations. 
 
The implausibility of describing the Ethiopian federalism as coming-
together federalism should, not, however, blind us from noting the symbolic 
significance of the opening statement of the preamble. The opening 
statement and the subsequent paragraphs of the preamble reveal much how 
the Constitution views the Ethiopian state. Simply put, the Ethiopian 
Constitution does not aim at the construction of a nation-state. More like the 
Swiss Constitution, the different groups that make up the Ethiopian society 
have decided to place their allegiance primarily with their ‘nations and 
nationalities’. The preamble suggests that the decision to live together under 
one state is not motivated by the idea of nationhood or a common culture 
but by the conviction that the different groups that have historically 
inhabited Ethiopia have over time developed a ‘common interest’ and 
‘contributed to the emergence of a common outlook’. The preamble of the 
Constitution declares that the common destiny as Ethiopians “can best be 
served by rectifying historically unjust relationships and by further 
promoting [their] shared interests.”  
 
The Ethiopian approach rejects the patriotic narration about historic 
Ethiopian nationhood and replaces it with an idea of Ethiopia as a multi-
nation state. This is further strengthened by article 8 of the Constitution 
which vests all sovereign powers in the “nations and nationalities and 
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peoples of Ethiopia”. In this regard, the Ethiopian approach departs from the 
major trends in African states where the prohibition or suppression of 
political expression of ethnicity is the norm. Ethnic expressions are not only 
limited to the cultural realm. In fact, the political expression of ethnicity is 
encouraged. Ethnic communities are granted full political rights. By a 
constitutional fiat, ethnic communities, one may reasonably argue, are 
turned into political communities. Whether this is a good or bad construct is 
something that will be explored as we continue the discussion of Ethiopian 
federalism. 
 
2.2 Symbolic codes 
The vision of Ethiopia as a multi-nation state that acknowledges its internal 
diversity is also apparent in a number of symbolic codes that the state has 
adopted. Unlike a number of states, including South Africa, which have 
ignored institutional realities to eschew the federal nomenclature, the 
Ethiopian Constitution declares the Ethiopian State, in no ambiguous terms, 
as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The subnational units are 
also referred to as state governments that have their own state councils.   
 
The symbolic significance of flags is also appreciated by the Constitution. 
Article 3(1) of the Constitution has retained the old flag of Ethiopia, which 
consists of three equal and horizontal bands of green at the top, yellow in 
the middle and red at the bottom. It, however, placed a yellow pentagram 
and single yellow rays emanating from the angles between the points on a 
light blue disk centred on the three bands. The yellow pentagram, which 
also represents the national emblem, signifies the desire of the ‘nations, 
nationalities and peoples’ of Ethiopia to live together in equality and 
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unity.28 Like the Spanish Constitution, the Ethiopian Constitution allows 
members of the federation to have their own respective flags as determined 
by their respective legislatures. The same applies to emblems.29  
 
The paradigm shift in the vision of the state has also allowed member states 
of the federation to celebrate public holidays in addition to state-wide 
holidays. This has allowed the states to celebrate events whose historical 
importances are not necessarily shared by members of other ethnic groups. 
The day on which the TPLF started its armed struggle against the military 
regime is, for example, a public holiday in Tigray regional state. Another 
example is the commemoration of the Martyrs of the Chelenko war in the 
Harari regional state. In 1887, the expanding army of the Shewa Amhara led 
by Emperor Menelik had to overcome a fierce resistance from the people of 
Harari before it captured the city of Harar. Although this particular 
historical event was thrown into the historical dust bin, with the advent of 
the new dispensation, which has brought with it a different interpretation of 
the historiography of the state, the Harari people have now been able to 
commemorate it as the Chelenko Martyr’s day.   
 
Similarly, the present dispensation has given the different ethnic groups the 
opportunity to use their towns and institutions to somehow reflect their 
cultural and historical identity. The Oromyia regional state, for example, has 
                                                 
28  Article 3(2) Constitution. Successive regimes had placed their own unique 
identifiers on the flag. For instance, the Derg had the Arma placed on the flag and 
Emperor HaileSelassie had the Lion of Judah on the flag. The green, the yellow 
and red flag has remained the same. 
 
29  Article 3(3) Constitution. 
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named its legislative body Chefe Oromyia, in celebration of the most 
acclaimed democratic institution in the historic Oromo society. There have 
also been some name changes, especially in the Oromyia regional state. The 
town of Nazret and Debrezeit are now renamed as Adama and Bishoftu 
respectively, the original names of the two towns before they were changed 
following the expansion of the Menelik army into the area. Addis Ababa, 
the capital city, originally an Oromo homeland, has maintained its official 
name. Oromo officials and their media outlets are, however, free to refer to 
the town by its previous name, Finfine. Unlike in the case of South Africa, 
the changing of names has not provoked strong protest from other groups. 
 
The symbolic codes of the Ethiopian state clearly recognise the internal 
diversity of the Ethiopian society as they allow the different ethnic groups 
to express their culture and history. The problem is that the symbolic realm 
might, in some cases, give rise to internal tensions. A good example is the 
celebration of the martyrs of Chelenko in Harari regional state. In a region 
that has a large number of individuals that belong to the Amhara ethnic 
group, the commemoration of Chelenko, in its present form and spirit, has 
the effect of projecting the dichotomy of the oppressor and the oppressed, 
the conqueror and the vanquished. Such divisive symbolism compromises 
the capacity of the state to build ‘one political community’ which is not only 
based on the recognition of diversity but also on the need to hold it together. 
The commitment of the preamble to continue as a one ‘political community’ 
cannot be achieved unless recognition is complemented by the spirit of 
reconciliation. In this regard, the Ethiopian system, it seems, has to yet 
explore innovative ways of avoiding ‘divisive symbolism’ and translating a 
potentially disruptive symbolism into a symbolic code that promotes 
reconciliation and recognition.   
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2.3 Language 
Article 5 of the Constitution, outlining the basic principle of the language 
policy, declares that all Ethiopian languages shall enjoy equal state 
recognition. This is further elaborated by article 39 of the Constitution 
which states that every ethnic group in Ethiopia “has the right to speak, to 
write, and to develop its own languages; to express, to develop and to 
promote its culture; to preserve its history”. Based on these constitutional 
principles, the Constitution declares that Amharic shall be the working 
language of the Federal Government while allowing the states to determine 
their respective working language.30 The federal offices that operate in the 
states employ Amharic as the language of communication. 
 
From the outset, it is important to note that the Constitution, faced with an 
ocean of linguistic diversity, has opted not to adopt official language/s. It 
has rather opted for a ‘working language’. Symbolically, this is obviously 
designed to avoid the impression that a particular language is favored above 
any other at the symbolic level. The Ethiopian system adopted Amharic as 
the language of government (federal) business without conveying the 
message that the adopted language is dominant over others.  The success of 
the system in overcoming the dilemma that it tries to circumvent is, of 
course, something that can be debated. As we shall see in the following 
paragraphs, there are sections of the society that regard the continued use of 
Amharic at the federal level as a continuation of their marginalisation and 
the perpetuation of past policies that subordinated all other languages to 
Amharic.  
 
The constitutional stipulation that allows each regional state to adopt its 
working language opens a room for the application of a territorial model of 
                                                 
30  Article 5 Constitution. 
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language planning, in which case the working language of each member of 
the federation would be that of the majority of the locality.31 In practice, 
five of the nine regional states have endorsed unilingualism. This obviously 
provides ample room for each ethnic community to develop its language 
and culture. It also represents recognition of the linguistic identities of the 
constituent units. An important consequence of this policy is that 
individuals moving into either of these regions must assimilate. That means 
Amharic–speaking citizens moving to an Oromifa-speaking region have to 
leave behind any prior claim to language protection. As we shall see later, 
this has created a problem in some areas where an important number of 
minorities are scattered in the midst of the regionally dominant linguistic 
groups, especially in major urban areas of some of the member states. It is, 
however, important to note that the ethnically plural regional states have 
opted to retain Amharic as their working language. To be precise, three of 
the four multi-ethnic states (i.e. the SNNPR, Benishangul and Gambela 
regional states) have decided to retain Amharic as their working language.  
 
2.3.1 The debate on language policy 
The language policy has provoked criticism both from centrifugal and 
centripetal forces. On the one hand, there are sections of the society that 
regard the adoption of Amharic as the working language of the Federal 
Government as a “little more than the continued endorsement of the 
superior position of the language, and the sections of society associated with 
it, by the Ethiopian state”.32 For these sections of the society, the policy is a 
threat to their ethnic-self determination rights.33 It also undermines the 
                                                 
31  The state-based federal offices use Amharic for government business. 
32  Cohen 2000: 111.  
33  Smith 2007. 
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constitutional principle that all languages are equal.34 The Oromo Federal 
Democratic Movement, for example, has opposed the sole use of Amharic 
as the working language of the Federal Government and calls for the 
adoption of Oromifa as the working language of the Federal Government.35  
 
The more vocal criticism comes from the proponents of the idea of 
Ethiopian nationhood who want to use language as a unifying factor. They 
criticise the position of the Constitution on language as an attempt to create 
‘the biblical tower of Babel’ in Ethiopia. If that was not the intention, they 
argue, the drafters of the Constitution would have opted to encourage the 
use of Amharic, ultimately developing it as the national language.36 
According to this argument, Amharic could serve “as an important 
instrument for the eventual creation of greater cohesion among Ethiopians 
in language and in a sense of common national destiny as one people”.37 
The case of India is often invoked to support this line of argument. Bekele 
remarks that “the role of English as a common language among the diverse 
linguistic groups in India has tremendously assisted in the development of a 
national consciousness in that country”.38 The proponents of this view 
recommend the Russian and Spanish model of language planning where the 
Russian and Castilian languages are respectively used along the languages 
of the constituent units.39 It is similarly contended that non-Amharas, owing 
                                                 
34  Bekele 2003. 
35  Interview with Bulcha Demekesa, chairman of the Oromo Federalist Democratic  
Movement (OFDM) http://www.oduu.com/news/index.php?news_id=4 (accessed 
on 25 February 2005) 
36  Minase 1996. 
37  Minase 1996: 37. Ehrlich (1999: 63) similarly argues that the language policy has  
the effect of “causing a degree of separation between the various groups”.   
38  Bekele 2003: 213. 
39  See Bekele 2003. 
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to the decreased amount of formal education they receive as a result of the 
language policy, will effectively lose access to the state apparatus, further 
disconnecting them from a sense of Ethiopian identity.40  
 
2.3.2 Assessment 
The position of the Constitution on the use of language marks a clean break 
with the past during which Amharic enjoyed a superior position throughout 
the country.  It is a major departure from the historical pattern in which “the 
distribution of the political goods of communication, recognition and 
autonomy has been highly skewed, benefiting native Amharic-speakers 
disproportionately”.41 Of course, the special place of Amharic in the 
Ethiopian linguistic landscape has not vanished entirely. It is also true that 
the retention of Amharic as the language of national communication can 
appear to some as the continuation of the Amharic hegemony. However, 
even if one cannot deny the symbolic implication of the retention of 
Amharic as a federal language, its continued use can hardly be associated 
with deliberate symbolic dominance. The decision to keep Amharic as the 
federal working language is no more than a reflection of the position that 
the language has attained as “an effective means of national 
                                                 
40  Ehrlich 1999. Bloor and Wondwosen (1996) share the same concern. It is often  
argued that the present language policy in Ethiopia “will restrict movement across 
administrative units, thereby disrupting existing patterns of exchange between 
different areas and contact between different people” (Cohen 2000: 112). 
41  Smith 2007: 5. As pointed out by Fasil (1997: 55), “state recognition of every  
Ethiopian language means that efforts for its development –i.e. the preservation of 
literature, the provision for a script, where such does not exist; the documentation 
of its oral literature; and the further study of each language via grammatical, 
vocabulary and overall publication and enhanced use of the language –will be 
done with both state blessing and state support to the extent possible”.  
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communication”.42  This is also evident from the fact that it is not labelled 
as an official but rather as a working language of the Federal Government. 
 
Using Amharic along with the regional languages as co-official language in 
all regional states might, as some argue, help to promote the relationship 
between the different linguistic groups. This view, however, belies the 
structural imbalance that exists between Amharic and the other languages 
and the effect that this imbalance may have on the development of the latter. 
As indicated in previous chapters, Amharic, to the exclusion of all other 
languages, has been the language of government business for decades. This 
provides Amharic with a unique position in terms of language status, which 
other languages would be hard-pressed to compete with. Even in states 
where the speakers of other languages are in a majority, there is no 
guarantee that a policy of co-official languages will manage to avoid the 
dominance of the Amharic language. Without, at least, some kind of 
‘normalisation of language policy’, the regional language will in all 
likelihood be relegated to a secondary status.  
 
Moreover, even if one accepts the instrumentality of the Amharic language 
in bringing different ethnic communities together, it is not clear if it has to 
be given an official status both at the federal and state level. As noted 
above, Amharic is now the working language of Federal Government in 
which all government business is conducted. Obviously, any 
communication between the Federal Government and a member state or 
between two member states will be conducted in Amharic. Furthermore, 
with the view to promote the language as the language of national 
communication, Amharic is being provided as a subject in almost all 
primary schools throughout the country. It is also important to note that 
                                                 
42  Cohen 2000: 111. 
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almost all ethnically plural regional states, with the sole exception of Harari, 
have opted for Amharic as their working language. Generally, Amharic is 
still given precedence over all other languages.43 This means Amharic can 
still serve as a cohesive force by facilitating communication between and 
among the different ethnic groups.  
 
It is also not clear if those like Bekele that criticise the present language 
system based on the Indian model have really grasped the Indian system. 
Their criticism rather reflects an incorrect appreciation of the Indian system. 
It is true that the adoption of English as a language of government business 
(i.e. associate additional official language) has facilitated communication 
between the different ethnic groups in India. Underlying the Indian and, as a 
matter of fact, some African states’ decision to adopt English as the official 
language, is the very fact that English has a unique neutral status compared 
to other local languages. It is this factor that often motivates the use of 
English and not other local languages as languages of government business. 
As Schmied observes, this is specifically true in most decolonised states: 
 
Ethnic languages are normally not accepted as 
national languages wherever other groups fear ‘tribal 
dominance’ and prefer English, which is ‘tribally 
neutral’. Only tribally neutral lingue franche have any 
chance of taking over certain functions from English 
as national languages.44  
                                                 
43  What might even be problematic is the dominance of Amharic in the majority of  
the ethnically plural regional states. This, one may argue, works against the 
constitutional commitment to promote linguistic diversity and especially the use of 
local languages even though the scheme benefits from the culturally neural status 
of Amharic in the context of the regional languages. 
44  Schmied 1991: 27.  
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The decision made by India not to adopt Hindu as a ‘working language’ of 
the national government was underlined by the fact that the adoption of 
Hindu would portray the dominance of the Hindu-speaking group and the 
relegation of others to a secondary status. It is also important to note that the 
Indian system recognises twenty two state languages. Thus, in addition to 
allowing the constituent units to adopt their own regional languages, the 
adoption of the Indian model would have resulted in the ‘officialisation’ of 
a ‘culturally neutral language’. Amharic, obviously, does not enjoy a neutral 
status among the different ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Yet despite this fact, a 
decision has been made to maintain Amharic as the federal working 
language. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, it is regarded as the language of 
national communication and, as a result, it is being taught as a subject in 
primary schools in non-Amharic speaking parts of the country. Generally, if 
the suggestion for the Ethiopian system is to emulate the Indian model, one 
can reasonably argue that the present system provides more than what the 
Indian system has to offer. 
 
Finally, we turn to the argument that non-Amharic speakers will lose access 
to the state apparatus as a result of the language policy.  It is not at all clear 
how the language policy will have the effect of compromising the capacity 
of individuals from a non-Amharic speaking group to access the state 
thereby continuing their historical marginalisation. In fact, the reverse 
seems to be true in present day Ethiopia. Regional state government as well 
as administrative units within each regional state are run and staffed by 
members of the language group that is dominant in the regional or sub-
regional government unit. The new dispensation has opened more 
opportunities for employment ‘to sons of the soil’. As we shall see later, this 
is also the case at the federal level. More than ever, one can easily observe 
the appointment of individuals from extremely diverse linguistic 
background in the different institutions of the national government 
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including the cabinet. In fact, fluency with Amharic does not seem to be an 
obstacle in assuming higher offices of the Federal Government. It is not 
uncommon to come across ministers for whom Amharic obviously is clearly 
not their mother tongue.  
 
2.3.3 Language in education policy 
The language in education policy is underlined by the constitutional 
commitment to ethnic diversity and multilingualism. The Education and 
Training Policy (ETP) as adopted by the Ministry of Education emphasises 
the use of local languages in primary education.45 Section 3.5(1) provides 
that  
 
cognizant of the pedagogical advantage of the child 
learning in mother tongue, and the rights of nationalities to 
promote the use of their languages, primary education will 
be given in nationality languages.  
 
The ethnically homogenous regions have adopted the languages of their 
respective dominant groups as the medium of instruction for primary 
education. Tigrinya, Oromifa, Amharic, and Somali are the languages of 
primary education in Tigray, Oromyia, Amhara and Somali regional states 
respectively. In the Southern regional state, where there are more than a 
dozen ethnic groups, eleven nationality languages are being used as a 
medium of instruction in primary education.46  
                                                 
45  The Constitution, under article 51(2) limits the role of national government in  
education to establishing and implementing national standards and basic policy 
criteria. This begs the question whether the national Ministry of Education has the 
power to adopt a policy that regulates the medium of instruction in schools that 
operate within the regional states.  
46  Smith 2007. This has entailed the translation of educational materials from  
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The implementation of this policy has brought to an end the dominant 
position of Amharic in areas of education as the sole medium as well as a 
timetabled subject throughout primary and secondary education.47 However, 
to be precise, the position of Amharic in the Ethiopian linguistic landscape 
is not totally compromised. Because of its status as a federal ‘working 
language’, Amharic is defined by policy as the language of national 
communication. This rule is given practical expression through the 
provision of Amharic as a subject in primary education.  
 
Furthermore, the Amharic language has also benefited from the fact that the 
policy does not close the door for the use of languages other than one’s own 
native language for primary education either due to expediency or other 
practical reasons. This is, in fact, clearly stated in section 3.5.2 of the policy, 
according to which, the use of own language for the purpose of education is 
not compulsory. The section provides that “nations and nationalities can 
either learn in their own language or can choose from among those selected 
on the basis of national and countrywide distribution”. This has opened the 
door for further use of Amharic in education. In Afar regional state, for 
example, the medium of instruction for primary education is Amharic. This 
is primarily attributed to the lack of trained Afar teachers and the lack of 
                                                                                                                            
Amharic to the different nationality languages. Other costs include “the costs of 
standardising the use of nationality language, training teachers and producing 
supplementary reading materials in that language” (Smith 2007: 15).  
47  Bloor and Wondwosen 1996. Smith (2007: 6) indicates that “[t]he Amharic- 
dominated language policy of most of the 20th century was detrimental to the 
educational aspirations of non-Amharic speakers, who were forced to enter a 
learning environment at age six or seven in which everything was taught in a 
foreign language. Peasant families saw little use in such an education when their 
children were not even able to come home and tell them what they learned, 
particularly when their labor was so needed at home and in the productive sectors 
of agriculture and pastoralism”.  
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materials and resources, making it impossible to implement the regional 
official policy that declares the use of Afar.48 In the Southern region, there 
are also zones like, for example, the Gurage zone, where primary schools in 
all weredas of the zone, with the exception of one, use Amharic as the 
medium of instruction. Members of the Gurage ethnic community opted to 
use Amharic rather than their own language for the purpose of primary 
education. 
 
Although some predicted that the working language policy would impose 
constraints on the right to education of children belonging to ethnic 
minorities,49 this concern is, to a large extent, mitigated by the 
accommodative approach that the regional states, with territorially 
concentrated minorities in their midst, have adopted.  The ethnically defined 
Agaw Awi Zone, an Agaw-speaking area within the Amhara regional state, 
uses Awgini rather than the regional working language, Amharic, as the 
medium of instruction in primary education. The same is true of the 
Oromyia Zone in Amhara state, which is home to Oromifa-speakers. It uses 
Oromifa as the medium of primary education rather than the regional 
working language, namely Amharic.  
 
The accommodative approach is also extended, to some extent, to urban 
areas where there are a large number of ethnic migrants. With the view to 
accommodate the large Amharic-speaking population that resides in most 
urban areas outside the capital, regional states have allowed for the 
provision of schools in Amharic. This is true not only in ethnically 
                                                 
48  Smith 2007. The situation is similar in the Benishangul Gumuz regional state,  
which is home to four indigenous linguistic groups although there is a plan to 
introduce the indigenous languages as a medium of instructions within the next 
five years. 
49  Bekele 2003. 
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heterogeneous states but also in the ethnically defined regional states where 
the majority of the regional population belongs to one non-Amharic 
speaking ethnic group. According to the policy adopted by the Oromyia 
regional state, for example, areas with a significant proportion of other 
language communities must offer instruction in Amharic, either by 
designating one entire primary school or certain class rooms for this 
purpose.50 A parallel medium of instruction in Oromifa and Amharic is 
introduced in major urban areas of the Oromyia regional states including 
Bishoftu, Jimma, Adama, Nekemte, Shashemene and Zeway, which have a 
large Amharic-speaking population.51 The same is true in SNNPR where 
primary schools in major urban areas, especially in regional and zonal 
capitals, use both Amharic and the zonal languages as mediums of 
instruction either by establishing separate schools or using sections in 
schools. This is the case, for example, in cities like Awassa (Amharic and 
Sidama), Arba Minch (Amharic and Gamonya), Sodo (Amharic and 
Wolayta), Hosanna (Amharic and Hadiyisa) and Dilla (Amharic and 
Gedeoffa). Furthermore, the capital cities of all regional states have primary 
schools where Amharic is used as the medium of instruction.52  
                                                 
50  Smith 2007. 
51  Cohen 2006. 
52  One of the contentious issues with regard to the use of language was whether the  
Ethiopic script or the Roman script should be used to transcribe the non-Semitic 
languages. The Ethiopic script, whose origin can be traced to inscriptions from the 
fourth century, “was bequeathed by Giiz to Amharic and Tigrinya and, until 
recently, was the obvious candidate for establishing literacy in the vernaculars” 
(Bloor and Wondwosen 1996: 329). With the exception of the Semitic languages 
and, to some extent, Oromifa, most of the languages have remained oral 
languages. Those in favor of the Roman script argued that “the Ethiopic script is 
unsuitable for Oromifa because it does not represent the sound system of Cushitic 
languages” (Cohen 2000: 132). Baye (1992: 15) lamented that “the script is 
unique to Ethiopia and, as such, a national symbol of distinction”. Furthermore, he 
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2.3.4 Assessment 
In many aspects, the language in education policy and the practice thereof 
represent an extension of the constitutional commitment to the equality of 
all language groups. It extends the public sphere on which a linguistic 
community is allowed to develop its language and culture. It is a further 
affirmation of the recognition of the linguistic identities of the constituting 
communities. 
 
An important feature of the present system is that it recognises the linguistic 
identities of minorities that are found in ethnically defined regional states. 
More commendable also is that it has, to some extent, succeeded in quelling 
the anxieties of ethnic migrants in areas of language in education. Very 
recently, this accommodative practice of the state is also extended to non-
Amharic speaking individual and particularly to Oromifa-speakers that 
reside in the capital. The Oromyia regional state is now allowed to establish 
ten schools that teach in Oromifa in Addis Ababa. Despite the fear that 
minority languages will not be accommodated and that they will be obliged 
to receive primary education in some other languages,53 both the Federal 
                                                                                                                            
argued that “the Ethiopic script is a suitable vehicle for any language, since it is a 
syllabary which can easily be adopted for all spoken tongues in Ethiopia with 
necessary modifications (modified to incorporate new sounds)” (Baye 1992:15). 
Some have even gone to the extent of claiming that the Oromos’ decision to reject 
the Ethiopic script is motivated by political considerations which is underlined by 
“anti-Amhara or anti-Amharic sentiments” (Bloor and Wondwosen 1996: 333). 
The proponents of Qube similarly argue that “the arguments against the use of the 
Qube are similarly based on emotion and not on practical criteria, and that those 
who advocate the use of the Ethiopic script for all of Ethiopia’s languages are, at 
root, in favor of continued Amhara, and Amharic, domination” (Cohen 2000: 133-
134). It was later decided that the Roman script, which uses a writing system 
called the Qube, should be used to transcribe Oromifa.  
53  See Bloor and Wondwosen 1996. 
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Government and the constituent units are gradually developing a system 
that accommodates the demands of the different linguistic groups in areas of 
education. As a result, the claim that that the degree of pluralism evident in 
the country makes the broader application of the mother-tongue principle 
virtually impossible, falls away. 
 
In fact, the Ethiopian system goes further than the Western multi-national 
federations like Switzerland and Belgium in accommodating the interests of 
minorities and ethnic migrants. In Switzerland, ethnic migrants or minorities 
have no choice but to send their children to schools where education is 
provided in the language of the dominant group. In Belgium, as well, 
children of Flemish-speaking parents that live in the Wallonian-speaking 
part of Belgium have no other choice but to be educated in Wallonian 
schools. The same applies to the children of Wallonian-speaking parents 
living in the Flemish part of Belgium. Even in cases where they have 
allowed pockets of ethnic communities that are demarcated into the other 
side of the border to use their language (as in the case of the language 
facilities in Belgium), they regard the measures as transitory exceptions to 
the principle of territoriality.  In Ethiopia, however, the departures from the 
territorial principle are not regarded as transitional measures. They are 
integral elements of the systems of accommodation that are deemed 
essential by the existing demographic realities of a regional state. 
 
The major shortcoming in Ethiopia in so far as the language in education 
policy is the inconsistency that one observes in the handling of issues 
related to the use of languages in education. In ethnically heterogeneous 
towns like Yirag Alem and Yirga Chefe, for example, parents have been 
denied the opportunity to send their children to schools where Amharic is 
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used as the medium of instruction. 54 The authorities of the zones argued 
that Amharic education is allowed in zone capitals and since Yirag Alem 
and Yirga Chefe are not zone capitals, they are not required to provide 
primary education in Amharic.55 This contradicts, however, with the 
approaches followed in other parts of the country where the decision to use 
Amharic is motivated not by the status of the town (i.e. whether it is a 
regional or zonal capital) but by its demographic realities. It is the ethnically 
diverse nature of the population and, more specifically, the presence of a 
large Amharic speaking population that necessitated the use of Amharic in 
primary education. Authorities in some areas have also forced communities 
to use their local languages in schools despite a strong demand by the latter 
to stick to Amharic.56 The imposition of the use of a particular language has, 
in some cases, caused a relocation of communities.57 This application of the 
language in education policy contradicts a clearly stated rule of the ETP that 
provides ethnic communities with the discretion to learn either in their own 
language or choose from among those selected on the basis of national and 
                                                 
54  Cohen 2000. 
55  According to the regional authorities, “the zone government had the right to  
decide which languages were used in any areas of the zones” (Cohen 2000: 268-
269).  
56  A case in point is the Kembatas dominated (85%) town of Durame in the  
Kembata-Alaba-Tembaro zone where the zone authorities argued that “since the 
population consists almost entirely of Kembatas, they should use their own 
language” (Cohen 2000: 269). 
57   Some parents have adopted other strategies like sending children to live with  
relatives (Cohen 2000). Of course, sometimes this was because they lived on the 
‘wrong’ side of the Zone border. Cohen (2000: 125) notes that “[w]here the 
Sidama Zone borders the Welayta speaking area of the North Omo Zone, for 
example, children were moving in both directions in order to obtain an education 
in their mother tongue languages”. This has created a sense of being an outsider 
among children whose parents have lived in the area for generations. 
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countrywide distribution. Receiving education in own language is not 
compulsory as long as there is sufficient support for the use of other 
languages like Amharic.58  
 
The inconsistencies described above indicate to the fact that, with few 
exceptions, there are no clear laws and policies, both at the federal and state 
level, much less a constitutional stipulation, which regulate the use of 
Amharic as a medium of instruction in regional states. The principles and 
condition that are needed for the introduction of Amharic as medium of 
instruction, whether solely or along with other regional languages, have not 
been clearly outlined. The matter has simply been left to the whims of 
regional and sub-regional authorities, which explains the ad hoc manner in 
which the matter has been handled.  
 
3. Self rule 
This section examines how self rule, one of the institutional principles that 
give effect to the act of recognition, has found its way into the Ethiopian 
federal system by looking at three principal areas: the geographical 
                                                 
58  Ironically authorities from the same zone have allowed residents of two other  
towns, that are inhabited by two other ethnic groups (i.e. Alaba and Tembaro) to 
use Amharic as medium of instruction.  Paradoxically, they motivated their 
decision by relying on the policy that declares the right of every ethnic community 
to choose the language that should be used in the primary education system. The 
authorities in Gurage Zone seem to have grasped this very well as they have 
heeded to the demand of their community and allowed the use of Amharic even in 
areas that are largely comprised of Gurages only. This misapplication of the policy 
fails to note that the imposition of language policy can, in some cases, be 
counterproductive. As noted by Kennedy (as quoted in Bloor and Wondwosen 
1996: 330) “[l]anguage change should be phased, move to a speed commensurate 
with social acceptance and be made in line with social trends, not by decree, 
otherwise community antagonisms will prevent implementation”. 
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configuration of a federation, the division of powers (i.e. which powers are 
allocated to which level of government, and financial autonomy. 
 
3.1 Territorial autonomy 
Article 39 of the Constitution states that every nation, nationality and people 
in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self government which includes 
the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it 
inhabits. This seems to be one of the first indications that the Constitution 
has opted to reorganise the federation along ethnic lines rather than 
geography or administrative convenience. A rather straightforward signal 
comes from article 46 of the Constitution which states that the geographical 
configuration of the federal state shall be based on “the basis of settlement 
patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned”.  
 
3.1.1 Ethnically defined regional states 
Based on the guiding principle established by article 46 of the Constitution, 
nine regional states that are largely delimited along linguistic lines and two 
administrative regions are established (see map of the Ethiopian constituent 
units).59 More than two thirds of the people that live in five of the nine 
regional states, including Tigray, Amhara, Oromyia, Somalia and Afar, 
belong to a single ethnic group. Each of these states is also designated after 
the name of the dominant ethnic group in each state.60 The state of Gambela 
and Benshangul/Gumuz, on the other hand, are largely bilingual regional 
states with two other numerically small minorities in their midst. The 
SNNPR, on the other hand, depart from the rule that determines the 
                                                 
59  Article 47 Constitution. 
60  The Tigray region is named after the regionally dominant Tigre ethnic community.  
The same goes for the others. The Afar regional state- the Afar ethnic community, 
Amhara regional state- Amhara ethnic group, Oromyia regional state-Oromo 
ethnic community, Somali regional state-Somali ethnic community. 
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organisation of states along linguistic lines. This regional state is home to 
numerous small ethnic groups.61  
 
Another anomalous feature of the internal organisation of the federal state 
relates to the Harari regional state. Despite the fact that the region is home 
to two other linguistic groups that are numerically superior to the Harari 
ethnic group, the region is named and considered mainly as belonging to the 
latter. This scenario is more likely to have historical explanation rather than 
one based on the demographic realities of the region. Addis Ababa, the 
capital city, and Dire Dawa, both of which are multi-ethnic cities, are 
recognised as two special autonomous city-states with their own self-
government structures.62 
 
The provision of statehood to ethnic groups is not, however, limited to what 
is already provided in the Constitution. The Constitution has kept the door 
of statehood ajar for other ethnic groups that would advocate for the 
                                                 
61  The reason for the conflation of these ethnic groups (some of which were given a  
state of their own in the Transitional Charter) under one regional state, when 
considered in light of the principle that guided the organisation of the other states, 
is not convincing. Although a number of the ethnic groups might be too small to 
achieve a regional state of their own, there are ethnic groups like the Sidama that 
are numerically comparable with the other ethnic groups like the Harari that have 
acquired a state of their own. It is not also clear why the option that is applied with 
the case of the bilingual regional states cannot be applied to some of the ethnic 
groups in the southern regional state rather than assembling all of them under one 
state. Of course, not each ethnic group can have a state of its own in a country 
where there are more than 70 of them. Some level of consistency in the 
application of the regional formula should, however, be maintained. 
62  Since Addis Ababa is located within the Oromyia regional state, the ‘special  
interest’ of the state of Oromyia is recognised by the Constitution (article 49(5)). 
Currently, Addis Ababa also serves as the capital city of the Oromyia regional 
state.  
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establishment of a state of their own. Article 39(3) of the Constitution 
reserves to ethnic groups within the ethnically plural regional states the right 
to establish at any time their own state. A procedure for the establishment of 
such a state is also provided in the same article. This has not materialised so 
far although the Sidama, a numerically dominant ethnic group within the 
southern regional state, the SNNPR, has demanded for the establishment of 
a regional state of their own. 
 
The fact that the organisation of the state is largely based on ethnicity has 
given rise to subnational units that are asymmetrical in size and capacity as 
shown in Table 8.1. As Cohen has aptly remarked, little attention was given 
to extra-ethnic factors in the drawing of state boundaries: 
 
In drawing the regional boundaries little attention was given to 
their respective geographical size, population densities, 
agriculture and resource basis, level of infrastructure, existing 
administrative capacity, or ability to generate tax revenues. As a 
result states (regions) differ greatly in size and potential.63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63  Cohen 1995: 164. Kinfe (2001: 26-27) describes Benishangul, Gambela and Afar  
as “clear winners in the new division of the country” as each of these states, 
according to him, has taken “a much larger share than is justified on ethnic or 
political ground”. In the case of Benishangul and Gambela, this, he explains, 
should be seen as “compensation for their past agony”.  
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3.1.2 The dilemma of ethnic-based territorial units 
The ethno-linguistic orientation of the geographical configuration of the 
federal state has provoked harsh criticisms. The crux of most of these 
criticisms is that it is a perilous experiment that is more likely to exacerbate 
ethnic tensions and militate against national unity.64 Some even go to the 
extent of branding the present dispensation as “bantustanisation”.65 Others, 
who view the new dispensation favorably, regard the present arrangement as 
“a bold and imaginative type of national engineering”.66 They consider the 
consideration of ethnicity in the organisation of the state as “a relief of 
ethnic tension, rather than a problem”.67 Bullcha Demeksa, leader of the 
Oromo Federalist Movement, remarks: 
 
 We will stay together if we stop frustrating the yearnings of the 
peoples of Ethiopia (at least all of the Southern peoples) for 
cultural emancipation, political autonomy, social equality and 
economic survival. Those who say the federation should not be 
built on nationality foundation, but on the old, whimsical 
administrative subdivisions are fighting against the will of the 
great majority of the Ethiopian people.68 
 
3.1.3 Assessment 
It is submitted that the constitutional decision to coincide internal 
boundaries with ethnic divisions or, at the very least, to heavily orient its 
                                                 
64  Brietzke (19995: 27) remarks: “The gist of these criticisms is that it is a dangerous  
experiment in autonomous ethnic development to separate people who begin to 
live within territorial units with mixed populations, in that it creates tensions that 
militate against the need for national unity.”  
65  Mesfin 1999. See also Assefa 2002. 
66  Bereket 1997: 21. 
67  Twibell 1999: 399. 
68  Bulcha 1993: 33. 
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internal structures along ethno-linguistic lines calls for a balanced 
assessment.  
 
3.1.3.1 Promoting the self-management of ethnic communities 
It must be emphasised that the inclusion of the ethnic factor in the design of 
the state is consistent with the constitutionally declared commitment to 
celebrate ethnic diversity and build a multi-nation state. Drawing internal 
boundaries based on geographic or administrative criteria would have 
defeated this commitment as those federations are often underlined by 
strong integrationist and assimilationist dispositions. The state in that 
context would also not have been any different from what are often referred 
to as mono-national federations which are more congruent with a unitary 
representation of the state than with a spirit of federalism which seeks to 
recognise and accommodate distinct collective identities within a larger 
political partnership.  
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the ethnic factor in designing the territorial 
structure of a state presents an ideal framework to provide extensive self 
rule for an ethnic group, “guaranteeing its ability to make decisions in 
certain areas without being outvoted by the larger society”.69 In a country 
like Ethiopia where particular ethnic groups have been dominated 
culturally, economically and politically by historically privileged members 
of a particular ethnic group, it is imperative that they, in order to avoid the 
continued dominance of the dominant group, are provided with territorial 
autonomy. An arrangement that makes an ethnic group a majority in its own 
house, it is argued, empowers geographically concentrated ethnic groups 
with the necessary space to protect and promote their distinctiveness, 
                                                 
69  Kymlicka 1995: 27-28. 
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without fear of the dominant group imposing their values or vetoing their 
aspirations.70  
 
Empowerment of the different ethnic groups in Ethiopia is, in fact, the 
major conspicuous contribution of the present federal system. Dereje 
Feyissa, in his work on the experience of the Gambela regional state, 
demonstrates how the present system has turned an ‘obscure district’ into a 
‘regional state’ with considerable local empowerment:  
 
Well beyond the tenuous imperial co-option of local leaders and 
the appointment of few local people to the regional administration 
during the Derg period, in post-1991 Gambela all regional 
administrative posts are occupied by locals. In fact, in a dramatic 
reversal of power relations, the highlanders who had long 
dominated the region’s politics have now assumed a subordinate 
political status. …..The rebuilding of cultural self-confidence is 
also evident in a degree of “retraditionalization”. In the early 
1990s, leaders of the [ruling party in the state] tried to reintroduce 
a cultural practice (the extraction of the lower teeth, called naak), 
which had been banned during the Cultural Revolution. In 2001, 
four Anywaa village headmen (Kwaros) were reinstated in 
different districts. Although retraditionalization has not gone far, 
largely because the local population is modernist in its outlook 
and aspirations, the local population has, at least, been offered a 
cultural choice.71  
 
In light of the above mentioned points, not only is it not convincing to tag 
the present system as bantustanisation, a policy of the apartheid government 
in South Africa. The likening of the present system with the South African 
bantustanisation seems to be based on an incorrect appreciation of the true 
                                                 
70  Simeon 1998. 
71  Dereje 2006: 213. 
 
 
 
 
 420  
nature of the Bantustan policy. It is true that the current system in Ethiopia 
shares with bantustanisation a policy of organising the state along ethnic 
lines. But that is where the seemingly similar nature of the two systems 
begins and ends. To begin with, the reason behind the Bantustan policy’s 
decision to divide the black community along ethnic lines was not to grant 
self-government within the constitutional and territorial framework of the 
South African state. The idea was that each homeland, demarcated along 
ethnic lines, becomes an independent state and establishes itself as a nation-
state, with its inhabitants eventually losing their South African citizenship. 
More importantly, however, and this is where the major points that 
distinguish the two system lie, the Bantustan policy was a unilateral policy 
of the apartheid government that was simply imposed on black Africans. 
These two basic features of the Bantustan policy render the latter a case of 
‘expulsion’ rather than an exercise of the right to self- determination. The 
Bantustan policy was condemned not because of its ethnic character per se 
but because of the way the system was brought about.  
 
In the case of Ethiopia, the federal solution adopted by the Constitution may 
not have support among all sections of the society. There is, in fact, strong 
resistance to the system among the urban intellectual elite. Yet the Oromo 
Liberation Front, which has large support among the Oromo, the largest 
ethnic group in Ethiopia, has endorsed the transitional system which is 
adopted by the present constitution in its current form. So do the Somali and 
other parties that have been waging armed struggle in the peripheries of the 
country. It is, of course, possible to argue that a broader consensus could 
have been sought. It cannot, however, be denied that the major political 
forces at the time of the negotiation agreed on the adoption of the federal 
system. In conclusion, even though the present system shares with the 
Bantustan policy the same basis for the organisation of the state , it is totally 
inappropriate to equate it with bantustanisation. If the use of ethnicity in the 
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configuration of the state is equated with bantustanisation, then even 
countries like Belgium and Nigeria in its early days of independence would 
not be spared from the same categorisation.     
 
3.1.3.2 The dangers of providing a mother state to each large ethnic 
group 
As much as the decision to provide territorial autonomy responds to the 
demands of many ethnic groups, the Ethiopian approach to provide a 
mother state to each single, especially large, ethnic group, admittedly, poses 
a potential danger to the territorial integrity of the state. As the experience 
of multi-ethnic federations reveal, large ethnic groups carved under a single 
constituent unit pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. The 
propensity to engage in conflicts is high when each constituent unit is 
identified with a single ethnic group. As discussed in Chapter Three, the 
experiences of the Nigerian federation just after independence as well as the 
Belgian federation reveal the problem of providing a mother state to each 
large ethnic group. This view is shared by Edmond Keller who expresses his 
apprehension about breaking up Ethiopia into a few large ethnically based 
regions. He is concerned about “the complications created by the promise of 
self-determination based upon large nationality-based states”.72 The central 
point of this argument is that the geographical configuration of the 
federation around the countries’ major ethnic fault-lines has the potential to 
lead to hegemonic ethnocentrism and, in extreme cases, secessionism.  
 
Another equally negative effect of providing each ethnic group with a 
mother state is that it facilitates identity fragmentation along ethno-
                                                 
72  Keller 1998: 122. His suggestion is to devolve power to “states that are relatively  
ethnically homogenous but smaller and avoid the complications created by the 
promise of self-determination based upon large nationality-based states” (Keller 
1998: 122). 
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linguistic lines. In such an arrangement, ethnicity becomes the dominant 
lexicon of political discourse, creating conducive conditions for ethnic 
entrepreneurs. In the Ethiopian case, this has been observed both in the 
proliferation of ethnic-based parties as well as in what some call as the 
‘genesis’ of ethnic identities.  Of the 76 parties currently registered with the 
National Electoral Board, 60 of them are ethnic based parties that have their 
strongholds in the different regions of the country.73 Furthermore, the 
number of ethnic-based parties that are joining the political terrain are on 
the rise. This obviously facilitates the fragmentation of the population along 
ethno-linguistic lines. Ethnic identities that had mere cultural value in the 
past are now politically relevant entities. Of course, the proliferation of 
ethnic-based parties would not have been a problem if their genesis is an 
outcome of a particular political and historico-social situation. What we are 
increasingly witnessing, however, is ethnic-entrepreneurs who often 
establish ethnic-based parties in order to take their share of powers and 
privileges within a system that rewards political mobilisation along ethnic 
lines. This effect is especially visible in the ethnically plural regional states 
of Gambela and SNNPR. A study by Sarah Vaughan in her article, 
“Responses to ethnic federalism in Ethiopia’s Southern region”,74 reveals 
how the heavy emphasis on ethnicity in the design of the federal 
arrangement and the fact that the system rewards political mobilisation of 
                                                 
73  National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, available at www.electionsethiopis.org,  
accessed on 15 October 2007. It is usually difficult to gauge the level of support 
enjoyed by the parties as elections results are often contested. All regional states 
are controlled by ethnic-based parties that are either member of or affiliated to the 
EPRDF , which is the ruling party at the federal level. The Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy, a pan-Ethiopianism party with a state-wide objective and a major 
contender of the 2005 election, made strides although it later refused to take seats 
in parliament. The popularity of the party in the capital, major urban cities and the 
Amhara regional state was evident.  
74  Vaughan 2006.  
 
 
 
 
 423  
ethnicity has induced local elites to mobilise the local population along 
ethnic lines with the purpose of furthering their own interests. Although one 
would have to conduct to substantiate these claims, a tendency of identity 
fragmentation in other socio-economic institutions is already emerging. One 
such case is the clear association of a number of private banks and insurance 
companies with particular ethnic groups. A conclusive remark on this point, 
however, requires further and more substantive research.  
 
A related effect of the present system is that it has resulted, in some cases, 
in the creation, or rather re-definition, of ethnic identity. The Silte case 
illustrates this very well. The Silte were traditionally regarded as belonging 
to the Gurage ethnic group, which is further subdivided into various clans 
and sub-clans. The Silte, unlike most of the Christian Gurages, are Muslims 
by faith and speak a different dialect. After the introduction of the new 
dispensation, educated local elites, using religious and linguistic markers, 
began to promote a distinct Silte identity.75 After a protracted process 
involving political wrangling and eventually a referendum, the Silte are 
recognised as a distinct ethnic group. This has resulted in the establishment 
of a Silte Administrative Zone and the allocation of a seat for a Silte 
representative in the second chamber of the federation.76 Without entering 
into the specific debates of whether the Silte, ethnographically speaking, 
belong to the Gurage ethnic group, it is important to note that the Silte case 
signifies the saliency that ethnicity has achieved in Ethiopian politics. As 
ethnicity has become a major weapon for access to power at various levels 
of government, ethnic entrepreneurs have continued to advance political 
                                                 
75   Markakis 1998. 
76  Other subgroups within the Gurage have also claimed a separate ethnic identity  
but in vain. 
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mobilisation along ethno-linguistic lines in order to realise their political 
goals.    
 
It is not also clear why ethnicity, to the exclusion of all other identities, is 
given paramount importance in designing the territorial structure of the 
state. As indicated in the previous chapter, in addition to ethnic identity, 
regional identities have played an important role in Ethiopian history. 
Individuals that belong to the Amhara ethnic group, for example, harbor 
strong regional identities. Despite their bond of linguistic affinity, they 
strongly identity themselves with the distinct regions they have historically 
inhabited (i.e. Gojjam, Gondar/Begemdir, Wollo and Shewa), which were 
administered separately for ages. As one writer remarks, 
 
“[t]he historical heritage of own territorial domain seems to 
have an appeal that transcends the bond of linguistic affinity 
among the native Amharic speakers. The memories of the 
regions of Shewa, Gonder, Gojjam and Wollo as separate 
territorial entities are bound to linger on.77 
 
The consideration of ethnicity in the design of the state to the exclusion of 
all other identities like regionalism renders the approach, to some extent, 
ahistorical.  
 
Generally, the present internal organisation of the state has the potential to 
freeze ethnicity and territorial boundaries. In such a system, every dispute 
turns into an ethnic dispute. Ethnicity becomes the sole lexicon of political 
discourse and, more dangerously for national unity, a readily accessible tool 
                                                 
77  Bekele 2002: 188-189. One can assert this conclusion about the Amharas in pre- 
1991 Ethiopia. It is not clear to what extent the mobilisation of these groups under 
one ‘All-Amhara’ slogan has been able to erase, at least in the short run, these 
regional identities and replace them with an ethnic identity. 
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for ethnic entrepreneurs. As ethnicity has become a major source of power, 
the development of ethnic entrepreneurship across linguistic lines has 
become a common phenomenon. Nothing other than the political turmoil 
and violence that we witnessed in the southern regional state can illustrate 
this more aptly. These criticisms, however, should not be interpreted as a 
rejection of the consideration of the ethnic factor in the designing of the 
state but rather to demonstrate that the Ethiopian Constitution has taken it 
too far.78 
 
3.1.4 Secession 
The most striking element of the right to self-government, as recognised in 
the Ethiopian Constitution, is that it includes the unconditional right of 
every ‘nation, nationality and people’ in Ethiopia to self determination, 
including the right to secession.79 That puts the Ethiopian Constitution in a 
league of its own as the only constitution that explicitly recognises the right 
to secession. The importance attached to this specific right is evident from 
the fact that it cannot be suspended or limited even in the extreme case of 
external invasion, a break-down of law and order and other calamities that 
warrant a proclamation of a state of emergency.80 It is regarded as “the 
ultimate extension and expression of the right to self determination”.81   
 
3.1.4.1 The procedure for secession 
The Constitution provides for a procedure according to which the right to 
secession can be exercised. The exercise of the right to secession has to be 
                                                 
78  Alemante (2003:107) similarly argues that “[w]hile the ethnic make up of a region  
should certainly play a major role in boundary drawing, it should not play such a 
decisive role that it trumps all other considerations”. See also Assefa 2005 
79  Article 39 Constitution. 
80  Art 93(4) (c) Constitution. 
81  Fasil 1997: 53. 
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initiated first by the approval vote of “a two-thirds majority of the members 
of the legislative council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned”.82 
The Federal Government is obliged to organise a referendum within three 
years from the time it receives the relevant council’s decision for secession. 
It is expected that the Federal Government, during the three year cooling-off 
period, will engage the relevant council and the population group that wants 
to secede in order try to respond to the demands of the group within the 
territorial framework of the state with a view of averting secession. This is 
not, however, a constitutional obligation, which is imposed on the Federal 
Government. If the process of accommodation fails to remove the agenda of 
secession from the table, then the referendum must proceed.83 If the demand 
for secession secures the majority vote in the referendum, the process of 
effecting the secession should follow immediately. This shall be done when 
the Federal Government has transferred its powers to the newly independent 
state and the division of assets is effected in a manner prescribed by law. 
 
The right to secede from the federation is not the only solution prescribed 
by the Constitution to those groups that demand the application of their 
right to self determination. Ethnic groups that do not have a state of their 
own can secede from the regional state they are demarcated into. This is 
evident from article 47(2) of the Constitution which recognises the right of 
ethnic groups within the regional states to establish, at any time, their own 
state. The Constitution provides the procedure according to which ethnic 
groups can acquire the state of their own.84 
 
                                                 
82  Article 39 (4) (a) Constitution. 
83  Fasil 1997. See also Alem 2006. 
84  Article 47(3) Constitution. 
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Some argue that exercising the right to secession presupposes the status of 
statehood. It is only after an ethnic community acquires a regional state of 
its own and consequently establishes a legislative council that it can initiate 
a process for secession.85 “The formal issue of secession”, goes the 
argument, “deals with states”. 86 If an ethnic community within a regional 
state seeks to secede from the federal state, it must first go through the 
procedures outlined in article 39(4) of the Constitution and achieve the 
status of statehood.87   
 
As much as this construction of the secession clause appeals to common 
sense, there is nothing in the wording of the Constitution that warrants such 
a conclusion. The only element of the Constitution that might direct one to 
this conclusion and on which the proponents of this argument must have 
relied on, is that the group that wants to secede must have, as implied in the 
Constitution, a legislative council. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for an 
ethnic community to establish a state of its own in order to have a 
                                                 
85  Fasil 1997: 159. 
86  Fails 1997: 159. 
87  Bekele (2002) argues that this right of ethnic communities can easily  be 
frustrated by the regional states. Since it is the Council of nations, nationalities 
and peoples that can demand a state of its own and since the establishment of a 
structure of local government falls within the jurisdictions of the regional states, 
the latter can frustrate any demand for an own state by refusing to provide for a 
self government structure that would have included legislative councils. He 
concludes that even the HF is not constitutionally empowered to deal with such a 
situation. This, however, is not completely accurate. It is true that the 
organisations of government structures within a region are matters that are left to 
the regional governments. But it is also important to note that the Constitution, 
under article 62(3), confers on the HF the power to decide on issues relating to the 
right of ethnic communities to self-determination. No one can dispute that the 
right to establish an own self-government unit is an issue that is intrinsically 
linked to the right to self determination.  
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legislative council. Most of the ethnic communities that are lumped together 
under the Southern regional state have established a self governing structure 
with a legislative council at the zonal level. One can plausibly argue that as 
long as an ethnic group has established a self-governing administration, 
there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits it from leaving the federal 
state without first acquiring the status of a regional state, however, plausible 
the latter option might be.     
 
Another point that is often debated is whether the exercise of the right to 
secession presupposes that claimants demonstrate legitimate conditions that 
warrant the exercise of the right. In other words, the issue is whether 
secession, as recognised in the Constitution, is permissible only for certain 
legitimate causes. Relying on the constitutional stipulation that regards the 
right to secession as the ultimate extension and expression of the right to 
self-determination, some argue that the right to secession is not an 
independently existing right. For the proponents of this view, the right to 
secede can be invoked only when the right to self-determination is denied.88 
This line of argument, it is further argued, finds support in international 
law.89 In sum, a decision to exercise the right to secession can only be 
legitimised when people are denied to exercise their right to self-
determination.90  
 
                                                 
88  Hashim 2004.  
89  Article 13(2) of the Constitution states that the fundamental rights and freedoms  
specified under chapter three of the Constitution “shall be interpreted in a manner 
conforming to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenants on Human Rights and international instruments adopted 
by Ethiopia”. 
90  Hashim 2004. 
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Significantly, the Constitution does not outline grounds under which a 
demand for secession can be made. Unlike the Transitional Charter, which 
made secession dependent on the violation, denial or abrogation of rights,91 
the Constitution does not require seceding groups to provide reasons for 
their demand for secession. It simply outlines the procedure according to 
which the right to secession can be exercised. In other words, a group that 
seeks to secede is not constitutionally required to demonstrate “the moral 
ground” on which it may seek secession.92 Although the HF may demand 
the relevant council to motivate their claim for secession, the relevant 
council is not constitutionally obliged to do so and the Federal Government 
cannot refuse to facilitate the demand for want of legitimate cause(s).  
 
3.1.4.2 Assessment 
Setting aside the ruling party’s strong ideological commitment to self-
determination, the political forces at play during the transition would not 
have settled for anything less than the constitutionalisation of secession. 
Considering the sheer size of the military force wielded by the OLF and 
other similar groups and their capacity to ignite conflict, however 
ineffective that might be, it was evident that a peaceful transition required 
acceding to the demands of these forces by constitutionalising the right to 
secession. As noted by Alem, “the OLF would not have joined the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia and the country would probably have 
once more relapsed into civil war”93 if the clause had not been incorporated 
into the Constitution. A similar position was taken by all Somali parties that 
made it clear that their continued participation in the Ethiopian political 
                                                 
91  Transitional Charter of Ethiopia, No. 1, Negarit Gazeta, 50th Year, No.1, Addis  
Ababa, 22 July 1991 
92  Bekele 2002. 
93  Alem 2006: 323. 
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process was dependent on the recognition of the right to secession by the 
Constitution.94 
 
The procedure-laden nature of the right to secession has led many to doubt 
the constitutional commitment to this right.  Bekele, for example, argues 
that “the overly vague nature of the procedural requirements and the long 
complex processes relating to its implementation apparently affirms that the 
right to secede exists more in theory than in fact”.95 The proponents of this 
view regard it as “a mere formal constitutional right”. Alem shares this view 
when he says that the secession clause has more of a symbolic value than 
anything else as “it is unlikely that any regional state or ethnic group will 
actually be permitted to secede from Ethiopia”.96  
 
It is submitted that the procedural requirements for the implementation of 
the right to secede should not lead to conclude that the secession clause has 
a mere symbolic value only. In fact, one may argue that the condition for 
the implementation of the right to secede is not as burdensome as is often 
put across. The right of secession as adopted in the Constitution is not, for 
example, a remedial right. Unlike the Charter of the Transitional 
Government, the Constitution does not require the claimant group to show a 
legitimate cause for secession. It only requires the claimant group to show, 
through the support of their legislative representatives and eventually a 
referendum, proven support for the secession claim. Considered in this light, 
the procedure required for the implementation of the right to secede cannot 
be invoked to cast doubt on the constitutional commitment of the right to 
secede. The constraint for the implementation of the right to secession 
                                                 
94  Alem 2006: 323. 
95  Bekele 2002: 176. 
96  Alem 2006: 329. 
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might rather lie in the political practice and specifically the position of the 
ruling party on secession. It is true that the ruling party is opposed to the 
exercise of the right to secession although it was the major force behind the 
constitutionalisation of secession. However, it is also important to note that 
political culture is not static. With the constitutionalisation of secession, the 
implementation of the right of secession is kept alive. The ultimate 
realisation of the right depends on the interplay between the level of support 
and mobilisation for the claim of secession and the ruling party’s level of 
resistance to such claims.  
 
Notwithstanding that, one should not also discount the significance of the 
mere constitutionalisation of secession. Alem’s own admission suffices to 
underscore the significance of the symbolic value of incorporating the 
secession clause into the Constitution:  
 
Ethnic groups in border regional states (e.g. Somali) 
consider the secession clause to be a necessary 
condition for their continued membership in the 
Ethiopian state. During debates leading up to the 2000 
election, all parties in the Somali regional state, 
including the one allied to the EPRDF, attributed their 
participation to the existence of the secession clause.97   
    
3.2 Powers and functions   
Division of powers between the Federal Government and the constituent 
units is one important area where the state can provide practical expressions 
to self rule. This relates both to the area of competence and scope of power 
                                                 
97  Alem 2006: 329. An important issue that is not clearly answered by the  
Constitution relates to the fate of minorities within the regional state that seeks to 
secede. The issue is whether they would be allowed to decide their fate or be 
forced to follow the decision of the majority of the regional state. 
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granted to constituent units. Division of powers between the federal and 
state governments is outlined in articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution. The 
powers of the Federal Government are explicitly provided for in the 
Constitution. The long list of federal competencies reveals that areas that 
usually fall within the ambit of the central government in most federations 
do so as well in the Ethiopian case. Examples include foreign affairs, 
defence, customs and excise duties, national currency and monetary policy, 
the central bank, citizenship, immigration, criminal law, international trade 
and commerce.98 Following the territorial principle, the Constitution also 
confers on the Federal Government powers over matters that involve the 
territories of more than one regional state, including inter-state commerce, 
all kinds of transport linking two or more states, utilisation of land and other 
natural resources, of rivers and lakes crossing the boundaries of the federal 
state or linking two or more states. It is also responsible for enacting labor, 
commercial and penal codes.99 The regional states are provided with a brief 
explicit list of competences, namely enacting state constitutions, 
development planning, civil service, police and administration of land and 
other natural resources in accordance with federal laws. In addition, powers 
not explicitly reserved to the Federal Government alone or concurrently to 
both levels of government are vested in the regional states.   
 
3.2.1 The ‘long list’ of federal competencies 
The 21 item list of federal competences might create the impression that 
little room is left for the states to enact legislation; that the long list of 
federal competencies hollows out the residual powers of the regional states. 
Aberra Jembere has, for example, concluded that the Constitution “gives so 
                                                 
98  Articles 51 and 55 Constitution. 
99  Articles 51 and 55 Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 433  
much power to the Federal Government very little is left to the states”.100 
Andreas similarly remarks that member states do not have a significant 
legislative role. For him, the authorities of the regional states are limited to 
areas of cultural and executive power.101 By arguing that the powers left to 
the states are only executive powers, he suggests that the Ethiopian 
federalism “consists chiefly in administrative decentralisation”.102 These 
arguments might be further reinforced by provisions of the Constitution 
which seemingly extend the power of the Federal Government to identity-
related matters like education, the preservation of cultural and historical 
legacies as well as historical sites and objects. Article 51(2) of the 
Constitution entrusts the Federal Government with the power to “establish 
and implement national standards and basic policy criteria for public health, 
education as well as for the preservation of cultural and historical legacies”. 
 
3.2.2 Assessment 
The distribution of power adopted by the Constitution is, to some extent, a 
reflection of its commitment to the accommodation of ethnic diversity. It 
embodies the recognition and accommodation of the particular identities of 
the different groups. The system provides each constituent government, 
which is ethnically defined, with the powers that are instrumental in the 
preservation and promotion of identity as well as in freely pursuing own 
                                                 
100  Aberra 1999: 191. Ehrlich (1999) similarly argues that the regions and sub-regions  
are entrusted with broad cultural and linguistic powers that the Constitution, rather 
than producing a more loyal Ethiopian citizenry, results in greater fragmentation. 
He concludes that no real power remains in the centre.   
101  Andreas 2003. 
102  Andreas 2003: 167. He, of course, accepts the judicial powers of the states. The  
limited areas where the states are allowed to legislate relate, according to him, to 
areas that pertain to cultural diversity.  
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cultural development. This is evident in the fact that states’ areas of 
competences include cultural and educational matters.  
 
Although article 52 of the Constitution seems to provide the Federal 
Government powers in identity-related matters, a careful reading of the 
Constitution suggests that the powers of the Federal Government in those 
areas are, in fact, limited to setting national standards and outlining basic 
policy criteria.103 Once this is noted, it becomes clear that the regional states 
can exercise power not only in language but also in other cultural and 
education matters including but not limited to schools, museums, libraries, 
theatres, broadcasting agencies and the like. As explicitly provided in the 
Constitution, the regional states also have the power to enact their own civil 
law which includes family law. The Federal Government can enact civil 
laws only when the second chamber deems it necessary to establish and 
sustain one economic community. The practice of the regional states also 
supports the position that the regional states enjoy considerable autonomy in 
identity-related matters. Most regional states have now adopted their own 
family law. They exercise control over media services, museums, schools, 
libraries and the like.  
 
The competences of the regional states also extend to other areas that are 
not necessarily related to the promotion of ethnic identity. This is owing to 
the extensive areas of competences that are not covered by the seemingly 
exhaustive list of powers of the Federal Government. These include, among 
others, intra-state transport, state roads, criminal matters not covered by the 
federal legislature, state tourism, health services, agriculture, disaster 
management, housing, state roads, intra-state trade, vehicle licensing, fire 
                                                 
103  The exception is that the federal government is allowed to enact law on the  
utilisation of historical sites and objects. 
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fighting services, traffic regulation, electricity, liquor licenses and other 
matters. The regional states can exercise control over these and many other 
areas that are not explicitly assigned to the Federal Government. This 
indicates that member states of the Ethiopian federation, in contrast to what 
many argue, enjoy legislative autonomy in many areas. 
 
The legislative autonomy of the regional states also benefit from the fact 
that there seems to be little or no concurrency between the two levels of 
government in the Ethiopian federation. No explicit list of concurrent 
powers is provided in the Constitution with the single exception that a 
concurrent power of taxation exists for enterprises which the federal and 
state governments jointly establish, companies, large scale mining, 
petroleum and gas operations.104 This brings the division of powers adopted 
by the Constitution closer to the dualist division of power model where 
powers are exclusively delegated to one or more orders of government. This 
dualist nature of the division of power is further entrenched by article 50 of 
the Constitution which imposes a duty on both governments to respect each 
other’s constitutionally defined powers. This model of division of power 
enhances the autonomy of subnational units. 
 
                                                 
104  Assefa (2006) claims that the Constitution has incorporated concurrent powers  
although these have not been explicitly stated. He substantiates his position by 
stating that article 55(5) of the Constitution which vests the HPR, the lower house, 
with the power to enact penal code and still allows the states to enact penal laws 
on matters not specifically covered by the federal penal legislation. He considers 
this as a concurrent power “because the state may legislate only if the federal 
penal law does not exhaust the list of offences” (Assefa 2006: 145). It is submitted 
that this power represents a special type of residual power rather than a concurrent 
power. 
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Furthermore, unlike the Constitution of South Africa,105 Spain and India, the 
Ethiopian Constitution does not provide for conditions under which the 
central government is allowed to interfere in the legislative powers of the 
states. Phrases like ‘national interest’ or ‘national uniformity’ which are 
often used by constitutions to allow the Federal Government to interfere 
with the jurisdiction of constituent units are lacking. This signals that the 
states are allocated final decision-making powers over matters that are 
allocated to them. In other words, the legislative powers of the states are full 
and exclusive. This obviously has the effect of reinforcing the autonomy of 
state governments. The only exceptional circumstance that allow for the 
interference of the Federal Government in state matters is when there is a 
reasonable belief that a serious breach of human rights, which endangers the 
constitutional order is taking place in the concerned state.106 
 
3.3 Financial autonomy 
The financial arrangement in Ethiopia is characterised by the fiscal 
dependence of the states on the Federal Government, which can be 
explained by their inadequate source of revenue and the resultant heavy 
dependence on intergovernmental transfers.  
 
3.3.1 Division of revenue 
Article 95 of the Constitution outlines the basic principle for the sharing of 
revenue between the Federal Government and the states. It states that the 
division of revenue shall take the federal arrangement into account. This 
means that the divisions of revenue should reflect the sovereignty of each 
                                                 
105  See section 44(2) South African Constitution. 
106  Article 62 (9) Constitution. See also Proclamation No 359/2003, System for the  
Intervention of the Federal Government in the Regions Proclamation, Federal 
Negarit Gazeta, 9th year No. 80 Addis Ababa 10 July, 2003. 
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level of government in their respective domain. Unlike in other federations 
where the allocation of taxation power is determined by reference to the 
type of tax, the territorial principle, coupled with the principle of ownership 
of the source of revenue, by and large, informs the division of taxation 
powers between the federal and state governments. The territorial scope of 
an economic activity determines the level of government that can exercise 
powers of taxation on the same. This principle of revenue allocation is 
concretised by articles 96 to 98 of the Constitution. 
 
Sources of revenue that are owned by the Federal Government and tax bases 
that have a national character are subject to federal taxation. The Federal 
Government thus has the power to levy and collect import and export taxes 
and other dues, income tax from federal and international organisation 
employees; income, profit, sales and excise tax on enterprises owned by the 
Federal Government; on the income and winnings of national lotteries and 
other games of chance.107 Other sources of federal revenue include taxes on 
income of houses and properties owned by the Federal Government as well 
as the income of air, rail and sea transport services.108 Import and export 
taxes and dues represent the major sources of revenue for the Federal 
Government. In the 1998/99 fiscal year, this particular tax category 
generated about 32% of the total revenue that was raised both at the federal 
and regional level.109  
 
Following the territorial cum ownership model, state governments are 
entrusted with the power to levy and collect income tax on employees of the 
                                                 
107  Article 96 Constitution. 
108  Article 96 Constitution. 
109  Solomon 2006. 
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state and of private enterprises.110 The states can levy and collect taxes on 
the incomes of private farmers and farmers forming cooperatives. They can 
also levy and collect profit, income, sales and excise taxes on public 
enterprises which they own. Another important source of revenue for the 
state governments is fees collected from usufructuary use of land.  
 
Consistent with the territorial and ownership principle, the Constitution also 
provides for concurrent powers of taxation.111 The power to levy and collect 
profit, sales, excise and personal income taxes on enterprises that the federal 
and regional governments jointly establish resides with both levels of 
government. The concurrent power of taxation is also extended to taxes on 
income derived from large-scale mining and all petroleum and gas 
operations as well as royalties on such operations. 
 
Analysis of the tax sources and tax bases of the federal and state 
governments reveals that the most productive taxes are assigned to the 
Federal Government. Although the states are provided with an array of tax 
sources, they are of limited significance. The states’ own sources of revenue 
account for less than 20% of state expenditure responsibilities.112 In the 
2006 fiscal year, for example, Tigray made the highest local contribution to 
state expenditure, which, however, was only 28% of the total state 
expenditure. In that same fiscal year, Afar made the lowest contribution to 
own’s state expenditure, which stood at 6.1%.113 This meant that the capital 
budget of all states was totally financed by the Federal Government, 
including half of their recurrent budget.114 Furthermore, the revenue sources 
                                                 
110  Article 97(1) Constitution. 
111  Article 98 Constitution. 
112  Bevan 2001. 
113  Solomon 2006. 
114  Solomon 2006. 
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of the states are shrinking as a result of the process of privatisation, which 
has caused a reduction in the number of public enterprises owned by the 
states.115 Despite the Constitution’s mandate that each level of government 
bear all financial expenditure necessary to discharge its expenditure 
responsibilities,116 state governments often struggle to raise sufficient 
revenue to finance their recurrent expenditure let alone capital expenditures.  
 
Table 7.2: Total regional governments expenditure and regional                 
governments expenditure financed from own revenue         
2006 (in Billion Birr; ZAR=1.27 Birr) 
         
Region Total 
Expenditure (in 
Billion Birr)  
Own Revenue  
(in Billion Birr) 
% Share of 
Own 
Revenue 
Tigray 695.7 194.9 28.0 
Afar 332.0 38.0 11.4 
Amhara 1899.7 380.3 20.0 
Oromyia 2958.3 624.3 21.1 
Somale 506.2 31.0 6.1 
B,S Gumuz 229.0 22.1 9.7 
SNNPR 1626.4 262.8 16.2 
Gambela 156.2 12.4 7.9 
Harar 119.0 20.5 17.2 
Dire Dawa 153.9 34.3 22.3 
Total  8676.4 1620.6 18.7 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) 
 
3.3.2 Intergovernmental transfers 
The inadequate own-source revenue has compelled the states to heavily rely 
on transfers from the Federal Government. This is imperative given the fact 
that the states, despite their limited revenue generating capacity, are 
responsible for a lion’s share of expenses incurred on social sectors that 
heavily contribute to poverty alleviation including education, health and 
                                                 
115  Bevan 2001. 
116  Article 94 Constitution. 
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roads.117 According to article 94 of the Constitution, the Federal 
Government provides grants to the states emergency, rehabilitation and 
development assistance functions. The Constitution refers to these transfers 
as subsidies, also known as block grants. Using a formula developed by the 
House of Federation (HF), the second chamber, the block grant is allocated 
among state governments. The current formula, which was adopted in 
2003/4, has three elements: population size, difference in the level of 
development of the regions, and revenue effort. The most determining 
factor is population size (65%) followed by level of development (25%) and 
efforts to raise revenue and sectoral performance (10%).118 This particular 
intergovernmental transfer, which is an unconditional fiscal transfer, 
accounts for 80% of state government revenue.  
 
Block grants are supplemented by what are usually called specific purpose 
grants. These are conditional grants that are allocated for a specific project. 
More often than not, these grants are transferred to finance specific food 
security and safety net programs.119 
 
The nature of intergovernmental transfers and the role of the Federal 
Government in respect thereof were at the centre of a recent debate in the 
HPR. In a report presented to the HPR in 2006, the federal auditor alluded 
to some irregularities in the use of subsidies that were transferred from the 
Federal Government to state governments.120 According to the report, 4.8 
                                                 
117  Fantahun 2007. 
118  A total of birr 9.5 billion Birr has been divided among the state governments in the  
2007 fiscal year, representing an increase of almost 28% from the previous fiscal 
year (see Fantahun 2007).  
119  According to Fantahun (2007: 8), “[f]ood security is the most prominent, and  
currently the federal government allocates Birr 2 billion annually for this purpose’. 
120  Addis Fortune, (an English weekly) available at www.addisfotune.com 26 June  
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billion birr were unaccounted for in the Federal Government funding 
allocations to the regional administration. The Prime Minister strongly 
argued, if not angrily, that the federal auditor has gone beyond his 
constitutional mandate by trying to exercise control on the utilisation of 
subsidies by state governments. He argued that the central government has 
no constitutional basis to look into the utilisation of these transfers by the 
states. That is the jurisdiction of regional auditors. The state governments, 
to use the words of the Prime Minister, can “burn” the money they received 
in federal subsidies if there was to be an article in their constitution allowing 
for that to happen and if they chose to do so.121  
 
The Prime Minster is correct in that subsidies, under Article 94(2) of the 
Constitution, represent unconditional transfers. The central government, 
when providing subsidies, cannot choose the specific area or development 
project for which the transfer must be used. In other words, it cannot 
earmark the money for specific projects. The only indications in this regard 
are that the subsidies be used for development, state emergency or 
rehabilitation, which, in any case, are too broad to be regarded as 
conditions. This does not, however, mean that there are no restraints on the 
use of transfers. Unlike what the Prime Minister claims, the states are not 
totally free of federal control on the use of subsidies.  
 
First, the Constitution clearly states that subsidies are provided for the 
purpose of tackling state of emergency as well as facilitating rehabilitation 
and development.122 This, at least, means that subsides cannot be used for 
operational expenses unless those expenses are related to development, 
                                                                                                                            
2006. 
121  Addis Fortune (an English weekly)available at www.addisfotune.com 26 June  
2006. 
122  Article 94(2) Constitution. 
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rehabilitation programs or state of emergency. Operational expenses, like 
covering the salaries of state employees, must be financed by states’ own 
revenue. Although that is hardly the case in practice, this means subsidies 
should not be used to finance recurrent expenditure. Second, and most 
importantly, article 95(2) of the Constitution clearly states that the “Federal 
Government shall have the power to audit and inspect the proper utilisation 
of subsidies it grants to the states”. As an exception to the parallel system of 
finance management adopted by the Constitution, which subjects the 
financial management of each level of government to their respective 
auditors, the federal auditor has the power to look into the utilization of 
subsidies. Of course, the Federal Government may not have the power to 
interfere in the choices of the development projects that the state may make. 
Development choices must be left to the states. The examination should be 
limited to ‘auditing’ and ‘inspecting the proper utilisation of subsidies’. This 
is about sound financial management systems and about the fact that 
expenditures that a state makes from the subsidies it receives are, as any 
other financial expenditures, properly made for activities carried out during 
the fiscal year. For these reasons, subsidies are unconditional transfers. 
Contrary to the claims of the Prime Minister, however, this does not mean 
the Federal Government has no role whatsoever in the utilisation of the 
subsidies it transfers to the states.   
 
3.3.3 Assessment 
The dominance of the Federal Government in the financial arrangement is 
evident. The regional governments do not have powers over most of the 
taxes that generate high revenue as those are assigned to the Federal 
Government. The net outcome is a financial arrangement in which the 
regional governments are heavily dependent on intergovernmental transfers.  
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The heavy fiscal reliance of the regional states on the Federal Government 
is regarded by Andreas as a blessing in disguise as it would “raise doubts 
about the wisdom and likelihood of secession”.123 The basic assumption that 
Andreas makes in this regard is that economic viability is a critical factor in 
determining the option of leaving a state by way of secession.  According to 
him, the heavy financial reliance of state governments on the Federal 
Government should give those with a secessionist inclination a second 
thought.124 This, he argues, should particularly be the case “in the border 
states, where separation seems a practical possibility”. This argument seems 
to, however, confuse, the capacity to raise revenue with the actual power to 
generate revenue. The fiscal dependence of the member states does not 
necessarily arise from a lack of productive tax base but from the very fact 
that the Constitution has denied them control over those richest sources of 
revenue by assigning them to the Federal Government. The financial 
dependence has not discouraged the development of secessionist movement 
even in border states. In fact, the prospect of oil reserves in some of these 
regions seems to have fuelled some of the already existing secessionist 
movements. A case in point is the Ogaden National Liberation Front 
(ONLF) which often invokes exploitation of the natural resource in the 
Somali regional state by the Federal Government as legitimate cause for its 
low-level armed struggle. This indicates that the fiscal dependence of the 
states on the Federal Government does not necessarily restrain secessionist 
movements.  
 
The inadequate source of revenue for the states and, consequently, their 
heavy reliance on the Federal Government obviously has a crippling effect 
on their autonomy. Officials that rely on intergovernmental transfers cannot 
                                                 
123  Andreas 2003: 166 
124  Andreas 2003:166. 
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achieve allocative efficiency. They cannot match their development projects 
with the developmental priorities of their constituents.125 The meager 
amount of state budget which does not go beyond covering salaries of state 
employees and public services means that state officials are left with “little 
leeway for experimentation”.126 
 
4. Shared rule 
An institutional framework that aims to accommodate ethnic diversity must 
present a countervailing concern to national unity by complementing self 
rule with shared rule. This section examines whether the Ethiopian 
institutional framework translates the principle of shared rule into 
institutional reality.  
 
4.1 Representation in the House of Peoples Representatives (HPR) 
The HPR, the lower house of the Ethiopian parliament, is the highest 
authority of the Federal Government through which shared rule finds 
practical expression.127  
 
4.1.1 The electoral system for the HPR 
It is designed to have a maximum of 500 members.128 The members are 
elected for a term of five years on the basis of universal suffrage. For the 
purpose of election, each state is divided into electoral districts. Members 
                                                 
125  As argued by Andreas (2003: 116), “[o]fficials supported by transfers lack  
economic incentives to reach decisions tailored to the needs and preferences of 
their constituents”. 
126  Andreas 2003: 116. 
127  Article 50(3) Constitution. The Constitution provides that “all matters assigned  
…to the federal jurisdiction” fall within the legislative competence of the HPR 
(article 55(1) Constitution). 
128  Article 54 Constitution. 
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are elected from the plurality of votes cast in each electoral district.129 This 
is what is usually referred to as the first-past-the-post system, the simplest 
form of the majority system in which the candidate with the most votes is 
declared the winner.  
 
4.1.2 Special representation for minority ethnic groups 
The Constitution requires that an arrangement be provided by law for 
special representation of minority ethnic groups. It specifically reserves a 
total of at least 20 seats of the HPR to the representatives of minority ethnic 
groups.130 The effectiveness of this safety net for minority ethnic groups 
depends, however, on how the ethnic groups that deserve special 
representation are determined. The electoral law does not give any 
indication in this regard as it simply leaves the task of preparing criteria for 
determining such ethnic groups to the HPR.131  One plausible suggestion is 
that the term minority should be determined to include ethnic groups that 
are numerically too weak to gain parliamentary representation. Practice 
seems to more or less endorse this suggestion. According to the decision 
adopted by the transitional parliament and which is still being applied, it is 
‘minority nationalities’ whose population ranges between 10,000 and 
100,000 that are eligible for special representation in the parliament.132  This 
means that ethnic groups that are numerically too weak to gain 
parliamentary representation are, by and large, eligible for representation as 
each electoral constituency, according to the electoral law, has a population 
                                                 
129  Article 54(2) Constitution. 
130  Article 54 Constitution. 
131  Article 7(3) Constitution. See also Proclamation No 438/2005, Proclamation to  
Make Electoral Law of Ethiopia Conform with the Constitution of the FDRE 
(Amendment), Federal Negarit Gazeta 11th Year No.23, Addis Ababa 18 January 
2005.  
132  Solomon 1998. 
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of one hundred thousand.133 Ethnic groups that are geographically 
concentrated but numerically too weak to win an electoral constituency and, 
thereby gain representation, are covered by this scheme of representation.  
 
4.1.3 The role of the HPR and ethnic-based parties 
A certain level of lack of clarity exists about the role of the HPR as a 
deliberative body that represents the people as a whole and the place of 
ethnic-based parties in the same house. Despite the absence of express 
constitutional prohibition, Bekele argues for the exclusion of ethnic-based 
parties from contesting seats in the HPR. He bases his argument on the 
nature and role of the HPR. First, he relies on the constitutional stipulation 
which states that members of the HPR are representatives of the Ethiopian 
people as a whole (emphasis added) and members are mandated to be 
directed “by the will of their people” in their deliberation.134 For him, the 
HPR is an institution established by the Constitution to reflect “the 
Ethiopian nationhood as an element of unity”.135 Second, the apparent 
rationale for the creation of the two houses and their constitutional functions 
also supports this interpretation of the Constitution.136  
 
Bekele’s view of the HPR seems to be based on an inaccurate understanding 
of the nature and role of the HPR. The fact that the Constitution envisages 
                                                 
133  For the purpose of holding election, the electoral law states, the territory of the  
country shall be divided into constituencies each of which has a population of one 
hundred thousand (see Proclamation No 111/95, Proclamation to Make Electoral 
Law of Ethiopia Conform with the Constitution of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, Negarit Gazeta, TGE, 54th Year- No 9, Addis Ababa, 23rd 
February 1995. 
134  Article 54(4) Constitution. 
135  Bekele 2003: 152. 
136  Bekele 2003: 152. 
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the HPR as a body that represents the people of Ethiopia as a whole does 
not mean that its members do not have a constituency that may be based on 
ethnic affinities, regional solidarities or other relevant socio-political 
groupings. It only means that they are not supposed, at least, to formally 
organise their votes as a block. Members of the lower house are not 
supposed to receive instructions on how to vote on certain issues from the 
regional state where they come from. Members of the second house, on the 
other hand, are often supposed to act on behalf of the regional state from 
which they are elected or appointed. In fact, this underlies the major 
distinction between an upper house and lower house in most federations.  
 
Furthermore, his understanding of the role and nature of the Ethiopian lower 
house also contradicts the current trend that underlines the need to enhance 
the representative character of national institutions, including lower houses, 
by ensuring representation. This is, in fact, what often drives the discussion 
about the appropriate electoral system in multi-ethnic federations. His view 
about bi-cameral parliament and the respective role of each house are 
reminiscent of the traditional view that limits issues related to representation 
of diversity in the context of second chambers. Generally, there are no 
constitutional reasons that warrant the exclusion of ethnic-based parties 
from contesting election to the HPR. 
 
4.1.4 Assessment  
As indicated in Chapter Three, the plurality electoral system, when 
compared to the proportional system, scores low in enhancing the 
representativeness of a lower house. It gives little room for the 
representation of small parties in federal institutions. In so far as the 
representation of ethnic groups is concerned, however, the effect of the 
majority electoral system should not be evaluated in abstract. One important 
factor that greatly determines the effect of an electoral system is the 
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geographical settlement of ethnic groups. A plurality system is more likely 
to have an effect of marginalisation on ethnic groups that are not 
territorially concentrated. In a state like Ethiopia, where the states are 
delimited on the basis of linguistic lines, the application of the majority 
system is less likely to affect the representation of ethnic groups in the HPR 
in a negative way. Furthermore, the organisation of the electoral 
constituencies suggests that any possible marginalising effect of the 
majority electoral system is very limited. According to the electoral law, the 
country is divided into permanent constituencies by taking the wereda, the 
second lowest administrative unit, as a basis and, when necessary, making 
some readjustments on the basis of population census.137 More often than 
not, each wereda is inhabited dominantly by a single ethnic group.138 In 
fact, even zonal administration, which is the next higher administrative unit 
and which consists of a number of weredas, is often ethnically defined in 
the regional states that are ethnically plural. Where there are ethnic 
minorities within a zone, special weredas that do not form part of the zone 
are established for those ethnic minorities. In addition, unlike the Afrikaners 
of South Africa, there is no single large ethnic group in Ethiopia that is 
widely scattered throughout the country without being territorially 
concentrated in some parts of the country.  
 
If there are any votes that might be wasted as a result of the plurality 
system, it is the votes of ethnic migrants, individuals that belong to the 
dominant ethnic groups in the northern part of the country, especially those 
that belong to the Amhara ethnic group, who have settled outside their place 
                                                 
137  Article 7(1) Constitution. See also Proclamation No 438/2005, Proclamation to  
Make Electoral Law of Ethiopia Conform with the Constitution of the FDRE 
(Amendment), Federal Negarit Gazeta 11th Year No.23, Addis Ababa 18  January 
2005.  
138  Tronvoll 2000. 
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of origin.139 As these particular ethnic groups, relatively speaking, are 
numerically strong and with a ‘mother state’ of their own, it is not possible 
to argue that the electoral system has denied them representation in the 
HPR. Of course, as we shall see later, the effect of this electoral system at 
regional state level on these and other groups of people that are found in the 
midst of regional majorities calls for a re-examination of the electoral 
system.  
 
Any possible exclusion of ethnic groups as result of the application of the 
plurality system is further mitigated by the constitutional provision that 
guarantees the representation of minority groups in the HPR. A total of at 
least 20 seats of the HPR are specifically reserved to the representatives of 
minority ethnic groups. As indicated earlier, the way in which this provision 
is implemented has ensured the representation of ethnic groups that are 
numerically too weak to secure parliamentary representation (i.e. ethnic 
groups whose population stands between 10,000 and 100,000). The only 
problem in this regard is that the formula adopted for allocation of the 20 
seats simply focuses on the size of ethnic groups without giving due 
attention to the capacity to have own constituency, which can be affected by 
pattern of settlement. This means that ethnic groups that are dispersed in 
different regions or electoral constituencies without being numerically 
strong in a single electoral constituency to achieve parliamentary 
                                                 
139  As the experience of 2005 election shows, most of the ethnic migrants feel  
threatened by the present dispensation that is perceived as favoring the regional 
dominant groups and often cast their vote in support of the state-wide parties. As 
these particular ethnic groups are, relatively speaking, numerically strong and with 
a ‘mother state’ of their own, it is not possible to argue that the electoral system 
has denied them representation at the national level. Of course, as we shall discuss 
later, the effect of this electoral system at the state level on these and other groups 
of people that are found in the midst of regional majorities calls for concern. 
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representation, albeit large in number, are not necessarily guaranteed 
representation.  
 
The major problem with regard to the plurality electoral system is that it 
gives little room for developing inter-ethnic solidarity. One of the 
reservations about the adoption of the plurality system in a multi-ethnic 
context is that it provides political parties with little incentive to cast their 
net wide. Unlike the PR system which encourages political parties to create 
regionally and ethnically diverse lists, with the view to maximise their 
overall national votes, political parties operating within the plurality 
electoral system are likely to concentrate on electoral constituencies where 
the likelihood of them winning an election is strong. This seems to partly be 
the case in Ethiopia. The majority of the parties are only focused on wining 
elections in the areas where the ethnic group, on whose behalf they have 
established the party, is geographically concentrated. They as a result only 
field candidates that belong to the specific ethnic group they ostensibly 
represent.140 If not for this particular challenge, the general assessment is 
that although the adoption of a PR system would have enhanced 
representation to some degree, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
                                                 
140  This, however, does not mean that the system has totally excluded the creation of  
ethnically diverse party lists. In present day Ethiopia, where ethnicity has achieved 
an important political saliency, parties with a state-wide objective have no option 
but to diversify their list if they are to succeed in the elections. This, in fact, seems 
to be a fact accepted by the major opposition party that participated in the 2005 
election with a state-wide objective. The Coalition for Democracy and Unity did 
not only diversify the list of its candidates but also sought to ensure that the top 
leadership structure of the party represents the major demographic composition of 
the country (see Berhanu 2007). The institutional deficiency in this regard seems 
to be compensated by the political context. Of course, the representative nature of 
the leadership structure is highly questionable. 
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present system has resulted in the marginalisation of specific groups from 
the HPR.   
 
4.2 The House of Federation 
The upper house of the Ethiopian parliament, the House of Federation (HF), 
is a unique institution. This is true both in terms of its composition as well 
as the functions it is entrusted to perform by the Constitution. As it shall 
become clear in the following paragraphs, it is this unique feature of the 
House that has led some to argue that the House is not a typical second 
chamber. Some have even gone on to conclude that the Ethiopian federal 
system, contrary to what many think, does not consist of a bi-cameral 
parliament.   
 
4.2.1 Composition of the HF 
The HF, according to article 61 of the Constitution, is composed of 
representative of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia, in other 
words, ethnic communities. According to the Constitution, each ethnic 
group shall be represented by at least one member.141 Moreover, as shown 
in Table 7.4, those ethnic communities whose population exceed one 
million are entitled to have one additional representative for every increase 
by a million.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
141   Article 61(2) Constitution. 
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Table 7.3: Composition of the House of Federation 
 
No Regional 
State 
Members 
represented 
in the 
House per 
regional 
state 
Nations, Nationalities 
and 
Peoples represented 
in the House 
Number of representatives per 
Nations , Nationalities and 
Peoples represented in the 
House 
 1 Tigray 6 Tigre, Kunama, Erob,  Tigre (4), Kunama, Erob 
 2 Afar 2 Afar Afar 
 3 Amhara 17 Agewhimra, Agewawi, 
Oromo, Amhara) 
Amhara (13), Agewhimra, 
Agewawi (2), Oromo 
 4 Oromyia 19 Oromo Oromo (19) 
 5 Harari 1 Harari Harari (1) 
 6 Somale 4 Somale Somale (1) 
 7 Benishangul 
Gumuz 
5 Berta, Gumiz, Komo, 
Mao, Shinosha 
Berta (1), Gumiz(1), Komo (1), 
Mao (1), Shinosha(1) 
 8 Southern 
Nation and 
Nationality 
54 Kunta, Burji, Basketo, 
Alaba, Derashe, 
Gewade, Kusiye, Yem, 
Kore, Gedeo, Malle,  
Deasenech, Hammer, 
Tsemay, Ari, Aribore, 
Gnangatem, Mursi, 
Bodi, Deme, Gammo, 
Goffa, Gidicho, Zeyse, 
Ayda, Keffa, Nea, 
Chara, Kembata, 
Tembaro, Welayta, 
Sidama, Hadiya, Sheka, 
Dawaro, Gurage, 
Gorage, 
Kebena, Mareko, Silte, 
Dize, Zelmam, Meanet, 
Sheko, Surma, Bench, 
Gammo, Mashulle 
Welayta (2), Sidama  (3), Hadiya 
(2), with the remaining ‘nations 
and nationalities’ represented by 
one representative each. 
 9 Gambela 4 Agnawak, Nuware, 
Upo, Megenger) 
Agnawak (1), Nuware (1), Upo 
(1), Megenger (1) 
 Grand Total   112         69                    112 
Source: HOF 
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Article 61(3) of the Constitution states that state councils shall elect 
members of the House. As the reading of the second part of the same article 
suggests, election of the members of the House can be either direct or 
indirect. The decision is left to the councils of member states. In practice, 
the state councils have never held elections to have the members of the 
House directly elected by the people. It is the state councils themselves who 
have chosen representatives to the House. Thus, the House is not composed 
of individuals who are elected by the people but appointed by the state 
councils. 
 
In terms of composition, there are two elements that distinguish the HF 
from most second chambers in other federations. First, unlike in many 
federations where second chambers are representative of subnational 
entities, the HF is simply composed of representatives of ethnic groups. 
Strictly speaking, it is not composed of representatives of the nine states. 
Unlike the provinces of South Africa where members of the second 
chamber, the National Council of Provinces, are provincial delegates that 
should speak in unison on matters that affect provinces, members are not 
representatives of state who are required to act on the instructions of state 
councils. There is no explicit requirement that instructs members to vote 
along constituent government lines. The arrangement of the House, which is 
based the equitable representation of ethnic communities, tends to indicate 
that state solidarity is not the intended modus operandi of the House.142 The 
                                                 
142  This also means that a representative of an ethnic group, in principle, can advance  
an opinion that is different from representatives of other ethnic groups, who, 
nevertheless, come from the same state. The likelihood of this happening might be 
slim in the context where the boundary of the state coincides with that of an ethnic 
group. That, however, is only true of the five states. Even in those ethnically 
defined states there are minorities that, according to article 61 of the Constitution, 
have to be represented separately in the House. More than 85% of the inhabitants 
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lack of direct link between the states and the HF is, however, circumvented 
by the role that the state councils, as indicated above, play in the 
nomination/election of members of the house. The role of the state councils 
in the appointment of members seems to indirectly make up for the lack of 
explicit link between members of the HF and the states from which they are 
elected. Members have become de facto representatives of the states.143 
 
The second element that distinguishes the HF is the issue of equality of 
representation. In some federations like that of South Africa and USA, the 
subnational units are represented in equal numbers irrespective of their 
unequal population sizes. In the American Senate, for example, each of the 
fifty-one states has two representatives, irrespective of the size of the 
population they represent. The Ethiopian Constitution has departed from 
this system of representation by ensuring not only each ethnic group is 
represented by one member but also by allowing the presence of an 
additional representative for each one million of the population. As a result, 
                                                                                                                            
of the State of Tigray, for example, belong to one ethnic group. There are, 
however, minorities in their midst which includes the Saho. 
143  The extent of the control of the states over the members they designate to the  
House is  not, however, clear. It is assumed that they can at any time remove the 
member. Constitutionally speaking, this might be problematic. This would 
especially be the case in a situation where a member of the House broke ranks 
with the state from which he came from on an issue that affects his/her ethnic 
group. A member of the house is primarily a representative of an ethnic group.  
That means he is entitled to have an opinion different from that of the state, as 
expressed by the other representatives, on matters that are brought before the 
House. A member can also speak against the policies and practices of the state, if 
there are any, which adversely affect his or her respective ethnic group. The 
logical conclusion is that there is no constitutional obligation on a member of the 
House to follow the instructions of a state council. Similarly, a state council 
cannot remove a representative of an ethnic group from the House. 
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the ethnic group with the largest size ends up having more seats than the 
others.  
 
4.2.1.1 Equitable representation? 
Some authors argue that the representation system in the HF does not 
represent an equitable representation. Bekele has the following to say about 
the inequality of the system:  
 
The state of the Gambela Peoples has three more representatives in 
the HF than the state of Harare People, though the population of 
the former exceeds that of the latter by only about forty thousand. 
The state of Gambela with a population of less than two-hundred 
thousand and the state of Bensihsnagu-Gumuz with a population of  
about four hundred and sixty thousand, separately they have as 
many representatives in the HF as the State of Somalia whose 
population is almost three –and-half- million. Each has two more 
representatives than the State of Afar, which is populated by over a 
million inhabitants.144 
 
The evaluation of the representation system as inequitable can only be 
accepted if the HF is viewed as body of state representatives. In terms of the 
Constitution, however, the HF is a body of representatives of ethnic 
communities and not state governments. The members are supposed to act 
on behalf of ethnic communities. The point of reference for representation 
should thus be ethnic communities and not state governments. Given the 
fact that the regional states are not ethnically homogenous, it is natural that 
ethnically heterogeneous states will produce a disproportionate number of 
members in the house when compared with other states that have large but 
ethnically less diverse populations.145 Nevertheless, given the current state 
                                                 
144  Bekele 2002: 156. 
145  This argument is based on the fact that some regional states, despite their small  
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of affairs in which members of the HF serve as de facto state 
representatives, this observation, it must be admitted, cannot be simply 
dismissed as a non-issue. 
 
4.2.1.2 Representation of intra-substate minorities and ethnic migrants 
Another issue related to the composition of the HF is the claim that 
members of ethnic groups that reside outside their place of origin are not 
represented in the HF.  Alem questions why only the Oromo are represented 
in the HF despite the fact that there is a significant non-Oromo population 
inhabiting the Oromyia regional state. By the same token, he argues, it is 
puzzling why the non- Harari population in the Harari regional state, which 
is much greater than the Harari themselves, do not have a seat in the HF 
while the significantly small Harari ethnic group is represented in the 
House. He concludes that “these are sources of disillusionment for the 
unrepresented ethnic group”.146   
 
It is not clear if the so-called ‘non-representation of ethnic groups’, as Alem 
claims, represent anomalies to the system of representation evident in the 
HF. A distinction has to be made between two categories of people that do 
not belong to the regionally empowered group. On the one hand, there are 
members of ethnic groups that live outside their place of origin, usually 
referred to as migrant ethnic groups. This mostly refers to the Amharas and 
members of other ethnic groups that are dispersed throughout the major 
urban areas of southern and eastern Ethiopia including, for example, in 
Oromyia and Harari regional states. The position of the Constitution with 
regard to these specific groups of people seems to be rather clear. In as 
                                                                                                                            
population, have disproportionate representation as a result of the fact that they are 
ethnically heterogeneous as compared to other states, which are large in number 
but ethnically less heterogeneous. 
146  Alem 2006: 330. 
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much as the multi-ethnic cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are not 
represented in the HF on the grounds that they do not represent a particular 
group, the ethnic-migrants that have settled in the different parts of the 
country cannot be regarded as distinct ethnic groups that deserve separate 
representation. The ethnic migrants belong to different ethnic groups 
although they predominantly come from the Amhara ethnic group. The 
assumption is also that allocation of seats for the HF, which takes into 
account population size of an ethnic group, considers not only members of  
an ethnic group that reside in their place of origin but also members of the 
same ethnic group that happen to live outside their ‘native land’.147 As the 
house is not a composition of representatives of regional states, there is no 
reason to determine the population size of each ethnic group only with 
reference to those that reside in their place of origin. This means the number 
of Amhara representatives in the HF is determined not only on the basis of 
Amhara population that reside in the eponymous regional state but also 
taking into account individual Amharas that have migrated to different parts 
of the country. This practice seems to endorse this understanding of the 
Constitution as it does not provide for a separate representation of ethnic 
migrants.  
 
The remaining question is whether the Constitution envisages a different 
view with regard to pockets of ethnic groups that are indigenous to the area 
they inhabit which is, however, demarcated into a regional state that is 
defined as belonging to another ethnic group. These ethnic groups usually 
border a regional state that is inhabited by the same ethnic group that they 
                                                 
147  It is not, however, clear whether the House actually considers the entire member  
ship of the ethnic community in question irrespective of their place of residence 
when determining the number of representations that an ethnic community is 
entitled to.  
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belong to. This is the case, for example, with the Oromo speakers in the 
Oromyia Zone of the Amhara regional state. The practice suggests an 
exception to the HF’s system of representation in relation to these specific 
ethnic groups. The Oromo speakers mentioned above are provided separate 
representation in the HF.  Notwithstanding this practice, it is unclear 
whether the system of representation actually warrants a separate 
representation of ethnic groups that have found themselves in the ‘wrong 
regional state’, albeit indigenous to the area they inhabit. The exception can 
be accepted only if it can persuasively be argued that indigenous ethnic 
communities that are demarcated outside their homeland constitute a 
distinct “nation, nationality or people” that deserve separate representation. 
A case can hardly be made to that effect. In the absence of that, the adopted 
practice injects an element of regionalisation in the representation system of 
the HF, something that is not envisioned as a basis for representation in the 
HF by the Constitution.   
 
In conclusion, the anomalies in the representation system of the HF is not, 
as Alem argues, the non-representation of ethnic migrants but, on the 
contrary, the separate representation of ethnic groups that have found 
themselves on the ‘wrong’ side of the border.  
 
4.2.2 Powers and function of the HF 
Although the HF is often considered as one of the legislative institutions of 
the Federal Government, a brief look at the powers and functions of the HF 
reveals that it does not exercise any legislative function.  
 
As the scheme of distribution of powers adopted by the Constitution shows, 
legislative competences over identity-related matters are assigned 
exclusively either to the Federal Government (i.e. via the HPR) or the states, 
leaving little or no room for the HF. Its limited role in this regard includes 
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the initiation and approval of constitutional amendments.148 Another related 
function of the HF, which allows it to play a role in protecting the states 
from legislative interference by the Federal Government, pertains to areas of 
civil law. In principle, legislation in the areas of civil law are reserved to the 
states. The Federal Government can enact civil laws only when the law in 
question is necessary to “sustain and establish one economic unity”.149 The 
determination of such laws is not, however, entirely left to the Federal 
Government. The HF is entrusted with the function of delimiting the areas 
of civil law, which are important for the development of ‘one economic 
unity’ and, thus, require federal legislation.150 This is clearly one of the few 
cases where the HF plays an important role in protecting regional autonomy 
by limiting the legislative powers of the Federal Government in the areas of 
civil law. The other mechanism by which the HF protects the autonomy of 
regional states relates to its controlling power over any intervention by the 
Federal Government into the affairs of a state. According to article 62(9) of 
the Constitution, any federal intervention in the functions of a member of 
the federation has to be permitted first by the HF. In fact, it is only the HF 
that can order federal intervention if, in violation of the Constitution, a 
member state endangers the constitutional order.151  
 
As the foregoing shows, the HF plays no significant role in the federal 
legislative process. It rather functions as an institution that forges and 
maintains a harmonious relationship, horizontally, between the different 
ethnic groups and, vertically, between the ethnic groups and the federal 
state. This role of the HF commences with its duty to “promote the equality 
of the peoples enshrined in the Constitution and enhance their unity based 
                                                 
148  Articles 104 and 105 Constitution. 
149  Article 55(6) Constitution. 
150  Article 62(8) Constitution. 
151  Article 62(9) Constitution. 
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on their mutual consent”.152 The HF is also entrusted with the power to 
decide on issues relating to the rights of ethnic communities to self 
determination, including the right to secession.153 This power of the HF is 
further elaborated by the Proclamation that determined the powers and 
functions of the latter, which states that an ethnic group “who believes that 
its self-identities are denied, its right of self-administration are infringed, 
promotion of its culture, language and history are not respected, in general 
its rights enshrined in the Constitution are not respected or, violated for any 
reason” 154 can present its application to the HF. This also includes the role 
that the HF plays in reorganising a referendum when the question of the 
right of secession arises. Related to this, the HF fulfils a dispute settlement 
function. It has the responsibility of seeking solutions to misunderstandings 
that may arise among states, including state border disputes.155  
 
Another related but unusual role for a second chamber is its power to 
interpret the Constitution. The HF, with the expert help of the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry, provides the final and ultimate decision in 
constitutional disputes, including on the constitutionality of laws.156 Other 
powers and function of the HF include determining the division of revenue 
                                                 
152   Article 62(4) Constitution. 
153  Article 62 (3) Constitution. 
154   Article 19(1) Proclamation No.251/2001, Consolidation of the House of  
Federation and the Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities Proclamation, 
Federal Negarit Gazeta, 7th Year No. 41 Addis Ababa,  6 July 2001. 
155  Article 62(2) Constitution. The basic principle is that all state border disputes shall  
be settled by agreement of the concerned states. In the event that the disputing 
states failed to reach an agreement, the decision rests with the House which has to 
take into account ‘the basis of settlement patters and the wishes of the people 
concerned’ in making the decision. Article 48 of the Constitution  
156  Articles 82-84 Constitution. For a critical discussion of this role of the HF, see  
Yonatan 2006.  
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derived from joint tax sources between the federal and state governments,157 
including the amount of subsidies the Federal Government may provide to 
the states.158  
 
4.2.3 Assessment 
Generally, the representation system in the HF provides representatives of 
ethnic groups with an opportunity to voice the preferences of their ethnic 
groups as well as protect their interests. The efficacy of the system to 
protect the interests of ethnic groups is, however, compromised by the 
representation system which is majoritarian in nature. Currently, the Oromo 
and the Amhara are represented by 19 and 13 representatives respectively 
while no less than 50 other ethnic groups have one representative each. This 
clearly shows that small ethnic groups are likely to be outvoted easily by the 
numerically strong ethnic groups unless they establish large coalition, which 
are often difficult to sustain. In addition, although the configuration of the 
HF as composition of the representative of ethnic groups reinforces the 
constitutional declaration that sovereignty rests with the ‘nations, 
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia’, it belies the political reality that state 
governments are the most important units of government. In fact, members 
of the HF are, in practice, representatives of state governments.  
 
The major criticism against the HF is that it plays little or no role in 
protecting the jurisdictions of the states. The HF is not involved in the 
overwhelming majority of laws passed by the Federal Government. As 
Brietzke has noted, “the consent of the [HF] is not a precondition to the 
                                                 
157  Article 62(7) Constitution. 
158  The HF is responsible for developing a formula based on which revenue  
allocations are made every year. 
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effectiveness of federal legislation”.159 Let alone override the HPR in 
certain areas of legislation, it does not even have the power to provide 
inputs or recommend the reconsideration of a bill adopted by the latter 
before it becomes a law. This even extends to instances where legislation 
passed by the HPR pertains to matters that directly affect the states or in 
areas that are relevant to them. Members of second chambers do not, for 
example, have the power to veto national legislation in the areas of culture, 
language and education. This is problematic considering the fact that the 
autonomy of the states cannot be full and complete unless they are allowed 
to successfully challenge interferences of the Federal Government on what 
would normally be their jurisdiction.  
 
Of course, the HF can always use its power of constitutional interpretation 
and specifically the power to declare laws that contravene the Constitution 
as invalid to trump any interference of the central government on what 
would normally be the jurisdiction of the state governments. This, however, 
is only after the bill becomes a law. This denies the federal arrangement an 
opportunity to use the HF as an institution through which the Federal 
Government and the state can promote the co-management of the society as 
a whole, which is essential for the promotion of national unity and the 
maintenance of the federation.  
 
4.3 Representation in the federal executive 
Unlike in South Africa, the representation of different ethnic groups in the 
national institutions is a constitutional requirement in Ethiopia. Article 
39(3) of the Constitution explicitly mandates the “equitable representation 
of the different ethnic communities in the Federal and state governments”. 
                                                 
159  Brietzke 1995: 28. He concluded that a genuine bicameral legislature has not  
been created in the federal system. See also Assefa 2006. 
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Two important points can be discerned from this constitutional requirement. 
First, equitable representation is not only limited to the Federal 
Government. State governments are also obliged to ensure equitable 
representation in their institutions. This, firstly, applies to the regional states 
that are ethnically homogenous but still have some minorities in their midst. 
This refers to, for example, the representation of the Kunama and Irob 
ethnic communities in Tigray regional state as well as the Agwi and the 
Oromo in the Amhara regional state. Second, it applies to the ethnically 
heterogeneous regional states like Gambela, Benishangul-Gumuz, SNNPR 
and Harari regional states. It is yet not clear, however, if ethnic migrants – 
ethnic groups that are not indigenous to the regional states - must also be 
represented in state structures.   
 
Second, the equitable representation of the different ethnic communities is 
not merely limited to the executive branches of the federal and state 
governments. The Constitution rather makes reference to equitable 
representation in relation to state and Federal Governments in general, thus, 
extending representation beyond the executive to both the legislative and 
judicial arms of federal and state governments. In addition, the Constitution 
mandates the government to ensure the representation of all ethnic 
communities in the national armed forces.160 This means the constitutional 
requirement of equitable representation, as noted by Fasil, must “permeate 
the whole government in all its branches”.161 This section focuses on 
equitable representation in the federal executive. 
 
 
 
                                                 
160  Article 87 Constitution. 
161  Fasil 1997: 156. 
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4.3.1 The constitutional practice of representation 
In the wake of the new dispensation, the Federal Government, under the 
leadership of the EPRDF, a coalition of four ethnic-based parties, has 
become more diversified than ever in terms of ethnic composition. Unlike in 
the past, the leadership structures of national institutions are no longer 
monopolised by the Amharas or ‘Amharacised individuals’ from other 
ethnic groups. A lessening of Amhara influence over the director-level 
management of national institutional structures is evident.162 The first 
cabinet that was formed after the adoption of the Constitution in 1995 was, 
for example, composed of four Amharas, six Oromos, three Tigres and three 
ministers from other ethnic groups in the 16-member cabinet.163 The current 
cabinet, which is formed after the 2005 election, is more ethnically diverse 
than the two cabinets that preceded it. Led by a Prime Minister from Tigre, 
the 21-member cabinet is composed of five Amharas, seven Oromos, two 
Tigres and one each from Somali, Gurage, Afar, Silte, Keficho, Sidama and 
Hadya ethnic groups.164  
 
Even if one accepts that the cabinet is ethnically diverse, some argue, the 
fact that individuals belonging to the Tigre ethnic group control key 
ministerial and other important positions continues to reinforce the 
perception that the government is dominated by the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF). The fact that the position of Prime Minister, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Security are in the hands of 
Tigrinya speakers is often used to substantiate this argument. Although the 
                                                 
162  Joireman and Szayna 2000. 
163  Ethiopia: The status of Amharas available at  
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ins/ethiopia_amharas_93.html, accessed on 20 
May 2008  
164  Available at http://www.ethioconsulate-la.org/Listofcabinetengl.pdf, accessed on  
20 May 2008. 
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Minister of Defence has not been a Tigrinya speaker for sometime now, the 
chief of staff position has been in the hands of individuals from this ethnic 
group.  
 
4.3.2 Assessment 
The general assessment is that representation in the Ethiopian Federal 
Government is ethnically diverse. This is true not only of the national 
cabinet but also of ambassadorial and other important national 
appointments. The remaining question, however, is whether the individuals 
that are claimed to represent different ethnic groups in the cabinet represent 
the communities on whose behalf they are appointed. There is a need to go 
beyond the formal representation system and examine the true nature of 
their representativeness. This requires one to go beyond the constitutional 
structure and look into the constitutional practice.    
 
Responding to the question posed above requires one to look into the 
formative stages of the ruling party and examine the composition of the 
ruling party and especially how the coalition came about. As the TPLF took 
control of Tigray and decided to proceed beyond south of Tigray to 
overthrow the military government, creating alliance with other political 
groupings was deemed imperative. The TPLF first created an alliance with 
the Ethiopian National Democratic Movement (ENDM) which later 
transformed itself into the Amhara National Democratic Movement 
(ANDM), a small armed group that was waging war against the military 
government in parts of the Amhara region. As the war against the military 
junta proceeded to what is today Oromyia, the TPLF established the Oromo 
People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) to represent the Oromo people, 
largely out of captured Oromo soldiers and officers.165 It was, by and large, 
                                                 
165  Young 1997: 147. 
 
 
 
 
 466  
these three groups that came together to create the EPRDF. The last to join 
the coalition was the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front 
(SEPDF), which was primarily created by the TPLF. As noted by Young,  
 
[the SEPDF] was largely created after the defeat of the military 
and it was the TPLF forces that first occupied the region when 
the Derg army evacuated its bases…..As a result, the first 
administrations established were made up solely of Tigrayans 
and only afterwards were southern Ethiopians captured during 
the war given political training and assigned to various 
administrative and ‘elected’ positions.166 
 
The general pattern that one observes in the formation of the EPRDF is that 
its core organisation, the TPLF, followed a policy of creating alliance which 
largely relied on the creation of political parties in its own image as opposed 
to linking with existing parties, be it in Oromyia or the SNNPR. Young 
comments that the TPLF leadership “did not seriously entertain the idea of 
building alliances with existing southern parties and instead drove them 
largely out of existence.”167  
 
The ‘alliance-building’ process followed by the TPLF has tainted the image 
of the coalition and discredited the new parties in the eyes of the community 
they are supposed to represent. Although these criticisms are often 
overstated, the OPDO and the SEPDEF, which are largely the creations of 
the TPLF,168 have faced an uphill struggle to earn legitimacy. The OPDO is 
often viewed by Oromo nationalists as an instrument weapon of 
“Abyssinian hegemony - Tigrean in this case”169 and a weapon of the TPLF. 
                                                 
166  Young 1997: 212. 
167  Young 1997: 213. 
168  Young 1997: 211. 
169  Adhana 1994: 236. 
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Some have labelled the organisation as “neo-Gobenas”,170 in reference to 
one of the Amharcised Oromo generals of the Amhara dominated Empire 
during the reign of Menelik II (i.e. Ras Gobena). A comment on OPDO by 
Oromo intellectuals summarises how the OPDO is regarded among the 
Oromo urban population and especially among Oromo intellectuals: “Since 
the OPDO [was] formed out of prisoners of war, it is clear that members of 
OPDO….do not represent a nationality, a class or even the Ethiopian 
military to which they once belonged”.171  
 
The same, albeit in a less callous tone, can be said of the SEPDF, which has 
little legitimacy among the people they claim to represent.172 The general 
view or, at least, the perception is that these parties are not equal partners of 
the coalition. They are hardly regarded as true champions of the rights of 
the communities they claim to represent. This is especially damaging in a 
political context where there are already existing parties that claim to 
represent the same community/ies. 
 
Of course, the composition of the cabinet and other major national 
appointments extends beyond these four parties and includes leaders from 
other ethnic-based parties. These individuals usually come from parties that 
are ‘affiliated to the EPRDF’ although they are not formal members of the 
coalition.173 The appointment of ministers from these parties has enhanced 
                                                 
170  Adhana 1994: 236. 
171  As quoted in Adhana 1994: 236. 
172  The ANDM, it is indicated, is largely opposed by intellectuals and towns people.  
As election 2005 also attests, the Amhara regional state is one of the strongholds 
of the opposition. 
173  In the quarters of the ruling party, these parties are often referred to as affiliated  
parties, referring to their relation with the EPRDF. Merara Gudina, on the other 
hand, refers to these parties as the infamous PDOs (People’s Democratic 
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the representative character of the government as it extends representation 
from the three major ethnic communities as well as dozens of ethnic 
communities in the Southern region to other ethnic groups that are located 
in the peripheral parts of the country. Good examples in this regard are the 
ministers appointed from parties that are operating in the Somali and Harari 
regional states. The problem is that these parties are also subjected to the 
same criticism that is directed against the OPDO and the SEPDEF as they 
are created under the tutelage of the EPRDF. They are regarded as 
‘controlled ethnic-based organisations’ that are created on behalf of the 
various ethnic groups in the country.174 
 
In sum, the Constitution mandates the representation of the different ethnic 
groups in the Federal Government. The present Ethiopian government can 
be generally regarded as a reflection of the diverse ethnic communities in 
the country. Whether these different ethnic communities see themselves 
represented in the higher offices of the national government is, however, 
another issue. Formal representation does not necessarily guarantee actual 
representation. In fact, as indicated above, there are grounds that cast doubt 
on the representative nature of the national institutions. The root of the 
problem lies in the political practice and, more specifically, in nature of the 
EPRDF, from whose ranks and files the majority of the ministers and 
ambassadors are appointed. The fact that at least two member parties of the 
coalition are created under the tutelage of the TPLF out of captured soldiers 
and officers has compromised their legitimacy in the eyes of the 
communities they are supposed to represent. Individuals that are appointed 
from these parties are hardly regarded as true representatives. This is 
                                                                                                                            
Organisations) that are established by the ruling party for each ethnic group. 
Merara 2003: 123.  
174  Merara 2003: 146. 
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especially true in ethnic communities whose members have independently 
established political parties. A similar problem plagues the parties in the 
peripheral parts of the country. As they are created under the direction of 
EPRDF, they are hardly regarded as independent parties and neither are 
their leaders who are appointed to national institutions including the cabinet.  
 
Notwithstanding the practice, it must be emphasised that the constitutional 
framework provides a means for the representation of the different ethnic 
groups in the national executive. However, the translation of the 
constitutional mandate into a reality largely depends on the political 
practice.   
 
5. Intra-state minorities and ethnic migrants 
The geographical configuration of the Ethiopian federal state has not 
created entirely ethnically homogenous states. In some of the states, there 
are ethnic minorities that live in the midst of the empowered regional 
majorities, albeit indigenous to the area they inhabit. This includes ethnic 
groups like the Kunama in Tigray, the Agew and the Oromo, both of whom 
inhabit pockets of the territory of the Amhara regional state. On the other 
hand, there are also ethnic migrants like the Amhara and members of other 
ethnic groups who have historically moved south and settled in Oromyia 
and other regional states due to different historic or economic reasons. The 
latter are usually found in large numbers in major urban areas of the 
different states. This pattern of settlement brings to the fore issues about the 
majority-minority tension at the state level. It begs the question whether the 
Ethiopian Constitution provides for a mechanism by which intra-state 
minorities and ethnic migrants can be accommodated. As the following 
discussion reveals, the Ethiopian institutional response provides for a 
number of mechanisms through which intra-state minorities can be 
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accommodated in the federal system. A major limitation of the federal 
system is that it does not adequately address the plight of ethnic migrants.  
 
5.1 The use of language 
As indicated earlier, the Constitution allows the regional states to adopt 
their own working language. This makes the regulation of language a thorny 
issue in so far as the situation of intra-substate minorities and ethnic 
migrants is concerned. The plight of intra-state minorities as well as ethnic 
migrants, however, seems to be mitigated, to a certain extent, by the fact 
that a majority of the ethnically plural states have opted to use Amharic as 
their working language. As indicted earlier, three of the four multi-ethnic 
states have decided to retain Amharic as their working language. The 
decision to adopt Amharic as the working language is understandable in a 
state like the SNNPR where there are more than a dozen linguistic groups. 
Any marginalisation of the local languages in that region is also mitigated 
by the fact that the ethnically defined zones within the regional state use 
their respective languages in the administration. One may, however, still 
wonder why the states with no more than two or three major linguistic 
groups (i.e. Gambela and Benishangul) have not, at least, opted for official 
bilingualism.  
 
A different practice comes from the other multi-ethnic state of Harari, a 
home both for the Harari and Oromifa speaking groups with a large number 
of Amharic speakers. The regional state has decided to use two languages, 
Harari and Oromifa, as the co-working languages of the regional state. The 
decision not to advance one particular language but to, at least, recognise 
two working languages at the regional level is an important recognition of 
the intra-state diversities from which the other states can draw lessons even 
if it still has to accommodate the Amharic speaking inhabitants of the state.  
The Harari model also ensures that linguistic groups make use of their 
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constitutional right to promote their language and cultural identity while at 
the same time accommodating linguistic diversity at the state level.  
 
Of course, the decision of the ethnically plural states to adopt Amharic as 
their working language might have been motivated by the desire to avoid 
any political wrangling that might ensue as a result of adopting one of the 
indigenous languages as the working language of the region. In directly, the 
policy also responds to the linguistic anxieties of ethnic migrants who are 
usually fluent speakers of Amharic. However, in as much as the decision to 
use Amharic in multi-ethnic regional states might ease the majority-
minority tension at the state level, it represents more of an attempt to 
eschew the challenges of diversity rather than adopt a solution that is 
consistent with the constitutional commitment to linguistic diversity. It 
represents a failure to make use of the language clause, which encourages 
the advancement of local languages. This, in some cases, has been to the 
detriment of the local population and its adverse effect on local 
empowerment is evident. In Gambela regional state, where Amharic is 
adopted as the working language, the dominance of ethnic migrants in the 
civil service sector cannot be ignored.175 The ethnic-migrants are still the 
largest contingent of employees in the civil sector. The language policy in 
this particular region, it is argued, “will ultimately disadvantage the local 
people, who are becoming steadily less competent in the language of the 
regional and the Federal Government”.176   
 
Ethnic migrants, when it come language use, occupy a very different 
position in the states that are ethnically homogenous. As indicated earlier, 
the Constitution provides for a territorial model of language planning. In 
                                                 
175  Dereje 2007. 
176  Dereje 2007: 216.   
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practice, this has resulted in a policy of unilingualism in ethnically defined 
regional states.177 The states of Oromyia, Tigray, Somalia, and Amhara 
have adopted the language of the empowered ethnic group as the language 
of government business. The implementation of this strict policy of 
unilingualism has been problematic in states where there are large numbers 
of individuals that do not belong to the empowered regional majority. This 
is especially true in most major urban areas of the states of Oromyia and 
SNNPR where Amharic speaking people reside in large number. Following 
the introduction of the new dispensation, Amharic-speaking parents were 
often forced to send their children to schools that use the language of the 
regionally empowered ethnic group. Large numbers of ethnic migrants that 
have lived in these urban centers for decades no longer enjoy the right to 
use their language for government business. Government documents, 
including traffic fines, are not accessible for Amharic-speaking residents of 
these towns as state government offices solely use the regional language for 
government purpose.  
 
As the foregoing suggests, in so far as the use of language is concerned, 
ethnic migrants occupy contrasting positions in ethnically plural states and 
ethnically homogenous states. In ethnically plural states, the adoption of 
Amharic as the working language has allowed ethnic migrants to continue 
to dominate the civil service and use their language in government business 
without any constraint. This, as shown in the Gambela case, has been done 
sometimes at the expense of regional languages and the empowerment of 
local communities. The reverse seems to be true in the ethnically defined 
regional state. The strict unilingual policy adopted by these states has meant 
that the large number of ethnic migrants that live in the major towns of 
                                                 
177  The ethnically plural states, as indicated earlier, have adopted Amharic as their  
working language. 
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these states cannot communicate in their own language with the public 
authorities and government offices. The contrasting positions of ethnic 
migrants suggest the need to adopt a balanced approach that would 
accommodate the interest of ethnic migrants without adversely affecting the 
interest of persons belonging to the indigenous ethnic groups.  
 
A good example comes in this regard from the policy that has been adopted 
in the areas of language in education policy. As indicated in the section that 
discussed the language policy in education, the initial unilingual policy has 
been modified in order to accommodate the rights of children of ethnic 
migrants to receive education in the language of their nationalities. Major 
urban areas in the different regional state have now either a separate school 
or certain classes in school, which use Amharic as a medium of instruction 
in primary education. Similar institutional measures that accommodate the 
interest of both ethnic migrants and indigenous ethnic groups can go a long 
way in terms of managing ethnic diversity. 
 
5.2 Territorial self rule for intra-state minorities 
A major guarantee for the protection of intra-state minorities comes from 
the recognition that the configuration of the state has not resulted in separate 
ethnically pure territorial units. Article 47(2) of the Constitution provides 
that ethnic groups within the nine states have the right to establish, at any 
time, their own states. It, in other words, provides for ‘internal secession’.178 
According to the procedure outlined in article 47(3) of the Constitution, the 
demand for statehood must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the Council of the ethnic group concerned. After receiving a 
written demand, the state council, from which both ethnic groups want to 
                                                 
178  It then provides for a procedure according to which an ethnic group can secede  
and establish its own state. 
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secede, organises, within a year, a referendum for members of the relevant 
ethnic group. For an ethnic group to have a state of its own, only a majority 
of the voters’ vote in favor of secession is sufficient. Once this is achieved, 
the state council will transfer its powers to the ethnic group that made the 
demand and the new state created by the referendum will automatically 
become a member of the federation. 
 
Some of the state constitutions have also introduced a similar system but at 
a lower level in order to accommodate identity-related demands from intra-
state minorities. As indicated at the outset of this chapter, most of the 
regional states are comprised of three-tier administrative structures, namely 
zone, wereda and kebele. With the view to accommodate intra-regional 
minorities, most regional constitutions have amended their constitutions to 
provide for the establishment of ethnically defined zones and special 
weredas. For example, the SNNPR, as indicated earlier, is not ethnically 
defined as it is home to a dozen ethnic groups. In order to respond to the 
constitutional requirement of ensuring self-government and equitable 
representation of the different ethnic groups, the regional constitution has 
established ethnically defined zonal administrations. In contrast to their 
counterparts in other regional states, zonal administrations in the SNNPR 
are recognised by the regional constitution as an autonomous tier of local 
government with constitutionally mandated elected councils and executive 
administrations. The Amhara state has also established three special 
zones.179 
 
A similar measure that is adopted by regional states in order to 
accommodate intra-state minorities is the establishment of special weredas 
in some of the regional states. Normally, weredas are part of a zone. With 
                                                 
179  Tronvoll 2000. 
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the view to accommodate minorities that, due to their population size, 
cannot establish their own zone within a regional state, however, a number 
of regional states have amended their constitutions to provide for the 
establishment of ethnically defined special weredas that do not form part of 
zones. The Benishangul Gumuz state has, for example, established two 
special weredas while the state with the most number of special weredas is 
the SNNPR with eight special weredas. Functioning as autonomous entities, 
these ethnically defined zones and weredas provide intra-state minorities 
with the territorial space that is necessary to mange their own affairs.  
 
5.3 Ethnic migrants and the protection of individual rights 
Although the majority of ethnic migrants belong to the historically 
dominant Amhara ethnic group, individuals that belong to other groups, 
who nevertheless speak Amharic, are also widely scattered throughout the 
country. They are usually found in large number in major urban areas. 
Owing to their settlement pattern, territorial self rule is not feasible to ethnic 
migrants. Ethnic migrants must thus seek protection within a non-territorial 
framework. 
 
As indicated in Chapter Three, one such mechanism that is often used to 
protect minorities relates to constitutionally entrenched bill of rights. 
Although the emphasis on groups rights overshadows all other equally 
important provisions of the Constitution, respect for universal individual 
rights is given equal status, though not equal attention, as that of collective 
rights, or as the Constitution puts it, ‘the rights of nations, nationalities and 
people’. This is clearly stated from the outset in the preamble to the 
Constitution which emphasises the “full respect of individual and people’s 
fundamental freedoms and rights”. It also declares the need to “live together 
on the basis of equality and without any sexual, religious or cultural 
discrimination”. The Constitution also provides for a vast array of universal 
 
 
 
 
 476  
individual rights. Importantly, article 25 of the Constitution declares the 
right to equality and prohibits discrimination on grounds of, among other 
things, race, nation, nationality, or other social origin, language, religion or 
other status. In this regard, what is conspicuously absent from the 
Constitution is a provision that regulates the right of individuals to receive 
state-funded education in the language of their own choice.180   
 
The practice does not, however, reflect the equal status that the Constitution 
bestows on individual and collective rights. In fact, the major challenge in 
terms of accommodating ethnic migrants is attributable to a political 
practice that gives more weight to collective rights and frustrates claims 
based on individual rights. For example, the language issue has often been 
used to block ethnic migrants from exercising their individual rights to 
participate in the political institutions of the regional states. The language 
criterion is often used to deny Amharic-speaking individuals from being 
elected to public offices including state parliaments. In some regions, 
individuals that do not speak the working language of the region are barred 
from contesting elections. As a result, the political participation of ethnic 
migrants in state administration has been largely curtailed. This contradicts 
article 38 of the Constitution which declares the right of every Ethiopian 
national to take part in the conduct of public affairs, including to vote and to 
be elected at periodic elections, without any discrimination based on nation, 
nationality, language, religion or other status. Notwithstanding this, the 
denial of political rights of ethnic migrants in regional states that do not use 
Amharic as their working language seems to have received legal backing in 
a case that was decided by the HF.  
 
                                                 
180  This, as indicated earlier, is regulated by the ETP, which is discussed in detail in  
the section that deals with language in education policy. 
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The case181 involved three Amharic-speaking individuals who wanted to 
stand for the 2000 state legislature election in Benishangul-Gumuz regional 
state.182 Based on a petition made by an ethnic-based party that operates 
within the regional state, the National Electoral Board (NEB) ruled that the 
individuals could not stand for election as they could not speak one of the 
four indigenous languages spoken in the regional state. The NEB based its 
decision on article 38(1(b)) of the electoral proclamation that makes the 
right to stand for an election dependent on the ability to speak the working 
language of the region. The individuals appealed to the HF objecting to the 
decision of the NEB on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. The House 
reversed the decision of the NEB and affirmed the right of the three 
individuals to stand for election. The decision of the House has, however, 
fallen short of entrenching the right of ethnic migrants to stand for an 
election irrespective of their linguistic ability.  
 
The House rejected the decision of the NEB on the basis that the individuals 
can speak the working language of the region, which is Amharic, and do not 
necessarily have to speak the languages of any of the indigenous groups. It, 
however, held that the electoral law that makes the right to stand for an 
election dependent on the working language of the region is constitutional. 
It justified its decision on pragmatic considerations as opposed to normative 
grounds. It argued that the ability to speak the regional working language is 
                                                 
181  Since cases decided by the HF are not reported, they do not carry formal titles.  
This case was accessed from the personal file of H.E Menberetsheay Tadesse, 
Vice President of the Federal Supreme Court and member of the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry, a body of legal experts that examines constitutional issues 
submits its recommendations to the HF for a final decision.  
182  Benishangul Gumuz is home to four major indigenous ethnic groups. It is also  
inhabited by a very large group of Amharas and other Amharic speaking 
individuals from other ethnic groups. The working language is Amharic. 
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essential if a deputy is to engage fully and effectively in the debates and 
discussions of the regional parliament. Speaking the working language is 
essential, if not indispensable, for the effective representation of the 
electorate in parliament, it concluded.  
 
The major limitation of the decision of the House lies in its focus on 
mechanical aspects of representation. It is true that effective representation 
can be enhanced by the ability to speak the working language of the 
parliament. But this does not mean that there are no other mechanisms 
through which language constraints can be addressed. The provision of 
translation facilities can, for example, easily alleviate language constraints. 
Even in the federal parliament, deputies that have difficulties with Amharic, 
the federal working language, often rely on translation facilities to convey 
their message. By following the logic inherent in the decision of the House, 
one cannot also escape arriving at the absurd conclusion that members of 
indigenous ethnic groups that do not speak the working languages of the 
ethnically diverse regional states of Gambela and Benishangul, which is 
Amharic, must be excluded from standing for election for regional 
parliaments.  
 
The House’s analysis of effective representation is also narrowly focused on 
the functioning of the parliament. This also explains why the House does 
not consider it necessary for an individual that wants to stand for election in 
a federal parliament to speak the regional language. The House fails to take 
into account the fact that effective representation also requires being able to 
effectively communicate with the electorate. In fact, the essential ingredient 
for effective representation is the capacity to communicate with the 
electorate which, at the very least, involves speaking the languages of the 
electorate or the constituency they seek to represent.  
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The House has failed to drive home two essential points that it emphasised 
in the opening paragraphs of its decision. First, it stated that the Constitution 
envisages equal respect for both group and individual rights. This stems 
directly from the preamble of the Constitution which recognises the need for 
“full respect of individuals and people’s fundamental freedoms and rights”.  
Second, it reiterated that language should not be used as a ground to exclude 
others from political participation. In other words, language should not be 
used in order to advance a claim of ownership of the region, implying that 
those that do not speak the indigenous language of the region are outsiders. 
The regional state belongs to all who live in it. That means, among other 
things, that ethnic migrants’ right to participate in the political process 
should not be compromised on the ground of language. Any contrary view, 
be it based on pragmatic or normative considerations, has the effect of 
disenfranchising a large number of the population in most urban areas of the 
different regional states. This undermines the constitutional commitment to 
equal respect for individual and group rights. It also creates a feeling of 
exclusion among ethnic migrants. The decision of the House to scarify these 
basic constitutional commitments on a few pragmatic and technical 
considerations are, to say the least, difficult to justify. 
 
5.4 Representation in state structures 
As indicated earlier, the ‘equitable representation’ of the different ethnic 
groups is a constitutional mandate of the Federal Government but also state 
governments.183 State governments are also obliged to ensure that the faces 
of their institutions reflect the ethnic plurality that that characterise their 
society. This, firstly, applies to the regional states that are ethnically 
homogenous but still have some minorities in their midst. This refers to, for 
example, the representation of the Kunama and Irob ethnic communities in 
                                                 
183  Article 39(3) Constitution. 
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Tigray regional state as well as the Agwi and the Oromo in the Amhara 
regional state. Second, and more importantly, it applies to the ethnically 
heterogeneous regional states like Gambela, Benishangul-Gumuz, SNNPR 
and the Harari regional states. Furthermore, as indicated earlier in relation to 
the Federal Government, the equitable representation of the different ethnic 
communities is not merely limited to the executive. As the obligation of 
ensuring equitable representation is mentioned in relation to state and 
federal governments in general, state governments are obliged to ensure 
equitable representation in the legislative and judicial arms of state 
governments as well.  
 
This constitutional obligation of equitable representation reflects the 
constitutional commitment to accommodate intra-state diversity. By 
ensuring representation of the different ethnic groups that inhabit the state, 
it signals the message that each state belongs to all who live in it. It is yet 
not clear, however, if ethnic migrants must also be represented in the state 
structures   
 
5.5 Assessment 
The federal constitution provides for some mechanisms to address the case 
of intra-state minorities and ethnic migrants. Flexibility with the use of 
language in education in ethnically heterogeneous regional states is one 
such example. The right to statehood and the creation of special 
weredas/zones by the state constitutions also contribute to the 
accommodation of intra-state minorities. These measures have, however, 
their own limitation in addressing the plight of ethnic migrants. For 
example, while the Constitution indicates that the division of constituent 
units in a possible solution to internal demands for self government, this is 
not an option which is available for ethnic migrants who are not 
geographically concentrated.   
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Some of the solution to intra-substate minorities and ethnic migrants must 
thus be sought within the territorial administration that these minorities find 
themselves in. Judicially enforceable universal individual rights represent 
one such response. In this regard, although the constitutional commitment to 
the observance of full respect to individual and collective rights is an 
important mechanism that can be used to protect individuals belonging to 
these particular groups, the practice is not encouraging. The 
disenfranchisement of ethnic migrants, which has relegated them to a 
‘secondary citizen’ of regional states, is a testimony to the failure of the 
constitutional practice to give effect to this constitutional commitment.  
 
An effective response to the plight of ethnic migrants and intra-substate 
minorities requires regional states to come to terms with their ethnic 
diversities and fully accept that they are sharing with the federal state the 
same problem of accommodating ethnic diversities but only at a state level. 
The Ethiopian institutional response to the anxieties of intra-substate 
minorities, which involves both territorial self rule and representation at 
state structures, is in line with this normative position. That does not, 
however, seem to be the case with ethnic migrants. With the exception of 
the concessions made to ethnic migrants in areas of education, no other 
mechanisms are provided by the Constitution through which ethnic migrants 
can exercise control over matters that are relevant to them, especially in 
identity related matters like language, culture and the media. The lack of 
protection in a form of non-territorial autonomy has denied ethnic migrants, 
who are often ‘too dispersed or few in numbers’ to exercise territorial 
autonomy, a say over certain functions which are of relevance to them. 
Furthermore, the application of the majority system of election, as opposed 
to the proportional electoral system, at the state level also means that these 
groups have potentially little or no representation in state parliaments. In so 
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far as the accommodation ethnic migrants are concerned, one may 
reasonably conclude, the Ethiopian federal system leaves much to be 
desired.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The Ethiopian Constitution clearly recognises the multi-ethnic character of 
the society it seeks to govern. Rejecting the age-old argument that Ethiopia 
is a historic nationhood, the Constitution declares Ethiopia as a multi-nation 
state. This is evident both in the preamble of the Constitution, the national 
symbols as well as in the language clause that signifies the equality of all 
linguistic groups. This marks a major departure from the policies and 
practices of successive regimes that sought to build a single Ethiopian 
identity in the image of the language and cultures of the Amhara. Being 
Ethiopian is no more coterminous with speaking Amharic and practicing the 
culture that is associated with it. This undeniably is a triumph to the many 
linguistic groups that inhabit the country whose language and culture has 
been denigrated for so long.  
 
The Constitution has not limited itself to formal recognition of Ethiopia’s 
ethnic diversity. By adopting an institutional arrangement that represents a 
marriage between federalism and ethnicity, it has provided practical effect 
to its act of recognition. Unlike the tactical cooptation of the Imperial 
regime and the policy of the military junta that limited diversity to the 
cultural realm, the current Constitution extends a full measure of political 
autonomy to ethnic communities. The right of ethnic communities to govern 
themselves is a major feature of the Constitution. It has provided ethnic 
groups with territorial space that is necessary to promote their language and 
cultural identity and mange their own affairs. This is further reinforced by a 
division of power that vests constituent units with legislative power over 
identity-related matters as well as other functions of relevance to them. The 
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state is clearly moving away from the nation-state paradigm towards a 
politics of recognition and accommodation. 
 
The problem with the Ethiopian system is that it overemphasises ethnic 
diversity both in the symbolic realm and in the institutional expression of 
self rule. A prime manifestation of this overemphasis on ethnicity is evident 
in the organisation of the territorial structure of the state which seeks to 
provide a mother state to each large ethnic group. This construction of the 
state has the effect of freezing ethnic identity as the prime marker of 
political allegiance, thus, limiting the development of either overarching or 
crosscutting cleavages. The Ethiopian system, to use the words of Basta, 
provides ethnic solutions to ethnic problems; this, in turn, has the effect of 
nourishing ethnicity and radicallising ethnic allegiance.184 This is evident 
from the fact that identity fragmentation along ethno-linguistic lines has 
become a common phenomenon in Ethiopia. In some cases, it has even 
contributed to the weakening, if not disappearance, of age-old regional 
identities. More puzzling also is the prominence given to ethnic identity to 
the exclusion of all other identities like regional identities which, as shown 
in Chapter Six, are an important historical element of the Ethiopian makeup. 
The ‘putting together’ of the Amhara people into one regional state is a 
prime example of the imposition of ethnic identity over and above the more 
historically relevant regional identities that define members of this 
particular ethnic group. To that extent, the prominence attached to ethnic 
allegiance is ahistorical. An appreciation of the fact that identities other than 
ethnic identity have historically developed in the country would have 
resulted in a different geographical configuration of the state. Rather than 
creating one large Amhara state, for example, the Ethiopian Constitution 
could have retained the historical regional divisions and divided the Amhara 
                                                 
184  Basta 2002: 20. 
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into multiple states based on regional allegiances. The same can be said of 
the Oromo.  
 
The dogmatic approach to ethnicity has not only resulted in overlooking the 
consideration of other historically relevant identities but also the extension 
of political identity to ethnic groups that did not consider themselves as 
such. Ethnic groups that have never mobilised themselves politically have 
been given a political status. As indicated earlier, ethnic communities have 
turned into political communities by a mere constitutional fiat.    
 
In addition, the lack of adequate processes and institutions of shared rule 
has made it difficult to countervail the ethnicisation of the system by 
utilising joint spaces that facilitate communication among the various 
groups and help to develop inter-ethnic solidarity. The second chamber, the 
HF, which would be expected to promote the co-management of the 
federation, plays little role in bringing the constituent units within the 
political processes of the federal state.    
 
The basic idea of federalism in any multi-ethnic setting is ideally to 
accommodate ethnic diversity while at the same time maintaining national 
unity. The idea is not to create ethnic enclaves. It is not to demarcate each 
ethnic group with a mother state of its own with the resultant consequence 
that territories are defined as belonging to the regionally empowered group 
with other groups treated as guests or outsiders. The grand aim of 
accommodating ethnic diversity requires that the state, to the extent 
possible, seeks to accommodate diversity at each point of relevance.  
 
In this regard, the Ethiopian system needs to move beyond its fixation with 
ownership based on historical and other considerations in the organisation 
of the state and rather base its organisation of the state on demographic 
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realities. This does not mean that historical considerations are not necessary 
in the configuration of the state but they should be relevant only to the 
extent that they are necessary to determine the path that the society should 
take in unison. In the context of a state that attempts to come to terms with 
its history of conquest and subjugation, the federal arrangement should not 
be used to advance a policy of the restoration of a ‘distant past’. Not only is 
this impossible to achieve but it is highly disruptive and defeats the basic 
tenet of federalism as it results in the alienation of certain groups. This 
concept does not seem to resonate in the Ethiopian system of federalism. 
The state of Harari, one of the nine states in Ethiopia, illustrates this very 
aptly. Despite the fact that the Harari state is home to two other linguistic 
groups that are numerically superior to the Harari ethnic group, the region is 
named and considered mainly as belonging to the latter. This scenario, 
which is more likely to have historical explanation rather than one based on 
the demographic realities of the state, has the effect of creating the 
impression that members of the other two groups are treated as mere guests. 
The plight of ethnic migrants can also be attributed to the same system 
defines states as belonging to one ethnic group based on historical 
considerations and not current demographic realities. This once again 
defeats the very purposes of the federal arrangement, namely to 
accommodate ethnic diversity. 
 
It is submitted that federalism is the only viable route that the state of 
Ethiopia can rely on to maintain itself as a state. Contrary to those who 
argue for a territorial/administrative based federalism, the consideration of 
the ethnic factor in the making of the federation is an indispensable element 
of the federal formula that Ethiopia has to adopt in order to accommodate its 
ethnically diverse society. To that extent, the present Ethiopian system is 
definitely on the right track.  The overemphasis on diversity, as is evident 
both at the symbolic and level and self rule (and especially in the territorial 
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structure of the federation) has, however, the danger of putting the 
federation under intense pressure. Since the excessive emphasis on regional 
autonomy is not countervailed by a set of institutions and processes that 
promote shared rule and thereby national unity, there is a tendency that 
interaction between ethnic groups will develop into a zero-sum game.
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion and lessons 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis examined how institutions of multi-ethnic states have been 
designed to accommodate ethnic diversity while at the same time 
maintaining national unity. It located institutional responses to the 
challenges of ethnic diversity within the context of a federal arrangement. It 
examined how a federal arrangement has been used to reconcile the 
conflicting pressures of the demand for the recognition of distinctive 
identities, on the one hand, and the promotion of political and territorial 
integrity, on the other. It used South Africa and Ethiopia as case studies as 
the two federal systems provide a contrasting approach to the issues of 
ethnic diversity.  
 
In order to achieve the aforementioned objective, the thesis first tackled the 
question whether ethnic diversity should be provided recognition. It then 
examined the capacity of the federal arrangement to accommodate ethnic 
claims without posing a threat to the political integrity of a state. After 
developing a template of institutional arrangements that demonstrates how 
the normative principles of recognition and accommodation can provide an 
institutional reality within a context of a federal arrangement, it went on 
examining the institutional responses adopted by South Africa and Ethiopia.  
 
This concluding chapter has two objectives. First, it restates the major 
findings of this study. Second, it identifies institutional lessons from the two 
case studies. It does not prescribe the adoption of a particular institutional 
framework to multi-ethnic states that are struggling with the challenges of 
ethnic diversity. The aim is rather to draw institutional lessons from the two 
case studies and in the process assist multi-ethnic states that are grappling 
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with the question of how to design state institutions in order to 
accommodate ethnic diversity without endangering political and territorial 
integrity.  
 
The thesis concludes that the contrasting approaches that emerge from the 
review of the two case studies suggest that federalism, as an institutional 
response, represents a continuum, or to be precise, a ‘purpose continuum’. 
The appropriate institutional response to the challenges of ethnic diversity 
within the continuum depends on the political saliency of ethnicity in the 
country in question, which, in turn, depends on historical and political 
circumstances that attend the state formation process. In addition to 
federalism, the thesis maintains the relevance of individual rights regime 
and other non-territorial institutional measures in order to accommodate 
ethnic groups that are not territorially concentrated. The central thesis 
remains that recognition and accommodation of ethnic diversity, entrenched 
formally or informally, directly or indirectly, is an essential institutional 
principle of a multi-ethnic state that seeks to build an inclusive state. Yet, a 
federal solution that attempts to respond to the multi-ethnic challenge has to 
guard itself from the dangers of both overemphasising and de-emphasising 
ethnic diversity.  
 
2. Recognising ethnic diversity 
One of the first questions that this thesis addressed was whether a multi-
ethnic state should recognise its ethnic diversity. The thesis suggests a 
positive answer: A multi-ethnic state has to somehow recognise the ethnic 
plurality that characterises the society it seeks to govern. The empirical 
evidence comes from states that sought to ignore or suppress ethnic 
diversity. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, there are plenty examples of 
states that attempted to take away the ethnic mosaic feature of the state and 
develop a single national identity along a single language, culture or 
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ideology that transcends ethnic differences only to find themselves in ethnic 
turmoil. States in Africa, Europe and Asia attempted to promote national 
unity at the expense of cultural diversity. Some did this by denying that 
there are linguistic minorities within their respective territory and presenting 
themselves as monocultural states. Others sought to build a national identity 
along the languages and cultures of a particular ethnic group. The ‘nation-
state building’ project in Ethiopia had a core culture that was based on the 
languages and cultures of the Amhara.  
 
The approach that seeks to transform a multi-ethnic state into a nation-state, 
as the empirical evidence show, falls short of what is required to build, to 
use the words of the South African Constitution, ‘a state that belongs to all 
who live in it’. The state was rather identified with the ethnic group whose 
culture and language was recognised in the public sphere. This created the 
feeling of alienation among other ethnic groups who had to assimilate to the 
languages and cultures of the majority group in order to be regarded as one 
among equals. The alienated groups eventually responded by politically 
mobilising against what they considered as a relegation of their culture and 
identity to secondary status. Explicit ethnic mobilisation dominated the 
political arena. Ethnic nationalist movements that seek recognition, 
autonomy and representation or, in extreme cases, a state of their own 
became a common feature of ethnically plural states. In short, the nation-
state building project, as it is often referred to, failed to achieve the desired 
result of creating a common national identity. The clear empirical message 
was that a state that is predicated on suppressing ethnic diversity is bound to 
generate ethnic particularism and ethnic tension much less to create a 
homogenised society. 
 
The empirical evidence is also supported by other arguments. The point is 
that a state that does not recognise its ethnic diversity cannot go without 
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empowering, advertently or inadvertently, a particular group and alienating 
another. In other words, a multi-ethnic state cannot remain neutral to 
ethnicity or in matters where ethnic relationships are concerned. Requiring 
the state to remain neutral in relation to ethnic relationships, leaving the 
matter to the so called ‘cultural market place’ is, as argued by Kymlicka1 
and many others, as good as calling for the separation of state and ethnicity. 
The state should not promote or inhibit the practice of the culture and 
language of a particular ethnic group. The ‘cultural market place’ should 
rather decide if a certain culture is going to survive or decay. In short, there 
should be a “benign neglect” of ethnic differences. However, the call for 
“benign neglect”, as noted by Kymlicka2 and many others, does not make 
sense. Simply put, the state cannot remain neutral with respect to matters 
that have a bearing on ethnic relationships as there will always be contexts 
in which the state cannot help but adopt, for example, state symbols that 
recognise at least an identity of a particular ethnic group.3 When a 
government opts to use a certain language as official language, the state is 
recognising the linguistic identity of the group that speaks the language. The 
same applies to the choices of public holidays and other similar issues. Of 
course, as indicated in earlier chapters, some states might circumvent the 
challenges of the symbolism of language by opting for a culturally neutral 
language, which is particularly the case in most decolonised states of Africa 
and Asia (i.e. English, Portuguese and French). This is not, however, an 
option that is always available. In most instances, the state cannot avoid but 
recognise and promote the identities of a particular ethnic group.  
 
                                                 
1  Kymlicka 1995. 
2  Kymlicka 1995. 
3  Patten 2001: 288. 
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Based on these arguments, this thesis concludes that the state has to 
somehow recognise its ethnic diversity. A multi-ethnic state that seeks to 
suppress diversity and attempt to build a common national identity based on 
the core culture of a particular ethnic group is bound to provoke violent 
ethnic nationalist movements. Similarly, a state that ostensibly follows a 
policy of neutrality when it comes to ethnic relationships often ends up 
identifying itself with a particular group. In short, a multi-ethnic state 
should seek to avoid an attempt to homogenise its ethnically diverse 
population and transform it into a nation-state or remain ‘culturally neutral’. 
Recognition of ethnic diversity is an important element of building an 
inclusive state in a multi-ethnic society. 
 
3. The contingent nature of politicised ethnicity and its implication 
on the recognition of ethnic diversity 
The next issue pertains to the nature and degree of recognition that a multi-
ethnic state should provide to ethnic diversity.  This thesis puts forward two 
main arguments in this regard, based on the political relevance of ethnic 
identity. First, there is nothing about ethnic identity that makes it a peerless 
and paramount identity that it should receive recognition in the public 
sphere to the exclusion of all other competing interests. The saliency and 
relevance of ethnicity as a rallying point for political mobilisation often 
depends on historical and political contingents that attend the so-called 
‘nation-state building’ project. In other words, ethnicity is often the function 
of the ‘nation-state’ building project. This says ethnic cleavage does not 
necessarily translate into a political divide. Hence, the contingent nature of 
politicised ethnicity. Second, if we accept the argument that ethnic 
difference does not always translate into a political divide, then the nature 
and degree of recognition that a multi-ethnic state accords to ethnic 
difference, as a politically relevant divide, should consequently reflect the 
political saliency of ethnicity in the state under consideration.  
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3.1 Politicised ethnicity as a contingent process 
The argument on the political relevance of ethnicity as a contingent process 
can be demonstrated by briefly reiterating the political role of ethnicity in 
South Africa and Ethiopia. As demonstrated in Chapter Four, the political 
saliency of ethnicity is of limited significance in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Despite the fact that the country’s black community is composed of 
ten ethnic groups, political mobilisation along these ethnic groups is not 
common. The performance of political parties that sought to mobilise the 
black population along ethnic lines has been limited. Even the IFP that 
relied on ethnic sentiments of the Zulu population group has seen its support 
dwindling as South Africa moves away from the apartheid era. The 
Afrikaner-based parties have not also been able to convince their 
community to rally behind programs that promote a ‘nationalist Afrikaner’ 
agenda. The potential amenability of the territorial structure of the state to 
ethnic mobilisation, owing to the relative concentration of each ethnic group 
in a particular province, has also not given rise to the formation of 
territorially based ethnic mobilisation. Despite predictions that ethnic 
rivalries will emerge among the black community when the white 
domination comes to an end, the solidarity of the black community that, to a 
large, extent, has muted inter-ethnic rivalry has, as shown in Chapter Four, 
persisted into post-apartheid South Africa. In short, ethnicity is still not the 
most relevant divide in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
The limited saliency of ethnicity in the South African political discourse can 
only be explained by the particular historical and political context of the 
South African state and society. Unlike many other multi-ethnic states, 
South Africa has not yet experienced an exclusive ‘nation-state building’ 
project that empowers a particular ethnic group and marginalises the rest. In 
fact, the political experience of South Africa was such that it united the 
different ethnic groups that inhabit the country to forge a common national 
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identity against the apartheid government. At the centre of this struggle are 
also the ideology of the ANC that regards ethnicity as artificial and the 
manipulation of ethnicity by the apartheid government which contributed to 
the maligned concept of ethnicity in South Africa. In post-apartheid South 
Africa, the limited significance of ethnicity is further facilitated by the 
absence of a central power that arranges groups in hierarchical relations or 
imposes the domination of particular ethnic group/s over others. The best 
possible explanation for the limited saliency of ethnicity thus lies in the 
absence of strong indication that the state is strongly identified with a 
particular ethnic group or a state policy that favors a particular ethnic group 
to the detriment of others. The South African experience suggests that 
ethnicity is not usually a primary rallying point of political mobilisation but 
often a function of state policies that deny, accommodate or promote ethnic 
diversity. 
 
The situation is quite different in Ethiopia. Unlike in South Africa, 
historically the state of Ethiopia, as argued in Chapter Six, was predicated 
on suppressing ethnic diversity and building the state along the language 
and culture of one particular ethnic group. The state-driven homogenisation 
policy eventually provoked the emergence of ethnic movements in the 
different parts of the country. For this reason, ethnicity obviously has more 
political relevance in Ethiopia when compared to South Africa.  Yet, as 
argued in Chapter Six, the political history of Ethiopia cannot be solely 
explained by the phenomenon of ethnicity. Regional identity and the 
resultant mobilisation had also played an important role in the making of 
Ethiopia.  
 
These two cases demonstrate that the saliency of ethnicity is not static. 
There is nothing about ethnicity that is ahistorical, immutable or universal. 
There is no necessary parallelism between social cleavages and political 
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mobilisation. The relevance of ethnicity as a rallying point for political 
mobilisation depends on the historical and political contingents of each 
state. This, of course, does not change the basic position that mandates the 
recognition of ethnic diversity. The fact that ethnic identity is not a primal 
identity and that it is often the product of the ‘nation-state building’ project 
does not mean that ethnic diversity should not be recognised. If anything, 
this particular understanding of the nature of ethnicity suggests that a multi-
ethnic state, if it is to avoid ethnic based political mobilisation and the 
resultant ethnic turmoil, has to either remain neutral in ethnic relationships 
or recognise and accommodate the ethnic diversity that characterises its 
society. As indicated earlier, the state cannot simply remain neutral, which 
leaves it only with the latter option.  
 
Some might yet have difficulty in accepting the position that multi-ethnic 
states should worry about recognising ethnic diversity. They point to multi-
ethnic states that seemingly are centrist but yet stable and argue that ethnic 
diversity is not necessarily a relevant challenge to these states. As the 
foregoing discussion indicates, recognition of ethnic diversity is not 
categorical. The relevance of ethnic differences as a political divide is not 
always guaranteed as this often depends on political and historical 
circumstances. This does not, however, mean that ethnic divide is not a 
relevant challenge. The political and historical circumstances that made 
ethnicity a non-issue are not necessarily static. Depending on state policies 
that affect ethnic relationships (i.e. depending on how state institutions 
deny, accommodate or promote ethnicity), ethnicity may emerge as the 
dominant political force. This means even in conditions where ethnicity 
does not appear to be the most relevant political divide, the state has to 
ensure that it adopts policies that prevent the emergence of conditions that 
gives rise to the political mobilisation of ethnicity. The issue should not thus 
be about the mere recognition of ethnic diversity but about the nature and 
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extent of recognition that a multi-ethnic state has to accord to ethnic 
diversity. This is what the next section deals with.  
 
3.2 The implication of politicised ethnicity as a contingent process 
An important implication of regarding the political relevance of ethnicity as 
a contingent process is its effect on the extent to which a state should 
recognise ethnic diversity and consequently on the institutional arrangement 
that a state has to fashion to respond to the challenges of ethnic diversity. 
The non-singular position of ethnic identity means, among other things, that 
ethnicity should not be recognised as a single organising principle of 
society. If possible, a state, in its attempt to manage ethnic diversity, must, 
to the extent possible, avoid the institutionalisation of ethnic identity. It 
should strive to accommodate ethnicity without creating conditions that 
make the latter a single rallying point of political mobilisation. This helps to 
avoid the accentuation of ethnic cleavage while at the same time 
recognising and accommodating ethnic diversity. Positioning ethnicity as a 
major basis for the organisation of the state would reduce the institutional 
response to a mere ‘ethnic solution’ with the potential effect of rendering 
the interaction between ethnic groups a zero-sum game. Of course, extreme 
circumstances might require extreme measures. In a particular multi-ethnic 
context, a constitutional system that institutionalises ethnicity might be the 
only way of keeping a very deeply divided society together. This, however, 
does not detract from the main position that the nature and degree of 
recognition that a multi-ethnic state accords to ethnic identity as a political 
identity should mirror the political saliency of ethnicity in the state under 
consideration.  
 
The institutional response that the Ethiopian state has adopted involves the 
freezing of ethnic identity as the prime marker of political allegiance to the 
exclusion of all other overarching or crosscutting cleavages. By a mere 
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constitutional fiat, the institutional response, as argued in Chapter Seven, 
has turned ethnic communities into political communities. This is especially 
visible in the territorial organisation of the Ethiopian federation which, to a 
large extent, follows an ethnic line, including the designation of each 
subnational unit after the name of the regionally empowered ethnic group. 
Although the consideration of ethnic factors in the organisation of the state 
is relevant considering the political history of Ethiopia, the extent that the 
institutional response went to use ethnicity as the basis to organise the 
society belies the political reality that characterised the Ethiopian state and 
society. A more appropriate appreciation of the political history of the 
country would have shown that ethnicity is not the sole political divide. 
Regionalism is an equally important politically relevant divide. Neither can 
the centripetal forces be easily disregarded. National unity remains a potent 
mobilising force in the country. As indicated earlier, to the extent that the 
Ethiopian institutional response recognises and institutionalises ethnicity to 
the exclusion of all other politically relevant crosscutting and overarching 
identities, it is ahistorical.  
 
The Ethiopian experience also illustrates the danger of using ethnicity as a 
singular politically relevant identity. The discussion in Chapter Seven has 
clearly demonstrated that as a result of the heavy emphasis on ethnicity in 
the organisation of the state, the development of ethno-nationalism across 
language community lines has become a common phenomenon. Ethnicity 
has become the sole lexicon of political discourse and a readily accessible 
tool for ethnic entrepreneurs. This is visible both in the number of ethnic-
based political parties that mushroomed all over the country and the 
ethnicisation of political discourse. As a system that offers political rewards 
to assertions of ethnic identity, the political space in Ethiopia is increasingly 
crowded by ethnic claims which are especially apparent in the persistent 
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demands for recognition and autonomy by small ethnic groups in the 
Southern region. 
 
This institutional response is problematic partly because it does not mirror 
the political realities of the country. The system does not provide equal 
recognition to the competing centripetal and centrifugal forces whose 
struggle for a place in the public sphere continues to define the political 
realities of the Ethiopian state and society. “To the victory, the spoils” was 
rather the motto that guided the designing of the Ethiopian institutional 
response to the challenges of ethnic diversity.4 The militarily victorious 
ethnic-based liberation movements, by and large, translated their political 
program into constitutional mandates. Obviously, an incorporation of the 
views of the centripetal forces in the designing of the institutions would 
have tamed the highly ethnically oriented nature of the system. This, in fact, 
is what distinguishes the Ethiopian system from the more contextually 
appropriate South African institutional response.  
 
As argued in Chapter Five, South Africa neither suppresses nor actively 
promotes ethnicity. This particular approach is in line with the socio-
political realties of the country where ethnicity is still not the most 
politically relevant divide. The institutional arrangement that is skewed in 
favor of shared rule, thereby promoting national unity, is also consistent 
with the nature of ethnic relationship that exists in the country. The political 
mobilisation of ethnicity is rare despite the existence of different ethnic 
groups and those that ventured along those lines have not been able to 
convince their constituency of the need to rally behind their nationalist 
agenda. Irrespective of the non-saliency of ethnicity, however, the South 
                                                 
4  The blame for the failure of an all-inclusive process falls on the opposition as  
much as on the ruling party.  
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African system, as argued in Chapter Five, does not go without recognising 
and providing institutional expression to ethnic diversity. This is not only 
consistent with the position held at the outset of this chapter that a multi-
ethnic state should always recognise ethnic diversity but also a reflection of 
the recognition that there are groups in South Africa, albeit of limited 
significance, that demand the recognition of their distinctive identities. It 
also represents an acknowledgment that ethnic differences, unless somehow 
recognised and accommodated, could emerge as potentially strong political 
divide. It is this readiness and capacity to harmonise both centripetal and 
centrifugal forces, which made the political transition in South Africa a 
reality, that is conspicuously absent in the Ethiopian case.  
 
4. Institutional expression in the form of federalism 
As argued in Chapter Three, recognition of ethnic diversity is only part of 
the solution to the challenges of ethnic diversity. The fact that a state 
defines itself as belonging to all that live within its defined territory is not 
sufficient. Providing practical expression to the act of recognition is equally 
crucial. This thesis seeks to locate practical expressions of the act of 
recognition within the context of a federal arrangement.  
 
4.1 Federalism as the expression of recognition of ethnic diversity 
Federalism, as an institutional response that deals with the multi-ethnic 
challenge, is premised on the formal recognition of ethnic diversity. The 
multi-ethnic state, as defined in the constitution, other important state 
documents and symbols, has to acknowledge the multi-ethnic character of 
the society it seeks to govern. In the absence of formal recognition, the 
mere adoption of federalism would only be more congruent with a unitary 
representation of the state than with the spirit of federalism, which 
combines unity with diversity and seeks to recognise and accommodate 
distinct collective identities within a larger political partnership. It would 
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not be any different from what are often referred to as mono-national 
federations that do not use their federal arrangement to express their 
diversity. In such cases, a federal arrangement would mainly be 
“understood as an administrative arrangement in which only the principle of 
uniformity and homogeneity can guarantee a fair and equal treatment of 
every citizen”.5 Moreover, efforts to deny multiple identities in defining the 
state and attempt to portray a homogenised society often contribute to 
identity fragmentation. As the Canadian case illustrates, the act of 
recognition is still important even in the presence of practical and 
institutional arrangements that guarantee autonomy and representation for 
ethnic groups.  
 
Recognition is linked to how the state views itself – whether it defines itself 
as a nation-state or as a state that readily accepts its multi-ethnic character. 
As the preceding chapters reveal, elements that bear on the definition of the 
state range from the preamble to the constitution to language and state 
symbols. The latter are expressed in terms of public holidays, national 
anthem, flag and the like. These constitutional and political elements that 
often have a bearing on the definition of the state are not necessarily federal 
in nature. However, a multi-ethnic state that is serious about building an 
inclusive state, it is submitted, cannot help but ensure that these elements 
are not defined in the manner that suppresses or deny the diverse identities 
within its society. It ensures that they portray a state that belongs to all who 
live in it. As amply demonstrated in Chapter Three, federalism, with its 
particular territorial matrix and multiple levels of government, provides 
ample opportunities to do so and thereby ensure that the definition of the 
state reflects its multi-ethnic character.  
 
                                                 
5  Rocher, Rouillard and Lecours 2001: 193 
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4.2 Federalism as a ‘purpose continuum’ 
As one of possible institutional responses to the multi-ethnic challenge, 
federalism, it is argued in Chapter Two, has the capacity to accommodate 
ethnic diversity while at the same time maintaining national unity in states 
where the different ethnic groups are generally territorially concentrated. 
The self rule plus shared formula has the capacity to reconcile the 
seemingly contradicting demands of centrifugal forces, which stress the 
distinctiveness of their identities, and the centripetal forces, which regard 
the demands of the former as a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. 
It generally provides a framework within which ethnic relationships can be 
managed. This particular capacity of federalism can be used to provide 
practical effect to the recognition of ethnic diversity by the state. Of course, 
there is no guarantee that federalism always succeeds in managing ethnic 
diversity. The success of federalism is contingent on a set of factors that in 
one or another way has a bearing on the institutional design of the state. 
These range from the dynamics of ethnic relationships to the political 
practice and the forces that are competing for political resources. The 
argument has rather been that a system based on the principle of federalism 
has, with the right application, the capacity to respond to the exigencies of 
an ethnically plural society. 
 
An important implication of the argument that the extent to which 
recognition should be provided to ethnic diversity should be contingent on 
the political saliency of ethnicity is that the purpose of an institutional 
design like federalism and its particular configuration varies depending on 
the nature of ethnic relationships that exist in a country. In a particular 
context, the nature of ethnic relationships might not have taken a political 
slant that the purpose of the federal response is to merely ensure that inter-
ethnic solidarity is maintained and conditions that facilitate the political 
mobilisation of ethnicity are avoided. At the other end, ethnic relationships 
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might have deteriorated to the extent that the purpose of the federal 
response is merely to take corrective measures, mainly to satisfy the 
demands of the different ‘warring’ ethnic groups, and maintain the 
territorial integrity of the state. In short, the institutional design that a multi-
ethnic state should adopt in relation to ethnic relationships can be viewed in 
a form of a ‘purpose continuum’. On this purpose continuum can be seen 
institutional designs whose sole purpose ranges, as indicated above, from 
prevention to remediation.  
 
The ‘purpose continuum’ is also consistent with the view that this thesis has 
adopted about federalism. As it is argued in Chapter Two, federalism is not 
understood as a static concept with a priori formula that prescribes a certain 
way of organising the state. It is rather considered as a functional concept 
that allows the organisation of the state in the manner that responds to its 
particular exigencies. The ground rule is that an application of the federal 
idea involves the application of both self rule and shared rule. In fact, each 
system of federation that exists in the present day is operating along a 
continuum of federations that displays different combinations of self rule 
and shared rule.  
 
As can be gleaned from the South African experience, an institutional 
design that is tasked with prevention does not suppress or deny ethnic 
diversity.  It is rather based on the premise that recognition of ethnic 
diversity is imperative in a multi-ethnic state. The essence of a preventive 
approach lies in the capacity of the state to accommodate ethnicity without 
making the latter an explicit principle of state organisation. It seeks to avoid 
ethnicity as a single rallying point of political mobilisation. It involves 
territorial arrangement that avoids the creation of ethnic hegemony but still 
respond to ethnic concerns. In the arena of representation, it requires the 
state to be sensitive about ethnic balance without incorporating a 
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constitutional mandate that demands some sort of quota system.  It often 
prefers political accommodation as opposed to constitutional 
accommodation lest that constitutional designation of groups entrenches 
strict identity categorisation. For the same reason, it, to the extent possible, 
eschews explicit ethnic-based policies. The institutional response is also 
skewed in favour of national unity. Institutions and processes that promote 
shared rule and, thereby, national unity, are emphasised.  
 
The preventive approach stands in sharp contrast to the approach positioned 
at the other end of the purpose continuum, namely the remediation 
approach. A major distinguishing feature of the remediation approach is that 
it recognises ethnicity as a constitutional and political principle of state 
organisation. Ethnicity is used as the primary and/or exclusive basis to 
designate communities into different salient groups. This is an approach that 
emphasises ethnic identity both in the recognition and institutional 
expression of ethnic diversity. Subnational units demarcated along strict 
ethnic lines, practicing a policy of strict regional unilingualism and enjoying 
veto power over national government decisions affecting their own 
community and a system of representation based on quota system are 
characteristic of this particular approach. Conversely, less emphasis on 
national unity is another distinguishing feature of this approach. The 
institutional expressions of the recognition of ethnic diversity are heavily 
biased in favour of satisfying the demands of centrifugal forces that they 
hardly provide a common space to define common national objectives and 
promote national unity. The remediation approach is considered as the 
sensible approach in a context where the ethnic relationship among the 
geographically concentrated ethnic groups has reached such a low point that 
the only concern of the institutional design is maintaining the territorial 
integrity of the state. In fact, this particular institutional response is 
considered necessary if the concerned multi-ethnic state is to survive as a 
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state at all. It is often the last option left to avert the imminent danger of the 
different ethnic groups going their separate ways. Hence, the remedial 
nature of the institutional response. 
 
Ideally, a multi-ethnic state, if it is to accommodate ethnic diversity and 
maintain national unity at the same time, must adopt institutional 
arrangements that fall somewhere between the prevention and remediation 
ends of the continuum. In other words, the success of federalism depends on 
its capacity to respond to ethnic concerns without eroding allegiance to the 
larger state.  In a multi-ethnic state, the intention of a federal arrangement is 
to keep the state together while at the same time allowing ethnic groups to 
maintain their distinctiveness. The intention is not to give prominence to 
concerns of national unity at the expense of ethnic diversity by letting the 
national government prevail over the constituent units, denying the latter 
adequate space and authority to manage their own affairs. Neither is the 
intention of federative arrangement to allow the centrifugal forces to 
subsume any concern for national unity thus eventually allowing the loyalty 
to the subnational units to prevail over loyalty to the union. The objective of 
adopting a federal structure is rather to allow the co-existence of both 
centrifugal and centripetal forces. This would, however, only be possible 
when an institutional design that can harmonise these two forces is adopted. 
An excessive emphasis, be it on diversity or union, has the danger of either 
threatening the union or destroying the distinctiveness of the sub units. As 
Basta has succinctly put it, “the success of federalism depends on the fact 
whether a federation constructed to accommodate ethno-regional diversities, 
which are otherwise recognised as legitimate conflicting interest, enhances 
dual identity and loyalty”.6 The experiences of both Ethiopia and South 
                                                 
6  Basta 2003: 24. As Watts (1999, 125) also notes, an imbalance in which the  
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Africa illustrate the danger of overemphasising and de-emphasising ethnic 
diversity respectively.  
 
As indicated in Chapter Seven, the Ethiopian response to the challenges of 
ethnic diversity overemphasises ethnic diversity, both in the symbolic realm 
and in the institutional expression of self rule. This excessive emphasis on 
ethnic diversity is also evident in the structuring of the territorial 
configuration of the state and its institutions. As is apparent from the 
absence of adequate processes and institutions of shared rule, the 
institutional design does not also exhibit a countervailing concern for 
national unity. As a result, fragmentation along ethno-linguistic lines has 
become a common phenomenon. This has put the federation under 
continuous strain. Although large scale conflicts have disappeared, conflicts 
among small ethnic communities that previously did not have political 
identity has mushroomed in many parts of the country. Of course, these are 
sometimes the works of ethnic entrepreneurs who, nevertheless, are 
motivated by the fact that the Federal Constitution has defined ethnicity as 
the sole marker of political allegiance, making it a means to access power, 
influence and representation.  
 
On the other hand, the dangers of underemphasising ethnic diversity are 
evident in the South African case. The tendencies to depart from the spirit 
of accommodation, as it is evident in the debate on the future of provinces, 
present a dangerous disregard to issues of ethnic diversity. A view that 
regards the provinces as an outcome of a compromise that is no longer 
                                                                                                                            
forces of diversity prevail “unless accompanied by the institutional 
encouragement of common institutions that provide the glue to hold the 
federation together” could be disintegration in the making. On the other hand, 
an imbalance in which the forces of national unity prevail could suppress 
diversity and eliminate state autonomy.  See also Duchacek 1970.  
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imperative fails to appreciate the important role that the provinces play by 
providing ‘regional elites’ with the means for political participation and 
representation in the leadership structure of their respective provinces, 
promoting the self-management of communities. There is also a need to 
ensure that the political practice does not frustrate the ‘accommodationist 
elements’ of the Constitution. This includes ensuring respect for the 
constitutional declaration of official multilingualism and maintaining ethnic 
balance in the national executive. A political practice that disregards or 
undermines the constitutional promise of accommodating ethnic diversity 
can easily risk the dangers of underemphasising ethnic diversity. This will 
precipitate the emergence of conditions that will be exploited by political 
entrepreneurs who would mobilise ethnicity to achieve their political goals, 
creating strain on inter-ethnic relationships.  
 
The two case studies demonstrate that any federal solution that attempts to 
address the challenges of ethnic diversity has to take into account both the 
need to accommodate ethnic demands and maintain the glue that holds the 
society together. The clear message is that excessive emphasis, be it on 
ethnic distinctiveness or national unity, has to be avoided in designing the 
federal arrangement of the state. If possible, the state should avoid the 
‘remedial response’. However, this may not always be possible as deep 
ethnic rifts may warrant the adoption of such a response.7 There is no 
                                                 
7  Overemphasising diversity, both at the level of symbol and self rule, puts a  
federation under continuous intense pressure. Under such circumstances, the 
interaction between ethnic groups becomes a zero-sum game. This is evident from 
the case of Belgium where excessive emphasis on regional autonomy has 
weakened national unity. The restructuring of the territorial configuration of the 
state and its institutions was fully driven by the need to satisfy the demands of 
regional linguistic groups. There was no equal, countervailing concern for national 
unity. Such kind of approach to the problem of ethnic diversity endangers the 
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strictly defined balance that each type of federation must strike. The precise 
position of a state’s institutional response should be informed by the 
political saliency of ethnicity in the country. With the dynamics of ethnic 
identity and ethnic relationships, the institutional arrangement may have to 
be skewed in favour of one or the other end of the continuum, in favour of 
centrifugal or centripetal forces. In other words, the degree of recognition 
and institutional expression that a state has to accord to ethnicity may vary 
depending on the social and political realities of the society (i.e. it 
corresponds with the appropriate analysis of the political saliency of 
ethnicity in the context under consideration). In fact, the non-singular 
position of ethnic identity means that a greater degree of plasticity should 
underline the institutional design that a multi-ethnic state has to fashion in 
order to respond to the challenges of ethnic diversity. Yet, the basic 
principles of recognition and accommodation and the rules that translate 
these principles into institutional reality must, by and large, remain in place 
in any multi-ethnic society. 
 
5. The limits of federalism 
Federalism is not a panacea to the multi-ethnic challenge. It is submitted 
that non-federal elements of institutional recognition and accommodation, 
including an appropriate electoral system, a representative executive and 
non-territorial protection of language and culture, should be incorporated 
into the institutional design and political culture of the state if the latter is to 
adequately respond to the challenges of ethnic diversity.  
 
                                                                                                                            
territorial integrity of the state. What must, however, be equally recognised is that, 
in a very deeply divided societies like Belgium, such arrangements might be the 
only way of keeping the state together. The relevance of such an approach thus 
depends on the particular historical and political situation of a society. 
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5.1 Shared rule in the national decision-making bodies 
In the context of a federal arrangement, representation of the different 
ethnic groups in the national decision making bodies is often confined to 
second chambers. This leaves out the question of representation in the most 
important decision-making bodies of the national government, namely the 
executive and the lower house. This belies the political reality that the 
national executive and the lower parliament are often the most contested 
political spaces among the different ethnic groups. Concentration of 
executive power in the hands of a particular group has often been the cause 
of disgruntlement among ethnic groups, eventually contributing to the 
emergence of conflicts. Moreover, government power is often manifested 
primarily in the functions of the executive and the lower house. As the 
survey of federations would reveal, even the strongest second chamber is 
not as important and powerful as the executive and the lower house.  
 
A federal arrangement that is serious about ensuring a place for all ethnic 
groups in the country cannot ignore the representation of the different ethnic 
groups at the centre. This is about ensuring the equitable representation of 
the different ethnic groups within the institutions of the national 
government. It is about making sure that that the faces of the most important 
national institutions reflect the diversity of the society. The absence of 
equitable representation in the national institutions can potentially 
undermine any institutional recognition and accommodation that a multi-
ethnic state has already put in place. 
 
Federalism does not necessarily guarantee representation of the different 
ethnic groups in the national executive and the lower house. This requires a 
multi-ethnic state to consciously devise other mechanisms to enhance the 
representative character of these important national institutions. With regard 
to representation in the lower house, this often relates to the choice of the 
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electoral system. Representation in the national executive, on the other 
hand, relates to the composition of the cabinet as well as other important 
executive appointments including the appointment of ambassadors.  
 
5.2 Self rule and intra-substate minorities 
The discussion of multi-ethnic federations, including South Africa and 
Ethiopia, revealed that a geographical configuration of a federal state, 
including one that heavily relies on ethnicity in the making of subnational 
units, seldom don’t leave us with separate ethnically pure territorial units. 
Be it indigenous ethnic groups (i.e. indigenous to the area they inhabit) or 
ethnic migrants, there will always be ethnic minorities that are scattered in 
the midst of regional majorities. This brings to the fore issues related to the 
accommodation of ethnic diversities at the subnational level. 
 
Federalism may not adequately respond to the security and respect of intra-
substate minorities. A federal arrangement that grants a mother state to a 
numerically dominant ethnic group within a territorial unit often exposes 
minority groups to discriminatory policies of the regionally dominant group. 
Such an arrangement would only move the locus of inter-ethnic conflict and 
tension from the central government to the level of the constituent units. Of 
particular importance in any multi-ethnic federation is thus the need to take 
into account the interest and rights of intra-substate minorities. Securing the 
rights of minorities which are created by autonomy arrangements is crucial 
for the long term success of any federal arrangement.8  
 
It is submitted addressing the anxieties of regional minorities requires the 
state to accept that the constituent units are sharing with the larger state the 
same problem of accommodating ethnic diversities but only at a constituent 
                                                 
8  Ghai 2001: 22. 
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unit level. In prescribing a particular response, however, a distinction has to 
be made between ethnic groups that are scattered throughout the country, on 
the one hand, and those that are territorially concentrated but do not have 
their own self-governing unit, on the other. For the former, the application 
of aspects of self rule and shared rule, owing to their territorial dimension, 
may not be appealing. The anxieties of such geographically dispersed ethnic 
groups can be addressed by adopting a judicially enforceable bill of rights. 
For geographically concentrated ethnic groups, on the other hand, the 
constituent units, recognising their multi-ethnic character, can apply, to the 
extent possible, processes and institutions of both self rule and shared-rule. 
Of course, owing to different reasons, the entire package of ‘self rule plus 
shared rule’ arrangement cannot be replicated at the level of the constituent 
units. It may not also be desirable as this may promote fragmentation along 
ethnic lines. There are, however, some aspects of both self rule and shared 
rule that, albeit in a different form, can be incorporated in any proposal that 
deals with intra-subnational ethnic diversity, which goes a long way in 
terms of ensuring that the federal response adequately accommodates the 
demands of all ethnic groups that inhabit the subnational unit in question.  
 
6. Institutional lessons from Ethiopia and South Africa 
An effective institutional response to the challenges of ethnic diversity 
involves a two-stage approach. First, it involves recognition of ethnic 
diversity. Second, it involves providing practical effect to this act of 
recognition within the framework of the self rule plus shared rule formula of 
federalism. This section identifies the major institutional lessons without, 
however, trying to prescribe the adoption of a particular institutional model  
 
6.1 Recognition 
From the discussion of the case studies and the experience of other multi-
ethnic federations, the expression of the recognition of ethnic diversity 
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emerges as an important element of an institutional response to the multi-
ethnic challenge. This aspect of the institutional response entails a decision 
on the part of the multi-ethnic state to readily recognise the multi-ethnic 
character of the society it seeks to govern. States can express the act of 
recognition through the preamble to the constitution, language and symbolic 
codes including public holidays, coat of arms, flags and the like. 
 
6.1.1 Preamble 
The preamble to the constitution often reflects whether a state recognises its 
multi-ethnic character. As the experiences of Ethiopia and South Africa 
show, recognition of ethnic diversity through the preamble range from those 
that emphasise the distinctiveness of ethnic groups that inhabit the country 
to those that represent a cautious recognition of ethnic diversity within the 
framework of national unity. The opening statement of the preamble to the 
Ethiopian Constitution (i.e. we the nation, nationalities and peoples of 
Ethiopia) emphasises the distinctiveness of the diverse ethnic groups that 
constitutes the country. On the other hand, the preamble to the South 
African Constitution commences with an emphasis on national unity (i.e. 
we the people of South Africa) but does not conclude without recognising 
the diversity of the South African society (i.e. South Africa belongs to all 
who live in it, united in their diversity). 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that even if many may agree that the 
preamble to the constitution should somehow reflect a state that recognises 
its multi-ethnic character, this does not necessarily require presenting the 
country as a mere ensemble of diverse ethnic groups. The preamble can be 
used to reflect recognition of both the diversity of the state and the common 
political union that they seek to establish and promote. A good example in 
this regard is the preamble to the Swiss Constitution which commences with 
the opening statement ‘we the Swiss people and cantons’, reflecting an 
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equal emphasis both on national unity and its diversity. Of course, there 
might be particular contexts where the preamble has to emphasise the 
distinctiveness of the diverse groups that constitute the country or national 
unity. As long as the emphasis can be explained by the particular political 
history of each country, it should not be problematic provided that it is not 
excessive and does not go without acknowledging ethnic diversity or 
promoting national unity as the case may be.  
 
6.1.2 Symbolic codes 
Symbolic codes of the state are often used to provide public affirmation to 
the culture and history of the dominant group thereby portraying the state in 
the image of that particular group. As the experience of South Africa, 
Ethiopia and other states that move towards the politic of recognition 
shows, there seems to be an increasing understanding that the reorientation 
of the state towards the direction of recognition should also involve the 
redesigning of symbolic codes in a manner that takes into account the 
practices, cultures and history of the different ethnic groups. Both in 
Ethiopia and South Africa, flags, national anthem and public holidays are 
used to reflect the multi-ethnic character of the state. This suggests the 
adoption of an inclusive state symbols; that the public culture, symbols, and 
character of the federation should include a wide range of communities.  
 
It is not, however, sufficient that the symbolic codes reflect the recognition 
of ethnic diversity. The state’s decision to reflect the history and culture of 
the diverse ethnic groups in the country in the symbolic codes can easily 
lead to the adoption of divisive symbolism. There are state symbols that 
have the tendency to create animosity among the different ethnic groups and 
endanger inter-ethnic relationships. This is especially true in relation to 
symbolic codes that have historical roots. The commemoration of the 
Martyrs of the Chelenko war in the Harari state in Ethiopia has the effect of 
 
 
 
 
 512  
projecting the ethnic groups that inhabit the state as the conqueror and the 
vanquished. This, as argued in Chapter Seven, can compromise the 
constitutional commitment of building ‘one political community’. The 
Ethiopian experience suggests that a state should strive to be innovative in 
using symbolic codes as a means to reconcile conflicting historical 
interpretations. By doing so, the state will not only recognise ethnic 
diversity but also help to maintain and promote national unity. A good 
example comes in this regard from South Africa which provides a creative 
approach towards determining public holidays. The decision of the South 
African government to retain December 16 as public holiday, which, in the 
past, represented a commemoration of the Afrikaners victory over a Zulu 
army in 1838, but change the theme of the holiday by declaring it as the 
Day of Reconciliation, marks a departure from ‘divisive symbolism’ and 
represents an attempt “reconcile conflicting historical interpretations”.9   
 
It is, of course, not practicable to ensure the representation of each and 
every ethnic community in the symbolic codes of the state. But that should 
not give the majority group or any particular group, for that matter, the right 
to prevail at the symbolic level as doing so would alienate other ethnic 
groups from the state. In this context, the best option might be for the state 
to avoid symbolic codes that recognise any identity at all. Doing so, where 
there is an option, avoids the problem of creating insiders and outsiders.10 
That, however, is not possible since a state cannot remain neutral as it 
cannot help but adopt state symbols that recognise at least one identity.11 
The argument has rather been that a state, to the extent possible, should 
strive to ensure that its symbolic codes reflect the culture, histories and 
                                                 
9  Ehlers 2000, 17-18  
10  Patten 2001. 
11  Kymlicka 1995. See also Patten 2001. 
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identities of a broader range of communities. This, of course, requires some 
degree of innovation. Nevertheless, federalism, with its multiple levels of 
government, provides ample opportunities to do so. A good example in this 
regard is the practice in some federations including in Ethiopia whereby 
each constituent unit is able to have holidays that are separate from or 
additional to the state-wide public holidays. Other similar practices 
discussed in Chapter Three also show how the federal territorial matrix can 
be used to facilitate the adoption of inclusive symbols that provide 
intuitional reality to the act of recognition.  
 
6.1.3 Language 
A language rights regime that operates within the context of a multi-ethnic 
federation should represent the recognition of the linguistic identities of the 
constituent units. This entails the framing of the language rights regime as a 
concrete expression of the federalist principle and attempting to achieve a 
delicate balance between unity and diversity.12 It involves the adoption of a 
language policy that enables cultural communities to promote their language 
and cultural identity while at the same time promoting inter-ethnic 
solidarity.13 In this regard, the recognition of all languages as equal is an 
imperative element of any state that seeks to recognise ethnic diversity. 
Beyond that, however, there is no definite answer on determining the 
official language(s) of the federal as well as subnational governments.  
 
In terms of the federal language, the options are either to promote particular 
language(s) or, as in the case of South Africa, regard all languages spoken 
by the different ethnic groups as official languages of the country.  The 
South African option is obviously viable in a country with few linguistic 
                                                 
12  Coulombe 2001: 242. 
13  Balmer 1992: 447 
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groups. As it is evident from the South African experience, a country with 
more than at least ten ethnic groups cannot, for example, expect to 
practically realise the usage of all languages in all or most business of the 
federal government. Such kind of policy, as again proved by the experience 
of South Africa, is an “impractical egalitarianism”.14 Despite the 
multilingual reality that characterises South African society and a 
constitution that declares official multilingualism, monolingualism is the 
emerging trend. This shows that the South African approach will result, 
more often than not, in a situation where a particular language becomes the 
‘unofficial official language’ of the state. In that case, a mere recognition of 
all the languages spoken in the country as official languages will only have 
a symbolic value. In addition, the policy is bound to create discontent 
among some ethnic groups unless the ‘unofficially official language’ is a 
culturally neutral language, as English is for most South Africans15 and 
decolonised states. This is also the only situation where a state can adopt a 
particular language as official language without provoking a hostile reaction 
from other ethnic groups.  
 
Adopting national language remains, however, a challenge in states like 
Ethiopia that do not have the benefit of a culturally neutral language. One 
option in this context is to select a particular language, which in most cases 
would be the historically dominant language, as the language of government 
business without bestowing it with the status of an official language. The 
Ethiopian approach which recognises Amharic as the working language 
                                                 
14  Sacks 1997: 683. 
15  This, of course, is not true for Afrikaners for whom issues relating to language  
historically constitute a central place in their resistance against the British cultural 
hegemony. This partly explains why the Afrikaners, unlike the other ethnic groups 
in South Africa, feel so strongly about the dominance of English in today’s South 
Africa. 
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represents this option. This approach seemingly contrasts with the South 
African model that recognises all languages as official languages. Like the 
South African model, however, it is underlined by the same principle that 
recognises all linguistic groups as equal. The difference lies in the way the 
two systems give expression to this same principle.  
 
Under the working language approach, the selected language will become 
the working languages of the federal government in which all tasks of 
government are conducted. Of course, as in the case of the use of Amharic 
in Ethiopia, the symbolic implication of adopting a particular language or 
retaining a historically dominant language as the working language of the 
federal government cannot be easily disregarded. The solution lies in 
convincing the different ethnic groups that the particular language, as the 
title suggests, is adopted not to reflect the hegemony of the speakers of that 
language but because of the special position that the language has attained 
as effective means of national communication. This becomes, however, 
easy, only when the state demonstrates its commitment to the equality of all 
languages by adopting some form of territorial model of language planning, 
expressing regional preferences in language usage.  
 
Unless in a bi-ethnic state where the personal model, which allows citizens 
to use their language in every part of the country, can serve the same 
purpose, the territorial approach to language, whereby each region adopts its 
language(s), is the language planning model that seems to provide effective 
institutional reality to the act of recognition. Under this model, the 
subnational units are allowed to adopt regional language(s). This does not 
necessarily mean promoting unilingualism. As is the case in South Africa, 
subnational states that are inhabited by more than one ethnic group can, to 
the extent possible, recognise intra-substate linguistic diversities by 
recognising more than one language as working languages of the 
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subnational government. This would not only represent recognition of intra-
substate diversities but also portrays a state that promotes social cohesion 
and national unity by avoiding the association of a particular territory with a 
single language. This option may not, however, be appropriate in a situation 
where a subnational state is composed of, for example, not less than five 
ethnic groups. As the experience of ethnically plural subnational units that 
adopted Amharic as their working language in Ethiopia suggests, adopting a 
language that is culturally neutral in the context of the relevant subnational 
state is often the only way out. Yet, the system can be used to allow each 
subnational state to use its institutional and territorial structure to reflect its 
linguistic diversity. 
 
Related to this is whether subnational units should adopt the national 
official/working language as co-official at the subnational level. Of course, 
adopting the national language as co-official promotes social cohesion, 
especially in countries where there is extensive movement of citizens across 
internal borders. However, subscribing to this view does not necessarily 
require the co-officialisation of the national language. The idea of using 
language as a social cohesion can be promoted, for example, by ensuring 
that children, as in the case of Ethiopia, learn the federal language as a 
subject in their primary education. The argument for co-officialisation of the 
federal language at the regional level can have currency only in a situation 
like in Ethiopia where there are a large number of geographically dispersed 
ethnic migrants, especially in urban areas, who would be disadvantaged 
when government business is conducted in the language of the regionally 
empowered group.  
 
The co-official language policy is not, however, without a problem. The 
problem with this policy is that it has the tendency to promote the 
hegemonic status that a historically privileged language group enjoys. This 
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is clearly the case in Ethiopia where the adoption of Amharic as co-official 
language at the regional level would have the effect of maintaining the 
historically dominant position of that language with the regional language in 
all likelihood occupying a disproportionate place. This is also supported by 
the experience of Quebec in Canada where the co-official policy 
perpetuated the dominant position of English necessitating the province to 
embark on what is called “the language normalization process”. In a country 
where the designated federal language is not culturally neutral and where 
the nationally designated language is a historically dominant language, the 
co-official policy at the regional level is thus likely to perpetuate the 
dominant position that the latter enjoys in the state. Without state 
intervention, the historically dominant language will continue to remain as 
the majority language status relegating the regional language, albeit 
numerically dominant, to a secondary level.  
 
In a subnational state where there are large numbers of ethnic migrants, 
however, the adoption of the co-official policy seems unavoidable if the 
system is it to accommodate ethnic diversity. The dangers that the co-
official policy might pose on the status of the regional language can be 
mitigated by allowing the subnational state to adopt what is called “the 
language normalization processes”. As the experience of Quebec in Canada 
shows, the basic aim of these processes is to restore and maintain the 
majority status that local languages should assume in their localities.16 As 
the experience of Ethiopia suggests, in a country like Ethiopia where there 
are a large number of ethnic migrants, the absence of a co-official policy 
easily causes strain on inter-ethnic relationships and run the risk of 
alienating particular ethnic groups. 
 
                                                 
16  See chapter four. 
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6.2 Self rule 
The two case studies provide a number of lessons on how the principle of 
self rule can be translated into institutional reality. 
 
6.2.1 Territorial structure 
In a country where ethnic groups are generally territorially concentrated, 
territorial autonomy has emerged as an important mechanism by which the 
institutional principle of self rule can be translated into institutional reality. 
This particular form of self rule involves a delineated part of a territory 
wherein an ethnic group living within a specific territory will have the 
authority to mange its own affairs. It enables regionally concentrated ethnic 
groups to dominate politically in those constituent units in which they have 
numerical majority. It provides them with a territorial space that is 
necessary to enjoy both cultural and political autonomy. The Ethiopian 
experience illustrates this very well. By making ethnic groups a majority in 
their own house, the Ethiopian federalism has provided them with a 
territorial space, which is essential for the preservation and promotion of 
their language, culture and identity as well as the self management of their 
own communities. Chapter Seven has demonstrated how the present system 
has turned an “obscure district” into a regional state with a significant local 
empowerment. Similarly, the territorial structure in South Africa, where 
there is relative concentration of ethnic groups in the provinces, has 
provided ‘regional elites’ with the means for political participation and 
representation in the leadership structure of their respective provinces, 
promoting the self-management of communities. In both cases, the self-
management of communities is further facilitated by policies that allow 
regional preferences in language usage.     
 
Notwithstanding the above stated benefits of providing territorial autonomy 
to ethnic groups, little consensus is, however, available on how a multi-
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ethnic federation should go about providing ethnic groups with a territorial 
autonomy. At the centre of this issue is whether the territorial structure of a 
multi-ethnic state should be designed in a manner that associates an ethnic 
group with a single subnational unit. The issue is whether the 
accommodation of ethnic diversity requires the state to demarcate each or at 
least the major ethnic groups into separate territory and whether this is an 
advisable route that sates have to take. In short, should each ethnic group 
have a mother state? 
 
The geographical configuration of the Ethiopian federation provides to each 
large ethnic group a territorial autonomy. The Oromo, Amhara, Tigre and 
the Somali, the four largest ethnic groups, are provided with a mother state. 
This approach of providing a mother state to each ethnic group has elevated 
ethnic identity to a primary political identity. As ethnically defined regional 
states become the major custodians of constitutionally entrenched powers, 
the territorial structure of the federation has encouraged political 
mobilisation along ethnic lines. A characteristic of the present Ethiopian 
politics is that ethnic entrepreneurs, motivated by a territorial structure that 
rewards political mobilisation along ethnic lines, continuously engage in 
political wrangling that uses ethnicity to access power, privilege and 
influence. This, in turn, has resulted in the ethnicisation of public discourse. 
It has also facilitated the fragmentation of the population along ethno-
linguistic lines. The proliferation of ethnic based parties and the pervasive 
demands of small ethnic group for territorial autonomy have become the 
major features of the political and constitutional debate in Ethiopia. The 
lesson from the Ethiopian approach is that providing a mother state to each 
large ethnic group can contribute to the ethnicisation of the system, causes 
continuous tension, puts a strain on the federation and might even pose a 
risk to the territorial integrity of the state.  
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The Ethiopian experience can also be easily supported by the experiences of 
other multi-ethnic federations like Nigeria and Belgium where providing big 
mother states to each numerically strong ethnic group has a counter 
productive effect. As argued in Chapter Three, the experience of Belgium 
and Nigeria shows that creating only few, ethnically defined, large and of 
equal size constituent units renders negotiation difficult as it leaves only 
limited scope for trade-offs. Furthermore, such an arrangement freezes 
territorial boundaries and denies the political system of the fluidity and 
flexibility that could result from a larger number of smaller constituent 
units. In such a system, every dispute turns into an ethnic dispute. The 
propensity to engage in conflicts is also high when each constituent unit is 
identified with a single ethnic group. The lesson is that multi-ethnic 
federations must be aware of the danger of creating few ethnically defined 
big states that pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the state.  
 
The remaining question is how a multi-ethnic state can provide territorial 
autonomy to ethnic groups and still avoid the counterproductive effects 
mentioned above. One option is to divide numerically large ethnic group 
into a number of constituent units without, however, denying ethnic groups 
territorial autonomy. In the case of Ethiopia, this would have involved the 
division of the Oromo and the Amhara into a number of, more or less, 
ethnically homogenous territorial units. By dividing large ethnic groups into 
a number of territorial units of a reasonable size, this type of arrangement 
leaves room for flexibility and the establishment of a certain kind of 
balance. It also encourages intra-ethnic competition and thus avoids the 
development of ethnonationalism across ethnic lines, possibly replacing it 
with the political mobilisation of non-ethnic interests. Generally, such an 
arrangement, it is believed, has the capacity to diffuse what would otherwise 
be a bitter and polarized dispute and avoids, or at least, dilutes the political 
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mobilisation of ethnicity. A reference to the Swiss case might help in this 
regard.   
 
Switzerland, a country composed of four major language groups, is 
composed of twenty-six cantons. From a linguistic point of view, each 
canton is homogenous. However, each language group is not identified with 
only one canton. Instead, each of the four major language groups is divided 
into multiple cantons. As major powers reside with the cantons, the 
geographical configuration of Swiss federalism discourages the 
development of ethno-nationalism across language community lines.17 The 
Swiss political parties, unlike their Belgian counterparts, have not 
experienced fragmentation along linguistic lines. Moreover, crosscutting 
cleavages are expressed in the cantonal system.18  
 
The state’s decision to provide territorial autonomy to ethnic groups without 
endangering inter-ethnic relationship and posing a threat to the territorial 
integrity of the state can be achieved by taking into account other identities 
that are relevant in the geographical configuration of a federation. In the 
case of Ethiopia, for example, regionalism has been an important part of the 
Ethiopian political makeup. As argued in Chapter Six, persons that belong 
to the Amhara ethnic group harbour strong regional identities. The 
consideration of this factor in the geographical configuration of the 
federation would have rejected what this thesis calls ‘the putting together’ 
of the Amhara into one regional state and recognised the historically and 
politically relevant regional divide among the Amhara. This would have 
further diluted the status of ethnicity as the sole criteria to organise the state.  
 
                                                 
17  McGarry and O’Leary 1993: 31. 
18   McGarry and O’Leary 1993:31. 
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An important lesson that emerges from the Ethiopian experience is that the 
inclusion of the ethnic factor in the geographical configuration of the state 
should not result in the exclusion of other historically and politically 
relevant identities from the equation that determines the territorial structure 
of the state. In other words, the territorial division of multi-ethnic states 
should not simply rely on the demographics of the country but should also 
take into account the political and historical relevance of those 
demographics.19 This also means that the different criteria that can be used 
to design the territorial structure of a state are not mutually exclusive. In the 
case of Ethiopia, for example, both ethnicity and regionalism could have 
been used to demarcate the internal units of the federation. A related 
example comes from Canada. Canada, by providing the Francophone 
community its own province, Quebec, has adopted the ethnic model of 
federalism while at the same time using the territorial model when it divided 
the rest of Canada into nine provinces with out regard to any cultural bond. 
These examples suggest that it is possible to apply both ethnic and other 
criteria in the geographical configuration of a single federation as long as it 
is consistent with the political history as well as social realities of the 
country. 
 
6.2.2 Division of powers and functions 
The experience of multi-ethnic federations suggest that most politically 
mobilised ethnic groups often demand control over matters that are relevant 
to them, which are usually identity-related matters. This implies that an 
institutional response to ethnic claims cannot avoid involving a division of 
power that entrusts the constituent units with competence on matters that are 
                                                 
19  This is consistent with the view adopted in this thesis that the extent to which a  
state should recognise its ethnic diversity must depend on the political relevance 
of ethnicity in the state under consideration. 
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of particular relevance to their community. This suggests the provision of 
exclusive powers over identity related matters to the constituent units. Such 
an entitlement allows each constituent government to preserve and promote 
its identity as well as freely pursue its own cultural development. As 
indicated in Chapter Three, distinguishing these identity-related matters is 
not an easy task.  
 
It is submitted that the degree of autonomy of constituent governments 
cannot be determined by the long list of heads of competencies but by the 
relevance of the competencies in achieving the basic objective of the 
federation, namely to accommodate ethnic diversity. In Ethiopia, the states’ 
areas of competencies in the areas of identity-related matters include 
education, media services, museums, libraries and the like. The provinces in 
South Africa enjoy autonomy in areas of provincial cultural matters, 
archives, provincial sport, museum and provincial recreation. The provinces 
also enjoy a long list of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence which includes identity related matters like education, 
indigenous law, language policy and media services. When considered 
together with the experiences of other multi-ethnic federations discussed in 
Chapter Three, the division of power adopted by South Africa and Ethiopia 
suggest that the apparent identity-related competences are, broadly 
speaking, language, culture and education. This usually extends to 
institutions and structures through which these areas find further practical 
expressions. This, for example, refers to schools, museums, libraries, 
theatres, higher educations, broadcasting agencies and the like.  
 
However, the increasing interrelation of economic and cultural policy 
suggests that the demands of ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic federation 
cannot be met by simply providing them with the power to exercise control 
over culturally-related matters. This suggests that the distribution of power 
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and responsibilities should go beyond providing the constituent units control 
over identity-related matters and extend to economic policies that affect 
their welfare. 
 
The scope of competences provided to subnational units is equally 
important in determining the autonomy of subnational units. The scheme 
of power distribution adopted by the South African Constitution provides 
the national government overriding power over almost all legislative areas 
of provincial government, in areas of both concurrent and exclusive 
provincial competences. Although this power of the national government 
has never been used in practice, the experiences of other multi-ethnic 
federations suggest that these overriding powers can potentially limit the 
autonomy of the provinces. This suggests that the autonomy of a 
subnational unit is also linked to the scope of the legislative powers left to 
the constituent unit. This means providing autonomy to the constituent 
units should include not only entrusting the constituent units with the 
legislative powers over identity-relate matters but also powers that cannot 
be excessively and frequently tampered with by the national government.  
 
As the discussion of the experiences of multi-ethnic federations in Chapter 
Three reveals, there are a number of mechanisms that can be used to 
safeguard the autonomy of the constituent units from the interferences of 
the national government. First, to the extent that the central government is 
allowed to interfere in the legislative authorities of the constituent 
governments, the imperatives of effective autonomy require that the 
interference be kept at its minimum. This can be done either by clearly 
specifying the circumstances under which national governments can 
legislate in the fields of constituent governments and subjecting the 
interference to certain conditions that are clearly outlined in the 
Constitution. This can be further complemented by an impartial institution 
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that judges when such an act from the national government is appropriate. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the central government interferes with the 
legislative powers of constituent governments, the legislative scheme can 
ensure that it does not impede the autonomy of constituent governments to 
preserve and promote their ethnic identity by providing, among others, an 
exclusive power over identity-related matters. 
 
6.2.3 Financial autonomy 
Constituent governments may have the necessary legislative and 
administrative powers in order to manage their own affairs. However, all 
these powers will be hollow if they are not accompanied with the necessary 
financial resources. The institutions that they intend to use as a vehicle to 
preserve and promote their identity will also be of no use if they do not have 
the constitutional mandate to raise and mobilise revenue.  
 
For constituent governments to enjoy some level of financial autonomy, 
exercising control over own taxing powers is essential. In South Africa, 
although the provinces can impose taxes, levies and duties, they are denied 
access to broad based taxes like income tax, a value added tax and other 
taxes, which are strong sources of revenue. Similarly, analysis of the tax 
sources and tax bases of the federal and state governments in Ethiopia 
reveals that the most productive taxes are assigned to the Federal 
Government. The experience of the two countries suggests that the financial 
autonomy of constituent units does not merely depend on entrusting them 
with a long list of taxation powers. A true financial autonomy requires 
going beyond providing the constituents units with mere taxation powers 
and ensuring that they exercise power over taxes that are productive.  
 
The degree of ‘constituent autonomy’ is affected by the extent to which the 
constituent units rely on transfers. South African provinces depend on 
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intergovernmental transfers for 95% of their revenue while 80% of regional 
state government revenue in Ethiopia similarly comes from fiscal transfers. 
This is compounded by the fact that the subnational units in the two states 
exercise little control over the use of transfers. This means the subnational 
units in both federations may not have the financial muscle that is necessary 
to make decisions tailored to the needs and preferences of their ethnic 
communities. This, as shown in Chapter Three, is not, however, unique to 
the two case studies. Quebec in Canada claims that the financial dominance 
of the federal government has allowed the latter to invade its autonomy and 
threaten “the cultural distinctiveness of the Quebec nation”.20  
 
The obvious lesson that emerges from the foregoing is that fiscal imbalance 
should be reduced. To the extent that the constituent units rely on 
intergovernmental transfers, the experiences of the case studies as well as 
other multi-ethnic federations suggest that the leverage of the central 
government to use its financial muscle to interfere with the areas of 
subnational jurisdictions has to be kept to the minimum. This can be 
achieved by ensuring that the intergovernmental transfers, or at least a lion 
share of these transfers, are unconditional transfers.21  
 
6.3 Shared rule 
There are a number of lessons that can be learnt from the two case studies 
on how the institutional principle of self rule can be complemented by the 
principle of shared rule. The imperatives of complementing autonomy with 
a countervailing concern to national unity requires a system that 
incorporates the shared rule principle by going beyond the federal 
arrangement and incorporating consociational features (as a matter of 
                                                 
20  Telford 2003: 23.    
21  See also Watts 2001. 
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constitutional imperative or ‘good political practice’) at the level of the 
national government including an appropriate electoral system. 
 
6.3.1 Lower house 
The shared rule role of the central government can be enhanced by ensuring 
the representativeness of the lower house, which is usually the most 
important and powerful deliberative body in most federations. The 
representativeness of the lower house often hinges on the electoral system, 
whether the state has adopted the plurality system or the proportional 
representation system (PR).  
 
It is generally submitted that supplementing federalism with a proportional 
electoral system enhances the representativeness of the lower house and 
fosters inclusivity. This is illustrated by the South African experience. 
Owing to the adoption of the PR system, small parties representing 
numerically weak ethnic communities have been able to secure seats in the 
National Assembly irrespective of the fact that they have own an 
insignificant percentage of the national vote. Parties that claim to represent 
ethnic groups that are not geographically concentrated have also benefited 
from the proportional electoral system. If the first past the post system, 
which puts geographic concentration of support as a precondition for 
electoral victory, is adopted, the likelihood of parties that represent the 
interest of a geographically scattered ethnic community like the  Afrikaners  
securing a seat in the lower house would have reduced significantly. This 
suggests that the proportional system generally ensures that both 
numerically small and geographically dispersed ethnic communities are 
represented in this important national institution.  
 
The effect of an electoral system on the representation of ethnic groups 
should, however, not be evaluated in abstract. In Ethiopia, where the 
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territorial units are delimited on the basis of linguistic lines and the ethnic 
groups are generally geographically concentrated, the plurality system has 
not led to disproportionate results along ethnic lines. This suggests that the 
effect of an electoral system is greatly affected by the settlement pattern of 
ethnic communities. A plurality system is more likely to deny representation 
to ethnic groups that are not territorially concentrated. In federations where 
the internal territorial structures is undertaken in a manner that each 
constituent unit represents a geographically concentrated ethnic group, the 
adoption of the majority system is less likely to have a marginalising effect 
on the representation of the different ethnic groups in the lower house. This 
is especially true in federations like Ethiopia where there is, by and large, no 
large ethnic group that is widely scattered throughout the country without 
having a ‘homeland’ where it is geographically concentrated.  
 
Of course, as the case of Ethiopia illustrates, there will usually be ethnic 
groups that are either too small in number to have an electoral constituency 
of their own or geographically dispersed. Such groups are more likely to be 
marginalised in terms of representation in a system that applies the plurality 
electoral system. In Ethiopia, this problem is addressed by providing a quota 
system that provides for special representation of minority ethnic groups. 
The effectiveness of this system depends, however, on how those ethnic 
groups that deserve special representation are determined. One suggestion is 
to ensure that the scheme includes ethnic groups that are numerically too 
weak to gain parliamentary representation. As argued in relation to the 
lower house in Ethiopia in Chapter Seven, the focus should not be on the 
size of the ethnic groups only but also on their capacity to have their own 
constituency which depends on the settlement pattern of the concerned 
ethnic groups. That way the system can ensure the representation of ethnic 
groups that cannot secure representation because of their settlement patterns 
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although their population size is far beyond the minimum threshold required 
to form a constituency.  
 
An important benefit that accrues from adopting the PR system as opposed 
to the plurality system is that the latter gives little room for developing 
inter-ethnic solidarity. As the experience of Ethiopia shows, political parties 
operating within the plurality electoral system are likely to concentrate on 
electoral constituencies where the likelihood of them winning an election is 
strong. The plurality system provides political parties with little incentive to 
cast their net wide. On the other hand, the PR system, as the experience of 
South Africa shows, encourages political parties to create regionally and 
ethnically diverse lists, with the view to maximise their overall national 
votes. As indicated in Chapter Four, the leadership structure of the ANC 
usually reviews the ANC national list to ensure that the diverse groups that 
inhabit South Africa are represented. Such practice obviously contributes to 
the promotion of inter-ethnic solidarity.   
 
The review of the experience of both South Africa and Ethiopia, supported 
by evidences from other multi-ethnic federations, suggest that the PR 
system is a more pertinent system of election in a multi-ethnic state that 
seeks to accommodate ethnic diversity. This choice of electoral system is 
not, however motivated by the capacity of the PR system to ensure a 
broader representation of the different ethnic groups. This can be achieved 
by the plurality system as well provided that the different ethnic groups are 
generally territorially concentrated. The reason for the choice of the PR 
system lies in its other role, namely its capacity to contribute to inter-ethnic 
solidarity and social cohesion by encouraging parties to develop a state-
wide objective. Yet it should be noted that the two electoral systems are not 
mutually exclusive. It is possible to apply both electoral systems within a 
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single federation. The adoption of a PR system at a subnational level is at 
least essential in order to accommodate intra-substate minorities.   
 
6.3.2 Second chamber 
The effectiveness of second chambers in representing the interest of the 
constituent units depends on the appointment system and the specific 
powers allocated to it by the constitution. 
 
A basic question with regard to the composition of the second chamber 
pertains to the debate about who should be represented in second chamber. 
In Ethiopia, the House of Federation (HF), the second chamber, is 
composed of representatives of ethnic groups. This departs from the 
common trend according to which second chambers are organised as 
representatives of subnational units. As a result of this unique representation 
system, there are a lot of uncertainties about how members of the HF are 
supposed to discharge their duties. As the discussion in Chapter Seven 
shows, it is not, for example, clear whether the members of the HF have to 
act in accordance with the instructions of state governments. It is not also 
clear on whether the representatives can vote differently from 
representatives of other ethnic groups who, nevertheless, come from the 
same state. Most importantly, the composition of the house belies the 
political reality that state governments are the most important unit of 
government and that members of the HF are, in fact, de facto 
representatives of state governments. The complications that emerge from 
the Ethiopian experience suggests that the second chamber should be 
composed of state representatives as it the case with the second chamber in 
South Africa, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP).  
 
Transforming the second chamber into a body of state representatives does 
not have to necessarily result in the exclusion of the ethnic factor from the 
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system of representation. The representation of the different ethnic groups 
in the second chamber can still be achieved by requiring that the delegate of 
each regional state is as representative as possible, which is also the case in 
South Africa. In South Africa, the representativeness of provincial delegate 
is construed as the representation of parties that have seats in a provincial 
legislature. In a country like Ethiopia where parties are largely organised 
along ethnic lines, such a requirement would go a long way in ensuring that 
each state delegate reflects the ethnic diversity of the state it represents. 
 
An equally important issue in the composition of second chambers pertains 
to the appointment system and especially it relates to the question who 
appoints members of the second chamber. In South Africa, the 
representation system which entrusts the provinces with the power to 
appoint representatives to the second chamber seems to put members in a 
better position to voice provincial preferences and protect provincial 
interests.22 In a federation like Canada, where members of the second 
chamber are appointed by the national executive, on the other hand, the 
capacity of the latter to protect subnational interests is greatly limited. This 
suggests that a second chamber that is largely composed of central 
government appointees cannot be expected to exercise its powers for the 
constituent units. These suggests that any examination of the effectiveness 
of second chambers in representing regional interests should go beyond 
what is represented and look into the system of appointment. The 
appointment system goes to the heart of determining whether the second 
chamber exercises power for, or against, the constituent units. In cases 
where the decision to appoint members is left to the national government, 
                                                 
22  As argued in chapter six,  this does not guarantee that members of the second  
chamber will usually vote along provincial interest. Voting along political-party 
lines is usually common. 
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the representation of the constituent units have been nominal. In this regard, 
the South African option where the appointment of representatives is left to 
the constituent units is worth considering. This can take either the form of 
direct election by the constituent units or, like in the case of South Africa, a 
representation by the deliberative body of the constituent units. 
 
A related issue with regard to the representation of the constituent units is 
whether the subnational units should be represented in equal numbers 
irrespective of their unequal population size. In most federations where 
there is great variation among ethnic groups and their corresponding 
constituent units in terms of population size, adopting a simple majoritarian 
system in which representation is largely based on population size, as the 
experience of the Ethiopian federation shows, ends up creating a scenario 
whereby small constituent units are easily outvoted by larger constituent 
units. This limits the role of the second chamber to a forum where the 
constituent units merely voice their preferences without having a 
meaningful power to affect the decision of the second chamber. Such 
representation system also defeats the very purpose of establishing a second 
chamber in a state that seeks to accommodate ethnic diversity. This suggests 
that some level of overrepresentation of constituent units is essential if a 
second chamber in a multi-ethnic state is to protect the interest of ethnic 
groups, especially small ethnic groups.  
 
In addition to the appointment system, the effectiveness of second chamber 
in representing subnational interests depends on the effectiveness of the 
institution in protecting subnational interests and promoting national unity. 
This relates to the specific powers allocated to this institution by the 
Constitution. The second chamber in Ethiopia does not participate in most 
of the legislations passed by the Federal Government. As a result, it plays 
little or no role in safeguarding the jurisdictions of the states including in 
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identity-related areas like culture, language and education. This, as argued 
in Chapter Seven, has not only made the autonomy of the states vulnerable 
to the interferences of the national government but it has also denied the 
federation an opportunity to use the second chamber as the vehicle for the 
co-management of the society, which would, in turn, promote national 
unity. In this regard, the organisation of the South African second chamber 
represents a good example. In the NCOP, the provinces play an important 
role in approving or rejecting bills that affect provinces while they play a 
delaying function in the passing of bills that do not necessarily affect the 
provinces. These powers of the NCOP put the latter in better position to 
ensure the effective and meaningful participation of the provinces in the 
national law making process. The contrasting position of the second 
chambers in the two federations suggest that second chambers in multi-
ethnic federations should be allowed to deal with matters directly affecting 
constituent units especially in areas that are relevant to them.  
 
6.3.3 Representation in the national executive 
As indicated in this thesis, the representation of the different ethnic groups 
in the national executive is an important issue that a multi-ethnic state that 
seeks to accommodate ethnic diversity must seriously consider. Issues of 
representation are often raised in relation to the composition of the cabinet 
but they are also equally applicable to ambassadorial and other important 
appointments to the institutions of the national executive. In federations 
where there are ethnically plural constituent units, the requirements of 
representation are also pertinent in the composition of the subnational 
executive.  
 
Broadly speaking, a multi-ethnic state can go about ensuring representation 
in the national executive in two ways. The first option is to follow the 
Ethiopian approach and make the representation of the different ethnic 
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groups in the national executive a constitutional requirement. This, as 
indicated in Chapter Three, is also the case in Switzerland, Nigeria and 
Belgium. The other option is make the representation of ethnic groups at the 
centre an important part of the political practice of a state. Informal 
representation of ethnic groups in the most important national institutions 
has been the case, to a certain extent, in South Africa but more importantly 
in Canada. Although it might be preferable to make the requirement of 
representation part of the political practice and not a constitutional mandate 
lest it introduces the institutionalisation of ethnicity, the choice depends on 
the particular context of each state.  
 
An important lesson that emerges from the experiences of both South Africa 
and Ethiopia is that the mere fact that national government is ethnically 
diverse does not necessarily amount to an actual representation of the 
different ethnic communities. The case studies have revealed that the formal 
representation system can sometimes be deceiving as it does not necessarily 
guarantee true representation. Appointing individuals that do not enjoy 
support among the community they are supposed to represent creates, as 
argued in Chapter Five, ‘a dangerous illusion of representation’ than 
reflecting an actual representation of the different ethnic groups. This 
suggests that the representation of ethnic groups, whether as a matter of 
constitutional imperative or political accommodation, cannot be successful 
by simply diversifying the faces of national institutions.  
 
6.4 Intra-substate minorities and ethnic migrants/dispersed ethnic 
communities 
It is argued that a federal arrangement that is constructed to accommodate 
ethnic diversity cannot afford to ignore the interest and demands of 
dispersed ethnic groups and intra-substate minorities. A federal arrangement 
that does not accommodate these ethnic groups is less likely to succeed in 
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managing ethnic diversity. It is submitted that the subnational units should 
provide institutional reality to the self rule plus shared rule formula at the 
subnational level. 
 
As indicated earlier, in designing an institutional response to accommodate 
the anxieties of intra-substate minorities, a distinction must be made 
between ethnic groups that are geographically scattered and those that are 
geographically concentrated but form part of intra-substate minorities. With 
regard to dispersed ethnic groups, the federal solution, due to its territorial 
orientation, is less appealing. Since they are dispersed all over the country, 
it is inconceivable to provide them with a territorial space to manage their 
own affairs. The anxieties of some groupings among the Afrikaners of 
South Africa cannot, for example, be addressed through territorial solution 
owing to the fact that they are dispersed throughout the country. The same 
applies to ethnic migrants in southern and eastern Ethiopia. An effective 
response to address the anxieties of such minorities requires primarily the 
adoption of judicially enforceable bill of rights that, among other things, 
entrench the right against discrimination based on language, race or 
ethnicity and ensure access to education in one’s own language. In some 
cases, the protection of dispersed ethnic groups might take a form of non-
territorial autonomy, which involves providing intra-substate minorities 
autonomy over certain functions of relevance to them, which recognises 
their different culture and identity. This option, which is envisaged in the 
South African Constitution (yet rendered ineffective by the practice and the 
lack of political will), can take the form of cultural councils that can be 
established by ethnic groups to exercise jurisdiction over a wide range of 
identity-related matters, including culture, education, language, libraries, 
theatres, museums, sports and the media.   
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With regard to geographically concentrated intra-substate minorities, 
however, territorial solution can be achieved to some extent. As the 
experience of the Ethiopian federalism shows, minorities that are 
geographically concentrated can be provided with a territorial space to 
manage their own affairs. This has taken two forms. First, the Constitution 
provides ethnic groups the right to secede from ethnically plural regional 
states and establish their own state. The same has been done in Switzerland 
where a new canton, Jura, was established in 1980 out of the Berne Canton 
in a response to demands for greater autonomy.23 Second, the internal 
territorial division within the ethnically plural regional states in Ethiopia has 
been arranged in such a way that the different ethnic groups can exercise 
authority on functions that are of relevance to them without necessarily 
providing them a regional state of their own. Yet, admittedly, this particular 
solution might not always be available and not even advisable. Although the 
division of constituent units in response to internal demands for self 
government is one possible option, it cannot be a “constitutional routine”.24  
 
The position of intra-substate minorities can be further enhanced by 
complementing non-territorial autonomy with some aspects of shared rule. 
This is about the representation of intra-substate minorities in the regional 
legislative and policy decision making bodies, including the provincial 
legislature, executive and courts. In Ethiopia, the equitable representation of 
the different ethnic groups in the state governments is a constitutional 
mandate.25 An issue that emerges from the Ethiopian experience in this 
regard is the relevance of the electoral system that is adopted at the 
subnational level. As the experience of Ethiopia shows, the application of a 
                                                 
23  This was done through an amendment of the federal constitution. Smith 1995: 15. 
24  See also Cairns 1995: 27. 
25  Article 39(3) Ethiopian Constitution. 
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simple plurality system at the subnational level can result in 
disproportionate results along ethnic lines in a situation where there are 
large numbers of ethnic migrants. This suggests the inclusion of an election 
system that ensures the representation of the groups that inhabit the 
subnational state. This can take the form of a plurality electoral system that 
includes a quota system or the PR system.  
 
Incorporating intra-substate minorities and ethnic migrants into the regional 
system through the processes and institutions of shared rule that reflect 
consociational principles, complemented with an electoral system that 
facilitates representativeness, can go a long way in accommodating intra-
substate minorities in the subnational political process. This helps minorities 
to feel that they are not merely ‘others’ that are simply tolerated by the 
regional majority group but also equal members of the society that 
participate in the management of the constituent units. It also ensures that 
the system does not simply focus on the autonomy of the different ethnic 
groups but also ensure that the subnational state belongs to all who live in it. 
This ensures that the guiding principle of the federation as advanced by this 
thesis, which says that sufficient attention should be given both to ethnic 
diversity and the promotion of national unity, filters through the federal 
territorial matrix and shapes the governance structure of subnational units as 
well. 
 
Finally, it must be noted that the above discussed mechanisms are not 
mutually exclusive. A state can complement a judicially enforceable bill of 
rights with institutions and processes of both self rule and shared rule in 
order to guarantee a system that adequately responds to the demands of 
intra-substate minorities.   
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7. Concluding remarks 
If multi-ethnic states are to avoid instability and, in a worst case scenario, 
civil war, they have to address the challenges of ethnicity. This is largely 
owing to the fact that the root cause for the problem that plagues these 
communities lies, to a certain extent, in the genesis of multi-ethnic states, 
which is often predicated on suppressing ethnic diversity. This thesis has 
argued that it is only when a state readily acknowledges the ethnic plurality 
that characterises the society it seeks to regulate and provide practical 
expression thereto that it can manage the tension among ethnic groups and 
assist in the achievement of social cohesion and promotion of national 
unity.  
 
The thesis has argued that federalism, an institutional design that is 
underlined by the principles of self rule and shared rule, is an appropriate 
institutional response (though not the only one) that can help states to 
address the multi-ethnic challenge in cases where ethnic groups are 
generally territorially concentrated. The success of federalism depends, 
among other things, on the particular nature of the federal design and the 
capacity of that design to successfully respond to the ethnic-related 
exigencies of the society in question. An important consequence of this 
position is that federalism cannot be regarded as the “one-size-fits-all” 
institutional prescription. It is rather presented in a form of a ‘purpose 
continuum’ whose institutional purpose and expression varies from 
prevention to remediation. A preventive-oriented federal response seeks to 
prevent the elevation of ethnic differences to a primary political divide 
while a remedial federal response struggles to contain the heavily 
deteriorating inter-ethnic relationships. The choice of the appropriate 
institutional response depends on the successful diagnosis of the political 
conflict of each society and specifically on the dose of ethnic politics that 
pervades the body politic. 
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The thesis has also argued that federalism is not a panacea. An effective 
institutional response to the challenges of ethnic diversity requires a state to 
go beyond the traditional elements of federalism and incorporate other non-
federal institutional arrangements that can help to complete the 
accommodation of ethnic diversity. In this regard, the thesis has underlined 
the importance of complementing federalism with a representative lower 
house and a national executive that reflect the diverse faces of the country. 
Without undermining the relevance of universal individual right for persons 
belonging to dispersed ethnic groups, the thesis has also emphasised the 
importance of extending the principles of self rule and shared rule to the 
subnational level with the view to accommodate intra-substate minorities. 
 
An important lesson that emerges from this thesis is also that states should 
be cautious not to confuse recognition of ethnic diversity with encouraging 
ethnicity. As argued above, politicised ethnicity is a contingent process. The 
likelihood of ethnic differences translating into political divide depends on 
the historical and political circumstances of the society in question. This 
means, among other things, that the political relevance of ethnicity is not 
always guaranteed. This, in turn, implies that a state, to the extent possible, 
should not institutionalise ethnicity. The institutionalisation of ethnicity not 
only encourages the political mobilisation of ethnicity but also elevate 
ethnic identity to a primary political identity. Such institutional response 
does not merely put a country in the league of states that recognise ethnic 
diversity. It rather places it in the league of states that encourage ethnicity to 
permeate their political, social and economic systems and risk, in all 
likelihood, the imminent danger of disintegration.  
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